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5ABSTRACT
Erkki Sevänen
The Modern and Contemporary Sphere of 
Art and its Place in Societal-Cultural Reality
in the Light of System-Theoretical and 
Systemic Sociology. 
A Study of a Sociological Research Tradition 
and its Art-Theoretical Contribution
Key	words:	the	sphere	of	art,	system-theoretical	sociology,	de-differentiation.
This	thesis	consists	of	four	articles,	published	between	2000–2006,	and	of	introductory	
chapters	 that	 place	 those	 articles	 into	 a	 broader	 theoretical	 and	 historical	 frame	 of	
reference.	On	the	one	hand,	the	thesis	considers	in	what	ways	representatives	of	system-
theoretical	and	systemic	sociology	have	understood	the	position	of	the	sphere	of	art	in	
modern	societal-cultural	reality.	On	the	other	hand,	the	thesis	clears	up	how	the	position	
of	the	sphere	of	art	has	changed	in	a	contemporary	Apostmodern@	and	globalising	world.	
In	addition,	this	thesis	explicates	how	far	changes	like	these	can	be	described	with	the	aid	
of	system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology.
Modern	society	has	been	characterised	by	a	far-reaching	differentiation,	which	means	
that	it	has	been	divided	into	systems	that	are	relatively	independent	of	each	other.	Each	
of	these	systems	has	possessed	its	own	boundaries	and	its	own	function	in	the	entirety	
of	culture	and	society.	To	systems	such	as	these	belong,	among	other	things,	economics,	
politics,	law,	science,	education,	health	care,	art,	mass	media	and	religious	life.	According	
to	the	theories	of	postmodernity,	in	contemporary	or	Apostmodern@	society	the	process	of	
differentiation	has	ended	and	societal	development	has	turned	towards	de-differentiation.	
Therefore,	 the	 boundaries	 between	 systems	 have	 become	 obscure	 and	 those	 systems	
would	even	have	fused	with	each	other.	In	this	way,	the	sphere	of	art	would	also	have	
fused	with	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	Correspondingly,	as	a	result	of	the	process	
of	globalisation,	boundaries	between	societies	or	between	national	societal	systems	have	
become	lower	and	those	societies	are	nowadays	more	and	more	economically,	politically	
and	culturally	interlaced.
This	thesis	analytically	considers	theories	of	postmodernity,	 in	particular,	the	views	
that	 the	 concepts	 of	 system	 and	 society	 have	 become	useless	 in	 sociology.	This	 thesis	
strives	 to	 show	that	contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	can	be	grasped	by	means	of	
system-theoretical	concepts;	to	be	sure,	this	requires	that	those	concepts	will	be	renewed	
in	 a	 way	 that	 better	 serves	 the	 needs	 of	 present-day	 research	 work.	 Associated	 with	
system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology	are	figures	such	as	Talcott	Parsons,	Jeffrey	C.	
Alexander,	 Anthony	 Giddens,	 Niklas	 Luhmann,	 Jürgen	 Habermas,	 Richard	 Münch,	
Renate	Mayntz,	Pierre	Bourdieu	and	Vessela	Misheva.	When	describing	contemporary	
societal-cultural	 reality,	 this	 thesis	 critically	 and	 selectively	 adopts	 elements	 from	 their	
views;	 in	 this	 connection,	 the	 thesis	 pays	 its	main	 attention	 to	 Luhmann=s	 theory	 of	
autopoietic	social	systems.
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PREFACE
Albeit	 the	 thesis	 on	 hand	mainly	 uses	 an	 abstract	 sociological	 and	 system-theoretical	
language	or	discourse,	 its	origin	 lies	 in	my	personal	experiences.	I	began	my	academic	
studies	 in	 1975	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Turku,	 in	 Western	 Finland;	 in	 those	 studies,	
comparative	literature	was	my	main	discipline,	but	in	addition	to	it	I	studied	sociology,	
philosophy,	linguistics,	political	science	and	media	research.	In	the	early	1980s,	I	moved	
to	 Eastern	 Finland,	where	 I	 started	 to	work	 at	 the	Department	 of	 Finnish	 Language	
and	Cultural	Research	 at	 the	University	 of	 Joensuu.	 In	 the	 late	 1980s,	 I	 finished	my	
graduate	studies	in	sociology	at	the	University	of	Joensuu,	but	literature	was	still	my	main	
discipline.	I	published	my	first	doctoral	thesis	on	literature	in	1994	at	the	University	of	
Joensuu.
In	 the	 1970s,	 comparative	 literature,	 like	 literary	 studies	 in	 general,	was	 strictly	 a	
text-centric	discipline	that	hardly	took	into	account	literature=s	societal-cultural	contexts.	
It	was	dominated	by	Anglo-American	new	criticism,	French	structuralism,	the	German	
Atext-immanent@	 approach	 and	 narratologist	 and	 formalist	 approaches.	 Because	 I	 was	
deeply	disappointed	with	the	state	of	that	discipline,	I	began	to	concentrate	on	my	studies	
in	philosophy	and	sociology	hoping	that	they	would	have	helped	me	to	better	understand	
literature=s	and	art=s	position	and	function	in	culture,	society	and	human	life.	
As	 far	as	 I	 remember	 it	 correctly,	 still	 in	 the	1970s	Talcott	Parsons	and	his	 system	
theory	were	topical	in	sociology,	even	if	American	and	European	sociologists	had,	to	a	
growing	extent,	already	presented	criticism	against	him	since	the	late	1960s.	In	particular,	
Marxist	 sociologists	 and	Marxist	 theorists	 used	 to	 regard	 system-theoretical	 sociology	
as	 a	 hopelessly	 abstract,	 unhistorical	 and	 conservative	 approach	 that	was	 incapable	 of	
taking	 into	 account	 social	 contradictions	 and	 the	 dynamics	 of	 societal	 development.	
Nevertheless,	it	was	in	the	1970s	that	leftist	social	theorists	such	as	Anthony	Giddens	and	
Jürgen	Habermas	adopted	the	concept	of	system	into	their	own	thinking	and	at	that	time	
they	also	began	to	elaborate	their	own	versions	of	system-theoretical	sociology.
When	I	continued	with	my	studies	in	sociology	at	Joensuu	in	the	late	1980s,	system	
theory	was	again	an	object	of	critique	in	the	social	sciences.	The	critique	in	question	was	
not	directed	only	at	Parsons	but	also	at	other	system-theorists.	Those	critics	or	theorists	of	
postmodernity	stated	that	system	theory	was	becoming	obsolete,	because	societal-cultural	
reality	was	 itself	 rapidly	 losing	 its	previous	 systemic	 structure	or	order.	Despite	 this,	 I	
found	 system	 theory=s	 holistic	 approach	 to	 societal-cultural	 reality	 as	 interesting	 and	
promising,	and	it	helped	me	to	grasp	the	spheres	of	literature	and	art	as	societal-cultural	
wholes.	Consequently,	at	the	turn	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	I	published	my	first	articles	
on	system	theory,	and	somewhat	later	I	also	utilised	system	theory	in	my	doctoral	thesis	
Vapauden rajat.	Kirjallisuuden tuotannon ja välityksen yhteiskunnallinen sääntely Suomessa 
vuosina 1918–1939 (The	Limits	of	Freedom.	Social	Regulation	of	Literary	Production	and	
Mediation	in	Finland	1918–1939,	published	in	1994)	whose	theoretical	basis	is	largely	
based	on	Niklas	Luhmann=s,	 Siegfried	 J.	 Schmidt=s,	 Jürgen	Habermas=,	Peter	Bürger=s	
and	Pierre	Bourdieu=s	investigations.	In	the	late	1990s,	I	published	the	monograph	Taide 
instituutiona ja järjestelmänä. Modernin taide-elämän historiallis-sosiologiset mallit (Art	as	
an	Institution	and	System.	The	Historical-Sociological	Models	of	Modern	Art	Life,	1998)	
in	which	I	contrasted	system	theories with	theories	of	postmodernity.	In	recent	years,	I	
have	continued	this	work	in	the	articles	of	this	thesis.
Professors	Ari	Antikainen	and	M=hammed	Sabour	from	the	Department	of	Sociology	
have	acted	as	my	supervisors.	I	warmly	thank	both	of	them	for	the	collegial	and	sympathetic	
understanding	that	they	have	addressed	to	my	research	work.	In	this	connection,	I	have	
7an	opportunity	to	express	my	long-term	debt	of	gratitude	to	Professor	Antikainen	who	
has	guided	my	steps	 in	 sociology	 since	 the	mid–1980s.	 I	have	been	 fortunate	because	
during	the	last	two	decades	I	have	had	a	great	number	of	fruitful	discussions	with	him.	
Professor	Sabour,	 in	 turn,	has,	 in	 the	same	way,	kindly	helped	my	 later	endeavours	 in	
sociology.	Also	Professor	Leena	Koski	from	the	Department	of	Sociology	has	supported	
my	research	work	by	reading	the	first	version	of	the	manuscript	of	this	thesis.	
Furthermore,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 acknowledge	 doctors	 Sören	 Brier	 (Management	
and	 Politics	Department,	 Copenhagen	 Business	 School,	Denmark)	 and	 Seppo	Raiski	
(University	of	 Jyväskylä,	Finland)	 for	 their	 role	 as	pre-examiners	 for	 this	 thesis.	Their	
critical	comments,	advices	and	propositions	proved	to	be	invaluable	for	the	completion	
of	 this	 thesis.	 In	 their	own	and	equally	 invaluable	way	my	academic	home	units,	 that	
is,	the	Department	of	Finnish	Language	and	Cultural	Research	as	well	as	the	Faculty	of	
Humanities	have	given	their	support	to	my	sociological	activities.	The	Faculty	of	Social	
Sciences	and	Regional	Studies	has	accepted	my	thesis	for	its	publication	series.		Dr.	Greg	
Watson	has,	without	sparing	his	own	time,	checked	the	language	of	my	thesis.
By	making	a	promise	to	act	as	my	opponent	Dr.	Risto	Kangas	made	the	end	phase	of	
this	process	possible.	I	thank	him	for	all	of	his	efforts.
I	owe	this	thesis	to	my	dearest	Ulla	who	has	given	a	deeper	meaning	to	everything	I	
do,	including	this	thesis.
Joensuu,	18	March,	2008
Erkki Sevänen
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1 THE POINT OF DEPARTURE, 
THE GOAL AND THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAME OF REFERENCE OF THIS 
STUDY
1.1 The Need for Clarification
Originally	 in	 sociology,	 the	 concept	 of	 Asystem@	 was	 chiefly	 associated	 with	 Talcott	
Parsons	and	his	structural-functional	school.	It	was	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	that	Parsons,	
together	with	his	collaborators	such	as	Edward	Shils	and	Neil	J.	Smelser,	elaborated	upon	
the	 concept	 of	 system	 and	 analysed	 societal-cultural	 reality	 by	means	 of	 it.	 Although	
Parsons	and	his	school	did	not	reach	a	hegemonic	position	in	American	sociology,	they	
widely	influenced	it,	and	in	Europe	they	also	gained	disciples	and	successors,	who	later	
turned	out	to	be	central	figures	in	this	discipline.1	Among	those	figures	there	were,	among	
other	persons,	Niklas	Luhmann	and	Jürgen	Habermas,	in	Germany,	Francois	Bourricaud	
and	Alain	Touraine,	in	France,	and	Anthony	Giddens,	in	Great	Britain.	Consequently,	
system-theoretical	 thinking	had	a	 rather	 secure	place	 in	 sociology	 in	 the	decades	 after	
the	Second	World	War.	However,	from	the	1970s	onward	its	intellectual	value	as	a	social	
theory	has	often	been	called	into	question.	Albeit	system-theoretical	sociology	has	had	
outstanding	spokesmen	during	the	last	decades	as	well,	several	cultural	and	social	theorists	
have	tended	to	think	that	ongoing	cultural	and	societal	changes	have	made	it	obsolete	-	at	
least	in	its	traditional	form.
Such	 questioning	 as	 this	 deviated	 from	 the	 criticism	 that	 leftist	 sociologists	 and	
conflict	theorists	had	earlier	directed	against	Parsons.	Within	leftist	sociology,	C.	Wright	
Mills,	 for	 example,	 regarded	 Parsons=	 thinking	 as	 too	 abstract	 and	 unhistorical,	 and	
conflict	theorists	such	as	Ralf	Dahrendorff	and	Alvin	W.	Gouldner	held	that	Parsons	was	
incapable	of	understanding	the	meaning	of	conflicts	and	contradictions	in	society	and	its	
development.2	Despite	their	critical	attitude	towards	Parsons=	sociology,	those	critics	did	
not	usually	claim	that	the	concept	of	system	would	in	itself	be	unusable	as	an	analytical	
tool	 in	 sociological	 research.	 In	 contrast,	 from	 the	1970s	onward	 certain	 cultural	 and	
social	theorists	have	argued	that	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	analyse	societal-cultural	reality	
adequately	be	means	of	the	concept	of	system.	On	the	other	hand,	a	milder	version	of	
a	criticism	 like	 this	 stated	 that	 the	concept	of	 system	must	be	changed	 fundamentally	
before	it	can	be	utilised	in	the	analysis	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	Often	
proponents	of	these	views	were	known	as	theorists	of	postmodernity.
The	most	 radical	 theorists	of	postmodernity	 thought	 that,	 roughly	 speaking,	 from	
the	 1960s	 onward	 society=s	 nature	 has	 fundamentally	 changed	 in	 the	Western	world.	
According	to	this	view,	modern	Western	society	and	culture	were	characterised	by	the	
structural	principle	of	functional	differentiation.	In	other	words,	modern	Western	society	
and	culture	consisted	of	differentiated	spheres	or	systems,	each	of	which	had	a	specific	
function	in	society	and	which,	to	a	great	extent,	were	autonomous	with	regard	to	each	
other.	However,	 this	 train	of	thought	continued,	nowadays,	 the	course	of	 the	societal-
1	On	Talcott	Parsons	and	his	position	in	sociology,	see,	for	example,	Alexander	1983,	Turner	1991	and	
Robertson	&	Turner	1991a.	
2	See	Robertson	&	Turner	1991b:	8;	Turner	1991:	xxxiii–xxxiv.	
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cultural	development	has	turned	into	an	opposite	direction	and,	therefore,	in	postmodern	
culture	and	society	the	spheres	or	systems	have	lost	their	clear-cut	boundaries.	Thus,	these	
spheres	or	systems	would	be	increasingly	fusing	with	each	other	in	postmodern	societal-
cultural	reality.
A	radical	version	like	this	manifests	itself,	for	example,	in	Jean	Baudrillard=s	(1983:	
147–150)	 and	 Gianni	 Vattimo=s	 (1988:	 55–56)	 writings.	 According	 to	 them,	 in	 a	
contemporary	Western	world	people	live	in	a	media	and	communication	society	in	which	
the	omnipresence	of	mass	media	and	information	technology,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	
consumption	culture	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life,	on	the	other	hand,	define	
the	nature	of	societal-cultural	reality.	In	this	sense,	the	whole	societal	world	would	have	
changed	 into	 an	 Aartificial@	 and	 Asimulated@	 network	 of	 signs,	 images	 and	pleasurable	
products	–	with	the	result	that	contemporary	society	would	no	longer	be	divided	into	
differentiated	spheres	or	systems.	Thus,	in	that	society	the	sphere	of	the	art	would	have	
merged	with	mass	media,	mass	culture,	design	and	with	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	
life.
Baudrillard=s	 and	 Vattimo=s	 view	 of	 postmodernity	 has	 been	 concerned	 with	 the	
entirety	of	contemporary	society.	In	principle,	rather	similar	views	have	been	presented	
by	Mike	Featherstone	(1991;	1993)	and	Fredric	Jameson	(1991)	as	well	as	by	Scott	Lash	
and	John	Urry	(1994),	although	usually	these	four	theorists	do	not,	in	the	first	instance,	
speak	about	the	entirety	of	society	but	about	the	relationships	between	the	economics	
and	culture.	All	of	them	are	inclined	to	think	that	the	sharp	boundaries	between	these	
two	spheres	are,	to	a	great	extent,	disappearing,	In	addition,	in	their	works	Lash	and	Urry	
have	also	stated	that	very	nearly	in	the	same	way	the	boundary	between	the	social	and	the	
cultural,	or	between	society	and	culture,	is	tendentiously	disappearing	in	contemporary	
societal-cultural	reality	(Lash	1992:	5,	8–11;	Lash	&	Urry	1994:	5,	14,	142–143;	Lash	
2002:	111–112).	According	to	views	like	these,	in	the	processes	in	question	the	sphere	
of	art	would	obviously	be	merging	with	 its	economic	environment	or	with	the	rest	of	
societal-cultural	reality.
As	far	as	methodological	questions	are	concerned,	theories	of	postmodernity	imply	
that	it	is	no	longer	justified	to	keep	culture	and	society	sharply	separate	from	each	other	
in	sociological	analysises.	Every	now	and	then	previous	sociologists	tended	to	ignore	the	
cultural	dimension	in	their	analysises	of	society	and	societal	phenomena,	but	in	present-
day	sociology	this	is	not	usually	a	legitimate	procedure.	Thereby,	present-day	sociologists	
do	not	usually	 study	either	 society	or	culture	but	 societal-cultural	 reality,	 that	 is,	 they	
take	 into	account	both	the	societal	and	the	cultural	dimension	in	their	research	work.	
In	the	same	vein,	this	thesis	endeavours	to	consider	art	both	as	a	societal	and	a	cultural	
phenomenon.	A	goal	like	this	manifests	itself	also	in	the	title	of	the	thesis;	a	careful	reader	
might	have	noticed	that	the	title	speaks	about	art=s	position	in	modern	and	contemporary	
societal-culture	reality	–	and	not	about	its	position	in	modern	and	contemporary	culture	
and	society.	In	addition,	from	the	title	one	can	conclude	that	in	my	opinion	sociology	
should	also	take	into	account	the	cultural	dimension	when	it	analyses	modernity	–	and	
not	only	when	it	analyses	postmodernity.
At	 least	 implicitly,	 the	 above-mentioned	 theorists	 suggest	 that	 when	 describing	
contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 sociology	 does	 not	 need	 the	 concept	 of	 system	
or	 that	 in	descriptions	 such	 as	 these	 it	 should	 elaborate	upon	 concepts	 that	 are	more	
useful	and	adequate	than	the	concept	of	system	is.	In	his	own	view	of	postmodernity,	
Zygmunt	Bauman	(1987;	1992),	a	representative	of	the	moderate	version	of	the	theory	
of	postmodernity,	arrives	at	more	cautious	conclusions.	According	to	him,	contemporary	
Western	societies	develop	extremely	dynamically,	wherefore	change	is	a	constant	element	
in	 them.	For	 this	 reason,	Bauman	continues,	 their	basic	nature	 cannot	be	 reached	by	
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means	of	a	Asimple@	 and	Amechanical@	 concept	of	 system;	 instead,	 the	proper	concept	
of	social	system	should	be	Acomplex@	and	Adynamic@.	Bauman	did	not	himself	elaborate	
upon	a	concept	of	social	system	that	would	fill	these	requirements,	although	his	view	of	
system-theoretical	sociology	seems	to	be	more	positive	than	that	of	the	above-mentioned	
theorists.	 In	 the	 same	vein,	Ulrich	Beck	 (1994:	24–25)	has	 stated	 that	 in	 its	present-
day	 form	 sociological	 system	 theory	 cannot	 adequately	 comprehend	 the	 nature	 of	
contemporary	societal-cultural	 reality	 that	 is	called	Areflexive	modernity@	by	him;	and,	
like	Bauman,	Beck	himself	has	not	attempted	to	renew	this	branch	of	sociology.3
Despite	the	hard	criticism	that	system-theoretical	sociology	has	received	during	the	
last	three	decades,	it	has	also	had	its	own	proponents.	For	example,	in	the	early	1990s	
Alain	Touraine	(1992:	57–62,	76)	made	his	own	appraisal	of	contemporary	sociology.	
According	 to	 him,	 nowadays	 several	 sociologists	 regard	 present-day	 societal	 reality	 as	
extremely	fluid	and	dynamic	–	or,	one	may	say,	as	a	space	in	which	Aall	that	is	solid	melts	
into	 the	 air@.4	 For	 this	 reason,	 they	 think	 that	 the	 present-day	 Asocial	 life@	 cannot	 be	
grasped	correctly	by	means	of	Asimple@,	Arigid@,	Ainflexible@	and	Amechanical@	concepts	
among	which	they	place	the	concepts	of	social	system	and	society.	Touraine	himself	sees	
these	concepts	as	useful	and	necessary	in	sociology;	in	this	sense,	he	resembles	sociologists	
such	as	Luhmann,	Habermas,	Giddens	and	Richard	Münch	who	have	worked	on	system-
theoretical	sociology	during	the	last	decades.5	
To	this	group	of	sociologists	one	could	add	Pierre	Bourdieu,	even	if	he	has	often	been	
critical	of	system-theoretical	concepts.	Yet,	the	concept	of	Asocial	field@,	the	most	central	
theoretical	tool	in	his	sociology,	closely	resembles	the	concept	of	social	system.	Bourdieu=s	
criticism	against	system	theory	is	based	on	the	belief	that	the	concept	of	social	system	
excludes	 contradictions	 and	 conflicts	 between	 social	 actors	 from	 itself,	 whereas	 social	
fields,	according	to	him,	consist	of	power	and	status	relationships	between	actors	(see,	
nearer,	Bourdieu	&	Waquant	1992).	Obviously,	this	criticism	is	mainly	true	of	Parsons=	
and	Luhmann=s	sociology,	but,	on	the	other	hand,	Habermas	and	Giddens	do	not	ignore	
contradictions	 and	 conflicts	 in	 their	 analysis	 of	 social	 systems.	Therefore,	 Bourdieu=s	
field-theoretical	sociology	can,	at	least	in	part,	be	translated	into	the	language	of	system-
theoretical	sociology	(cf.	Arnoldi	2001:	6).
Speaking	more	generally,	it	is	possible	to	understand	Bourdieu=s	sociology	as	a	part	of	
systemic	sociology.	The	concept	of	systemic	sociology	possesses	a	wider	extension	than	
the	concept	of	system-theoretical	sociology	does.	To	be	sure,	system-theoretical	sociology	
is	self-evidently	an	unquestionable	part	of	systemic	sociology,	but	in	addition	to	it	the	
domain	of	 systemic	 sociology	comprises	 those	 sociologists	whose	 thinking	 is	based	on	
concepts	such	as	Asocial	worlds@,	Adifferentiated	and	institutionalised	sub-areas	of	society@	
3	The	idea	of	reflexive	modernity	is	already	included	in	Beck=s	study	Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in 
eine andere Moderne (Risk	Society.	Towards	a	New	Modernity,	1986).	In	1994,	he,	Anthony	Giddens	
and	Scott	Lash	brought	out	a	book	Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Mo-
dern Social Order	in	which	they	clear	up	and	discuss	the	idea	of	reflexive	modernisation.	Consequently,	
Lash	has	characterised	contemporary	society	and	culture	both	as	postmodernity	and	reflexive	modernity.	
Still,	in	2004,	Beck	repeated	his	view	of	the	restrictions	of	system-theoretical	sociology	(see	Beck,	Bonss	
&	Lau	2004:	15–16,	23–26,	48).
4	The	expression	Aall	that	is	solid	melts	into	the	air@	originates	from	Karl	Marx=	and	Friedrich	Engels=	Ma-
nifest der kommunistischen Partei (Communist	Manifest,	1848).	In	the	1980s,	Marshall	Berman	made	it	
well	known	in	his	books	All that is Solid Melts into the Air: The Experience of Modernity	(1982).	Touraine	
does	not	mention	it	in	his	appraisal.
5	See	Luhmann	1975,	1981,	1985a,	1997b	and	1997c;	Habermas	1973,	1987a	and	1987b;	Giddens	
1979	and	1986;	Münch	1976,	1984,	1986a,	1986b,	1988a,	1988b	and	1991.
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and	Asocial	fields@.	All	of	these	concepts	are	utilised	in	the	study	of	social	wholes	that	are	
more	or	less	system-like	by	nature,	that	is,	they	are	cognate	concepts	of	the	concept	of	
social	system.
Consequently,	during	the	last	decades	systemic	and	system-theoretical	sociology	has	
had	 its	 own	 critics	 and	proponents.	Likewise,	 a	 tension	 like	 this	 has	manifested	 itself	
in	 the	 sociologically-orientated	 study	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 art;	 this	 sphere	 comprises	 both	
works	of	art	and	the	art	life.	On	the	one	hand,	researchers	such	as	Baudrillard,	Vattimo,	
Featherstone,	Jameson,	Lash	and	Urry	and	their	successors	have	seen	the	sphere	of	art	
to	be	largely	merging	with	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality	or	with	the	spheres	of	the	
economics,	mass	media,	cultural	industry	and	design.	A	view	like	this	does	not	necessarily	
imply	 that	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 is	 disappearing	 from	 the	 societal-cultural	world.	On	 the	
contrary,	Baudrillard	(1983:	151–152),	for	example,	has	suggested	that	in	postmodernity	
the	entirety	of	the	societal-cultural	world	has,	in	fact,	changed	into	an	art-like	formation,	
that	is,	into	an	artificial	and	aestheticized	space.	Thus,	in	this	sense	the	sphere	of	art	would	
have	widened	enormously	in	postmodernity.	On	the	other	hand,	the	representatives	of	
systemic	thinking,	as	well	as	their	disciples	and	successors,	still	regard	the	contemporary	
sphere	of	art	as	a	differentiated	social	system	or	as	a	system-like	social	whole.	One	can,	
therefore,	speak	about	the	systemic	study	of	art	and	its	way	of	understanding	the	position	
of	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 in	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 (cf.	 Zepetnek	 1997).	 In	
particular,	 Niklas	 Luhmann	 and	 his	 disciple	 Siegfried	 J.	 Schmidt	 represent	 system-
theoretical	sociology	in	the	systemic	study	of	art,	for	they	have	conceptualised	the	modern	
and	contemporary	sphere	of	art	as	a	differentiated	system.6		Similarly,	Bourdieu	belongs	to	
the	systemic	study	of	art	by	virtue	of	that	he	published	several	investigations	on	Athe	field	
of	art@.7	Likewise,	 in	France	researchers	such	as	Antoine	Hennion,	Raymonde	Moulin	
and	 Jean-Claude	 Passeron	 also	 represent	 the	 systemic	 study	 of	 art,	 in	 particular,	 the	
empirical	study	of	art	life.8	As	for	systemic	study	within	the	humanities,	the	American	
art-philosophers	Arthur	C.	Danto,	George	Dickie,	Marcia	Muelder	Eaton	and	Donald	
Kuspit	have	been	influential	within	this	domain.9	At	least	in	North	America	and	Western	
Europe,	 these	 philosophers	 have	 helped	 humanists	 to	 understand	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	
sphere	of	art,	 in	addition	they	have	 influenced	sociologists	 such	as	Howard	S.	Becker,	
Diana	Crane,	Rosanne	Martorella	and	Vera	L.	Zolberg	of	whom	Crane,	Martorella	and	
Zolberg	have	concentrated	on	the	exploration	of	the	contemporary	sphere	of	art.10	Of	
the	representatives	of	the	systemic	study	of	art	one	must	also	mention	Habermas	and	his	
disciples	Christa	and	Peter	Bürger	who,	like	Bourdieu	and	Giddens,	carry	on	the	spirit	of	
Acritical	theory@	in	the	systemic	study	of	culture	and	society.11
6	See,	for	example,	Luhmann	1982,	1984,	1986,	1990,	1994	and	1995;	Schmidt	1980,	1982,	1987,	
1989	and	1995b.
7	See,	in	particular,	Bourdieu	1979,	1992	and	1993;	Bourdieu	&	Darbel	1969.	
8	See,	for	example,	Sociologie de l=art. Colloque international Marseille 13–14 juin 1985		(Sociology	of	the	
Art.	An	International	Colloguy,	Marseille	13–14	June,	1985),	edited	by	Raymonde	Moulin	in	1986.	
This	work	contains	articles	by	Hennion,	Moulin,	Passeron	as	well	as	by	other	French	and	foreign	resear-
chers,	and	it	gives	a	good	overview	of	the	empirical	study	of	art	life.
9	See	Danto	1976,	1992,	1995,	1997	and	2000;	Dickie	1974	and	1984;	Eaton	1983;	Kuspit	1995	and	
2004.
10	 See	Becker	 1984,	Crane	 1987	 and	2002,	Martorella	 1986	 and	2002,	Zolberg	 1990,	Zolberg	 	&	
Cherbo	1997a.
11	See	Habermas	1982a	and	1982b;	Bürger,	Peter	1974	and	2001;	Bürger,	Christa	1977	and	1986.
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The	 representatives	 of	 systemic	 study	 characterise	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 with	 different	
concepts.	Luhmannian	theorists	and	researchers	speak	about	the	system	of	art,	whereas	
Bourdieu	and	his	disciples	use	the	concept	of	the	field	of	art.	North-American	philosophers	
and	sociologists	favour	concepts	such	as	Athe	art	world@	and	Athe	institution	of	art@,	and	
Habermasian	 theorists	 and	 researchers	 are	 inclined	 to	 operate	with	 the	 concepts	 Athe	
institution	of	art@	and,	to	a	minor	extent,	Athe	system	of	art@.	In	part,	these	concepts	are	
bound	to	different	theoretical	presuppositions	concerning	the	nature	of	society	and	the	
sphere	of	art.	However,	at	the	same	time	they	share	certain	common	aims	and	thoughts:	
they	endeavour	to	grasp	the	entirety	of	the	sphere	of	art	which	they	regard	as	a	more	or	
less	well-organised	formation	or	as	a	more	or	less	system-like	whole.	Thus,	they	theorize	
about	the	sphere	of	art	on	a	common	basis	such	as	this.	Situated	close	to	the	systemic	
study	of	 the	 sphere	of	art	 are	Raymond	Williams=	Culture	 (1986,	originally	published	
1981)	and	Janet	Wolff=s	The Social Production of Art (1993,	originally	published	1981),	
which	deal	with	central	constituents	of	the	sphere	of	art,	that	is,	with	the	works	of	art	and	
their	production,	mediation	and	reception.	Yet,	those	investigations	are	not	interested	in	
developing	a	theory	about	the	entirety	of	the	sphere	of	art,	in	that	they	partly	belong	to	
the	systemic	study	in	an	indirect	way.
So	far	we	have	seen	that	sociologists	and	cultural	theorists	do	not	agree	on	whether	
contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 is	 differentiated	 into	 systems.	 Likewise,	 they	 do	
not	agree	on	to	what	extent	that	reality	can	be	analysed	with	system-theoretical	concepts.	
A	 confusion	 like	 this	 forms	 the	 point	 of	 departure	 of	 my	 investigation.	 In	 general,	
this	 investigation	 is	 chiefly	model-theoretical,	methodological	 and	meta-theoretical	 by	
nature.
System-theoretical	 sociologists	 use	 to	 outline	 abstract	 theoretical	 models	 or	
representations	 of	 societal-cultural	 reality;	 theoretical	 models	 or	 representations	 like	
these	usually	aim	at	grasping	the	general	structure	and	the	general	principles	of	operation	
of	 a	 sub-area	 of	 societal-cultural	 reality.	 Subsequently,	 this	 thesis	 analyses	 what	 kinds	
of	 pictures	 of	 modern	 and	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 systemic	 sociology	
offers	us	and	what	kind	of	position	 the	 sphere	of	art	obtains	 in	 those	pictures.	As	 far	
as	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 is	 concerned,	 this	 thesis	 critically	 considers	
theories	of	postmodernity	and	at	 the	 same	time	 it	clears	up	how	that	 reality	could	be	
described	with	the	aid	of	system-theoretical	sociology.	In	this	vein,	the	investigation	pays	
attention	to	the	tools	–	that	is,	to	the	concepts,	methods,	presuppositions	and	beliefs	–	by	
means	of	which	system-theorists	and	theorists	of	postmodernity	have	constructed	their	
representations	or	models	of	 societal-cultural	 reality.	 Is	 it	possible	 to	estimate	whether	
representations	 or	 models	 like	 these	 correspond	 to	 societal-cultural	 reality?	 Extreme	
constructivists	 like	 Schmidt	 have	 answered	 this	 question	 strictly	 in	 the	 negative,	 and	
moderate	constructivists	like	Luhmann	have	been	inclined	to	think	in	the	same	way	but	
not	as	resolutely	as	their	extreme	congenial	spirits	have	done.	Although	I	believe	in	an	
equal	manner	that	observations	concerning	reality	cannot	be	free	of	conceptual	frames	
of	 references,	 I	 tend	 to	 think	 that	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 sociological	 representations	 can	
be	compared	with	societal-cultural	 reality;	yet,	at	 the	same	time,	 those	representations	
contain	beliefs	and	principles	whose	truth	value	we	are	not	capable	of	discovering	with	a	
comparison	like	this.
Traditionally,	it	has	been	thought	that	methodology	lies	between	theory	and	concrete	
methods.	On	the	one	hand,	the	methodology	of	a	discipline	includes	general	theoretical	
suppositions	about	the	nature	of	the	research	object	of	the	discipline	in	question;	and,	
on	the	other	hand,	the	methodology	of	a	discipline	tells	us	in	what	ways	and	with	what	
kind	of	methods	that	research	object	should	be	studied	(cf.	Silverman	1985).	Thus,	the	
methodology	of	 a	discipline	 contains	 theoretical	 suppositions,	but	 it	does	not	present	
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a	wide	 and	 systematic	 theory	 about	 the	 research	 object	 of	 the	 discipline	 in	 question.	
Conversely,	the	methodology	of	a	discipline	reflects	on	and	elaborates	concrete	methods,	
but	it	is	not	a	mere	taxonomy	of	concrete	methods.	It	is	precisely	in	this	sense	that	my	
investigation	considers	systemic	sociology	from	a	methodological	standpoint.	As	already	
stated,	 at	 a	 general	 level	 this	 thesis	 analyses	what	 kinds	 of	models	 of	 societal-cultural	
reality	system-theoretical	sociology	offers	to	us.	Furthermore,	it	explicates	the	methodic	
instructions	and	implications	that	the	representatives	of	the	systemic	study	give	to	that	
research	work	concerned	with	the	sphere	of	art.
Thirdly,	my	investigation	aims	at	explicating	the	philosophical	presuppositions	and	
commitments	that	are	included	in	systemic	theories	of	the	sphere	of	art	and	society;	this	
task	 forms	the	meta-theoretical	dimension	of	 the	 investigation	on	hand	(cf.	Österberg	
1989).	In	particular,	the	investigation	pays	attention	to	the	epistemological	conceptions	
that	underlie	 systemic	 theories	of	 the	 sphere	of	 art	 and	 society.	 In	 the	 same	vein,	 this	
investigation	asks	what	kind	of	position	human	action	and	human	actors	have	in	systemic	
sociology	and	what	kinds	of	value	commitments	manifest	themselves	in	it.
1.2 System-Theoretical Sociology and the Concept of System within the 
Context of General Systems Theory
Actually,	system-theoretical	sociology	can	be	seen	as	a	part	of	a	wider	scientific	orientation,	
that	 is,	 as	 a	 part	 of	 general	 systems	 theory.	 In	historical	 representations	 regarding	 the	
development	of	general	 systems	theory,	 the	origin	of	 this	orientation	has	been	seen	 in	
the	philosophy	of	antiquity	and	 in	 the	philosophical	 thinking	of	 the	 founding	 fathers	
of	modern	natural	 science.	Thereby,	 the	Swedish	 system	theorist	Lars	Skyttner	 (2001:	
45–46)	begins	his	historical	representation	of	general	systems	theory	with	the	philosophy	
of	Aristoteles,	in	particular,	with	Aristoteles=	metaphysical	view	of	the	hierarchical	order	
of	 the	nature;	 and	 the	German	 system	 theorist	Klaus	Müller	 (1996:	30–34),	 in	 turn,	
holds	that	Nikolai	Kopernikus=,	Johannes	Kepler=s	and	Galileo	Galilei=s	thoughts	about	
the	system	of	the	cosmic	harmony	prevailing	in	the	universe	is	one	of	the	earliest	instances	
of	system-theoretical	thinking.	Yet,	both	Aristoteles	and	the	pioneers	of	modern	natural	
science	 belong	 to	 the	 prehistory	 of	 system-theoretical	 thinking.	The	 same	 is	 true	 of	
Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel,	even	if	he	is	often	called	Aa	system-philosopher@.	Hegel	
formulated	a	number	of	statements	concerning	the	nature	of	systems;	for	example,	the	
following	principles	originate	from	his	thinking:	(i)	in	systems	the	whole	is	more	than	the	
sum	of	its	constituents,	(ii)	in	systems	the	whole	defines	the	nature	of	the	constituents	
and	(iii)	in	systems	the	constituents	interact	with	each	other	in	a	dynamic	way	(Skyttner	
2001:	45–46).	All	of	 these	principles	 can	also	be	 found	 from	certain	 later	 versions	of	
system-theoretical	 thinking.	After	Hegel,	 system-theoretical	 thinking	was	divided	 into	
two	branches.	One	branch	was	represented	by	political	economics,	in	particular,	by	Adam	
Smith	and	Karl	Marx;	the	latter	even	characterised	modern	capitalist	economics	as	a	self-
regulating	system	or	automat.	The	other	branch	was	represented	by	biology	in	which	the	
concept	of	system	was	chiefly	associated	with	the	idea	of	organic	whole.
In	the	early	20th	century,	system-theoretical	thinking	manifested	itself	in	Ferdinand	
de	Saussure=s	structuralist	theory	of	language	and	in	structuralist	movement	and	Gestalt	
psychology.	 Yet,	 the	most	 important	 figure	 in	 this	 connection	might	 be	 Ludwig	 von	
Bertalanffy,	a	theoretical	biologist,	who	worked	in	Germany	in	the	1930s	and	after	that	
in	the	United	States	of	America.	He	inspired	a	group	of	American	scientists	with	whom	
he	worked	 in	 the	1940s;	 the	group	 in	question	generalised	his	 ideas	 and	 transformed	
them	into	the	language	of	general	systems	theory.	Of	these	scientists,	Claude	Shannon	
and	Warren	Weaver	 elaborated	 a	 mathematical	 theory	 of	 communication,	 John	 von	
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Neumann	and	Oskar	Morgenstern	created	a	game	theory	and	applied	it	to	the	economics,	
and	Norbert	Wiener	developed	cybernetics.	The	proper	history	of	general	systems	theory	
begins	 from	Bertalanffy=s	 and	 his	American	 co-operators=	 research	work	 in	 the	 1940s	
and	 1950s.	 Somewhat	 later,	Talcott	 Parsons	 presented	 his	 system-theoretical	 view	 of	
human	action	and	society.	In	particular,	this	happened	in	works	like	Toward a General 
Theory of Action (1951,	 in	co-operation	with	Edward	Shils),	The Social System (1951),	
Economy and Society (1956,	in	co-operation	with	Neil	J.	Smelser),	Societies: Evolutionary 
and Comparative Perspectives	 (1966)	 and	The System of Modern Societies (1971).	From	
the	1960s	onward,	Parsons	used	to	utilise	cybernetics	when	describing	systems	and	their	
mutual	relationships.
As	for	Bertalanffy,	he	regarded	general	systems	theory	as	a	scientific	study	of	wholes.	
In	 this	 sense,	 it	 explores,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	 common	 properties	 of	 different	
systems,	 wherefore	 its	 proponents	 believe	 that	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 natural	 sciences	
and	the	humanities	 is	not	 in	every	 respect	unbridgeable	 (Bertalanffy	1971:	xvii–xviii).	
However,	unlike	positivism,	general	systems	theory	does	not	reduce	the	humanities	and	
the	 social	 sciences	 to	 the	 natural	 sciences,	 but	 it	 holds	 that	 in	 part	 they	 could	 use	 a	
similar	conceptual	vocabulary,	that	is,	a	system-theoretical	vocabulary	(Bertalanffy	1971:	
86–88).	Parsons=	sociology	is	in	accordance	with	these	principles.	His	thinking	is	holistic	
in	the	sense	that	he	attempted	to	grasp	the	entirety	of	society,	besides	of	which	he	took	
into	account	the	sphere	of	culture	as	well	as	the	personalities	and	behavioural	organisms	
of	 individuals.	Likewise,	Parsons	 adopted	 an	 anti-positivist	 and	 anti-reductionist	 view	
of	the	social	sciences;	in	fact,	already	in	the	1930s,	when	starting	to	work	on	his	action	
theory,	he	defended	a	view	like	this	(see,	nearer,	Parsons	1985a:	54–55).12
Parsons,	Bertalanffy	and	his	American	co-operators	belong	to	the	first	phase	of	general	
systems	theory.	In	the	early	1970s,	they	were	faced	with	a	competitor.	Already	in	the	late	
1950s	Heinz	von	Foerster	had	founded	an	institute	of	biological	computer	laboratory	at	
the	University	of	Illinois.	This	institute	later	became	famous,	for	the	figures	who	worked	
in	it,	such	as	W.	Ross	Ashby,	Gotthard	Günther,	Lars	Löfgren,	Humberto	R.	Maturana	
and	Gordon	Pask.	From	the	early	1970s	onward,	these	scienticsts	elaborated	upon	second	
order	cybernetics	that	deals	with	the	observation	of	observing	systems.	Bertalanffy=s	and	
his	American	co-operators=	 systems	 theory	was	 found	to	be	 too	 technocratic	by	 them.	
(Baecker	1996:	18–19.)	In	sociology,	Luhmann=s	late	production,	that	is,	his	theory	of	
autopoietic	 social	 systems	 is	 close	 to	 the	 research	work	of	Foerster=s	 institute,	 and	 the	
same	holds	usually	true	for	the	investigations	of	Luhmann=s	disciples.	However,	several	
well-known	system-theoretical	sociologists	seem,	in	the	first	instance,	to	lean	on	the	first	
phase	 of	 general	 systems	 theory.	For	 example,	Habermas	 and	Münch	have	 elaborated	
their	sociological	thinking	on	the	basis	of	a	critical	appraisal	of	the	Parsonsian	sociology,	
and	Jeffrey	C.	Alexander	and	Paul	J.	Colomy,	two	North-American	Aneo-functionalists@	
and	Parsons=	disciples,	have	done	the	same	in	their	own	sociology.13
General	 systems	 theory	 contains	 a	 huge	 number	 of	 definitions	 for	 the	 concept	 of	
system.	Despite	this	apparent	diversity,	those	definitions	seem	to	agree	on	the	idea	that,	
as	Skyttner	(2001:	53)	says,	Aa	system	is	a	set	of	interacting	units	or	elements	that	form	
an	integrated	whole	intended	to	perform	some	function@.	Thus,	an	internal	organisation	
and	a	specific	function	are	characteristic	of	a	system,	and	a	system	has	its	boundaries	that	
differentiate	it	from	other	systems.	At	a	more	general	level,	a	number	of	system-theorists	
12	See,	also,	Hamilton	1985:	16–17;	Lechner	1991:	169.	
13	See,	nearer,	Alexander	1983	and	1987;	Alexander	&	Colomy	1990;	Colomy	1992;	Habermas	1973b,	
1987a	and	1987b;	Münch	1984.	
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have	been	inclined	to	think	that	everything	that	exists	in	the	universe	is	organised	systems	
of	matter,	energy	and	information.	Thus,	those	system-theorists	have	conceived	of	the	
world	as	an	organised	whole	or	as	systems	that	differ	from	each	other	with	regard	to	their	
complexity.	 Simple	 systems	 contain	 only	 few	 elements,	 the	 interaction	 between	 those	
elements	is	highly	organised	and	regulated	by	clear-cut	rules,	the	sub-systems	in	simple	
systems	are	weakly	differentiated,	and,	in	all,	simple	systems	like	these	are	rather	closed	
with	regard	to	their	environment.	Conversely,	complex	systems	include	a	lot	of	elements,	
interaction	between	the	elements	is	loosely	organised,	the	sub-systems	in	complex	systems	
elaborate	their	own	goals,	and	in	many	respects	complex	systems	are	open	with	regard	
to	their	environment.	Machines	and	automats	are	often	seen	as	paradigmatic	instances	
of	simple	systems,	but	there	are	relatively	simple	systems	in	society	as	well.	For	example,	
small	and	well-organised	enterprises	and	administrative	institutions	could	be	regarded	as	
simple	systems,	albeit	it	is	generally	held	that	in	society	systems	cannot	be	as	closed	as	
they	might	be	in	the	mechanical	world.	On	the	other	hand,	usually	system-theoretical	
sociologists	 characterise	 functional	 and	 societal	 systems	 as	 open	 formations.	However,	
according	to	Luhmann	(1985a:	555;	1986:	620–623;	1995:	60),	modern	functional	and	
societal	systems	are	open	only	in	the	sense	that	they	take	energy	and	information	from	
their	 environment.	Yet,	 he	 adds,	 they	 are	 operatively	 closed,	 because	 they	handle	 this	
energy	and	information	according	to	their	own	principles	of	operation	–	or	according	
to	their	own	Amedia@	and	Amedium	codes@.	Thereby,	Luhmann	describes	these	kinds	of	
operatively	closed	systems	as	autopoietic	formations.
By	utilising	Table	1	we	can	say	that	the	art	life	is	one	of	the	functional	sub-systems	of	
society.	To	be	more	specific,	a	characterisation	like	this	is	mainly	applicable	to	modern	
Western	society	and,	as	system-theoretical	sociologists	of	art	think,	to	its	contemporary	
or	 postmodern	 phase;	 in	 both	 of	 them	 there	 has	 been	 a	 differentiated	 sphere	 of	 art.	
Conversely,	it	is	unclear	whether	there	was	a	differentiated	sphere	of	art	in	traditional	and	
pre-modern	Western	society;	most	of	the	system-theorists	seem	to	answer	this	question	in	
the	negative.	Likewise,	they	have	been	inclined	to	think	that	a	differentiated	sphere	of	art	
has	been	a	relatively	rare	phenomenon	outside	the	Western	world,	although	a	sphere	like	
this	might	nowadays	be	almost	a	global	phenomenon.
Thus,	the	art	life	in	modern	Western	society	can	be	seen	as	a	differentiated	functional	
sub-system.	In	addition,	the	concepts	of	interactional	system	and	organisational	system	
are	applicable	to	the	art	life,	for	there	are	formations	like	these	in	it.	For	example,	artistic	
groups	have	properties	of	interactional	system	in	the	sense	that	the	members	of	an	artistic	
group	 often	 know	 each	 other	 personally	 and	 they	 distinguish	 themselves,	 formally	 or	
informally,	from	other	artists.	Similarly,	theatres,	orchestras,	publishing	houses,	museums,	
galleries	and	administrative	institutions	and	private	foundations	in	the	art	life	often	fulfill	
the	criteria	of	an	organisational	system;	that	is,	they	have	more	or	less	clear-cut	rules	and	
roles	as	well	as	a	division	of	labour	and	a	formal	hierarchy	between	different	roles.	Usually	
system-theorists	ignore	the	state	of	affairs	that	there	are	interactional	and	organisational	
sub-systems	in	the	functional	system	of	art;	and,	conversely,	of	the	sub-classes	of	social	
systems	they	usually	only	apply	the	concept	of	functional	system	to	the	art	life.	Moreover,	
it	should	be	mentioned	that	Table	1	implies	that	the	sphere	of	art	is,	in	fact,	composed	
of	two	kinds	of	systems,	that	is,	of	a	functional	system	and	a	cultural	system.	In	this	way,	
the	entirety	of	the	system	of	art	contains	two	levels.	Yet,	system-theoretical	and	systemic	
models	of	the	sphere	of	art	are	not	necessarily	in	accordance	with	presuppositions	like	
these.	For	 example,	Luhmann=s	model	 seems	 to	 recognise	only	one	 level:	he	does	not	
make	 a	difference	between	 functional	 and	 cultural	 systems,	 and	he	 thinks	 that	 in	 the	
last	resort	the	system	of	art	consists	of	communications	concerning	works	of	art,	besides	
which	he	takes	into	account	works	of	art	in	his	studies	of	the	system	of	art	(see	Luhmann	
1986:	626–627;	1997a).	For	him,	the	system	of	art	is	solely	a	social	phenomenon.
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Table 1. Different	Classes	of	Systems
Mechanical	systems	(machines,	automats)
	
Organic	systems	(flora,	organisms)
	
Conceptual	and	analytical	systems	(logic,	mathematics)
	
Psychic	systems	(psyches,	consciousnesses)
	
Social	systems	 	 	 	 	 	
-	Interactional	systems	(families,	school	classes,	a	circle	of	friends)
-	Organisational	systems	(enterprises,	associations,	administrative	institutions)
-	Functional	systems	(economics,	politics,	legal	system,	science,	
the	art	life,	sports)
-	Societal	systems	(primitive	societies,	archaic	societies,	feudal	societies,	
estate	societies,	industrial-capitalist	societies,	fascist	societies,	socialist	societies)
	
Cultural	systems
-	Natural	languages	and	sign	systems
-	Cognitive	systems	(world	views,	scientific	theories,	representations)
-	Value	systems	(hierarchies	of	values,	moral	values,	aesthetic	values)
Sources:	 see,	 nearer,	 Bertalanffy	 1971:	 xx–xxi,	 26–27;	Geertz	 1993;	 Luhmann	 1974:143;	
Luhmann	1975:10–12,	21–22;	Luhmann	1985a:15;	Münch	1976:	147–148;	Parsons	1951:	
6,	17;	Schimank	1996:	139–140;	Skyttner	2001:	60.
Likewise,	 Schmidt=s	 early	 model	 was,	 for	 different	 reasons,	 almost	 equally	 one-
dimensional.	 Namely,	 Schmidt	 (1980;	 1982;	 1987)	 thought	 that	 the	 Asocial	 system	
of	art@	consists	of	phenomena	such	as	 the	production,	mediation,	 reception	and	post-
processing	 (criticism,	art	education)	of	works	of	art.	 In	other	words,	 for	Schmidt,	 the	
social	system	of	art	included	the	forms	of	action	that	maintain	the	art-based	culture	in	
society;	but,	the	art-based	culture	in	itself,	that	is,	works	of	art,	as	such	,	did	not	belong	to	
the	social	system	of	art.	However,	later	Schmidt	(1994:	248;	1995a:	18;	1999:	20–21,	34)	
changed	his	thinking	and	made	an	explicit	distinction	between	the	social	system	of	art	
and	the	cultural	system	of	art:	the	former	system	consists	of	the	action	that	produces	and	
maintains	the	latter	system	or	works	of	art.	After	having	made	this	distinction,	Schmidt	
could	incorporate	works	of	art	into	his	system-theoretical	research	work.
In	 Schmidt=s	 late	 production,	 the	 entire	 system	of	 art	 includes	 two	 levels,	 that	 is,	
a	Asocial@	 and	a	Acultural@	 level.	Rather	 similar	models	have	been	presented	by	 Itamar	
Evan-Zohar	and	Habermas.	In	his	Apoly-systemic@	thinking,	Evan-Zohar=s	(1990)	takes	
into	 account	 both	 the	 works	 of	 art	 and	 the	 action	 concerning	 them	 -	 presupposing	
in	this	way	that	the	system	of	art	consists	of	different	and	relatively	 independent	sub-
systems.	Habermas	(1973b:	14–15;	1987a:	322),	in	turn,	speaks	about	Athe	cultural	value	
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systems@	 (science,	 art,	 religion)	and	about	Athe	corresponding	cultural	 action	 systems@	
(the	 institution	 of	 science,	 the	 art	 life,	 religious	 communities).	Although	he	 does	 not	
use	the	word	Asocial@	in	this	connection,	his	distinction	is	parallel	with	the	distinctions	
made	by	Schmidt	and	Evan-Zohar.	In	general,	when	exploring	Athe	institution	of	art@,	
Athe	art	world@,	Athe	field	of	art@	or	Athe	 system	of	art@	most	of	 the	 representatives	of	
the	systemic	study	take	into	account	both	works	of	art	and	the	activities	that	produce	
and	maintain	 those	works,	 and	 in	doing	 so	 they	dot	not	necessarily	make	 an	 explicit	
distinction	between	social	and	cultural	systems.	This	indicates	that	they	do	not	regard	the	
problematics	concerning	this	distinction	as	especially	important.
Table	1	distinguishes	between	culture	and	society	–	or	between	cultural	and	social	
systems.	A	similar	distinction	was	made	by	Parsons.	In	his	system-theoretical	sociology,	
Parsons	spoke	about	four	kinds	of	systems,	that	 is,	about	culture,	society,	personalities	
and	behavioural	organisms.	Social	systems	can	be	conceptualised	as	action	and	interaction	
systems,	whereas	cultural	systems	are	mental	by	nature.	For	Parsons,	culture	contains	three	
basic	dimensions:	a	cognitive	dimension,	an	expressive	dimension	and	a	value	dimension.	
In	 this	 way,	 one	 can	 consider	 art	 from	 a	 cognitive	 standpoint	 or	 even	 as	 a	 cognitive	
system,	in	which	case	he	or	she	is	interested	in	representations	and	world	views	included	
in	works	of	art.	As	an	expressive	system,	art	has	its	own	language	that	consists	of	different	
signs,	symbols	and	expressive	tools.	And,	as	a	value	system,	art	expresses,	among	other	
things,	aesthetic	and	moral	values,	and	it	may	also	critically	appraise	the	values	prevailing	
in	society.	Thus,	as	a	cultural	phenomenon	art	can	be	analysed	from	the	standpoint	of	
these	 three	 dimensions	 –	 or	 as	 a	 cultural	 system	 it	 possesses	 these	 three	 sub-systems.	
(Parsons	1951:	6,	17,	24–26,	327.)
What	is	the	relationship	between	culture	and	society?	Does	culture	lie	entirely	outside	
society?	Parsons	(1951:	17,	327;	1971:	8)	thought	that	in	modern	Western	civilization	
the	four	elements	of	human	action	system	-	culture,	society,	personalities	and	behavioural	
organisms	 –	 are	 reciprocally	 dependent	 on	 each	 other,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 are	
relatively	 autonomous	 systems	 that	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 each	 other.	 This	 means,	
for	 example,	 that	 basic	 cultural	 values	 and	 symbols	 have	 been	 institutionalised	 as	 the	
cornerstones	of	social	systems	and	they	are	also	internalised	by	individual	personalities	
or	 actors;	 it	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 social	 systems	 and	 individual	 personalities	 are	 partly	
determined	by	culture.	From	another	angle,	one	can	say	that	in	part	culture	lies	inside	
society	and	individual	personalities,	but	certain	parts	of	culture	are	situated	outside	them.	
In	his	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems,	Luhmann	could	not	approve	a	view	like	this.	
According	to	him,	in	modernity	culture	functions	as	Aa	memory	of	social	systems@	and	
not	as	an	independent	entity;	therefore,	it	does	not	lie	outside	social	systems	but	belongs	
entirely	to	the	domain	of	society	(Luhmann	1995:	47–48).14	In	this	line	of	thought,	there	
is	no	 room	for	 a	distinction	between	 social	 and	cultural	 systems.	This	being	 the	case,	
Luhmann	rejects	the	concept	of	cultural	system,	and	that	which	other	theorists	call	cultural	
systems	 is	 included	 in	 social	 systems	 in	his	model	of	 social	 systems.	 In	 contemporary	
system-theoretical	sociology,	Dirk	Baecker	(1999:	43),	among	other	persons,	has	adopted	
a	similar	solution;	in	fact,	it	seems	that	a	clear-cut	majority	of	Luhmann=s	disciples	and	
successors	has	followed	this	solution,	even	if	Schmidt	has	spoken	for	a	two-dimensional	
concept	of	system.15
14	See,	also,	Beacker	1999:	37–39,	41–43,	45;	Helmstetter	1999:	84–85.	
15	On	the	theoretical	research	work	of	Luhmann=s	disciples,	see,	in	particular,	Schwanitz	1990;	Werber	
1992;	Schmidt	1993a;	Berg	&		Prangel	1993,	1995	and	1997;	Plumpe	1993a,	1993b	and	1995;	Fohr-
mann	&	Müller	1996;	Reinfeldt	1997;	Weber,	Stefan	1999a.
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System-theoretical	 sociology	 of	 art	 has	 mainly	 applied	 the	 concepts	 of	 social	 and	
cultural	system	to	the	sphere	of	art.	Undoubtedly,	general	systems	theory	also	contains	
other	 sub-areas	 that	have	proved	 to	be	or	 that	might	be	 relevant	 for	 the	 study	of	 art.	
For	 example,	 sub-areas	 such	 as	 communication	 theory,	 information	 theory	 and,	more	
recently,	 chaos	 theory	 have	 been	 utilised	 in	 the	 study	 of	 art,	 in	 particular,	 in	 studies	
made	in	the	humanities.	Yet,	usually	applications	like	these	have	not,	in	the	first	instance,	
been	 sociological	by	nature,	 and	during	 the	 last	decades	 they	have	been	eclipsed	by	 a	
research	tradition	that	is	based	on	the	concepts	of	a	social	system	and	cultural	system.	For	
this	reason,	my	study	largely	passes	over	those	other	sub-areas,	and	concentrates	on	the	
research	tradition	that	speaks	about	the	sphere	of	art	by	means	of	the	concepts	at	issue.
1.3 Three Internal Tensions in Systemic Sociology and in the Systemic 
Study of the Sphere of Art
So	far,	I	have	largely	considered	system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology	as	a	relatively	
homogeneous	whole	without	pointing	to	its	deeper	inner	tensions.	There	are,	however,	at	
least	three	fundamental	tensions	which	are	relevant	from	the	standpoint	of	my	thesis	and	
which	manifest	themselves	in	system-theoretical	and	systemic	study	of	art.	Those	tensions	
concern	(A)	the	epistemological	basis	of	a	sociological	study	like	this,	(B)	the	relationship	
between	the	concept	of	social	system	and	the	concept	of	action	and	(C)	the	underlying	
value	commitments	of	this	branch	of	research.
(A) Realistic versus Constructivist Epistemology
Originally,	general	systems	theory	grew	up	in	an	epistemologically	realistic	atmosphere.	
Put	briefly,	its	pioneers	usually	committed	themselves	to	the	belief	that	there	is	an	objective	
reality	or	universe	that	is	internally	divided	into	systems;	therefore,	its	proponents	argued,	
general	systems	theory	offers	to	researchers	the	tools	by	which	they	can	adequately	describe	
the	true	nature	of	reality	(cf.	Bertalanffy	1971:	xx–xxi,	87–88;	Skyttner	2001:	47–50).	
Although	Parsons	belonged	to	this	pioneer	phase	of	general	systems	theory,	his	attitude	
to	epistemological	realism	such	as	this	was	complicated.	In	fact,	he	represented	a	way	of	
thought	that	was	called,	by	himself,	Aanalytical	realism@.	Parsons=	analytical	realism	rejects	
the	belief	 that	human	beings	can	acquire	direct	or	 immediate	empirical	knowledge	of	
objective	reality.	Because	this	kind	of	belief	was	widely	approved	among	logical	positivists	
in	the	1930s,	Parsons=	analytical	realism	orientated	itself	against	positivistic	epistemology.	
In	contrast	to	it,	he	held	that	human	beings	can	obtain	empirical	knowledge	of	reality	
only	by	uniting	perceptions	with	concepts	and	theories.	In	this	sense,	empirical	knowledge	
always	 contains	 a	 conceptual	 –	 or,	 we	might	 add,	 a	 Aconstructive@	 dimension,	which	
does	 not,	 however,	mean	 that	 the	 concepts	 of	 sciences	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 give	 us	
relatively	adequate	representations	of	reality;	nor	does	it	mean	that	all	of	the	conceptual	
vocabularies	would	be	epistemologically	equally	well-functioning.	Parsons	believed	that	
certain	concepts	simply	are	more	apt	for	describing	reality	than	other	concepts	are	(see	
Parsons	1937;	1985	a).16	Albeit	Parsons=	epistemology	includes	a	constructive	dimension,	
it	should	not	be	regarded	as	constructivist	–	particularly	for	the	reason	that	by	sticking	
to	 the	 idea	of	objective	or	 adequate	knowledge	 it	 rejects	 the	 relativistic	 conception	of	
knowledge.
16	See,	also,	Heiskala	2000:	65–66;	Lechner	1991:	169;	Münch	1988a:	31–33,	44–45.	
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Parsons=	sociological	system	theory	must	be	seen	in	the	light	of	his	analytical	realism.	
In	his	system	theory,	he	built	abstract	models	that	have	not,	as	such,	been	intended	to	
function	 as	 Amirrors	 of	 reality@;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 his	models	 provide	 researchers	 with	
concepts	 by	 means	 of	 which	 they	 can	 describe	 and	 analyse	 concrete	 human	 action.	
Likewise,	 the	 concepts	 of	 society,	 culture,	 personalities	 and	behavioural	 organisms	 are	
themselves	analytical.	(Parsons	1951:	3,	6.)17	Subsequently,	these	four	entities	or	systems	
can	be	distinguished	from	each	other	in	theoretical	models,	but	they	are	intertwined	in	
concrete	human	action	and	usually	human	acts	contain	elements	from	all	of	them.
If	 it	 is	 illuminating	 to	 compare	 Parsons=	 analytical	 realism	 with	 epistemological	
constructivism,	then	a	comparison	like	this	is	not	equally	fruitful	in	the	case	of	the	leftist	
wing	 of	 systemic	 sociology.	The	wing	 in	 question	 does	 not	 represent	 epistemological	
constructivism	 but	 social	 constructivism.	Within	 the	 leftist	 wing	 it	 is	 Bourdieu	 (see	
Bourdieu	&	Wacquant	1992),	Giddens	(1976:	79,	155,	159–160)	and	Habermas	(1973a:	
188;	1987a:	158–159,	162)	who	have	emphasised	that	the	social	sciences	should	take	into	
account	people=s	beliefs,	values	and	interpretations	concerning	societal	reality,	for	people	
organise	their	own	life	and	their	mutual	relationships	on	the	basis	of	their	beliefs,	values	
and	 interpretations	 –	 and	 through	 this,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 those	mental	 entities	 change	
into	societal	reality.	In	this	sense,	societal	reality	is,	as	Giddens	and	Habermas	remark,	
Astructured	by	meanings@;	or	 for	 this	 reason,	as	Bourdieu	 says,	 sociology	 should	catch	
people=s	self-understanding	and	their	ways	of	giving	meanings	to	the	world.	
These	 three	 theorists	 do	not	 represent	 rigorous	 social	 constructivism.	Even	 if	 they	
require	that	sociology	has	to	take	into	account	the	self-understanding	of	social	actors,	they	
also	add	that	it	should	not	limit	itself	to	exploring	that	self-understanding.	For	example,	
in	the	study	of	societal	structures	it	is	not	always	reasonable	to	presume	that	sociology	
would	be	able	to	obtain	an	adequate	representation	of	those	structures	just	by	clearing	up	
how	social	actors	outline	them.	In	fact,	when	studying	societal	structures	sociology	must	
usually	draw	away	from	actors=	self-understanding	and	consider	the	structures	in	question	
in	an	objectivistic	way,	 that	 is,	as	 if	 they	were	 independent	of	how	actors	grasp	 them.	
On	the	other	hand,	some	extreme	social	constructivists	do	not	approve	a	methodology	
like	this;	 for	example,	the	representatives	of	symbolic	 interactionism	have	been	critical	
of	nearly	all	kinds	of	objectivistic	methodologies	–	with	the	result	that	they	have	almost	
confined	 themselves	 to	 exploring	 how	 actors	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 world.18	 Habermas	
(1973a:	289–291)	characterises	this	kind	of	methodological	thinking	as	Ahermeneutical	
idealism@	–	implying	in	this	way	that	it	has	a	rather	limited	value	in	sociological	research.	
Like	Giddens	(1976),	he	has	elaborated	a	methodology	of	Adouble	hermeneutics@	for	the	
social	sciences.	According	to	this	methodology,	sociology	must	first	reach	the	meanings	
and	interpretations	that	social	actors	project	into	the	world;	and	after	having	achieved	this	
it	must	explicate	and	explain	those	meanings	and	interpretations	and	societal	reality	by	
means	of	a	theoretical	language.	Actually,	in	the	latter	phase,	sociology	interprets	actors=	
self-understanding	and	societal	reality	with	the	help	of	a	language	that	deviates	from	or	
exceeds	actors=	self-understanding.
Epistemologically	 Bourdieu,	 Giddens	 and	 Habermas	 represent	 realistic	 thinking,	
because	all	of	them	believe	that	sociology	is	able	to	obtain	a	relatively	adequate	knowledge	of	
society.	In	addition,	they	think	that	societal	reality	is	in	itself	divided	or	differentiated	into	
systems	or	fields.	Luhmann=s	system	theory	is	based	on	principles	that	are	quite	different	
17	See,	also,	Alexander	1983:	28–29,	32;	Joas	1997:	211,	219.	
18	On	social	constructivism	(or	constructionism),	see,	also,	Heiskala	1997	and	2000.	
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from	these	presuppositions.	To	be	sure,	epistemological	realism	seems	to	underlie	his	early	
production,	but	his	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems	mainly	follows	a	constructivist	train	
of	thought.	Yet,	the	theory	in	question	does	not	possess	an	unambiguous	epistemological	
basis.	For	the	first	time,	Luhmann	presented	it	widely	in	his	investigation	Soziale Systeme.	
Grundriss einer allgemeiner Theorie (Social	Systems.	Outline	of	a	General	Theory,	1985a,	
originally	published	1984).	There	he	announces	that	his	theory	starts	from	the	principle	
that	Athere	are	systems@,	therefore	it	avoids	Aan	epistemological	doubt@	(Luhmann	1985a:	
30).19	Thus,	in	this	phase	Luhmann	was	close	to	realistic	thinking.	However,	in	his	books	
Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (The	 Science	 of	 Society,	 1991,	 originally	 published	
1990)	 and	 Soziologische Aufklärung 5. Konstruktivistische Perspektiven 2 (Sociological	
Enlightenment	5.	Constructivist	Perspectives	2,	1993d,	originally	published	1990)	the	
theory	of	autopoietic	systems	is	presented	differently.	Now	Luhmann	explicitly	binds	it	
to	constructivist	epistemology.
In	Luhmann=s	epistemology,	human	minds	are	autopoietic	systems	that	handle	sense	
impressions	 according	 to	 their	 own	 principles	 of	 operation	 and	 transform	 them	 into	
observations.	Because	 the	properties	of	 reality	have	not	been	 registered	 into	our	 sense	
impressions	and	observations,	one	should	not	regard	human	knowledge	as	a	mirror	of	
reality	but	as	a	construct.	Therefore,	Luhmann	gave	up	the	the	correspondence	notion	of	
truth	and	discarded	realistic	epistemology;	this	epistemology	is	based	on	the	notion	that	a	
theory	may	be	accepted	as	true	if	there	are	enough	reasons	to	suppose	that	it	corresponds	
to	 reality.	According	 to	Luhmann,	we	cannot	know	what	kind	of	entity	 the	 reality	 is;	
we	can	only	know	how	it	shows	itself	to	us.	And	the	reality	as	it	shows	itself	to	us	has	a	
contingent	nature,	because	our	picture	of	this	phenomenal	world	varies	according	to	the	
kinds	of	positions	and	angles	from	which	we	consider	it	and	also	according	to	the	kinds	
of	distinctions	and	concepts	that	we	apply	to	it	or	project	into	it.	(Luhmann	1991:	81,	
85,	102,	225,	526–527;	1993d:	7–11,	29,	33,	37,	58.)	With	regard	to	system	theory,	this	
means	 that	 one	 cannot	 directly	 compare	 system-theoretical	 representations	 of	 societal	
reality	with	the	societal	reality	itself;	this	would	simply	be	an	impossible	task.	This	is	why	
theories	must	be	otherwise	evaluated.	Luhmann	held	that	in	the	evaluation	of	theories	
sociology	has	to	direct	its	attention	to	their	internal	consistency,	conceptual	riches	and	
analytical	utility.	With	 the	 aid	of	 a	good	 theory,	 sociologists	 are	 capable	of	describing	
and	 analysing	 the	 societal	world	broadly	 and	 from	many	 sides.	Hence,	Luhmann	did	
not	regard	system	theory	as	 the	only	possible	or	as	 the	only	fruitful	way	of	describing	
society;	theories	of	other	kinds	might	also	be	useful,	albeit	he	committed	himself	to	the	
elaboration	of	system	theory
Luhmann=s	constructivism	belongs	to	a	broader	intellectual	movement,	for	in	general	
systems	theory	Humberto	R.	Maturana	and	Francisco	J.	Varela,	two	Chilean	biologists,	
and	Heinz	von	Foerster,	a	cybernetist,	have	developed	their	own	versions	of	constructivist	
epistemology.20	 Luhmann=s	 theory	 of	 autopoietic	 systems	 is,	 in	 particular,	 based	 on	
19	In	his	Soziale Systeme	Luhmann	(1985a:	30)	writes:	ADie	folgenden	Überlegungen	gehen	also	davon	
aus,	dass	es	Systeme	gibt.	Sie	beginnen	also	nicht	mit	einem	erkenntnistheoretischen	Zweifel	[...]	Der	
Systembegriff	bezeichnet	also	etwas,	was	wirklich	ein	System	ist,	und	lässt	sich	damit	auf	eine	Verant-
wortung	für	Bewährung	seiner	Aussagen	an	der	Wirklichkeit	ein.@	[The	following	reflections	start	from	
the	fact	that	there	are	systems.	Consequently,	they	do	not	start	with	an	epistemological	scepticism(...)	
The	concept	of	system	points	to	something	that	is	really	a	system,	and	for	this	reason	it	let	the	reality	be	
responsible	for	the	verification	of	its	statements.]	See,	also,	Luhmann	1993b:	29–31
20	See	Maturana	&	Varela	1998	and	Foerster	1996.	
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Maturana=s	 and	 Varela=s	 investigations	 which	 launched	 the	 concept	 of	 autopoiesis.	
According	to	Dirk	Baecker	(1990:	16–18,	30;	1996:	19,	56–57),	the	third	cornerstone	
in	constructivist	epistemology	 is	 the	distinction	theory	elaborated	by	George	Spencer-
Brown,	a	British	 logician.	Spencer-Brown=s	 theory	 includes	 the	 idea	 that	observing	or	
perceiving	 entails	making	 distinctions;	 one	 can	 observe	 or	 perceive	 an	 entity	 only	 by	
sorting	it	out	from	other	entities	and	by	naming	it.	In	this	sense,	observing	or	perceiving	
follows	the	maxim	ADraw	a	distinction!@.	In	his	epistemology,	Luhmann	(1991:	81)	adds	
to	this	idea	the	view	that	as	cognitive	activities	sorting	and	naming	do	not	have	an	access	
to	reality;	they	are	concerned	merely	with	the	phenomenal	world.
The	 above-presented	 remarks	 on	 Luhmann=s	 epistemology	 do	 not	 mean	 that	 his	
conception	of	knowledge	is	solely	based	on	a	theory	of	observation.	In	fact,	at	the	same	
time	he	sought	to	base	his	epistemology	on	system-theoretical	sociology.	In	this	sense,	
he	declared	that	knowledge	is	always	system-relative,	wherefore	researchers	must	always	
announce	the	system	from	whose	horizon	they	consider	the	world.	The	implication	here	
is	the	thought	that	our	picture	of	the	world	varies	according	to	what	kind	of	position	we	
have	in	the	world.	At	the	level	of	social	sub-systems	this	means	that	each	social	sub-system	
produces	its	own	representation	of	society,	and	from	the	horizon	of	the	system	of	art	the	
rest	of	society	looks	different	than,	for	example,	from	the	horizon	of	economics	or	politics.	
Thus,	Luhmann=s	epistemology	represent	relativistic	 thinking,	but	not	epistemological	
subjectivism	or	Aanything	goes@	principle	à	la	Paul	Feyerabend.	In	his	theory,	it	is	social	
systems	 that,	 in	 the	 last	 resort,	 take	 care	 of	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 (Luhmann	
1985a:	629;	1993d:	7,	11,	29).
Although	Luhmann=s	system	theory	has	a	slightly	ambiguous	epistemological	basis,	he	
has	been	seen	to	represent	a	moderate	constructivist	epistemology	(Krawietz	1992a:	43–44;	
1992b:	297).	A	more	extreme	version	of	constructivist	epistemology	can	be	found	from	
Schmidt=s	investigations,	which,	as	he	remarks	himself,	manifest	a	way	of	thought	called	
Aradical	constructivism@.	Schmidt	has	also	been	criticial	of	Luhmann,	for	in	his	system	
theory,	 particularly,	 in	his	works	 of	 the	 1980s,	Luhmann	 still	 reflected	upon	whether	
there	really	are	systems	in	societal	reality	or	whether	the	concept	of	system	is	only	a	more	
or	less	useful	analytical	tool	in	sociological	research	work.	For	a	radical	constructivist	like	
Schmidt	(1989:	28–29:	1992:	22–23;	1994:	13),	reflections	like	these	include	a	wrongly	
posed	question	–	for	the	reason	that	human	beings	cannot	have	a	direct	cognitive	access	
to	 reality.	 Such	 being	 the	 case,	 sociologists	 should	 give	 up	 ontological	 questions	 and,	
instead,	ask	what	kind	of	use	the	concept	of	system	might	have	in	sociological	research	
work	or	if	some	phenomena	can	possibly	be	observed	and	classified	as	a	system.
Schmidt=s	critique	on	Luhmann	recalls	the	traditional	controversy	between	ontological	
and	methodological	use	of	system	theory.	The	ontological	use	of	system	theory	is	based	
on	the	presupposition	that	societal	reality	is	itself	differentiated	into	systems,	wherefore	
system	 theory	would	 offer	 to	 sociologists	 an	 appropriate	 tool	 for	 the	 description	 and	
analysis	of	that	reality.	In	the	methodological	use	of	system	theory,	sociologists	attempt	to	
avoid	ontological	commitments	and	presuppositions;	instead,	they	regard	system	theory	
chiefly	as	a	useful	conceptual	frame	of	reference	by	means	of	which	they	can	classify	and	
systematize	their	observations	–	in	this	way	forming	and	constructing	systems.	In	systemic	
sociology,	Bourdieu,	Giddens,	Habermas	and,	to	a	minor	extent,	Münch	(1976:	21–22)	
use	 the	 concept	 of	 system	 or	 its	 cognate	 concepts	 chiefly	 in	 an	 ontological	 way,	 and	
Parsons	is	quite	close	to	this	use,	as	well.	Conversely,	within	system-theoretical	thinking	
Maturana,	Varela,	Foerster,	Luhmann,	Schmidt	and	their	disciples	and	successors	tend	to	
use	it	in	a	methodological	way,	although	they	are	perhaps	not	entirely	free	of	ontological	
presuppositions.
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(B) Actor-Centric versus Anti-Humanist Thinking
In	addition	to	epistemological	realism,	the	second	corner	stone	in	traditional	sociological	
system	 theory	was	 the	 concept	 of	 action.	Parsons=	 theory	 of	 social	 systems	 is,	 in	 fact,	
a	part	of	a	wider	theory,	that	 is,	a	part	of	a	general	action	theory	that	he	and	Edward	
Shils	introduced	in	their	joint	work	Toward a General Theory of Action (1951).	The	other	
parts	in	his	general	action	theory	are	a	theory	of	cultural	systems,	a	theory	of	personal	
systems	and	a	 theory	of	behavioural	organisms.	All	of	 these	 four	 theories	 are,	Parsons	
thought,	necessary	when	researchers	analyse,	 interpret	and	explain	human	action.	The	
above-mentioned	four	systems	consist	of	different	elements;	here	we	may	focus	on	social	
and	cultural	systems	that	are	relevant	in	the	context	of	this	thesis.	Cultural	systems	consist	
of	beliefs,	 representations,	values	and	meanings,	whereas	social	 systems	can	be	defined	
as	action	and	interaction	systems.	The	most	elementary	things	in	social	systems	are	acts,	
and	at	a	higher	level	these	systems	include	status	roles.	Social	systems	can,	therefore,	also	
be	characterised	as	interaction	systems	in	which	actors	have	certain	roles	and	a	certain	
status.	When	participating	in	social	systems,	actors	do	not	represent	themselves	as	entire	
personalities,	for	their	personalities	cannot	be	equated	with	the	roles	they	have	in	social	
systems.	At	any	rate,	in	this	sense,	Parsons=	system	theory	represents	an	actor-centric	way	
of	thought.
Luhmann=s	early	production	is	also	close	to	an	actor-centric	way	of	thought,	but	there	
he	does	not	understand	social	systems	precisely	in	the	same	way	as	Parsons	did.	In	the	
1960s	and	1970s,	Luhmann	(1973:	1974;	1975;	1976a)	explicitly	defined	social	systems,	
in	particular,	functional	systems	as	action	systems,	and	still	in	1981	he	wrote	that	a	system	
like	 this	 consists	 of	 actions	 that	 have	 a	 similar	 functional	meaning	 (Luhmann	 1981:	
56,132).	Thus,	the	boundaries	between	different	social	systems	take	shape	on	the	basis	
of	 the	 category	of	meaning.	When	 social	 actors	 comprehend	 the	 functional	meanings	
of	different	acts	 in	the	same	way,	they	agree	on	what	kinds	of	acts	can	be	classified	as	
economics,	politics,	the	practice	of	science	or	the	practice	of	art.	From	another	standpoint,	
one	can	say	 that	 the	 formation	of	 systems	such	as	 these	presupposes	 that	 social	actors	
interpret	the	societal	world	in	a	relatively	homogenous	way.	In	this	respect,	Luhmann=s	
early	 system	 theory	 deviates	 from	Parsons=	 theory,	 for	 the	 latter	 did	 not	 grant	 to	 the	
category	of	meaning	a	central	place	in	system	theory.	On	the	other	hand,	perhaps	more	
resolutely	than	Parsons,	Luhmann	emphasised	that	concrete	human	beings,	that	is,	their	
entire	bodies	and	minds,	do	not	belong	to	social	systems,	because	such	systems	consist	of	
meaningful	actions	produced	by	people	as	persons	or	social	actors.
In	 Luhmann=s	 early	 production,	 concrete	 human	 beings	 are	 situated	 outside	
social	 systems.	This	 stand	 represents	 an	 anti-humanist	 dimension	 in	Luhmann=s	 early	
production,	although	that	production	still	belongs	to	the	actor-centric	way	of	defining	
social	systems.	Anti-humanism	must	be	understood	against	the	background	of	traditional	
Western	humanism	that	originates	from	the	Enlightenment	period	of	the	17th	and	18th	
centuries.	Humanism	can	be	defined	as	an	ideology	or	value	orientation	whose	picture	of	
the	world	is	anthropocentric	in	the	sense	that	it	considers	the	world	from	the	point	of	view	
of	human	beings	and	groups	and	the	entire	humanity.21	Traditional	Western	humanism	
regarded	 human	 beings	 as	 basically	 free	 creatures,	 and	 it	 was	 inclined	 to	 emphasise	
the	 existence	 of	 an	 inherent	 antithesis	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 society.	Humanist	
conceptions	of	society,	in	turn,	have	been	apt	to	see	society	as	a	body	of	free	individuals;	
and	insofar	as	this	individual	freedom	is	threatened	by	those	in	power,	humanists	have	
21	See	Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Volume 4 (1998:	528–232).	
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usually	criticised	them	by	appealing	to	democratic	 ideals	and	basic	human	rights.	It	 is	
this	 kind	of	 conception	of	 society	 or	 of	 the	 societal	 system	 that	 is	 incompatible	with	
Luhmann=s	early	production.
In	 Luhmann=s	 late	 production,	 the	 actor-centric	 way	 of	 thought	 disappears	
and,	 conversely,	 the	 anti-humanist	 dimension	 becomes	 stronger.	 Now	 he	 states	 that	
autopoietic	social	systems	do	not	consist	of	action	but	of	communications	which	they	
produce	 themselves	 and	 which,	 in	 turn,	 maintain	 them	 (Luhmann	 1985:	 192–193,	
240–241;	1997b:	81–82).	This	 is	precisely	 the	core	of	 the	concept	of	 autopoiesis,	 for	
the	 concept	 in	 question	 refers	 to	 an	 entitity=s	 ability	 to	 produce	 and	 reproduce	 itself	
(Luhmann	 1987:	 38;	 1997b:	 65–67).	 In	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 understand	 Luhmann=s	
theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems	one	also	needs	to	know	that	he	uses	the	concept	of	
communication	in	a	special	way.	In	that	theory,	it	is	not	people	who	communicate,	since	
Aonly	 the	communication	can	communicate@	 (Luhmann	1991:	31).	By	 this	he	meant	
that	one	cannot	equate	communication	with	the	acts	and	states	of	mind	of	entire	and	
concrete	people.	To	be	sure,	the	flow	of	communication	is	dependent	on	people,	since	it	
cannot	exist	without	it;	but	it	is	incorrect	to	reduce	this	flow	to	their	acts,	intentions	and	
states	of	mind.	Luhmann	(1991:	24,	33–35,	44,	51,	63–65)	held	that	communication	
is,	 in	the	first	 instance,	a	characteristic	of	social	systems	which	maintain	it	by	utilising	
certain	psychic	and	physical	capabilities	possessed	by	actors	or	individuals.	The	entities	
that	communication	constructs	from	concrete	individuals	for	its	own	purposes	are	called	
Apersons@	 by	Luhmann:	 those	 entities	 ought	not	 be	 equated	with	 concrete	 and	 entire	
psycho-physical	individuals.	Communication	itself	is,	for	Luhmann	(1991:	23–24,	31–
33,	38),	a	combination	of	three	selections:	when	communicating,	a	person	must	choose	
the	information	that	he	or	she	wants	to	mediate	to	other	persons,	and	he	or	she	must	also	
choose	the	way	by	means	of	which	he	or	she	mediates	that	information;	the	third	element	
in	 communication	 is	 the	 receivers=	way	 of	 understanding	 the	 information	 or	message	
mediated	to	them,	and	this	understanding	consists	of	the	communicative	acts,	and	not	of	
the	mental	states	of	affairs,	by	means	of	which	the	receivers	react	to	the	information	(see,	
also,	Kangas	1996:	239).	Through	this,	Luhmann	wished	to	de-subjectivise	the	concept	
of	communication	and	to	empty	it	of	anthropocentric	presuppositions.
In	 the	 same	way,	Luhmann	endeavoured	 to	handle	 the	concept	of	meaning.	 In	 its	
simplicity,	actor-centric	sociologists	can	understand	meanings	as	intersubjective	mental	
states	shared	by	social	actors.	In	contrast	to	this,	in	his	late	production	Luhmann	speaks	
about	meanings	without	 pointing	 to	 actors	 or	 subjects.	Consequently,	 he	 also	 speaks	
about	meanings	in	a	way	that	is	probably	completely	unfamiliar	to	representatives	of	the	
humanities	and	hermeneutics.	For	example,	in	his	book	Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 
(Society	of	Society,	1997)	he	clears	up	the	concept	of	meaning	with	the	help	of	the	concepts	
such	as	Aactual@,	Apotential@,	Apossible@	and	Ameaning	horizon@.	For	Luhmann,	the	meaning	
horizon	of	a	system	is	 the	entirety	of	what	 is	possible	 in	that	system,	and	every	single	
communicative	event	in	that	system	realises	or	actualises	only	a	part	of	the	meaning	horizon	
of	the	system	in	question	(Luhmann	1997b:	142–144;	1997c:	1136–1137).	Frank	Becker	
and	Elke	Reinhardt-Becker	(2001:	46–50)	explicate	Luhmann=s	concept	of	meaning	by	
using	a	soccer	game	and	economics	as	examples.22	All	of	the	events	of	a	soccer	game	which	
can	influence	its	course	according	to	the	rules	of	the	game:	among	other	things,	corner	kicks,	
free	kicks,	penalty	kicks,	tacklings,	headings	of	the	ball,	spurts,	warnings	and	fouls	belong	
22	On	Luhmann=s	concept	of	meaning,	see,	also,	Lohmann	1987:	166–167;	Miller	1987:	201.
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to	its	meaning	horizon.	On	the	other	hand,	Becker	and	Reinhardt-Becker	go	on,	events	
such	as	murders,	killings	and	shootings	do	not	belong	to	the	meaning	horizon	of	soccer	
game,	 since	 these	 events	 are	 a	 part	 of	 another	world,	 that	 is,	 a	 part	 of	 the	 system	 of	
criminal	events.	The	meaning	horizon	of	the	system	of	economics,	in	turn,	is	defined	by	
activities	that	concern	the	exchange	of	goods;	in	particular,	buying,	paying,	selling	and	
advertising	are	typical	activities	in	that	system.
In	his	late	production,	Luhmann	hardly	bothers	himself	with	questions	of	methodology.	
Eearlier	he	paid	more	attention	to	questions	concerning	concrete	or	empirical	research	
work.	For	example,	in	his	Soziologische Aufklärung. Band 1. Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer 
Systeme	 (Sociological	Enlightenment.	Part	1.	Studies	of	 the	Theory	of	Social	 Systems,	
1974,	originally	published	1970)	he	reflects	upon	the	empirical	study	of	social	systems.	
According	to	those	reflections,	social	systems	are	empirically	observable	only	as	far	as	they	
are	understood	as	 action	 systems	 (Luhmann	1974:	39).	This	 is	 an	 interesting	 remark,	
because	with	regard	to	Luhmann=s	late	production	we	have	good	reasons	to	ask	how	we	
can	study	autopoietic	social	systems	empirically.	If	those	systems	cannot	be	equated	with	
the	action	of	individuals,	groups	and	collectives,	what	kinds	of	materials	would	be	able	to	
function	as	the	basis	of	an	empirical	study	concerning	the	systems	in	question?
Luhmann	does	not	provide	us	with	answers	to	these	questions.Yet,	his	anti-humanist	
way	of	thought	becomes	more	understable	if	we	take	into	account	that	in	his	production	
he	theorized,	in	the	first	instance,	about	modern	society	and	its	sub-systems.	According	to	
him,	formerly	action	and	interaction	were	important	elements	in	society,	but	in	the	course	
of	societal	evolution	interaction	and	society	have	more	and	more	clearly	differentiated	
from	each	other.	In	interaction,	social	actors	are	physically	close	to	each	other,	and	they	
are	capable	of	observing	each	other.	Primitive	societies	or	tribe	societies	were	largely	based	
on	an	interaction	like	this,	whereas	modern	society	cannot	any	longer	be	understood	in	
a	way	like	this.	Instead,	modern	society	and	most	of	its	fucntional	sub-systems	are	global	
formations,	and	in	this	world	society	social	actors	can	observe	each	other	only	to	a	limited	
extent.	Therefore,	one	could	conclude	that,	in	contrast	to	previous	societies,	only	modern	
society	and	its	functional	sub-systems	are	based	on	communication
Every	now	and	then	Luhmann	seems	to	think	precisely	in	this	way	(see,	for	example,	
Luhmann	1975:	9–11,	21–22;	1985a:	225,	552–553,	576–579,	584–585).	However,	
more	 often	 his	 late	 production	 gives	 an	 impression	 that	 social	 systems	 are	 always	
constituted	by	communication	(see	Luhmann	1985a:	192,	240–241,	497;	1997b:	79–
81).	Because	Luhmann	mainly	paid	his	attention	to	modern	society	and	its	functional	
sub-systems,	in	this	connection	we	can	pass	over	his	views	of	previous	societies.	At	any	
rate	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	Rudolf	Stichweh,	a	disciple	of	Luhmann,	is	inclined	to	
conceptualise	only	contemporary	society	and	its	functional	sub-systems	as	communication	
systems	(see	Stichweh	2000;	2007).	In	this	respect,	he	has	clearly	modified	Luhmann=s	
system	theory.
Otherwise	 Luhmann=s	 and	 Stichweh=s	 thinking	 resembles	 Manuel	 Castells=	 well-
known	idea	of	network	society.	According	to	Castells	(2000),	contemporary	society	must	
be	seen	as	a	global	network	society	whose	basic	constituents	are	flows	of	communication	
and	digital	information.	However,	in	contrast	to	this,	Luhmann	and	Stichweh	underline	
that,	 in	 fact,	 globalisation	 is	 not	 a	 new	phenomenon,	 because	 since	 its	 birth	modern	
society	 has	 been	 a	 global	 formation.	 According	 to	 them,	 the	 contemporary	 phase	 of	
modern	socierty	has	just	made	the	process	of	globalisation	more	and	more	intensive	and	
concrete.
Luhmann=s	anti-humanism	has	been	an	object	of	criticism	in	sociology	and	system	
study.	It	should	be	noticed	that	Schmidt,	who	had	spoken	resolutely	for	the	empirical	study	
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of	the	system	of	art	since	the	early	1980s,	has	not	approved	Luhmann=s	anti-humanism.	
In	the	mid-1990s	he	even	stated	that	Luhmann=s	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems	Ais	
rather	a	social-philosophical	super	theory	than	an	empirical-sociological	theory@	(Schmidt	
1995c:	214–215,	223;	see,	also,	Schmidt	1996:	116–118,	127–129).	In	Schmidt=s	own	
system-theoretical	 investigations,	 the	 starting	point	has	been	the	concept	of	action.	 In	
the	same	vein,	Hans	Joas	(1996:	222–223)	speaks	about	Luhmann=s	Asystem-theoretical	
cosmology@	demanding	a	system	theory	that	is	based	on	the	concept	of	action,	and	Uwe	
Schimank	(1996:	201–203,	219)	wants	to	complete	Luhmann=s	system	theory	with	an	
action-theoretical	 approach.	Although	 some	of	Luhmann=s	 disciples	have	 followed	his	
anti-humanism	without	questions,	most	of	the	system-theorists	seem	to	give	priority	to	
the	union	of	action	theory	and	system	theory	over	anti-humanist	conceptions	of	system.	
Accordingly,	Giddens	(1979;	1986)	and	Habermas	(1987b:	299–303)	have	understood	
social	systems	to	consist	of	relatively	stable	action	practices,	besides	which	in	Habermas=	
production	the	concept	of	system	is	clearly	embedded	into	a	theory	of	action.	Otherwise	
it	is	interesting	to	note	that	in	a	sense	Giddens	understands	modern	society	precisely	in	
the	same	way	as	Luhmann	and	Stichweh	do.	AModernity	is	 inherently	globalising@,	he	
writes	in	his	The Consequences of Modernity	(Giddens	2000:	63.	Originally	published	in	
1990.	See,	also,	Giddens	2001:	15).		This	indicates	that	it	is	possible	to	develop	a	theory	
of	world	society	or	globalisation	on	the	basis	of	the	concepts	of	action	and	interaction.	
Unlike	Luhmann	thought,	action	and	communication	do	not	necessarily	exclude	each	
other.	 Actor-centric	 system	 theory	 regards	 communication	 as	 a	 special	 dimension	 of	
social	 action	 and	 interaction	–	 that	 is,	 as	 a	 dimension	 that	might	be	 central	 in	 social	
action	and	interaction	without	being	their	sole	feature.	As	far	as	I	can	see,	this	kind	of	
actor-centric	concept	of	communication	can	be	incorporated	in	a	theory	of	world	society	
or	globalisation.
Of	Luhmann=s	critics	one	should	also	mention	Münch.	In	the	1970s	and	1980s,	he	
worked	on	a	system-theoretical	view	of	modern	society	grounding	that	view	on	a	theory	
of	 action	 and	Parsons=	 thinking	 (see	Münch	1976;	1988).	When	 elaborating	his	 own	
conception	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	he	has	used	an	actor-centric	concept	
of	communication	as	a	central	theoretical	tool	(see	Münch	1991;	1995;	1998).	Likewise,	
North-American	neo-functionalists,	in	particular,	Alexander	(1988)	and	Colomy	(1992),	
have	elaborated	upon	and	renewed	the	Parsonsian	tradition	on	the	basis	of	a	theory	of	
action.
In	systemic	sociology,	Bourdieu	is	a	rather	unusual	phenomenon	in	the	sense	that	his	
field	theory	has	not	been	embedded	into	an	action	theory,	and	nor	does	it	follow	the	anti-
humanist	way	of	thought.	Bourdieu	understands	the	social	fields	in	a	peculiar	way,	for	he	
thinks	that	they	consist	of	power	and	status	positions	(see	Bourdieu	&	Wacquant	1992).	
However,	in	his	concrete	or	empirical	investigations	he	mainly	analyses	people=s	actions	
and	their	mutual	tensions	and	conflicts	in	social	fields.	For	this	reasons,	it	is	justified	to	
see	him	to	as	belonging	to	the	camp	of	actor-centric	systemic	sociology.	Furthermore,	
a	genuine	anthropocentric	dimension	underlies	the	goals	of	his	systemic	sociology,	and	
similar	 goals	 can	 be	 found	 from	Giddens=	 and	Habermas=	 sociologies.	With	 the	 help	
of	 their	 investigations	Bourdieu,	Giddens,	Habermas	and	their	 like	have	attempted	to	
improve	people=s	capacities	 to	act	and	to	reflect	upon	the	world	and	themselves.	 It	 is,	
among	other	things,	through	this	that	their	sociology	is	one	of	the	heirs	of	the	spirit	of	
the	Enlightenment.	Yet,	their	thinking	is	not	in	every	respect	compatible	with	traditional	
Western	humanism.	In	contrast	to	the	individualist	and	voluntarily	accentuated	thinking	
of	the	humanism,	they	conceive	of	individuals	largely	as	products	of	various	historical,	
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societal	 and	 cultural	 determinants.23	 Therefore,	 they	 understand	 human	 nature	 and	
human	 action	primarily	 as	 social-cultural	 phenomena	–	 and	not	 as	 something	 that	 is	
inherently	opposed	to	society.
(C) Affirmative versus Radical Point of Departure
Almost	from	its	birth	onward,	system-theoretical	sociology	has	been	an	object	of	political	
discussions	within	the	academic	world. In	Parsons=	case,	the	reasons	for	those	discussions	
are	 connected	with	 his	 habit	 of speaking	 about	 Athe	 needs	 of	 systems@	 or	 Aabout	 the	
functional	necessities	of	systems@.	In	other	words,	he	thought	that	there	are	four	needs	
or	 functions	 that	every	 social	 system	has	 to	 take	care	of	 somehow.	Firstly,	every	 social	
system	should	adapt	itself	to	its	environment	and	utilise	the	resources	that	are	available	in	
the	environment.	Secondly,	every	system	must	make	strategic	decisions	about	the	use	of	
its	resources	and	about	the	goals	of	the	actions	taking	place	in	that	system.	In	addition,	
systems	cannot	survive	without	a	sufficient	degree	of	internal	integration	or	normative	
uniformity,	 and	 finally	 every	 system	 should,	 at	 a	 general	 level,	 define	what	 is	 held	 as	
important	and	as	worth	pursuing	in	it.	Parsons	(1971:	4–5,	10–11)	called	these	functions	
AAdaptation@	 (A),	 AGoal	 Attainment@	 (G),	 AIntegration@	 (I)	 and	 ALatency	 or	 Pattern	
Maintenance@	(L);	in	this	way	he	arrived	at	his	well-known	AGIL-schema.
Parsons	 thought	 that	at	 the	 level	of	 society	 it	 is	 the	 sub-system	of	economics	 that,	
in	 the	first	 instance,	 takes	 care	 of	 the	Adaptation,	 and,	 correspondingly,	 the	political-
administrative	sub-system	is	specialised	in	the	Goal	Attainment.	As	for	the	Integration,	
arrangements	such	as	law,	the	legal	system,	the	schooling	system	and	different	communities	
increase	society=s	normative	uniformity,	wherefore	society=s	integration	is	largely	due	to	
their	activities;	together	these	arrangements	form	the	sub-system	of	integration.	Latency	
or	Pattern	Maintenance	is	primarily	taken	care	of	by	the	socio-cultural	sub-system	that	
mediates	 central	 cultural	 values	 into	 society;	 owing	 to	 a	 mediation	 like	 this,	 central	
cultural	 values	 have	 been	 institutionalised	 as	 the	 basic	 or	 general	 action	 principles	 of	
social	institutions,	and	individuals	have	internalised	them	in	the	process	of	socialisation.	
The	 socio-cultural	 sub-system	 consists	 of	 units	 such	 as	 families,	 schools,	 religious	
communities,	higher	education	and	the	institutions	of	science	and	art.
In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	Parsons	was	accused	of	conservatism.	His	thinking	seems	to	
imply	that	certain	institutions	are	necessary	in	society,	because	Athey	satisfy	society=s	basic	
needs@.	S.N.	Eisenstadt	and	M.	Curelaru	(1977:	31),	two	sociologists	close	to	Parsons,	
point	out	that	a	criticism	like	this	does	not	necessarily	hit	the	target,	since	system	theory	
does	not	deny	that	a	certain	need	or	function	can	be	handled	with	the	help	of	several	
different	institutional	arrangements.	On	the	other	hand,	the	critics	remarked	that,	on	the	
whole,	it	is	inadequate	to	transfer	biological	and	psychological	concepts	into	sociology:	
undoubtedly	 human	 beings	 and	 biological	 organisms	 have	 needs,	 but	 the	 talk	 about	
society=s	needs	causes	nothing	but	confusion.	Parsons=	system-theoretical	sociology	was	also	
seen	to	blur	the	state	of	affairs	that	as	a	last	resort	it	is	the	ruling	elite	that	defines	society=s	
23	A	formulation	like	this	implies	that	according	to	those	three	sociologists	human	nature	and	human	ac-
tion	are	not	entirely	determined	by	culture	and	society,	wherefore	actors	are,	to	a	certain	extent,	capable	
of	making	free	choices.	However,	Bourdieu	might	be	a	problematic	case	in	this	connection.	For	example,	
Jeffrey	C.	Alexander	(1995:	151,	162–163,	173–175)	has	stated	that	in	Bourdieu=s	sociology	actors	are	
strictly	determined	by	their	position	in	society=s	class	structure.	For	this	reason,	Alexander	continues,	
Bourdieu=s	thinking	is	reductionist	and	deterministic	and	basically	it	represents	ANeo-Marxism@	in	con-
temporary	sociology.	Perhaps	this	appraisal	is	not	fair	enough,	for	at	least	Bourdieu	has	attempted	to	
avoid	both	reductionism	and	extreme	voluntarism.	See,	nearer,	Bourdieu	&	Wacquant	1992.
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needs;	 talk	 about	 society=s	needs	would,	 then,	basically	be	an	 ideological	 construction	
(see	Eisenstadt	&	Curelaru	1977:	32).	However,	one	has	to	say	in	defense	of	Parsons	that	
it	is	difficult	to	imagine	an	organised	society	that	would	have	given	up	the	handling	of	
certain	tasks;	to	tasks	such	as	these	belong,	among	other	things,	the	production	of	foods,	
the	maintenance	of	order	and	the	development	of	integrative	mechanisms.	It	is	probably	
necessary	that	organised	societies	take	care	of	tasks	like	these,	for	otherwise	they	would	
be	driven	into	a	state	of	stagnation,	recession	and	conflicts.	Yet,	this	does	not	mean	that	
in	his	AGIL-schema	Parsons	would	have	managed	to	name	these	kinds	of	tasks	correctly.	
Because	it	is	difficult	to	specify	the	tasks	in	question	exactly,	all	of	the	functions	that	are	
mentioned	 in	 the	AGIL-schema	do	not	necessarily	belong	 to	 those	 tasks.	Perhaps	 the	
functions	in	the	AGIL-schema	can,	at	least,	be	understood	as	the	strong	preconditions	of	
the	existence	of	social	systems;	in	other	words,	social	systems	would	lose	a	great	deal	of	
their	possibilities	to	function	well,	if	they	do	not	take	care	of	those	functions.
In	the	1960s	and	1970s,	Parsons	was	usually	seen	as	a	conservative	sociologist	who	
had	an	affirmative	attitude	to	modern	Western	capitalist	society	–	or	to	modern	Western	
democracies.	In	fact,	this	opinion	was	not	far	from	the	truth,	because	in	his	works	Parsons	
praised	contemporary	American	society	and	its	value,	believing	that	socialist	systems	in	
Eastern	Europe	and	elsewhere	in	the	world	will	fall	into	decay.	In	addition,	it	was	during	
the	decades	in	question	that	system	theory	became	an	important	tool	in	social	technology	
and	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 societal	 phenomena.	 Parsons=	 system-theoretical	 sociology	
seemed	to	suit	well	a	purpose	like	this	–	among	other	reasons	that	 it	handles	conflicts	
and	 contradictions	 as	 something	 that	 do	 not	 belong	 to	 the	 normal	 course	 of	 societal	
life.	Despite	this,	recent	American	appraisals	concerning	Parsons	do	not	always	see	him	
as	 a	 conservative.	 For	 example,	 Bryan	 S.	Turner	 and	Roland	Robertson	 (1991:	 252–
254,	258–259)	point	out	that	in	his	home	country	Parsons	criticised	racist	and	extreme	
right-wing	movements	and	he	was	aware	of	the	shortcomings	of	the	American	schooling	
system.24	Thus,	 in	 an	 appraisal	 like	 this,	 Parsons	 is	mainly	 understood	 to	 represent	 a	
moderate	right-wing	tradition.
In	the	1970s,	a	contrast	emerged	into	system-theoretical	sociology	that	later	proved	to	
be	a	long-term	one.	From	the	1950s	onward,	Parsons	and	his	disciples	and	successors	had	
dominated	this	branch	of	sociology;	among	those	successors	belonged	also	Luhmann,	who	
published	his	first	investigations	in	the	mid-1960s.	Unlike	Parsons,	in	his	early	production	
as	well	as	in	his	late	production	Luhmann	does	not	speak	about	the	needs	of	social	systems,	
for	he	only	presents	that	each	social	system	has	a	specific	function	in	society;	and	even	if	
social	systems	are	somehow	related	to	people=s	needs,	it	is	incorrect	to	analyse	and	explain	
them	by	pointing	to	the	supposed	needs	of	systems	(see	Luhmann	1973;	1974;	1976).	
However,	 in	 the	 1970s	 traditional	 sociological	 system	 theory	 was	 faced	 with	 a	 more	
radical	criticism,	since	at	that	time	leftist	or	Marxist	sociologists	began	to	elaborate	their	
own	versions	of	system	theory.	At	the	head	of	this	movement	was	Habermas.	In	1971,	
he	and	Luhmann	published	their	joint	book	Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie	
(Theory	of	Society	or	Social	Technology),	which	includes	two	articles	by	him	and	three	
articles	by	Luhmann	(see,	nearer,	Habermas	&	Luhmann	1976).	It	was	in	that	book	that	
Habermas	accused	Luhmann=s	 system	theory	of	conservatism	and	conformism	and	he	
tended	to	regard	it	largely	as	a	tool	for	social	technology.	Yet,	the	contrast	between	them	
has	been	deeper,	for	already	in	1970	Luhmann	had	started	to	publish	his	series	of	books	
under	the	title	Soziologische	Aufklärung	(Sociological	Enlightenment)	in	which	he,	in	fact,	
imposes	limits	on	social	criticism,	on	Enlightenment	thinking	and	on	politically	radical	
24	See,	also,	Müller	1996:	311;	Robertson	&	Turner	1991a;	Robertson	&	Turner	1991b.
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movements	–	that	is,	on	the	values	that	have	been	genuinely	important	for	Habermas.	
Thus,	 in	 his	 system	 theory	Habermas	 has	 continued	 the	 values	 and	 the	 tradition	 of	
the	Enlightenment	philosophy,	whereas	Luhmann	has	adopted	an	 ironical	and	critical	
attitude	toward	their	certain	parts.
There	is	Aan	emancipatory	knowledge	interest@	in	Habermas=	system	theory,	which,	
among	 other	 things,	means	 that	 it	 criticises	 Athe	 pathologies	 of	modern	 society@	 and	
modern	 social	 systems.	A	rather	 similar	knowledge	 interest	 is	 shared	by	Bourdieu	and	
Giddens	who	also	began	to	work	on	their	own	versions	of	systemic	sociology	in	the	1970s.	
Albeit	the	relationship	between	them	and	the	Parsonsian-Luhmannian	tradition	has	been	
tense	 and,	 from	 time	 to	 time,	 polemical,	 system-theoretical	 sociology	 contains	 more	
alternatives	 than	these	 two.	For	example,	Alexander,	Colomy	and	Münch	have	 largely	
elaborated	their	sociological	thinking	on	the	basis	of	Parsons=	sociology,	but	at	the	same	
time	they	have	taken	into	account	most	of	the	critical	remarks	and	comments	concerning	
Parsons=	 sociology.	 Accordingly,	 they	 do	 not	 share	 and	 approve	 of	 the	 conservative	
implications	of	Parsons=	sociology,	nor	do	they	practise	sociology	on	the	leftist	basis.	For	
reasons	like	these,	they	can	perhaps	best	be	classified	as	liberal	sociologists.
(D) The Above-Mentioned Tensions in the Systemic Study of the Sphere of Art
The	 above-mentioned	 tensions	manifest	 themselves	 also	 in	 the	 systemic	 study	 of	 the	
sphere	of	art.	As	far	as	the	controversy	between	realistic	and	constructivist	epistemology	is	
concerned,	most	of	the	research	work	in	the	systemic	study	of	art	seem	to	follow	realistic	
presuppositions.	Among	this	body	of	research	one	finds,	among	other	things,	Bourdieu=s	
and	Alain	Darbel=s	L=amour de l=art. Les musées d=art européens et leur public (The	Love	of	
Art.	European	Art	Museums	and	their	Public,	1969)	and	Bourdieu=s	Les régles de l=art. 
Genese et structure du champ littéraire (The	Rules	of	Art.	Genesis	and	Structure	of	 the	
Literary	Field,	1992).	The	former	is	based	on	a	wide-ranging	survey	of	museum	visitors	
throughout	Europe,	and	it	argues	that	an	ability	to	enjoy	art	is	not	a	natural	or	an	inherent	
gift	but	a	socially	inculcated	disposition	that	is	typical	chiefly	among	the	representatives	
of	the	upper	social	classes.	In	the	latter	investigation,	Bourdieu	shows	how	the	literary	
field	 and	 the	 artistic	 field	 in	 general	 gradually	 obtained	 a	 differentiated	 and	 relatively	
autonomous	position	in	French	society	in	the	19th	century.	Thus,	in	this	way	Bourdieu	
has	created	realistic	representations	of	the	field	of	art.	His	investigations	are	realistic	in	
the	sense	that	they	were	intended	to	adequately	represent	the	field	that	exists	objectively	
–	that	is,	independent	of	Bourdieu=s	own	opinion	and	activities	–	in	the	societal-cultural	
reality.
In	 the	 epistemological	 sense,	 rather	 similar	 representations	 are	Becker=s	 	Art World 
(1984,	 originally	 published	 1982),	 Christa	 Bürger=s	 Der Ursprung der bürgerlichen 
Institution Kunst im höfischen Weimar (The	Origin	of	 the	Bourgeois	 Institution	of	Art	
in	 the	Court	of	Weimar,	1977)	 and	Peter	Bürger=s	Theorie der Avantgarde (Theory	of	
Avant-Garde,	1974).	Becker=s	 investigation	presents	 to	 sociologists	of	art	 a	conceptual	
vocabulary	by	means	of	which	they	can	make	empirical	research	work	concerning	the	art	
world.	Christa	and	Peter	Bürger	have	usually	explored	the	modern	system	of	art	or	the	
modern	institution	of	art	from	a	historical	standpoint.	Under	the	circumstances,	in	the	
above-mentioned	investigation	Christa	Bürger	explicates	Johann	Wolfgang	von	Goethe=s	
(1749–1832)	 literary	and	theatrical	activities	and	his	conception	of	art.	 In	his	Theorie 
der Avantgarde	Peter	Bürger,	 in	 turn,	endeavours	 to	create	a	 theory	of	 the	avant-garde	
movements	of	 the	20th	century,	 in	particular,	of	 the	early	20th	century.	In	this	 sense,	
he	pays	attention	to	phenomena	such	as	Dadaism,	surrealism,	Bertolt	Brecht=s	political	
theatre,	John	Heartfield=s	photomontages	and	Andy	Warhol=s	pop	art.
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In	the	systemic	study	of	the	sphere	of	art,	constructivist	epistemology	manifests	itself	
most	clearly	 in	Luhmann=s	and,	 in	particular,	Schmidt=s	 investigations,	but	all	of	their	
disciples	and	co-operators	have	not	necessarily	adopted	a	constructivist	train	of	thought.	
Some	of	those	disciples	and	co-operators	have	simply	ignored	epistemological	questions,	
whereas	researchers	like	Gebhard	Rusch	(1993;	1997)	and	Reinhold	Viehoff	(1993)	use	
system	theory	chiefly	in	a	methodological	way,	that	is,	as	a	tool	by	means	of	which	they	
wish	to	classify	and	systematize	their	observations	and	materials.
As	a	conscious	anti-humanist	Luhmann	is	a	rather	rare	phenomenon	in	the	systemic	
study	of	 the	 sphere	of	art.	Most	 representatives	of	 the	 systemic	 study	consider	 the	art	
life	as	a	social	formation	that	consists	of	human	action	as	well	as	rules,	conventions	and	
resources	guiding	that	action;	and	when	those	researchers	speak	about	works	of	art,	they	
understand	works	of	art	as	manifestations	of	human	meanings	and	human	subjectivity.	
Only	Luhmann	and	his	most	loyal	disciples	seem,	as	far	as	it	is	possible	at	all,	to	speak	
about	 works	 of	 art	 as	 if	 those	 works	 were,	 to	 a	 great	 extent,	 independent	 of	 human	
actors.	To	be	sure,	in	his	art-theoretical	major	work	Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (The	Art	
of	Society,	1997a,	originally	published	1995)	Luhmann	thinks	that	art	is	a	special	sort	
of	 communication:	 art	 communicates	 by	 using	 perceptions	 and	 images	 that	 concern	
the	world,	and	in	this	way	it	makes	perceptions	and	images	available	for	other	people.	
Therefore,	Luhmann	also	holds	that	art	is	close	to	psychic	systems.	Yet,	he	continues,	art	
cannot	be	equated	with	psychic	systems	and	mental	states	of	affairs,	for	it,	like	other	social	
systems,	operates	by	means	of	communication	and	in	doing	this	it	only	utilises	certain	
psychic	and	physical	capabilities	of	actors.	Thus,	in	Luhmann=s	(1991:	38–39,	44,	63)	
thinking	social	systems	basically	operate	by	means	of	communication	and	psychic	systems	
conduct	their	operations	by	means	of	consciousness.
In	Luhmann=s	art-theoretical	investigations,	the	system	of	art	is,	in	fact,	connected	to	
communication	in	a	twofold	sense.	On	the	one	hand,	works	of	art	mediate	perceptions,	
images	 and	 representations	 of	 the	world	 to	 receivers;	 in	 this	way,	 they	 can	be	 said	 to	
function	as	vehicles	of	communication.	On	the	other	hand,	receivers	and	researchers	of	
art	as	well	as	art	critics	use	to	present	comments	on	works	of	art,	which	means	that	they	
practise	communication	concerning	works	of	art.	As	Boris	Groys	(1996:	9)	points	out,	
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft	 is	first	and	foremost	 interested	 in	communication	that	 takes	
place	through	works	of	art;	and	conversely,	only	to	a	minor	extent	does	it	pay	attention	
to	communication	concerning	works	of	art.	Yet,	in	his	other	art-theoretical	investigations	
Luhmann	takes	more	clearly	into	consideration	the	latter	aspect	of	artistic	communication	
(see,	for	example,	Luhmann	1984:	51–53).	
Even	if	Luhmann	theorised	about	social	systems	without	a	theory	of	action,	he	could	
not	 entirely	 abandon	 the	 category	 of	 actor	 in	 his	 art-theoretical	 books.	 In	Die Kunst 
der Gesellschaft he	uses	this	category,	for	example,	when	speaking	about	perceptions	and	
images.	It	should,	of	course,	be	noticed	that,	actually,	perceiving	or	observing	is	an	activity	
that	is	performed	by	an	actor	or	subject.	More	generally,	Luhmann	needs	terms	such	as	
Aartist@	and	Areceiver	of	art	works@	in	his	theory	of	the	system	of	art.	What	is	important	
here	is	the	fact	that	for	him	Aartist@,	Areceiver@	and	Aobserver@	are	abstract	figures	with	
no	specific	social	properties.	He	does	not	tell	us	the	social	class,	sexual	group,	age	group,	
ethnic	group	and	regional	area	these	actors	belong	to.	As	a	result,	he	gives	us	a	rather	
abstract	scientific	representation	of	the	system	of	art.	This	representation	seems	to	pass	
over	the	variety	of	any	concrete	social	world.
Luhmann	 used	 an	 abstract	 language	 of	 this	 kind	 because	 he	 thought	 that	 entire	
human	beings	do	not	belong	to	social	systems.	Undoubtedly,	he	holds,	social	systems	are	
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produced	and	maintained	by	human	actors,	but	the	entire	bodies	and	minds	of	human	
actors	 lie	outside	 social	 systems.	Likewise,	Luhmann	often	speaks	about	 the	 system	of	
art	abstractly.	Consequently,	in	the	above-mentioned	book	he	pays	wide	attention	to	the	
formal	and	structural	properties	of	the	art	works	and	to	the	operation	principles	of	the	
system	of	art	(cf.	Hutter	1996:	2–3;	Groys	1996:	8).	In	the	same	way,	he	also	used	to	
speak	about	other	social	systems,	for	example,	about	science,	law,	economics	and	mass	
media.
In	the	systemic	study	of	 the	sphere	of	art,	Luhmann	is	not	 the	only	representative	
of	affirmative	attitude.	In	fact,	there	is	in	the	systemic	study	of	the	sphere	of	art	a	sub-
branch	 that	 can	 perhaps	 be	 called	 Aadministrative	 research@.	 This	 expression	 derives	
from	 the	 situation	 that	 nowadays	 states	 in	Western	 countries	 need	 explications	 about	
the	art	life	and	cultural	policy	that	are	practised	within	their	territory.	Explications	like	
these	are,	for	example,	made	by	universities	and,	in	particular,	by	separate	research	units	
maintained	by	states,	and	states	then	use	them	as	a	basis	for	decision-making	in	cultural	
policy.	Thus,	more	or	less	unambiguously	those	explications	serve	the	needs	of	public	art	
administration	and	public	cultural	policy.	As	a	 typical	example	of	explications	such	as	
these	one	should	mention	Cultural Policy in Finland. European Programme for National 
Cultural Policy Review. National Report (1995)	which	 has	 been	 published	 by	 the	Arts	
Council	of	Finland,	that	is,	by	an	institution	maintained	by	the	Finnish	State.	On	the	
one	hand,	the	explication	in	question	offers	an	overview	of	the	production,	mediation	
and	reception	of	the	products	of	art	and	mass	media	in	Finland,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	
it	clears	up	in	what	ways	the	State	and	the	public	sector	in	Finland	maintain	and	support	
the	cultural	life.	Similar	explications	have	also	been	made	in	other	countries,	especially,	
in	countries	belonging	to	the	European	Union,	since	countries	in	the	European	Union	
have,	to	a	certain	extent,	attempted	to	follow	a	common	cultural	policy,	albeit	at	the	same	
time	the	European	Union	declares	that	it	respects	the	cultural	autonomy	of	its	member	
states.25
The	 investigations	 of	Habermas,	 the	 Bürgers,	 Bourdieu	 and	 their	 congenial	 souls	
represent	 the	 spirit	 of	 leftist	 critical	 theory	 in	 the	 systemic	 study	of	 the	 sphere	of	 art.	
The	researchers	in	question	are,	to	name	some	typical	instances,	critical	of	society=s	class	
structure	 and	 cultural	 inequality	 as	 well	 as	 of	 the	modern	 systems	 of	 economics	 and	
politics.	There	are	in	contemporary	sociology	and	cultural	studies	other	kinds	of	critical	
voices	as	well;	in	particular,	the	feminist	movement	and	the	voices	of	sexual	minorities	
cannot	be	left	without	mentioning	in	this	connection.	However,	so	far	there	has	not	been	
any	powerful	 feminist	 and	 sexual-political	 research	 traditions	 in	 the	 systemic	 study	of	
the	sphere	of	art.	To	be	sure,	of	the	feminist	sociologists	of	art	it	is	Janet	Wolff	who	was	
formerly	close	to	systemic	study.	Her	book	The Social Production of Art (1993,	originally	
published	1981)	considers	themes	such	as	the	production,	mediation	and	reception	of	
art	works	from	a	sociological,	Marxist	and	feminist	standpoint,	but	after	having	changed	
into	a	truly	feminist	researcher	she	almost	lost	her	interest	in	the	systemic	study	of	the	
sphere	of	art.	Like	many	other	feminists,	she	has	been	much	more	interested	in	questions	
of	micro-politics	than	in	questions	concerning	systems.26
25	See	Häyrynen	2006	and	Ristimäki	2002.	
26	For	example,	in	Wolff=s	books	Feminine Sentences. Essays on Women and Culture (1990)	and	Resident 
Alien. Feminist Cultural Criticism (1995)	the	systemic	standpoint	is	almost	completely	missing.
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2 THE ARTICLES IN THIS STUDY
2.1 General and Methodological Remarks
The	four	articles	included	in	this	thesis	have	been	published	in	different	contexts	and	at	
different	times.	The	first	one	of	them	was	published	in	a	Danish	system-theoretical	journal,	
the	second	one	in	a	British	sociological	journal	and	the	fourth	one	in	an	Estonian	literary	
journal.	The	third	article	was	published	in	a	Finnish	collection	of	articles;	thematically,	
the	articles	in	that	collection	deal	with	different	manifestations	of	aesthetic	culture.	As	
for	the	time-dimension,	the	articles	were	published	during	the	period	2000–2006.	This	
thesis,	then,	is	based	on	the	following	articles:
I	 AA	 Long-Term	 Contrast	 in	 Systemic	 Sociology:	 Niklas	 Luhmann=s	 Anti-
Humanist	 System	Theory	 and	 Actor-Centric	 Critical	Theory@.	Cybernetics and 
Human Knowing 13:2(2006),	pp.	64–93.
II	 AArt	as	an	Autopoietic	Sub-System	of	Modern	Society.	A	Critical	Analysis	
of	the	Concepts	of	Art	and	Autopoietic	System	in	Luhmann=s	Late	Production@.	
Theory, Culture and Society 18:1(2001),	pp.	75–103.
III	 AThe	Art	World	in	Contemporary	Western	Culture	and	Society.	An	Outline	
of	a	Theoretical	Model	Based	on	Systemic	Study@.	Seppo	Knuuttila,	Erkki	Sevänen	
and	Risto	Turunen	(eds.),	Aesthetic Culture. Essays in Honour of Yrjö Sepänmaa on 
His Sixtieth Birth Day, 12 December 2005.	Helsinki	2005:	Maahenki,	pp.	137–
172.
IV	 A>The	 Post-National	 Condition=.	On	 the	 Relationship	 Between	 the	 State,	
Nation	 and	Nationalist	 Policy	 in	 the	 Present-Day	Western	World@.	 Juri	Talvet	
(ed.),	Culture	 and	Nation	 at	 the	Turn	of	 the	Millenium.	Tartu:	Tartu	Ülikooli	
kirjastus.	Interlitteraria	5(2000),	pp.	15–36.
Thematically	 these	 articles	 form	 a	 relatively	 homogenous	 whole.	Three	 of	 them	 deal	
directly	with	questions	of	system	theory	and	the	systemic	study	of	the	sphere	of	art,	and	
one	of	them,	that	is	the	fourth	one,	is	more	indirectly	connected	with	those	questions.
Articles	I	and	II	consider	how	present-day	system-theoretical	sociology	comprehends	
modern	 and	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 or	 with	 what	 kinds	 of	 theoretical	
models	and	representations	of	that	reality	it	provides	us	with.	Questions	connected	with	
modern	 culture	 and	 society	 are	 in	 those	 articles	 on	 hand	 partly	 explicitly	 and	 partly	
implicitly,	 whereas	 questions	 connected	 with	 contemporary	 or	 postmodern	 societal-
cultural	reality	are	reflected	upon	explicitly	within	them.	It	should	be	noticed	that	system-
theoretical	 sociology	 has	 expressly	 concentrated	 on	 the	 study	 of	modern	 culture	 and	
society;	thus,	modernity	has	had	a	pride	of	place	in	it.	This	special	position	derives	from	
that	system-theorists	have	thought	that	it	is	precisely	modern	society	in	which	different	
systems	have	clearly	differentiated	from	each	other.	In	this	sense,	modernity	has	made	
possible	sociological	system	theory,	and	modern	culture	and	society,	in	turn,	have	formed	
a	 paradigmatic	 object	 for	 system-theoretical	 sociological	 analysises.	 However,	 system-
theorists	do	not	always	explicitly	mention	their	strong	bond	to	modernity	or,	alternatively,	
they	 are	 not	 always	 quite	 themselves	 aware	 of	 that	 bond.	 For	 example,	 especially	 in	
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the	1950s,	Parsons	 constructed	 abstract	models	 by	means	 of	which	 sociologists	 could	
analyse	concrete	societal	phenomena.	Although	Parsons	did	not	usually	specify	to	which	
societies	 those	models	would	best	be	 applicable,	he	 largely	built	 them	on	 the	basis	of	
modern	Western	or	highly	differentiated	society.	The	latest	ongoing	societal	and	cultural	
macro-changes,	 that	 is,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 phenomena	 called	 Apostmodernity@	 and	
Aglobalisation@,	have	made	bonds	such	as	these	more	visible.
Articles	 I	 and	 II	 also	 deal	 also	 with	 how	 present-day	 system-theoretical	 sociology	
grasps	 the	position	of	 the	 sphere	of	art	 in	modern	and	contemporary	 societal-cultural	
reality.	In	fact,	this	is	one	of	the	main	questions	in	those	articles.	Yet,	a	question	like	this	
cannot	be	handled	thoroughly	without	first	clearing	up	how	system-theoretical	sociology	
comprehends	modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	at	a	general	level.	It	is	
just	for	this	reason	that	those	articles	begin	by	considering	system-theoretical	models	of	
modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality,	whereafter	they	explicate	what	kind	
of	position	the	sphere	of	art	obtains	in	those	models.	Article	III	deviates	from	articles	I	
and	II	in	that	it	focuses	on	the	sphere	of	art.	On	this	basis,	it	presents	an	overall	view	
of	how	systemic	studies	of	the	sphere	of	art	conceive	of	the	contemporary	art	world	or	
contemporary	system	of	art.
In	addition,	the	above-mentioned	articles	deal	with	internal	tensions	within	system	
theory.	On	 the	one	hand,	 they	 analyse	 the	 contrast	between	Luhmann	and	 the	 leftist	
critical	theory	and,	on	the	other	hand,	when	appraising	Luhmann=s	thinking	they	also	
take	 into	 account	 the	 critique	 that	 system-theorists	 such	 as	 Renate	 Mayntz,	 Vessela	
Misheva	 and	 Richard	Münch	 have	 directed	 at	 Luhmann.	 In	 those	 articles,	 I	 outline	
my	own	conception	of	the	contemporary	system	of	art	by	starting	from	the	concept	of	
action	and	by	borrowing	ideas	from	Luhmann	as	well	as	from	his	opponents	and	critics.	
Moreover,	my	 conception	of	 the	 contemporary	 system	of	 art	 takes	 seriously	 the	 ideas	
presented	by	theorists	of	postmodernity	or	reflexive	modernity.	In	particular,	I	tend	to	
hold	 that	 the	 concept	of	de-differentation	 should	be	 a	most	 important	 concept	when	
system-theoretical	sociology	describes	the	relationships	between	the	contemporary	system	
of	art	and	the	other	functional	and	cultural	systems.
Model-theoretical,	methodological	and	meta-theoretical	questions	are	 important	 in	
articles	I	and	II,	whereas	article	III	concentrates	on	outlining	a	theoretical	model	of	the	
contemporary	sphere	of	art	and	article	IV,	in	turn,	sketches	a	theoretical	model	of	modern	
and	contemporary	nationalism	in	Western	societies.	The	central	system-theorist	in	articles	
I	and	II	 is	Luhmann	(1927–1998)	who	seems	to	be	 the	most	discussed	and	the	most	
innovative	figure	in	recent	system-theoretical	sociology.	In	the	1980s,	Luhmann=s	theory	
of	autopoietic	social	systems	was	chiefly	discussed	in	the	German-speaking	countries,	but	
since	the	1990s	it	has	increasingly	been	an	object	of	an	international	process	of	estimation.	
In	this	respect,	the	thesis	on	hand	can	be	seen	as	a	part	of	that	process	of	estimation.	At	
the	same	time,	the	thesis	presumes	that	Parsons=,	Habermas=	and	Bourdieu=s	thinking	is	
already	relatively	well-known	in	the	Western	academic	world,	whereas	Luhmann=s	 late	
production	has	only	recently	become	more	familiar	to	the	academic	world	outside	the	
German-speaking	 countries.	For	 these	 reasons	Luhmann=s	 theory	of	 autopoietic	 social	
systems	obtains	a	special	position	in	this	thesis.
Table	1	(see	page	19)	presents	a	list	of	classes	of	different	systems.	From	the	standpoint	
of	this	list,	articles	I–III	deal,	in	the	first	instance,	with	functional	and	societal	systems,	
that	is,	with	two	sub-systems	of	social	systems;	and,	secondarily,	they	deal	with	cultural	
systems	 whose	 instances	 works	 of	 art	 can	 be	 understood.	 In	 part,	 the	 fourth	 article	
uses	the	concept	of	system	in	the	same	way,	but	its	main	focus	is	elsewhere.	Namely,	it	
considers	modern	Western	nationalism	as	a	cultural	system	whose	position	has,	according	
to	certain	theorists,	become	problematic	in	a	contemporary	globalised	and	multi-cultural	
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world.	 Traditionally	 nationalism	 was	 an	 especially	 important	 phenomenon	 from	 the	
standpoint	of	the	modern	sphere	of	art,	since	from	the	late	18th	century	onward	it	was	
firmly	rooted	in	the	sphere	of	art.	In	other	words,	it	was,	in	part,	just	works	of	art	that	
gave	expressions	to	national	sentiments	and	nationalist	ideologies	in	Western	countries;	
and,	on	the	other	hand,	official	cultural	policy	practised	by	Western	states	attempted	to	
maintain	and	strengthen	the	bond	between	art	and	nationalism.	For	this	reason,	a	system-
theoretical	representation	of	the	sphere	of	art	should	not,	as	often	happens,	ignore	the	
phenomenon	of	nationalism.	The	important	question	in	this	connection	is	what	kind	of	
position	nationalism	has	nowadays	in	cultural	policy	and	in	the	sphere	of	art.	
Methodologically,	the	articles	are	based	on	the	idea	of	rational	reconstruction	that	is	a	
relatively	common	principle	or	procedure	in	theoretical	research	work	(see,	for	example,	
Heiskala	 2000:	 13).	When	 applying	 this	 idea	 I	 go	 analytically	 and	 critically	 through	
different	theories	and	investigations	of	modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	
endeavouring	to	discover	their	merits	and	shortcomings.	Although	a	critical	analysis	 is	
a	 necessary	 tool	 in	 a	 procedure	 like	 this,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 define	 the	merits	 of	
those	 theories	and	 investigations,	because	 their	merits	can	be	utilised	when	a	systemic	
study	 attempts	 to	 outline	 a	 more	 adequate	 model	 or	 representation	 of	 modern	 and	
contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality.	Articles	 I–IV	outline	a	model	 such	as	 this	 from	
the	 standpoint	of	 the	 sphere	of	 art.	The	model	 in	question	 is	not	 a	detailed	 systemic	
representation	of	societal-cultural	reality;	rather	it	presents	some	general	guidelines	for	a	
more	detailed	systemic	representation.
2.2 Article I: AA Long-Term Contrast in Systemic Sociology: Niklas 
Luhmann=s Anti-Humanist System Theory and Actor-Centric Critical 
Theory@
The	first	article	deals	with	the	contrast	between	Luhmann	and	critical	theory	in	systemic	
sociology.	As	the	main	representatives	of	critical	theory	in	systemic	sociology,	the	article	
regards	 Bourdieu,	 Giddens	 and	 Habermas.	 The	 Luhmannian	 approach	 is	 politically	
moderate,	 and	 it	 consciously	 rejects	 humanism=s	 anthropocentric	 picture	 of	 society.	
Conversely,	the	critical	approach	is	closely	connected	with	modern	Western	humanistic	
culture	 and	 its	 democratic	 ideals,	 and	 its	way	 of	 considering	 systems	 is	 actor-centric.	
Elements	of	societal	criticism	are	almost	entirely	missing	in	Luhmann=s	system	theory,	
whereas	critical	theorists	use	to	practise	societal	and	system	criticism	in	their	sociology.	
When	 analysing	 these	 approaches	 the	 article	 pays	 particular	 attention	 to	 their	 art-
theoretical	views,	because	the	contrasts	in	question	manifest	themselves	clearly	in	those	
views.	However,	the	latter	half	of	the	article	endeavours	to	show	that	when	Luhmann=s	
works	are	interpreted	freely	and	against	his	own	interpretations	certain	gaps	between	him	
and	critical	theory	can	be	overcome.	Through	this,	systemic	sociology	can	utilise	both	
of	 these	prominent	 and	 interesting	 approaches	 in	 a	 contemporary	 analysis	of	 societal-
cultural	reality.
In	this	article,	a	partial	synthesis	between	the	Luhmannian	approach	and	critical	theory	
is	based	on	an	action-theoretical	point	of	departure.	In	other	words,	when	considering	
the	functional	social	sub-systems	the	article	understands	them	as	systems	of	action	and	
interaction.	Thus,	the	art	life	can	be	seen	as	a	one	of	the	functional	action	and	interaction	
systems	of	modern	and	contemporary	 society.	However,	 this	dimension	contains	only	
one	side	of	the	sphere	of	art;	the	other	side	consists	of	the	state	of	affairs	that	art	is	also	a	
cultural	system.	Among	other	things,	works	of	art	and	artistic	traditions	form	this	other	
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side	which	cannot	be	adequately	conceptualised	by	means	of	the	concepts	of	action	and	
interaction.
A	partial	synthesis	between	the	Luhmannian	approach	and	critical	theory	is	possible	
because	 those	 two	 approaches	have	 certain	 things	 in	 common.	First	 of	 all,	 they	 agree	
that	modern	 society	has	been	 a	 functionally	differentiated	 formation	 in	which	 several	
sub-systems	or	fields	have	obtained	a	high	degree	of	system	autonomy.	Similarly,	both	of	
them	hold	that	aesthetic	values	and	codes	have	been	prevalent	in	the	modern	art	world	
that	 constitutes	one	of	 the	 functionally	differentiated	 sub-systems	or	fields	of	modern	
society.	Where	 they	differ	 from	each	other	 in	 this	 connection	 is	 the	different	 rank	of	
theoretical	tools	with	which	they	have	interpreted	this	situation.	According	to	Luhmann, 
each	funtionally	differentiated	sub-system	is	based	on	a	value	distinction	that	characterises	
this	whole	sub-system.	The	value	distinction	in	question	manifests	itself	in	the	medium	
code	of	this	sub-system,	and	the	basic	value,	in	turn,	manifests	itself	in	its	medium.	In	
the	1980s	and	in	the	early	1990s,	Luhmann	was	inclined	to	think	that	in	the	system	of	
art	Beauty	functions	as	the	medium	and	the	distinction	Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	as	the	
medium	code;	thereby	Luhmann	committed	himself	to	the	aesthetic	view	of	art.	However,	
later	he	arrived	at	the	conclusion	that	the	category	of	Beauty	cannot	be	regarded	as	the	
medium	of	the	system	of	art,	in	particular,	of	the	contemporary	system	of	art.	In	his	last	
investigations,	that	is,	in	his	works	Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (The	Art	of	Society,	1997a,	
originally	published	1995)	and	Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft  (Society=s	Society.	Two	
Volumes,	1997b	and	1997c)	he	proposed	that	we	may	regard	the	category	of	Fittingness	
as	the	medium	of	the	system	of	art	and	the	code	of	Fitting/Non-Fitting	would,	then,	be	
its	medium	code.	The	category	of	Fittingness	 says	 that	 in	a	 successful	work	of	art	 the	
details	or	components	must	fit	 the	 rest	of	 the	work;	otherwise	a	work	of	art	does	not	
function	well.	This	category	is	obviously	more	general	than	the	category	of	Beauty,	for	
the	latter	can	be	understood	as	a	special	case	of	the	former.	As	such,	transformations	like	
these	in	Luhmann=s	thinking	are	important	and	interesting;	yet,	they	did	not	change	his	
basic	way	of	considering	systems.	
Basically,	Luhmann	considers	 the	media	 and	medium	codes	of	 social	 systems	 as	 if	
they	would	largely	function	independently	of	people	who	act	in	those	systems.	According	
to	him,	when	society	was	differentiated	into	functional	sub-systems,	these	sub-systems	
began	 to	 develop	 their	 own	media	 and	medium	 codes.	Gradually,	 the	media	 and	 the	
medium	codes	settled,	and	at	the	same	time	functional	differentiation	become	society=s	
main	structural	feature;	this	constellation	guarantees	the	autopoiesis	of	functional	sub-
systems.	Naturally,	people	use	 the	media	 and	medium	codes	 in	question	when	 acting	
in	 sub-systems,	 but	 their	 action	 does	 not	 define	 the	 identity	 and	 boundaries	 of	 each	
sub-system.	It	is	the	media	and	medium	codes	that	provide	functional	sub-systems	with	
their	 identity	and	boundaries.	In	Bourdieu=s	La distinction. Critique social du jugement 
(Distinction.	A	Social	Critique	of	the	Judgement	of	Taste,	1979)	and	in	Peter	Bürger=s	
Theorie der Avantgarde (Theory	 of	 the	 Avant-garde,	 1974)	 aesthetic	 codes	 are	 seen	
differently.	Bourdieu	and	Bürger	regard	them	as	the	attitudes	and	dispositions	of	their	
social	 actors.	 On	 the	 level	 of	 their	 consciousness	 and	 self-understanding,	 actors	 use	
aesthetic	codes	but	the	sociology	of	art	should	not	limit	itself	to	the	stating	of	this	state	
of	affairs;	it	should	not	limit	itself	to	the	phenomenology	of	aesthetic	attitudes	and	codes.	
It	must	go	beyond	the	individual	actors=	self-understanding	and	ask	what	underlies	this	
kind	of	phenomenon	or	what	kinds	of	consequences	this	phenomenon	has.	
By	adopting	an	aesthetic	attitude	certain	art	devotee	groups	do,	in	Bourdieu=s	theory,	
unconsciously	attempt	to	distinguish	themselves	from	lower	social	classes	that	are	unable	
to	draw	complicated	distinctions	between	different	attitudes	or	codes.	In	this	sense,	an	
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aesthetic	attitude	would	only	form	a	part	of	the	upper-class	habitus	or	strategy	which	the	
upper	classes	use	to	distinguish	themselves	from	other	classes.	Thus,	Bourdieu	emphasises	
that	 the	 clear-cut	 differentiation	 of	 codes	 is	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	
cultural	interests,	life	style	and	habitus	of	the	higher	social	classes.	Bürger,	on	the	other	
hand,	thinks	that	aesthetic	experience	is	a	state	of	mind	in	which	modern	social	actors	
can	 momentarily	 feel	 themselves	 to	 be	 harmonious	 subjects	 and	 obtain	 imaginative	
compensation	for	the	shortcomings	of	reality.	In	this	respect,	that	experience	functions	
as	a	neutralizer	of	any	critical	 attitude	 towards	 society,	 and	 in	 the	 last	 resort	 it	has	an	
affirmative,	and	not	a	radical,	influence	on	the	rest	of	society.	In	this	way,	Bourdieu	and	
Bürger	 arrive	 at	questions	of	 societal	power	 relationships,	 cultural	 inequality	 and	art=s	
influences.	Luhmann=s	art-theoretical	 investigations	 largely	pass	over	questions	such	as	
these.
Even	if	Luhmann	ignores	concrete	social	actors	and	their	world,	his	sociology	is	not	
entirely	void	of	critical	elements.	For	him,	the	world	as	it	shows	itself	to	us	is	contingent	by	
nature.	Our	picture	of	this	world	varies	according	to	the	kinds	of	distinctions	and	concepts	
that	we	apply	to	it.	In	his	articles	ADas	Kunstwerk	und	die	Selbstreproduktion	der	Kunst@	
(Work	of	art	and	the	Self-Production	of	Art,	1986)	and	ADie	Weltkunst@	 (World	Art,	
1990),	he	argues	that	works	of	art	help	us	to	understand	that	everything	that	exists	in	this	
our	phenomenal	world	could	also	exist	in	another	way	-	in	other	words,	that	this	world	
can	be	constructed	in	different	ways.	Hence,	it	is	the	function	of	art	to	provide	people	
with	alternative	models	of	the	phenomenal	world;	works	of	art	realise	this	function,	for	
example,	by	producing	fictional	worlds	that	differ	from	our	normal	phenomenal	world.	In	
contrast,	critical	theory	has	understood	works	of	art	as	an	implicit	or	explicit	criticism	of	
the	instrumental	rationality	that	prevails	in	modern	society.	Because	Luhmann	discarded	
the	realistic	epistemological	assumptions	that	underlie	the	thinking	of	critical	theorists,	
he	could	not	approve	a	view	like	this.	He	stated	that	critical	theories	include	no	notion	
of	 the	 contingent	 or	 constructivist	 nature	 of	 artistic	 representations	 and	 sociological	
descriptions.	Rather,	they	have	simply	adopted	the	position	of	a	ABesserwisser@,	that	is,	
they	speak	about	society	as	if	only	they	would	be	able	to	know	its	true	nature.
In	his	epistemology,	Luhmann	differentiated	between	three	levels	of	observation.	(1)	
In	the	case	of	first-order	observations,	the	world	is	divided	into	separate	states	of	affairs,	
events	and	objects.	These	observations	are	directed	towards	reality,	but	they	cannot	attain	
it	as	such.	This	impossibility	derives,	Luhmann	continued,	from	the	fact	that	our	minds	
are	autopoietic	systems	that	handle	sense	perceptions	according	to	their	inner	principles	
of	operation.	Therefore,	we	can	only	construct	contingent	and	changing	pictures	of	our	
phenomenal	world	 by	means	 of	 different	 distinctions	 and	 concepts.	 (2)	 Second-order	
observations	are	directed	towards	the	observations	produced	by	the	first	order;	they	take	
the	first-order	observations	 as	 the	objectcs	 of	 reflective	 reasoning.	 (3)	The	 third	order	
consists	of	systematically	developed	theories	which	try	to	describe	and	explain	the	world.	
Now,	according	to	Luhmann,	critical	theorists	observe	society	by	means	of	distinctions	
such	 as	 democratic/non-democratic	 and	 authentic/non-authentic,	 whereas	 Luhmann	
himself	thinks	that	sociology	can	actually	only	be	critical	at	the	levels	of	second-order	and	
third-order	observations;	that	is,	in	an	epistemologically	honest	sense	sociology	can	only	
critically	analyse	the	distinctions,	concepts	and	theories,	by	means	of	which	sociologists	
and	the	laity	observe	society.
Luhmann	and	critical	theorists	do	not	agree	on	the	use	value	of	the	concept	of	de-
differentiation.	 Luhmann	was	 not	 fond	 of	 this	 concept,	 because	 he	 thought	 that	 the	
process	 of	 functional	 differentiation	 is	 still	 going	 on.	Critical	 theorists,	 in	 turn,	 have	
shared	 the	 view	 that	 the	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	
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process	 of	 de-differentiation.	At	 the	 same	 time	 they	 have	 been	 critical	 of	 this	 process	
which,	according	to	them,	is	changing	the	entire	society	into	a	market	place;	a	change	
like	this	threatens	to	destroy	the	wide	autonomy	of	the	sphere	of	art	and	through	this	the	
sphere	of	art	would	lose	its	capability	to	criticise	society=s	shortcomings	and	distortions.	By	
utilising	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	one	could	also	say	that	the	process	of	de-differentiation	
is	decreasing	the	degree	of	 the	autopoiesis	of	social	 systems,	even	 if	Luhmann	did	not	
himself	understand	that	concept	precisely	in	this	way.	According	to	him,	autopoiesis	is	
not	at	all	a	matter	of	degree:	a	functional	sub-system	operates	either	autopoietically	or	not	
–	and	there	is	not	a	third	possibility.
At	 the	 end,	 the	 article	 argues	 that	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 contains	
diverse	 elements.	 Namely,	 even	 if	 functional	 sub-systems	 are	 nowadays	 losing	 their	
autonomy	 and	 autopoiesis,	 at	 the	 same	 time	works	 of	 art	 and	 cultural	 products	 have	
become	increasingly	self-reflexive	and	intertextual,	that	is,	they	contain	more	and	more	
allusions	to	themselves	and	to	other	works	of	art	and	cultural	products.	In	this	sense,	the	
sphere	of	art	has	become	more	autopoietic,	since	an	autopoietic	system	is	self-referential	
and	self-productive.
2.3 Article II: AArt as an Autopoietic Sub-System of Modern Society. 
A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Art and Autopoietic Systems in 
Luhmann=s Late Production@
The	second	article	is	concerned	with	Luhmann=s	theory	of	the	system	of	art	which	he	
formulated	in	the	1990s,	in	particular,	in	his	books	Die Ausdifferenzierung des Kunstsystems 
(The	Differentiation	of	the	System	of	Art,	1994)	and	Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (The	Art	
of	Society,	1997a,	originally	published	1995).	The	 theory	 in	question	 is	based	on	his	
general	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems.	His	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems,	in	
turn,	implies	a	theory	of	modernity	because	he	thought	that	it	is	just	under	the	conditions	
of	modernity	that	functional	sub-systems	can	obtain	or	have	obtained	an	autopoietic	way	
of	operation.
When	describing	modern	 society,	Luhmann	gives	pride	of	place	 to	 the	 concept	of	
functional	differentiation.	In	general,	he	thought	that	the	development	of	human	society	
can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	main	 phases,	 according	 to	 what	 society=s	 primary	 form	 of	
differentiation	has	been.	Consequently,	the	history	of	human	society	comprises	an	archaic,	
a	civilized	and	a	modern	phase.	In	all	of	them,	society	has	been	a	differentiated	formation.	
Archaic	society	was	primarily	differentiated	in	a	segmented	way,	civilized	society	was	based	
on	a	stratified	differentiation	and	modern	society	is	first	of	all	a	functionally	differentiated	
formation,	although	it	also	contains	segmented	and	stratified	differentiation.	Segmented	
differentiation	divided	society	into	parts	or	sub-systems	(families,	tribes,	clans,	villages)	
which	are	distinct	and	equal.	Stratified	differentiation	divided	society	into	sub-systems	
(estates,	status	groups)	which	are	distinct	and	unequal.	Finally,	functional	differentiation	
divides	 society	 into	 sub-systems	 that	 serve	 different	 functions.	 Luhmann	 regarded	
functional	 differentiation	 as	 the	 dominant	 structural	 feature	 of	 modern	 society.	This	
society	consists	of	sub-systems	(economics,	politics,	law,	science,	education,	art,	religion)	
each	of	which	has	 a	 specific	 function	 in	 society.	As	 for	 the	concept	of	differentiation,	
Luhmann	defined	it	by	stating	that	differentiation	is	nothing	more	than	a	recurrence	of	
a	system/environment	difference	inside	a	system,	either	in	society	as	a	whole	or	in	some	
of	its	sub-systems.	Thus,	in	the	process	of	societal	development,	society	is	divided	into	
sub-systems	which	see	the	rest	of	society	as	their	environment.
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In	 Luhmann=s	 theory,	 functionally	 differentiated	 modern	 sub-systems	 operate	
autopoietically,	 that	 is,	 they	 are	 operationally	 closed	 systems	 with	 regard	 to	 their	
environment.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 they	 would	 have	 no	 connections	 to	 their	
environment.	The	environment	is	for	them	a	source	of	energy	and	information,	and	it	
imposes	some	general	limitations	on	their	functioning.	But	an	autopoietic	system	handles	
this	energy	and	information	according	to	 its	 internal	medium	and	medium	code,	that	
is,	according	to	its	own	principles	of	operation;	and,	thus,	precisely	in	this	sense,	it	is	an	
operationally	closed	formation.	Autopoietic	formations	are	also	self-referential.	Because	
they	themselves	produce	the	elements	of	which	they	consist	they	are	able	to	self-recur	and	
self-regenerate.	Those	 elements	 are	 communications;	 functionally	 differentiated	 social	
sub-systems	 consist	 of	 communications	which	 they	 themselves	 produce	 and	which	 in	
turn	maintain	 them.	Consequently,	 in	modern	 society	 functionally	differentiated	 sub-
systems	 are	 communicative	 systems,	 each	 of	 which	 has	 its	 own	 specific	medium	 and	
medium	code.	For	example,	in	the	sub-systems	of	economics	people	communicate	with	
the	medium	of	Money,	and	they	classify	or	codify	acts	into	payments	and	non-payments.	
In	the	sub-system	of	science,	in	turn,	the	medium	is	the	category	of	Truth,	and	by	means	
of	 the	code	True/Untrue	scientists	appraise	 the	truth	value	of	observations,	 statements	
and	theories.
Besides	modern	functional	sub-systems,	society	as	a	whole	can	be	understood	as	an	
autopoietic	system	with	regard	to	its	environment.	Yet,	in	his	works	Luhmann	concentrates	
on	considering	modern	functional	sub-systems.	It	should	be	noted	that	autopoiesis	is	a	
condition	for	the	state	of	affairs	that	the	sub-systems	can	be	functional	for	society	in	an	
effective	way.	 From	 the	 functional	 standpoint,	 the	 sub-systems	 are	 by	 no	means	 self-
sufficient	or	autotelic	formations.	Their	autopoiesis	guarantees	that	they	can	serve	society	
well.
Luhmann	 was	 quite	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 view	 of	 functional	 differentiation	
and	modern	 society	 is	not	 in	accordance	with	 theories	of	postmodernity	and	reflexive	
modernity.	Those	 theories	have,	 among	other	 things,	 stated	 that	nowadays	 functional	
sub-systems	are	increasingly	interlaced	–	with	the	result	that	there	would	no	longer	be	
clear-cut	boundaries	between	different	sub-systems.	Likewise,	globalisation	theorists	have	
pointed	out	that	individual	societies	or	national	societal	systems	have	lost	a	great	deal	of	
their	 economic,	political	 and	cultural	 independence;	 and	 thus,	 societal	 systems	would	
nowadays	also	be	interlaced.	
As	 for	 theories	 of	 postmodernity	 and	 reflexive	modernity,	 Luhmann	 thought	 that	
they	are	based	on	untenable	presuppositions,	because	they	define	functional	sub-systems	
by	means	of	the	concept	of	action.	However,	Luhmann	remarks,	human	action	usually	
belongs	to	several	sub-systems,	so	it	is	difficult	to	understand	the	process	of	differentiation	
on	the	basis	of	the	concept	of	action.	Instead,	he	continues,	if	we	lean	on	the	concept	
of	 communication,	 then	 we	 can	 better	 understand	 that	 the	 principle	 of	 functional	
differentiation	is	still	the	dominant	structural	feature	of	our	society	-	or	that	our	society	
still	consists	of	different	and	distinct	media	and	medium	codes	and	comparable	functional	
sub-systems.	According	to	Luhmann,	globalisation	theorists,	 in	 turn,	have	been	blind,	
because	they	have	not	understood	that	there	can	be	no	national	or	regional	societal	systems	
under	the	conditions	of	modernity:	only	political	administrations	and	legal	systems	have	
clung	to	regional	boundaries,	while	other	 functional	 sub-systems	have	 functioned	as	a	
part	of	world	society,	at	least	since	the	beginning	of	modernity.	That	beginning	can	be	
placed	at	the	18th	century,	for	at	that	time	the	aristocratic	estate	society	fell	into	decay	
and	it	was	replaced	by	a	functionally	differentiated	society.
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In	his	production,	Luhmann	did	not	make	a	distinction	between	social	and	cultural	
systems,	he	speaks	only	about	social	systems.	Yet,	by	applying	this	distinction	one	can	say	
that	in	his	theory	of	the	sub-system	of	art	he	concentrates	on	those	things	that	characterise	
art	as	a	cultural	system.	Namely,	for	Luhmann	the	sub-system	of	art	was	mainly	a	non-
material	 formation	whose	 chief	 constituents	were	 its	medium	 and	medium	 code	 and	
the	 stylistic	 and	 formal	 properties	 of	works	 of	 art.	He	 focused	 his	 attention	 on	 non-
material	or	abstract	phenomena	of	this	kind.	Such	being	the	case,	he	spoke	little	about	
the	 institutional	and	organisational	 side	of	 the	 sub-system	of	art.	There	are	museums,	
galleries,	 concert	 halls,	 publishing	 houses,	 artistic	 journals	 and	 artistic	 associations	 in	
the	sub-system	of	art,	but	Luhmann	largely	passed	over	concrete	phenomena	like	these.	
In	the	same	vein,	his	studies	deal	mainly	with	what	separates	the	sub-system	of	art	from	
other	sub-systems.	Only	to	a	minor	extent,	and	occasionally,	do	they	take	into	account	
the	connections	that	the	sub-system	of	art	has	with	other	sub-systems.
As	 a	 differentiated	 functional	 sub-system	of	modern	 society,	 the	 system	of	 art	 has	
its	own	boundaries	 that	separate	 it	 from	the	other	sub-systems;	 furthermore,	 it	has	an	
internal	order,	 and	 it	 serves	a	certain	 function	 in	 society.	 In	addition,	 if	 it	 really	 is	 an	
autopoietic	formation,	it	should,	then,	have	its	own	medium	and	medium	code	by	means	
of	which	it	handles	communicative	acts	concerning	works	of	art.	With	respect	to	these	
themes	or	alleged	properties	of	the	sub-system	of	art,	the	article	chiefly	deals	with	how	
Luhmann	understood	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 sub-system	of	 art	 and	how	he	 sought	 to	
define	its	medium	and	medium	code.	On	the	whole,	in	his	studies	of	the	system	of	art	
he	started	from	the	premise	that	the	system	in	question	can	be	regarded	as	an	autopoietic	
formation;	yet,	 in	 those	 studies	he	constantly	proved	 to	be	uncertain	of	what	actually	
functions	as	a	medium	and	as	a	medium	code	in	the	system	of	art.
Luhmann	states	that	one	of	the	peculiarities	of	the	system	of	art	is	that	in	it	works	
of	art	make	themselves	the	distinction	between	art	and	non-art:	they	themselves	claim	
that	they	are	art,	and	this	happens	with	the	help	of	formal	solutions.	Luhmann	thought	
that	certain	formal	solutions	are	peculiar	to	works	of	art,	and	for	this	reason	he	spoke	
about	the	specificity	of	artistic	form.	The	specific	form	constitutes	the	difference	between	
art	and	non-art	and,	 in	this	way,	makes	the	 identification	of	works	of	art	 for	receivers	
possible.	Yet,	Luhmann	added	that	nowadays	works	of	art	do	not	necessarily	follow	these	
principles;	in	contemporary	art,	a	great	deal	of	works	of	art	does	not	simply	possess	any	
distinctive	marks.	Therefore,	nowadays	people	must	often	know	some	outer	signals	or	
identification	marks	in	order	to	be	able	to	identify	works	of	art.	They	must,	for	example,	
know	whether	certain	objects	have	really	been	placed	on	display	as	works	of	art;	that	is,	
they	 should	 somehow	know	 the	 intentions	of	different	 cultural	producers,	performers	
and	distributors.
As	a	critique	on	these	thoughts,	the	article	claims	that	in	all	probability	works	of	art	
have	never	possessed	clear	and	unambiguous	distinctive	marks.	Therefore,	in	searching	for	
alternative	ways	to	reconstruct	the	boundary	between	art	and	non-art,	sociology	of	the	art	
can	bring	into	use	the	concept	of	discursive	power	that	has	its	roots	in	Michel	Foucault=s	
social	theory.	Discursive	power	is	a	power	of	definition	with	two	main	dimensions:	on	
the	one	hand,	the	owners	of	discursive	power	are	able	to	impose	the	normative	principles	
which	structure	societal-cultural	reality.	Those	principles	tell	social	actors	how	cultural	
artifacts	should	be	classified	into	different	types.	As	far	as	social	actors	have	internalised	
these	principles,	there	is	a	certain	normative	consensus	in	society.	In	this	case,	they	widely	
agree	on	what	kinds	of	artifacts	belong	 to	 the	domain	of	art.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	
normative	principles	 in	question	have	a	rather	general	nature.	They	do	not	necessarily	
contain	 all	 the	 information	 that	 actors	need	 in	 the	 classification	of	 the	 artifacts.	To	 a	
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certain	extent,	 individual	and	collective	actors	have	power	of	consideration	when	they	
apply	the	general	principles	to	practice	or	to	single	phenomena.	In	their	operations,	art	
critics,	art	galleries	and	art	museums	classify	artifacts	into	art	and	non-art,	or	into	good	
art	and	bad	art,	and	apply	those	principles	to	single	phenomena.	In	doing	this,	they	are	
interpreting	them	and	sometimes	also	modifying	and	transforming	them.
The	article	states	that	in	the	past	relatively	strict	rules	regulated	the	boundary	between	
art	 and	non-art.	Those	 rules	 stated	 that	 artifacts	must	have	 certain	 formal	or	 external	
properties	 and	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 human	 content	 before	 they	 can	 be	 accepted	 as	 art.	
Rules	like	these	were	not,	of	course,	wholly	exact	and	unambiguous,	but	in	the	current	
sphere	of	culture	 they	have	 largely	 lost	 their	credibility.	Nowadays,	 the	art	world	 lives	
in	a	 situation	 in	which	 there	are	no	 longer	clear	or	 strict	 rules	marking	 the	boundary	
between	art	and	non-art.	As	a	consequence,	both	the	experts	and,	more	particularly,	the	
laity	are	increasingly	uncertain	of	the	kinds	of	formal	and	substantial	properties	which	
artifacts	should	have	in	order	to	be	accepted	as	art.	This	situation	clearly	shows	how	the	
classification	of	artifacts	into	art	and	non-art	is	dependent	on	the	use	of	power	and	the	
will	of	the	institutions	of	art.
Luhmann	held	that	the	sub-system	of	art	must	have	a	specific	medium	and	a	specific	
medium	code,	for,	he	continued,	otherwise	it	would	not	be	an	autopoietic	formation.	His	
studies	contain	many	interesting	remarks	on	some	possible	candidates	for	a	medium	and	
a	medium	code;	all	of	them	have	been	an	object	of	critical	discussion	in	recent	systemic	
studies	of	the	sphere	of	art.	Thus,	it	seems	that	Luhmann	could	not,	in	a	satisfactory	way,	
define	the	communicative	tools	of	the	system	of	art.	The	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	fact	
that	his	concept	of	system	is	too	rigid.	The	domain	of	art	is	not	as	closed	as	he	presumed	
it	to	be.	On	the	contrary,	the	system	of	art	is	open	with	regard	to	other	social	and	cultural	
systems,	wherefore	its	communicative	tools	are	not	entirely	unique	or	specific;	those	tools	
can,	at	least	in	part,	be	in	use	also	in	other	social	and	cultural	systems.	As	a	result,	Schmidt	
has	proposed	that	the	Aspecific	code@	of	the	sub-system	of	art	might,	in	fact,	be	a	peculiar	
combination	of	several	codes.
The	article	presents	 that	 in	contemporary	societal-cultural	 reality	 the	system	of	art	
has	become	 increasingly	open	–	as	 theorists	of	de-differentiation	emphasise.	However,	
when	 describing	 this	 process	 the	 article	 chiefly	 leans	 on	 Mayntz=s	 and,	 especially,	
Münch=s	investigations,	and	it	takes	the	concept	of	action	as	its	point	of	departure.	De-
differentiation	is	understood	as	a	broadening	interpenetration	in	the	article.	Following	
Münch,	 interpenetration,	 in	 turn,	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 in	 which	
there	 are	 or	 there	 emerge	 common	 and	 overlapping	 areas	 between	differentiated	 sub-
systems;	these	areas,	or	interpenetrating	zones,	contain	elements	of	different	sub-systems.	
Albeit	 interpenetration	was	 already	 an	 important	 phenomenon	 in	modern	 society,	 in	
contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	its	meaning	is	clearly	increasing.	The	present	process	
of	 globalisation,	 for	 example,	 has	 created	 new	 economic,	 political,	 technological	 and	
cultural	interpenetrating	zones	between	national	societal	systems,	and	the	present	media	
revolution	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	have	produced	similar	zones	between	
the	sub-systems	of	art,	mass	media,	advertising,	fashion	and	design.	In	these	respects,	the	
sphere	of	art	has,	due	to	the	process	of	interpenetration,	become	less	autopoietic,	both	as	
a	social	and	a	cultural	system.
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2.4 Article III: AThe Art World in Contemporary Western Culture and 
Society. An Outline of a Theoretical Model Based on Systemic Study@
The	third	article	outlines	a	theoretical	model	of	contemporary	art	world	or	contemporary	
system	of	art	on	the	basis	of	the	systemic	study	of	art. In	doing	this,	the	article	takes	into	
account	both	the	sociological	and	the	philosophical	branch	of	the	systemic	study.	The	
former	 is,	 in	 particular,	 represented	 by	 the	 Luhmannian	 school	 and	 critical	 theorists,	
besides	which	the	article	utilises	theories	of	postmodernity	or	reflexive	modernity	and	the	
idea	of	de-differentiation.	The	philosophical	branch	 is	mainly	 represented	by	 theorists	
such	as	Arthur	C.	Danto	and	Donald	Kuspit,	of	whom	it	is	especially	Danto	who	has	also	
inspired	the	sociological	study	of	the	art	world	since	the	1980s.
By	the	expression	Acontemporary	art	world	in	Western	culture	and	society@	the	article	
gestures	towards	the	situation	that	has	characterised	art	life	in	Western	societies	since	the	
1960s.	By	proceeding	this	way,	the	article	follows	Danto	who	has	also	thought	that	the	
1960s	was	a	crucial	decade	in	the	development	of	art	life	in	Western	culture	and	society.	
More	 generally,	 theorists	 of	 postmodernity	 have	 often	 thought	 that	Western	 societies	
began	to	move	from	the	era	of	modernity	to	the	phase	of	postmodernity	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s.	Danto	and	the	other	representatives	of	the	philosophical	branch	do	not,	however,	
usually	 take	 into	 account	 large-scale	 societal	 changes	 and	 processes,	 wherefore	 it	 is	
necessary	to	complete	their	views	of	the	contemporary	art	world	with	macro-sociological	
theories.	A	completion	like	this	is	carried	through	at	the	end	of	the	article.
Theoretical	 models	 are	 abstract	 constructions	 that	 are	 framed	 with	 the	 intention	
that	they	would	help	us	to	understand	the	general	structure	and	operation	principles	of	
their	objects.	Hence,	in	the	study	of	culture	and	society,	such	models	usually	ignore	the	
differences	between	 single	 countries	or	 societies.	Subsequently,	 the	 article	mainly	pays	
attention	to	the	similarities	that	exist	between	single	countries	or	societies,	and	only	to	a	
lesser	extent	does	it	consider	the	differences	between	the	national	art	worlds.	Likewise,	as	
far	as	the	genre-based	sub-systems	of	the	system	of	art	are	concerned,	the	article	does	not	
in	any	detail	deal	with	divergences	between	them.	It	does	not	deny	the	existence	of	such	
divergences,	but	primarily	it	elaborates	an	abstract	model	or	representation	that	could	be	
applied	to	single	art	worlds.	
According	 to	 the	 article	 and	 systemic	 study,	 the	 central	 features	 and	 operation	
principles	of	 the	contemporary	Western	art	world	can	be	described	by	means	of	a	 list	
that	consists	of	nine	items.	Some	of	those	items	characterise	the	social	system	of	the	art,	
while	others	of	them	belong	to	the	cultural	system	of	the	art.	The	nine	items	in	question	
are	as	follows:
(1)	Till	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century	relatively	strict	rules	regulated	the	boundary	
between	art	and	non-art.	Both	theorists	and	devotees	of	art	shared	the	view	that	artifacts	
must	have	 certain	 formal	or	 external	properties	 and	 a	 certain	kind	of	human	content	
before	they	can	be	accepted	as	art.	The	original	avant-garde	movements,	however,	called	
these	rules	into	question.	When	Marcel	Duchamp	placed	or	attempted	to	place	on	display	
such	artifacts	as	a	urinal,	a	snow	spade,	a	coat	rack	and	a	machine	used	in	the	preparation	
of	chocolate,	he	offered	to	the	art	world	as	works	of	art	objects	whose	physical	or	external	
properties	did	not	separate	them	from	articles	of	daily	use.	Albeit	Duchamp,	dadaists,	
surrealists,	futurists	and	the	rest	of	the	original	avant-garde	movements	represented	only	
a	small	minority	in	the	Western	art	world	of	the	early	20th	century,	now	the	traditional	
conception	of	work	of	art	has	been	eclipsed	by	a	conception	whose	origin	lies	precisely	in	
the	original	avant-garde	movements.	According	to	this	dominant	new	conception,	works	
of	art	do	not	necessarily	possess	physical	or	external	distinctive	marks	that	separate	them	
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from	other	artifacts	or	objects.	On	the	contrary,	in	principle	anything	can	function	as	a	
work	of	art.
In	the	contemporary	art	world,	artists	such	as	Andy	Warhol,	John	Cage	and	Karlheinz	
Stockhausen	as	well	as	new	genres	such	as	body	art,	environmental	art,	installation	art,	
performance	and	community	art	have	shown	that	works	of	art	do	not,	indeed,	need	to	
possess	clear-cut	external	distinctive	marks.	Yet,	it	should	be	noticed	that	perhaps	all	of	
the	genre-based,	national	and	local	art	worlds	have	not	adopted	this	principle	entirely	and	
wholeheartedly.	Hence,	the	accuracy	and	prevalence	of	the	principles	in	question	needs	to	
be	specified	by	means	of	empirical	studies	of	genre-based,	national	and	local	art	worlds.
(2)	To	 a	 great	 extent,	 contemporary	 art	 has	 become	 estranged	 from	 the	 aesthetic	
conception	of	 art.	That	old	 conception	held	 that	works	of	 art	 are	primarily	meant	 to	
arouse	positive	aesthetic	experiences	in	their	receivers,	wherefore	it	is	important	that	the	
receivers	can	experience	them	as	sensuously	beautiful	and	pleasant	objects.	Contemporary	
art	does	not	emphasise	the	sensuous	side	of	works	of	art.	Its	central	constituents	are	the	
ideas,	thoughts	and	values	that	are	transferred	to	the	audience	by	the	sensuous	side.	A	
special	 branch	 in	 this	 de-aesthetized	 art	 is	 the	 so-called	 Adisturbatory	 art@	 which	 lays	
stress	on	artists=	social	and	political	responsibility.	Disturbatory	art	seeks	to	modify	the	
mentality	of	its	receivers,	and	often	it	has	been	inspired	by	feminist	thinking	and	feminist	
criticism	of	patriarchal	society.
Principle	 (2)	 is,	 above	 all,	 true	 of	 contemporary	 serious	 art,	 whereas	 popular	 art	
genres	 such	 as	 entertainment	music,	 rock	music,	 rap	music,	 film	 and	 television	 series	
give	 aesthetic	 pleasure	 and	 enjoyment	 to	 people.	Thus,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 sense	 aesthetic	
concepts	are	still	relevant	in	art	theory.	In	addition,	in	contemporary	culture	and	society	
the	process	of	the	de-aestheticization	of	serious	art	has	occured	at	almost	the	same	time	
as	 the	 process	 of	 the	 aestheticization	 of	 the	 everyday	 life.	The	 latter	 process	 includes	
phenomena	such	as	advertising,	fashion,	design,	urban	planning,	consumption	and	the	
omnipresence	of	the	media.	These	phenomena,	that	in	part	also	belong	to	the	sphere	of	
art,	have	made	our	social	environment	aesthetically	more	pleasant,	and	their	significance	
has	clearly	increased	in	contemporary	Western	life	styles.
(3)	The	auratic	charm	of	works	of	art	is	tendentiously	decreasing	and	disappearing.	
The	art-theoretical	concept	of	aura	comes,	of	course,	from	Walter	Benjamin=s	writings	
of	 the	1930s.	Benjamin	 stated	 that	works	of	 art	were	originally	 religious-magical	 cult	
objects,	and,	as	such,	they	were,	in	part,	experienced	as	sacred,	unattainable	and	unique	
objects.	From	those	times	on,	a	certain	kind	of	distance	between	the	works	of	art	and	
their	receivers	on	the	one	hand,	and	between	the	works	of	art	and	objects	of	daily	life	on	
the	other	hand,	belonged	to	the	characteristic	features	of	art.	However,	Benjamin	held	
that	this	distance	began	to	disappear	with	the	emergence	of	modern	popular	art	genres.	
Because	the	film	and	recorded	music	industries	manufacture	a	great	number	of	copies	of	
each	work,	they	dissolve	the	idea	of	the	uniqueness	of	a	work	of	art	and	through	this	they	
weaken	their	own	aura	as	works	of	art	as	well.
Likewise,	 due	 to	 recent	 changes	 in	 society=s	 communication	 and	media	 structure,	
ordinary	 people	 nowadays	 have	 opportunities	 to	 receive	 recorded	 and	 concert	music,	
films,	television	dramas,	television	series	and	music	videos	in	their	own	homes.	Thus,	the	
reception	of	works	of	art	is	an	integral	part	of	daily	life	in	contemporary	Western	society,	
and	partly	for	this	reason	art	is	no	longer	experienced	as	an	unattainable	and	mysterious	
thing.	 In	part,	phenomena	 (1)	and	 (2)	have	also	contributed	 to	 the	weakening	of	 the	
auratic	charm	of	works	of	art.
(4)	The	traditional	contrast	between	art	and	mass	culture	or	entertainment	has	lost	a	
great	deal	of	its	significance.	Before	the	1960s,	this	juxtaposition	was	a	constituent	part	
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of	the	ideology	of	high	modernism,	and	also	a	great	majority	of	intellectuals	and	cultural	
politicians	in	Western	countries	adopted	it.	This	way	of	thought	or	attitude	was	underlain	
by	 the	autonomy	conception	of	art	which	says	 that	genuine	or	authentic	art	does	not	
primarily	strive	for	economic	profit	or	popularity;	rather,	it	endeavours	to	satisfy	people=s	
aesthetic	and	spiritual	needs	and	to	enrich	the	national	culture	of	the	country	in	which	it	
originates.	Thus,	mass	culture	was	defined	as	a	commercial	phenomenon	and	as	a	threat	
to	the	authentic	values	of	art	and	national	cultures.	Because	a	great	deal	of	mass	culture	
was	 of	 American	 origin,	 criticism	 of	 it	 by	 European	 intellectuals,	 cultural	 politicians	
and	governments	was	 a	part	of	 their	fight	 for	 the	 right	 to	 cultural	 self-determination.	
During	the	last	decades,	the	governments	in	Western	Europe	have	also	actively	supported	
their	own	native	film	production	and	raised	the	quality	of	their	native	television	series	
production,	and	today	they	support	financially,	legislatively	and	symbolically	their	native	
cultural	 industries	–	recorded	music,	films,	television	series,	video	programmes,	digital	
products	–	which	they	usually	treat	both	as	an	artistic	and	an	economic	phenomenon.
(5)	 From	 the	 1980s	 on,	 the	 public	 cultural	 policy	 in	Western	 countries	 has	 been	
dominated	by	an	economic	paradigm	that	applies	economic	terms	to	the	sphere	of	art	and	
demands	straight	economic	benefits	from	it.	After	the	decades	of	the	Second	World	War,	
the	public	cultural	policy	in	Western	countries	strove,	among	other	things,	to	carry	out	
Aa	democratization	of	culture@,	but	today	the	significance	of	egalitarian	and	paternalistic	
ideals	is	decreasing	and	they	have,	in	part,	been	replaced	by	market-based	principles	of	
operation.
(6)	However,	at	the	same	time	increasing	diversity	and	pluralism	seem	to	characterise	
the	contemporary	Western	art	world.	This	art	world	 includes	 several	different	 stylistic	
layers,	for	example,	realistic,	modernist,	avant-gardist	and	postmodernist	works,	besides	
which	works	of	popular	art	can	often	be	classified	as	romances	or	as	romantic	melodramas.	
In	 addition,	 different	 regional,	 ethnic	 and	 sexual-political	 groups	 are	 active	 in	 the	 art	
world.
(7)	Today,	art	 is	 increasingly	 reflexive	by	nature,	 as	well.	A	 reflexive	work	 refers	 to	
and	comments	on	itself	or	other	works	or	art-theoretical	themes.	Implicitly,	Duchamp=s	
works	raised	theoretical	questions	such	as	what	makes	a	certain	object	a	piece	of	art	and	
what	the	boundary	between	art	and	non-art	is	based	on.	Today,	questions	like	these	are,	in	
particular,	important	in	visual	art	genres.	Similarly,	contemporary	novelists	use	to	reflect	
upon	the	conventions	of	the	novel	genre,	and	contemporary	American	popular	films	are	
rich	with	allusions	to	the	film	history	to	which	they	adopt,	for	example,	a	parodying	or	
nostalgic	attitude.
(8)	The	scope	of	the	art	world	has	broadened,	and	the	boundaries	between	different	
genres	of	art	have	become	indefinite.	The	former	feature	is	due	to	the	fact	that	from	the	
1960s	on	a	great	number	of	new	genres	of	cultural	production	have	been	accepted	as	
art.	These	include,	among	other	things,	films,	photographs,	modern	dance,	happenings,	
performances,	body	art,	kinetic	 art,	 environmental	 art,	 earth	art,	graffiti,	 installations,	
rap,	 video	 art	 and	 community	 art.	 In	 the	 contemporary	 art	world,	 these	 genres	 often	
blend	with	each	other.
(9)	The	external	boundaries	of	the	system	of	art,	that	is,	its	relations	to	other	social	
and	cultural	systems	have	become	indefinite,	as	well.	These	systems	are	more	and	more	
interlaced,	and	the	most	extreme	theorists	of	contemporary	culture	and	society	state	that	
the	system	of	art	is,	actually,	merging	with	other	systems.
In	the	philosophical	branch	of	systemic	study	it	is,	in	particular,	Kuspit	who	thinks	
that	the	system	of	art	is	dissolving	and	changing	into	a	commercial	entertainment	culture.	
Danto=s	thinking	lacks	the	skepticism	and	pessimism	that	is	characteristic	of	Kuspit,	but	
also	he	speaks	about	the	end	of	art	–	meaning	that	at	least	the	visual	art	genres	seem	to	
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be	fusing	with	theoretical	discourses	and	the	philosophy	of	art.	At	the	macro-sociological	
level,	 the	position	and	 the	 state	of	 the	 system	of	art	 can	be	described	and	 interpreted	
by	means	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 reflexive	modernisation	 and	 de-differentiation.	Reflexive	
modernisation	means	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 points	 of	 departure	 of	Western	modernity.	
Most	of	 the	 features	and	operation	principles	of	 the	contemporary	system	of	art	 seem	
to	call	into	question	the	modern	conception	of	art,	that	is,	a	conception	that	took	shape	
by	the	18th	century.	In	this	sense,	the	contemporary	phase	of	the	system	of	art	appears	
to	represent	a	criticism	and	a	questioning	of	classical	Western	modernity.	On	the	other	
hand,	by	utilising	the	concept	of	de-differentiation	one	can	say	that	in	the	contemporary	
societal-cultural	reality	the	degree	of	the	autonomy	and	differentiation	of	the	system	of	
art	 is	 decreasing.	Whilst	 becoming	more	open	 this	 system	has,	 in	 an	 inverse	 relation,	
changed	into	a	less	system-like	formation.
2.5 Article IV: A>The Post-National Condition=: On the Relationship 
Between the State, Nation and Nationalist Policy in the Present-Day 
Western World@
Article	IV	uses	the	concept	of	system	in	a	slightly	different	way	than	articles	I-III	do.	In	
articles	I-III,	the	concept	of	system	mainly	refers	to	the	functional	system	of	art,	to	the	
cultural	system	of	art	and	to	societal	systems. More	or	less	implicitly	and	explicitly,	the	
concepts	of	functional,	cultural	and	societal	system	are	present	in	the	fourth	article,	but	
in	the	first	 instance,	 this	article	deals	with	modern	nationalism	as	a	system	of	cultural	
beliefs,	ideas,	values	and	symbols,	that	is,	as	a	certain	kind	of	cultural	system.	In	addition,	
the	article	considers	 the	position	of	nationalism	 in	modern	and	contemporary	culture	
and	society.	In	particular,	it	clears	up	what	kind	of	position	nationalism	has	nowadays	in	
public	cultural	policy	and	cultural	institutions	within	the	Western	world.
Questions	 concerning	 nationalism	 and	 cultural	 policy	 are	 important	 from	 the	
standpoint	of	the	system	of	art,	since	from	the	late	18th	century	on	national	identities	and	
nationalist	ideologies	were	usually	constructed	by	means	of	traditions,	myths,	narratives,	
visual	representations	and	musical	compositions	as	well	as	by	publishing	studies	of	native	
language,	history	and	folklore	and	by	developing	collective	and	political	symbols.	For	this	
reason,	the	systemic	study	should	explicate	the	relationships	between	the	modern	system	
of	art	and	nationalist	policy.	Similarly,	even	if	it	has	been	stated	that	the	position	and	the	
role	of	nationalism	has	weakened	in	contemporary	public	cultural	policy,		systemic	study	
should	not	give	up	studying	that	position	and	role.
At	the	end	of	the	third	article,	I	make	a	brief	overview	of	nationalism=s	significance	in	
the	contemporary	public	cultural	policy	and	the	system	of	art.	The	fourth	article	can	be	
seen	as	a	more	detailed	continuation	of	that	overview.	Unfortunately,	overviews	like	these	
are	rare	in	systemic	models	of	the	sphere	of	art.	For	example,	Luhmann	and	his	disciples	
and	 successors,	 as	 well	 as	 critical	 theorists	 have	 almost	 completely	 ignored	 questions	
that	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 system	 of	 art	 and	 nationalist	
policy.	More	generally,	 it	 seems	that	 the	major	 theorists	and	the	 leading	researchers	at	
the	international	level	only	have	a	minor	interest	in	themes	and	questions	like	these.	In	
the	case	of	empirical	study,	the	situation	looks,	however,	different.	For	example,	when	
studying	the	Finnish	system	of	art	Finnish	researchers	use	to	take	into	account	nationalist	
standpoints	and	nationalist	cultural	policy	–	perhaps	for	the	reason	that	since	the	early	
19th	century	till	the	late	20th	century	the	Finnish	system	of	art	had	a	close	relationship	
with	the	construction	of	the	Finnish	national	identity	and	the	Finnish	national	culture.
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One	can	define	the	concepts	Anational@	and	Anationalism@	by	starting	with	the	idea	
of	nation.	Nation	can	be	understood	as	a	community	or	group	whose	members	believe	
that	 they	belong	 together,	which	provides	 them	with	a	 sense	of	mutual	 solidarity	and	
belonging.	For	this	reason,	those	members	share	the	same	kind	of	collective	identity	that	
is	called	their	Anational	identity@.	A	nation	also	has	a	name	–	for	example,	Athe	French@,	
Athe	Germans@,	Athe	Finns@,	Athe	Japanese@,	Athe	Chinese@	–	and	its	members	hold	that	
a	certain	area	or	place	 in	 the	world	 is	 their	home	country	or	 fatherland.	 In	general,	 a	
nationalist	movement	and	a	comparable	nationalist	policy	strive	to	establish	a	political	
unit	–	a	state	or	an	autonomous	territory	–	 for	a	 single	nation;	or,	 if	a	nation	already	
has	its	own	political	unit,	nationalist	policy	tries	to	protect	this	unit	and	strengthen	the	
collective	 identity	of	 the	nation	as	 a	whole.	Nationalist	 ideology	 is	 a	 system	of	beliefs	
and	values	 that	 expresses	 and	 legitimizes	 the	 aspirations	of	 the	 comparable	nationalist	
movement	and	nationalist	policy.	It	should	be	noted	that	nationalist	ideologies	have	been	
relatively	coherent	systems	of	beliefs	and	values,	that	 is,	systems	created	by	politicians,	
intellectuals	and	researchers.	In	addition,	nationalism	has	had	more	emotional	and	non-
systematic	manifestations	that	have	been	quite	common	among	lower	social	classes.	In	
this	connection,	that	popular	or	vernacular	nationalism	must	not	be	considered.
Since	the	1960s,	social	and	cultural	theorists	have	seen	nation-states	and	nationalism	
as	 products	 of	 the	 process	 of	 societal	 and	 cultural	 modernisation.	 Nation-states	 and	
nationalism	started	to	emerge	as	mass	phenomena	in	the	late	18th	century.	From	then	
on,	the	nation-state	has	constituted	a	norm	in	state-building,	first	in	the	Western	world	
and	later	also	further	afield.	How	can	such	phenomena	be	explained?	Why	have	nation-
state	and	nationalism	had	such	a	close	relationship	with	modernity?
In	part,	 that	 close	 relationship	can	be	 explained	 from	a	political	perspective.	After	
the	 collapse	 of	 feudalism	 and	 societies	 based	 on	 aristocratic	 estates	 the	 new	 brand	 of	
rulers	 could	no	 longer	 establish	 their	power	on	 a	 foundation	made	up	of	 religious	or	
metaphysical	principles,	or	on	dynastic	traditions.	Instead,	they	had	to	depend	on	people;	
that	is,	they	had	to	gain	the	approval	of	the	ordinary	people	for	their	right	to	rule.	Otto	
Dann	 (1991),	 a	German	historian,	 states	 that	 after	 the	 French	Revolution	 (1789)	 an	
approval	like	this	began	to	become	an	obligatory	and	necessary	part	of	political	culture,	
at	least	in	Western	Europe.	Thus,	nationalism	was	a	tool	that	helped	rulers	to	develop	
their	relationship	with	the	people.	Conversely,	it	helped	the	people	to	identify	and	to	feel	
solidarity	with	their	rulers	who	were	now	seen	as	members	of	the	same	group	-	or	national	
community	–	as	the	common	people	themselves.
Likewise,	it	is	possible	to	explain	the	popularity	of	the	nation-state	and	nationalism	
from	an	economic	perspective.	Namely,	the	development	of	modern	capitalism	required	
extensive	markets	which	extended	well	beyond	local	and	regional	boundaries.	Modern	
capitalism	built	up	a	structural	pressure	which	required	the	formation	of	a	national	market	
and	 a	national	 community	 to	make	use	 of	 it.	Benedict	Anderson	 (1983)	has	 pointed	
out	that	the	new	cultural	production	system	–	that	is,	the	modern	press	and	publishing	
companies	-	also	produced	special	effects	on	the	development	of	national	communities.	
Like	the	uniform	school	system,	this	Aprint	capitalism@	standardized	the	written	language	
and	helped	people	 to	understand	each	other	better.	Simultaneously,	 its	products	 -	 the	
news,	articles,	novels	–	helped	people	to	identify	with	their	national	community,	since	the	
products	of	print	capitalism	viewed	the	world	mainly	from	the	perspective	of	a	particular	
national	community.
In	 the	above-mentioned	senses,	 the	popularity	of	nation-state	and	nationalism	can	
be	understood	as	products	of	the	process	of	societal	modernisation.	Yet,	modern	nation-
states	are	not	entirely	products	of	the	process	of	modernisation.	According	to	Anthony	
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Smith,	many	Western	European	nation-states	derive	historically,	 at	 least	 in	part,	 from	
ethnic	communities.	An	ethnic	community	is	a	group	whose	members	believe	that	they	
are	descended	from	the	same	tribe	or	from	the	same	ancestors,	in	brief,	that	they	stem	
from	a	common	origin.	The	concept	of	nation	was	already	in	use	in	the	Middle	Ages;	at	
that	time	it	was	closely	connected	with	ethnicity.	The	medieval	concept	of	nation	was	also	
somewhat	narrow,	since	only	nobles	or	elite	groups	were	accepted	as	true	members	of	a	
nation	or	ethnic	community.	It	was	thought,	for	example,	that	only	the	English	nobility	
actually	belonged	to	the	English	nation	or	English	ethnic	community,	while	the	common	
people,	 or	 the	 Amob@,	 were	 excluded	 from	 the	 nation.	This	 kind	 of	 narrow	 concept	
of	nation	 also	prevailed	 in	Scottland,	France,	 Spain,	 Sweden	 and	Poland.	 In	 contrast,	
in	modern	nation-states,	 the	 ordinary	 people	 have	 been	 accepted	 as	 true	members	 of	
the	nation.	Roughly	speaking,	 this	process	has	 taken	place	 from	the	 late	18th	century	
onwards.
In	Western	Europe,	modern	nations	and	nation-states	were	usually	in	the	first	instance	
built	 by	 the	 states	 themselves.	Whilst	 doing	 this,	 those	 states	 used	 both	 political	 and	
cultural	tools;	that	is,	they	developed	collective	political	and	national	symbols	as	well	as	
cultural	beliefs	and	values	that	were	internalised	by	their	populations.	In	particular,	the	
uniform	school	system,	the	mass	media	and	the	arts	proved	to	be	important	tools	by	means	
of	which	the	symbols,	beliefs	and	values	in	question	were	spread	amongst	the	population.	
In	this	way,	each	of	those	states	made	its	own	population	a	relatively	homogenous	cultural	
whole.	In	Eastern	and	Southeastern	Europe	and	in	various	parts	of	Central	Europe,	the	
situation	was	different.	In	the	19th	century,	Eastern	and	Southeastern	Europe	was	ruled	by	
three	large,	bureaucratic	and	multinational	states,	namely	the	Russian	Empire,	the	Austro-
Hungarian	Empire	and,	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	(Turkey).	These	Empires	divided	up	
Eastern	and	Southeastern	Europe	between	themselves.	During	the	19th	century,	a	number	
of	national	liberation	movements	emerged	within	their	borders.	Because	those	movements	
could	not	get	support	from	the	multinational	states	already	mentioned,	they	had	to	create	
their	own	associations,	organisations	and	cultural	institutions.	And	although	they	tried	
to	establish	their	their	own	state	or	political	unit,	to	begin	with	they	had	to	act	without	
any	state	or	political	unit.	For	this	reason,	they	built	their	nation	primarily	with	the	help	
of	cultural	means,	whereas	traditional	Western	European	states	such	as	Spain,	France	and	
Great	Britain	could	lay	stress	on	the	national	importance	of	their	political	institutions,	as	
well.	In	a	similar	way,	German	and	Estonian	nationalist	movements	in	Central	Europe	
as	well	as	Finnish	and	Norwegian	nationalist	movements	in	Northern	Europe	developed	
their	own	ideology	primarily	on	a	cultural	basis,	because	at	that	time	Germany	consisted	
of	several	 independent	small	states	or	principalities,	Estonia	and	Finland	were	parts	of	
Russia	and	Norway	belonged	to	Sweden.
Still,	in	the	decades	after	the	Second	World	War,	the	public	cultural	policy	in	Western	
European	 countries	 contained	 a	 clear-cut	 nationalist	 dimension.	 At	 that	 time,	 those	
countries	developed	welfare	state	systems	that	took	care	of	their	citizens=	economic	and	
social	 security	and	their	physical	and	mental	health.	Politicians	 in	those	countries	also	
thought	 that	 it	was,	 as	 a	 last	 resort,	 the	duty	of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 local	 authorities	 to	
maintain	 a	 web	 of	 national	 cultural	 institutions	 and	 services.	 In	 addition,	 politicians	
created	financial	support	systems	for	the	arts;	they	held	that	systems	like	these	were	able	
to	rescue	the	national	cultures	of	Western	European	countries	from	the	supranational	or	
American	mass	culture.	Consequently,	those	systems	also	functioned	as	tools	in	nationalist	
protection	policies,	developed	by	the	states.
Since	the	1980s,	nationalist	considerations	have	gradually	lost	their	previous	strong	
position	in	the	cultural	policies	practised	by	Western	European	states,	to	be	replaced,	in	
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part,	by	a	neo-liberal	doctrine	which	demands	 that	 cultural	 institutions	 should,	 as	 far	
as	possible,	 be	 regarded	 as	business	 activities.	Therefore,	many	 cultural	 institutions	 in	
those	countries	and	their	cities	have	been	converted	into	commercial	enterprises	which	
have	to	produce	financial	profits	and	tempt	tourists	to	visit	the	countries	and	cities	 in	
question.	With	respect	to	this,	the	link	between	nationalist	policy	and	the	system	of	art	
has	weakened	in	Western	Europe.
In	the	centralized	state	system	of	the	Asocialist	bloc@,	that	is,	in	Eastern	and	Southeastern	
European	countries	and	in	certain	areas	of	Central	Europe,	nationalism=s	position	was	
not	firm.	However,	when	in	the	1980s	the	multinational	states	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	
the	Socialist	Federal	Republic	of	Yugoslavia	began	to	lose	their	previous	viability,	a	great	
number	of	nationalist	movements	began	to	emerge	with	surprising	rapidity	in	their	area.	
Many	of	those	movements	later	succeeded	to	establish	their	own	state,	and	after	that	they	
have	strengthened	their	national	orientations,	institutions	and	symbols.	Thus,	during	the	
last	decades	their	cultural	life	has	included	an	open	and	a	strong	nationalist	dimension.
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3 MODERN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 
IN THE LIGHT OF SYSTEMIC 
SOCIOLOGY
3.1 An Overall View of Systemic Theories of Modernity
On	the	basis	of	 system-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociology,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 reconstruct	
a	certain	kind	of	overall	view	of	modern	culture	and	society.	A	representation	like	this	
is,	of	course,	 rather	abstract,	and	 it	 largely	 ignores	 the	 incongruities	between	different	
representatives	 of	 system-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociology.	Nevertheless,	 one	 can	 say	
that	at	a	certain	level	of	abstraction	those	representatives	seem	to	have	certain	things	in	
common.	Almost	all	of	them	agree	that	modern	culture	and	society	can	be	characterised	
by	means	of	concepts	such	as	Afunctional	differentiation@,	Arationalization@	and	perhaps	
also	Asecularization@.
AFunctional	 differentiation@	 occurred	 as	 a	 systematically	 elaborated	 theoretical	
concept	 in	Parsons=	 system-theoretical	 investigations	 of	 the	 1950s.27	Despite	 this,	 one	
can,	 with	 good	 reasons,	 state	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 differentiation	 in	 itself	 had	 already	
been	used	by	the	classics	of	sociology.	In	particular,	this	generalisation	is	true	of	Georg	
Simmel	and	Émile	Durkheim.	In	his	work,	Über soziale Differenzierung. Soziologische und 
Psychologische Untersuchungen (On	Social	Differentiation.	Sociological	and	Psychological	
Investigations,	1890)	Simmel	considered	social	changes	and	processes	by	means	of	the	
concept	of	differentiation,	and	Durkheim=s	De la division du travail social	(The	Division	
of	Labour	in	Society,	1986,	originally	published	1893),	in	turn,	anticipated	the	concept	
of	functional	differentiation.	In	the	case	of	Durkheim,	Aanticipated@	means	the	fact	that	
although	 the	 concept	 of	 differentiation	 occurs	 in	 several	 different	 connections	 in	 his	
work,	there	he	usually	speaks	about	the	division	of	labour	as	well	as	about	the	variety	of	
modern	professions	and	tasks.	In	system-theoretical	sociology,	the	concept	of	functional	
differentiation	was	generalised	from	the	concept	of	the	division	of	labour,	and	at	the	same	
time	system-theorists	began	to	speak	about	society=s	functional	sub-systems.
Besides	Simmel	and	Durkheim,	the	concept	of	differentiation	was	also	used	by	Herbert	
Spencer,	Karl	Marx	and	Max	Weber.	In	fact,	Spencer	regarded	increasing	differentiation	
as	 an	 one	 of	 the	most	 central	 features	 or	 tendencies	 in	 societal	 evolution,	 and	Marx	
understood	modern	capitalist	economics	as	a	basically	autonomous	formation	that	has	
become	estranged	from	political,	moral	and	religious	regulation	and	from	its	Asoftening	
influence@.	When	 appraising	 Marx=	 theory	 of	 modern	 capitalist	 economics	 Johannes	
27	The	 sociological	 concept	 of	 functional	 differentiation	 is	 explicated,	 among	 other	 things,	 in	 S.N.	
Eisenstadt=s	Social Differentiation and Stratification (1977),	Niklas	Luhmann=s	(ed.)	Soziale	Differenzie-
rung. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie (Social	Differentiation.	Outline	of	a	General	Theory,	1985b),	
Renate	Mayntz=s,	Bernd	Rosewitz=s,	Uwe	Schimank=s	und	Rudolf	Stichweh=s	(eds.)	Differenzierung und 
Verselbständigung. Zur Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Teilsysteme	(To	Differentiate	and	to	Become	Inde-
pendent.	 About	 the	Development	 of	 Society=s	 Sub-Systems,	 1988),	 Jeffrey	C.	 Alexander=s	 and	 Paul	
Colomy=s	(eds.)	Differentiation and Social Change. Comparative and Historical Perspectives,	1990)	and	in	
Uwe	Schimank=s	Theorien	gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung (Theories	of	Societal	Differentiation,	1996).	
See,	also,	Stephen	Crook=s,	Jan	Pakulski=s	and	Malcolm	Waters=s Postmodernization. Change in Advanced 
Societies	(1992)	and	Scott	Lash=s	Sociology of Postmodernism (1992).
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Berger	(1992:	242–244)	even	compares	it	with	Luhmann=s	theory	of	autopoietic	social	
systems.	According	to	Berger,	Marx	conceived	of	modern	capitalist	economics	as	a	self-
referential	and	self-regulative	system	in	which	Acommodities	are	produced	for	the	sake	
of	commodities@	and	Acapital	is	heaped	up	for	the	sake	of	the	heaping	up	of	capital@;	in	
this	respect,	Marx=	theory	would	be	close	to	Luhmann=s	theory.	We	may	add	to	Berger=s	
appraisal	 that	Marx=	 theory	 also	 contains	 a	 clear-cut	 anti-humanist	 dimension,	 for	 he	
thought	that	people	do	not	participate	in	modern	capitalist	economics	as	entire	human	
beings	but	as	holders	of	certain	roles	or	Acharacter	masks@;	however,	unlike	Luhmann,	
Marx	was,	in	a	radical	way,	critical	of	a	state	of	affairs	such	as	this	which,	to	his	mind,	
enslaves	modern	people,	especially,	the	working	class.	Weber,	on	the	other	hand,	used	the	
concept	of	differentiation	in	his	own	view	of	modern	culture.	In	Weber=s	sociology,	societal-
cultural	rationalization	that	was	realised	by	the	Protestantism	led	to	the	differentiation	
of	the	Avalue	spheres@.	Therefore,	in	modern	culture,	science,	art	and	morality	are	largely	
independent	of	each	other	as	well	as	of	their	former	religious-metaphysical	foundations.	
In	one	of	his	key	texts,	AWissenschaft	als	Beruf@	(Science	as	Vocation,	1979,	originally	
published	1919),	Weber	writes	 that	 after	Charles	Baudelaire=s	 collection	of	poems	Les 
fleurs du mal (The	Flowers	of	Evil,	1857)	and	Friedrich	Nietzsche=s	works	one	knows	that	
a	thing	might	be	beautiful	without	being	good	in	a	moral	sense	-	or	that	a	thing	might	
be	beautiful	just	because	it	is	not	good	in	a	moral	sense.	Modern	value	spheres	or	value	
systems	are	not	only,	Weber	went	on,	differentiated	from	each	other;	they	also	compete	
with	each	other	and	they	are	in	contradiction	with	each	other.	For	this	reason,	it	is	difficult	
for	modern	civilization	to	attain	cultural	integration	and	to	maintain	a	collective	culture	
that	would	be	shared	by	all	of	its	members.
From	 Parsons	 onward,	 system-theoretical	 sociologists	 have	 characterised	 	 modern	
society	as	a	functionally	differentiated	formation	in	which	each	functional	sub-system	has	
its	own	specific	function.	Whilst	doing	this,	they	often	point	to	the	classics	of	sociology.	
Parsons,	for	example,	elaborated	his	own	system-theoretical	sociology	by	adopting	ideas	
from	Durkheim	and	Weber,	in	particular;	and	Habermas	has	appreciated	Marx=,	Weber=s	
and	 Parsons=	 theories	 of	 society.	How	 do	 system-theoretical	 sociologists,	 then,	 define	
the	 concept	 of	 functional	 differentiation?	Formerly	 they	were	 inclined	 to	define	 it	 by	
leaning	 on	 a	whole/parts	metaphor.	This	metaphor	 is	 in	 use,	 among	 other	 things,	 in	
Parsons=	works.	Consequently,	in	his	The System of Modern Societies (1971)	he	states	that	
Adifferentiation	is	the	division	of	a	unit	or	structure	in	a	social	system	into	two	or	more	
units	or	structure	that	differ	 in	their	characteristics	and	functional	 significance	 for	 the	
system@	(Parsons	1971:	26).	Thus,	a	starting	point	in	the	process	of	differentiation	is	an	
undivided	whole	that	will	be	divided	into	two	or	more	parts	or	structures	each	of	which	
has	a	specific	function	in	society:	a	definition	like	this	mainly	speaks	about	structural	and	
functional	differentiation.	Luhmann	(1997c:	707–743),	on	the	other	hand,	defined	the	
concept	of	differentiation	by	means	of	a	 system/environment	difference.	According	 to	
him,	differentiation	can	be	understood	as	a	recurrence	of	a	system/environment	difference	
inside	a	system;	in	this	connection,	the	word	Aa	system@	points	to	society	as	a	whole	or	
to	some	of	its	sub-systems.	Thus,	the	Luhmannian	definition	means	that	in	the	course	of	
societal	development	society	is	divided	into	sub-systems	which	regard	the	rest	of	society	
as	their	environment.
System-theoretical	 sociologists	 do	not	usually	deny	 that	 there	 are	 also	other	 forms	
of	 differentiation	 in	 modern	 society.	 Luhmann	 (1974:	 124,	 142,	 148;	 1975:	 136),	
especially,	claims	that	in	addition	to	functional	differentiation,	segmented	and	stratified	
differentiation	and	centre/periphery	differentiation	belong	to	modern	society.	Segmented	
differentiation	prevailed	in	primitive	or	archaic	society,	and	it	divided	society	into	parts	
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which	are	distinct	and	equal;	in	archaic	society,	those	parts	were	families,	tribes,	clans	and	
villages.	Stratified	differentiation	divides	 society	 into	 sub-systems	 that	 are	distinct	 and	
unequal;	 in	civilized	 society,	 those	 sub-systems	were	 estates	 and	 status	groups.	Finally,	
centre/periphery	 differentiation	 divides	 society	 into	 parts	 which	 possess	 a	 different	
quantity	of	economic,	political	and	cultural	resources;	for	example,	the	differences	between	
modern	capital	cities	or	modern	metropolitan	cities	and	small	towns	is	an	example	of	this	
form	of	differentiation.	Definitions	like	these	show	that	according	to	Luhmann	societal	
development	has	passed	from	primitive	or	archaic	society	to	civilized	society	and	from	
civilized	society	to	modern	society.	
It	should	be	mentioned	that	by	Aprimitive@	or	Aarchaic	societies@	Luhmann	(1997c:	
634–662,	678–706)	refers	to	tribal	societies,	and	by	Acivilized	societies@	(hochkulturelle	
Gesellschaften)	 he	 means	 both	 ancient	 democracies	 and	 tyrannies	 and	 medieval	 and	
premodern	 European	 societies;	 all	 of	 those	 civilized	 societies	 were	 aristocratic	 class	
societies.	 Parsons,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 used	 a	 somewhat	 different	 vocabulary.	When	
speaking	 about	 Aprimitive	 societies@	 he	 referred	 to	 tribe	 societies,	 and	 by	 the	 concept	
Aarchaic	societies@	or	Aintermediate	societies@	he	referred	to	those	societies	that	Luhmann	
termed	Acivilized	societies@.	According	to	Parsons	(1966:	51–52),	ancient	Egypt,	Greece	
and	Rome	as	well	as	traditional	China,	India	and	Islamic	empires	represent	archaic	or	
intermediate	societies.	What	Parsons	and	Luhmann	have	in	common	with	each	other	is	
that	they	structure	societal	history	with	the	aid	of	a	three-part	division.	Parsons	used	the	
pattern	 primitive--archaic/intermediate--modern,	 whereas	 Luhmann=s	 pattern	 has	 the	
form	primitive/archaicBcivilisedBmodern.
As	stated	earlier,	there	are,	in	modern	society,	several	different	forms	of	differentiation.	
In	his	 late	production,	Luhmann	wrote	 that	although	 functional	differentiation	 is	 the	
major	 structural	 feature	 of	modern	 society,	 class	 inequalities	 in	 this	 society	 represent	
stratified	differentiation;	yet,	modern	society	cannot	be	grasped	sufficiently	well	by	means	
of	 the	 concepts	 of	 social	 class	 and	 class	 inequalities,	 and	 the	 same	holds	 true	 also	 for	
concepts	such	as	Aindustrial	society@,	Acapitalist	society@	and	Aliberal-democratic	society@.	
(Luhmann	1985c:	141–142;	1987:	19–21,	51,	60).	To	be	sure,	Marxists	sociologists	and	
critical	theorists	have	pointed	out	that	in	his	view	of	modern	society	Luhmann	did	not	
pay	enough	attention	to	class	 inequalities	and	class	conflicts.	As	an	answer	to	remarks	
like	these,	Luhmann	(1985c:	151–152)	claimed	that	the	most	serious	problems	of	this	
society	-	for	example,	conflicts	between	states	and	environmental	problems	-	cannot	be	
solved	just	by	abolishing	the	contradiction	between	work	and	capital;	in	his	opinion,	this	
impossibility	indicates	that	the	basic	structure	of	modern	society	is	not	closely	connected	
with	 its	 class	 divisions.	As	 far	 as	 segmented	differentiation	 is	 concerned,	 for	 example,	
different	factories	and	enterprises	in	the	system	of	economics,	different	universities	in	the	
system	of	science	and	different	production	and	mediation	institutions	in	the	system	of	
art	represent	it	nowadays.
Even	if	Luhmann	thinks	that	modern	society	is	a	web	of	functional	sub-systems	and	
their	mutual	relationships,	in	practice	he	does	not	say	much	about	those	relationships.	
On	 the	 contrary,	he	often	 considers	 individual	 sub-systems	 as	 if	 they	were	Leibnizian	
monads,	that	is,	almost	entirely	closed	formations	or	islands.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is,	
in	particular,	Parsons	and	Münch	who	have	emphasised	that	functional	sub-systems	are,	
in	many	ways,	 interlaced.	There	 are,	 between	 sub-systems,	 common	 and	 overlapping	
areas	which	contain	elements	of	different	sub-systems;	these	common	and	overlapping	
areas	 are	 called	 Ainterpenetrating	 zones@	 by	Münch.	For	 example,	modern	 technology	
is	a	common	zone	between	science	and	economics:	these	two	sub-systems	–	the	natural	
and	technological	sciences	in	universities,	the	research	and	experimental	departments	in	
factories	and	enterprises	–	have	participated	in	the	development	of	modern	technology	
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which	 has	 formed	 a	 grounding	 for	modern	 economic	 production	 (Münch	 1984:	 14,	
18,	21;	1988b:	228).	Thus,	according	to	Parsons	and	Münch,	the	concept	of	functional	
differentiation	 does	 not	 alone	 define	 modern	 society	 sufficiently	 well,	 wherefore	
system-theoretical	 sociology	must	 also	 take	 into	 account	 the	 interpenetration	between	
different	or	differentiated	sub-systems.	Parsons	(1971:	26;	1985b:	169)	wrote	that	when	
functional	differentiation	is	Aprogressive@	or	successful,	the	sub-systems	are	interlaced	and	
the	interaction	between	them	takes	place	in	an	ordered	manner;	that	is,	there	is	a	good	
co-ordination	between	them.	This	is,	Parsons	underlined,	precisely	what	has	happened	
in	modern	Western	civilization,	whereas	 in	certain	other	or	Non-Western	civilizations	
functional	differentiation,	as	far	as	it	has	occurred	at	all,	has	caused	serious	problems	for	
the	functioning	of	the	whole	of	society.
ARationalization@	is	another	important	concept	in	system-theoretical	views	of	modern	
society.	This	concept	can,	for	example,	be	found	from	Parsons=	works	in	which	he	states	that	
Aprogressive	differentiation@	increases	society=s	abilities	to	adapt	itself	to	its	environment	
and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 successful	 differentiation	 such	 as	 this	 gives	more	 freedom	 of	
choice	to	individuals.	On	the	whole,	societies	like	these	are,	therefore,	more	effective	and	
rational	than	the	societies	in	which	functional	differentiation	is	not	a	central	structural	
feature.	These	thoughts	presented	by	Parsons	seem	to	be	derived	from	Durkheim=s	works.	
Durkheim	also	had	a	rather	positive	and	optimistic	view	of	 functionally	differentiated	
modern	Western	society.	Like	Parsons,	he	held	that	successful	functional	differentiation	
increases	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 productivity	 of	 functional	 sub-systems.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	Durkheim	stated	that	in	the	course	of	functional	differentiation,	society=s	cultural	
systems	–	that	is,	its	Acollective	consciousness@	–	have,	in	an	equal	manner,	become	more	
rationalized.	This	feature	is	due	to	the	fact	that	in	a	complex	and	differentiated	society	
collective	values	and	norms	cannot	usually	be	detailed	and	concrete.	Instead,	in	order	to	
be	capable	of	widely	regulating	the	action	of	individuals	those	values	and	norms	have	to	be	
rather	abstract;	and	it	is	precisely	their	abstractness	that	offers	individuals	an	opportunity	
to	exercise	their	own	discretion	in	concrete	situations.	In	this	sense,	the	rationalization	
of	cultural	systems	would	have	introduced	more	freedom	into	society.	Later,	this	view	of	
modern	culture	and	society	was	also	adopted	by	Parsons.
In	 addition,	 in	Luhmann=s	 and	Habermas=	works	 the	 idea	 of	 societal	 and	 cultural	
rationalization	 is	 connected	with	 the	 idea	of	 functional	differentiation.	However,	 they	
differ	from	Durkheim	and	Parsons	in	that	they	clearly	represent	a	pluralistic	conception	
of	rationality.	In	this	sense,	they	belong	to	a	wider	orientation	in	modern	thinking.	As	the	
German	philosopher	Wolfgang	Welsch	(1988:	79–81)	remarks,	a	displacement	towards	
pluralistic	thinking	and	a	pluralistic	conception	of	rationality	is	nowadays	common	in	
Western	intellectual	culture.	As	for	the	Anglo-American	world,	its	philosophical	roots	can	
be	partly	found	in	the	late	philosophy	of	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Peter	Winch=s	idea	of	a	
social	science,	T.S.	Kuhn=s	theory	of	scientific	revolutions	and	Paul	A.	Feyerabend=s	works	
on	the	theory	of	science.	For	example,	Wittgenstein=s	thoughts	on	the	diversity	of	language	
games	 and	 life	 forms	 have	 clearly	 inspired	 pluralistic	 thinking.	The	 other	 important	
source	 for	 the	 contemporary	 pluralistic	 train	 of	 thought	 is	 French	 post-structuralism,	
that	is,	philosophers	such	as	Gilles	Deleuze,	Jacques	Derrida,	Michel	Foucault	and	Jean-
Francois	Lyotard;	during	the	last	decades	they	have	perhaps	most	eagerly	criticised	the	
dominant	Western	conception	of	rationality.	Two	central	figures	 in	the	background	of	
their	 philosophies	 are	 Friedrich	Nietzsche	 and	Martin	Heidegger	who	 can	 be	 seen	 as	
forerunners	of	the	contemporary	pluralistic	train	of	thought.
Luhmann	already	adopted	a	plural	conception	of	rationality	in	his	early	investigations.	
For	example,	in	the	first	volume	of	his	Soziologische Aufklärung (Sociological	Enlightenment,	
1974,	originally	published	1970)	he	wrote	 that	 in	a	 functionally	differentiated	society	
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rationality	 has	 lost	 its	 unity.	 Hence,	 in	 modern	 society,	 rationality	 is	 always	 system-
specific	rationality	and,	as	such,	is	also	relative.	An	action	that	is	reasonable	or	acceptable	
in	one	system	might	be	unreasonable	or	foolish	in	another	system;	or	we	can	say	that	a	
person	who	acts	in	politics	or	economics	according	to	aesthetic	and	artistic	principles	is	
easily	stigmatized	by	others	as	a	troublemaker.	We	might,	 then,	conclude	that,	among	
other	persons,	Salvador	Dali	has	been	a	perfectly	acceptable	and	even	an	admirable	person	
in	the	art	world,	but	 in	the	sub-systems	of	politics	and	economics	he	would	probably	
have	been	a	somewhat	terrible	figure.	Luhmann	(1991:	7,	10;	1993d:	7,	11)	represents	
a	pluralistic	and	a	relativistic	conception	of	rationality	also	in	the	sense	that	he	thought	
that	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	obtain	a	horizon	from	which	one	would	be	able	to	observe	
the	entirety	of	society	correctly.	Every	horizon	is	partial	and	relative,	because	it	is	bound	
to	a	certain	sub-system	of	society	or	because	it	represents	the	standpoint	of	a	certain	sub-
system	(Luhmann	1985a:	629).
In	 Habermas=	 production,	 both	 his	 theory	 of	 knowledge	 interest	 and	 his	 theory	
of	 communicative	 action	discard	monolithic	 conceptions	of	 rationality;	 to	be	 sure,	 in	
this	connection	we	have	to	pass	over	the	former	and	focus	on	the	latter.	In	his	Theorie 
des kommunikativen Handelns (Theory	 of	Communicative	Action,	 1987a	 and	 1987b,	
originally	published	1981),	Habermas	distinguishes	between	strategic	and	communicative	
action,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 types	 of	 social	 action.	 Strategic	 action	 is	 calculating,	 goal-
orientated	and,	in	the	formal	sense,	consequential,	and	it	strives	for	success.	An	action	
like	this	follows	cognitive-instrumental	rationality;	a	person	who	is	capable	of	achieving	
his	or	her	goals	in	an	effective	way	manifests	this	type	of	rationality	in	his	or	her	action.	
In	contrast,	communicative	action	strives	for	mutual	understanding,	and	it	is	based	on	
a	type	of	rationality	that	is	called	communicative	by	Habermas.	In	this	sense,	a	person	
is	rational	insofar	as	he	or	she	is	able	to	give	reasons	or	to	argue	for	his	or	for	her	own	
standpoints.	Now,	according	to	Habermas,	strategic	action	is	dominant	in	the	modern	
systems	of	economics	and	politics,	whereas	the	spheres	of	science,	art	and	law,	as	well	as	
people=s	daily	lives	are	domains	of	communicative	rationality;	in	fact,	science,	art,	law	and	
people=s	daily	lives	represent	different	sub-types	of	communicative	rationality.
The	 difference	 between	 cognitive-instrumental	 rationality	 and	 communicative	
rationality	 resembles	 the	difference	 that	Weber	 (1956:	61,	129)	made	between	 formal	
and	substantial	rationality.	However,	in	Weber=s	theory	of	Western	modernity,	substantial	
rationality	is	not	as	central	as	communicative	rationality	is	in	Habermas=	thinking.	Weber	
described	an	action	that	is	rational	in	the	formal	sense	as	abstract,	non-personal,	calculating	
and	quantifying,	 and	 an	 action	 like	 this	 is	 also	 indifferent	with	 regard	 to	 all	 kinds	of	
substantial	value	principles.	Conversely,	substantial	or	material	rationality	appraises	the	
world	and	the	action	from	the	standpoint	of	certain	value	principles.	According	to	Weber,	
originally	 modern	Western	 formal	 rationality	 developed	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 economics	
and	 politics,	 but	 afterwards	 it	 also	 began	 to	 spread	 into	 other	 spheres	 of	 society.	 For	
this	 reason	 the	most	 serious	 problem	 in	modern	Western	 civilization	 lies	 in	 that	 it	 is	
increasingly	 dominated	 by	 an	 action	which	 is	 rational	 only	 in	 the	 formal	 sense;	 and,	
in	 inverse	 relation,	 the	meaning	 and	 domain	 of	 substantial	 rationality	 is	 declining	 in	
that	civilization.	Through	this,	modern	Western	civilization	threatens	to	change	into	a	
non-personal	machinery	whose	functioning	is	perfectly	rational	in	the	formal	sense,	but,	
correspondingly,	almost	completely	irrational	in	the	substantial	sense.	Even	if	Habermas	
has	also	thought	that	the	modern	systems	of	economics	and	politics	tend	to	oppress	or	
Acolonize@	the	spheres	of	communicative	action,	he	has	regarded	the	Weberian	theory	of	
Western	modernity	as	too	pessimistic.	To	his	mind,	the	sphere	of	communicative	action	
has	also	softened	the	negative	influences	that	the	modern	systems	of	economics	and	politics	
have	had	on	the	whole	of	society.	For	this	reason	the	Weberian	picture	of	modern	Western	
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rationality	is,	in	part,	erroneous.	In	Habermas=	opinion,	Weber	theorised	about	Western	
modernity	chiefly	from	the	standpoint	of	the	systems	of	economics	and	politics,	wherefore	
he	exaggerated	the	meaning	of	cognitive-instrumental	rationality.	Simultaneously,	Weber	
passed	over	people=s	life	worlds,	that	is,	the	areas	in	which	communicative	rationality	has	
had	a	secure	place.
In	system-theoretical	models	of	modernity,	the	concept	of	Asecularization@	has	been	
eclipsed	by	the	concepts	of	Afunctional	differentiation@	and	Arationalization@.	Usually	these	
models	seem	to	imply	that	the	position	and	meaning	of	religion	is	declining	in	Western	
modernity	in	which	religious	life	is	only	one	of	the	functional	sub-systems	of	society.	The	
Weberian	approach	to	religion	hardly	bothers	at	all	system-theorists.	Weber	(1979:	155)	
thought	that	the	secularization	of	culture	produces	serious	problems	for	modern	individuals	
who	constantly	have	to	suffer	from	Athe	loss	of	meaning@	(Sinnverlust);	he	held	that	it	is	
only	by	means	of	religion	that	modern	individuals	would	be	able	to	experience	their	life	
and	action	as	deeply	meaningful.	Due	to	the	processes	of	rationalization,	differentiation	
and	secularization,	religious	faith	is,	however,	impossible	for	a	great	majority	of	modern	
individuals.	For	this	reason,	Weber	emphasised,	they	cannot	avoid	existential	crisis	or	the	
loss	of	meaning,	albeit	they	try	to	make	sense	of	the	world	and	their	life,	among	other	
things,	by	means	of	pseudo-religions,	eroticism	and	a	hedonistic	way	of	life,	as	well	as	by	
taking	an	intensive	interest	in	different	genres	of	art.	These	remarks	imply	that,	to	Weber=s	
mind,	in	modern	Western	culture	art	has,	in	part,	obtained	a	similar	function	as	religion	
had	in	traditional	and	premodern	culture;	that,	is,	art	has	attempted	to	give	answers	to	
people=s	existential	questions	and	to	satisfy	their	existential	needs.	System-theorists	do	not	
use	the	concept	of	meaning	in	this	way,	that	is,	in	an	existential	way;	instead,	they	use	it	in	
a	functional	way.28	For	example,	the	system	of	economics	consists	of	actions	which	have	a	
similar	functional	meaning	and	which	can,	therefore,	be	classified	as	economic	activities.	
Likewise,	to	the	system	of	science	mainly	belongs	actions	which	represent	methodically	
controlled	and	systematic	research	work;	those	actions	have	usually	been	made	under	the	
protection	of	some	university	or	research	institute.	It	is	chiefly	these	kinds	of	actions	that	
are	labelled	as	science	in	modern	society.	Through	this,	meaning	is	a	necessary	feature	of	
functional	sub-systems,	even	if	individuals	may	feel	that	those	sub-systems	are	meaningless	
or	even	absurd	from	the	standpoint	of	their	own	existential	needs.
Of	system-theorists	Parsons	and	Habermas	have	also	explicitly	commented	on	Weber=s	
view	of	secularization.	Parsons	(1971:	88–91,	98–99,	114,	139)	could	not	share	that	view;	
instead,	he	held	that	religion	is	still	an	influential	constituent	of	modern	culture,	although	
he	also	admitted	that,	to	some	extent,	it	has	lost	its	social	significance.	Perhaps	Parsons=	
own	thinking	derived,	in	this	connection,	from	that	he	theorised	about	modernity	from	
the	horizon	of	American	society	in	which	religion	is	a	much	more	important	phenomenon	
than	it	is	in	European	countries	(cf.	Münch	1986b:	255).	Habermas	(1987a:	462–468),	
in	 turn,	 has	 disapproved	 of	 the	 thought	 that	 only	 religion	 would	 be	 able	 to	 satisfy	
individuals=	existential	needs.	According	to	him,	modern,	secularized	culture	and	people=s	
own	life	worlds	can	equally	function	as	a	source	for	a	meaningful	life.
When	theorising	about	modern	culture	and	society	most	of	the	system-theorists	mean	
by	Asociety@	a	national	societal	system	that	is	governed	by	a	corresponding	nation-state.	
For	example,	in	his	The System of Modern Societies (1971)	Parsons	mentions,	among	other	
28	Habermas	(1976:	149,	171,	188,	194–195),	Luhmann	(1974:	115;	1976b:	40–41,	65,	73,	80-84,	
90–93;	1981:	132;	1985a:	95)	and	Münch	(1976:	20–21),	among	other	persons,	have	understood	fun-
ctional	sub-systems	with	the	help	of	the	concept	of	meaning.
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things,	 ADutch@,	 AFrench@,	 ABritish@,	 AAmerican@,	 ASoviet@	 and	 AJapanese@	 societies	 as	
examples	 of	 individual	modern	 societies,	 and	Münch=s	Die Kultur der Moderne (The	
Culture	of	the	Modernity,	1986a	and	1986b)	deals	with	Great	Britain,	the	United	States	
of	America,	France	and	Germany	as	representatives	of	modern	culture	and	society.	The	
clearest	exception	in	this	connection	is	obviously	Luhmann.	From	the	1970s	on,	Luhmann	
(1975:	 53-55;	 1981:	 310–312)	 stated	 that	modern	 society	 is	 a	world	 society,	 because	
almost	all	of	the	functional	sub-systems	have	exceeded	the	limits	of	the	so-called	nation-
states.	 In	 his	Die	Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Society=s	 Society,	 1997),	 he	 announced	
more	 unconditionally	 that	 there	 can	 be	 no	 regional	 societies	 under	 the	 conditions	 of	
modernity;	 perhaps	 only	 political-administrative	 and	 legal	 sub-systems	 have	 relatively	
clear-cut	regional	boundaries,	whereas	other	functional	sub-systems	have	functioned	as	
parts	of	world	society	since	the	beginning	of	modernity.	(Luhmann	1997b:	30-31,	166.	
See,	 also,	Luhmann	1995:	117.)	 	However,	 in	another	connection,	Luhmann	(1993c:	
27)	 stated	 that	 functionally	 differentiated	 society	 has	 become	 true	 in	 Europe	 and	 in	
countries	that	are	close	to	it.	A	statement	like	this	does	not	seem	to	be	fully	in	accordance	
with	his	conception	of	world	society.	At	any	rate,	one	cannot	find	a	concrete	analysis	of	
world	society	from	his	investigations.	The	statement	in	question	implies	that,	in	the	first	
instance,	he	theorised	about	modern	society	on	the	basis	of	European	countries	or	on	the	
basis	of	European	national	societal	systems.	(See,	also,	Giddens	2001:	15;	Kangas	2006:	
17,	21,	293,	299–301,	305–308.)
The	 other	 sub-chapters	 in	 this	 chapter	 explicate	 how	 system-theorists	 conceive	 of	
modern	culture	and	society	and	what	kind	of	position	the	sphere	of	art	obtains	in	their	
models	of	modernity.	The	explication	starts	from	Parsons=	sociology	that	is	often	ignored	
by	 theorists	 of	 the	 system	of	 art.	The	 reasons	 for	 this	 becomes	 clear	 in	 the	next	 sub-
chapter.
3.2 Talcott Parsons on Modernity
Parsons	 held	 that,	 up	 to	 a	 certain	 limit,	 an	 increasing	 structural	 and	 functional	
differentiation	is	a	typical	feature	of	the	process	of	socio-cultural	evolution.	Such	being	
the	case,	at	the	level	of	general	action	system,	AprimitiveA	civilizations	were	largely	un-
differentiated	wholes	 (Parsons	 1966:	 30–50,	 95).	 A	 general	 action	 system	 consists	 of	
a	 cultural	 system,	 a	 social	 system,	 individuals=	 personal	 systems	 and	 their	 behavioural	
organisms.	In	primitive	civilizations,	these	four	systems	were,	in	many	respects,	merged	
with	each	other.	The	boundary	between	culture	and	society	was	undeveloped,	which	can,	
for	example	be	seen	in	that	when	exploring	primitive	civilizations	cultural	anthropologists	
often	replace	the	concept	of	society	or	the	concept	of	community	with	the	concept	of	
culture.	In	addition,	primitive	culture	was	dominated	by	a	religious-magical	world	view	
that	was	naively	held	as	an	objective	world	order;	by	means	of	it	people	also	arranged	their	
mutual	relationships	and	their	common	social	life.	Furthermore,	primitive	civilizations	
did	not	favour	their	members=	individuality.	A	collective	religious-magical	world	view	as	
well	as	long-term	traditions	and	customs	offered	to	people=s	identities	a	secure	and	stable	
basis,	which	prevented	them	from	developing	into	highly	individual	personalities.
In	comparison	to	primitive	civilizations,	modern	Western	civilization	is,	for	Parsons,	a	
structurally	and	a	functionally	differentiated	whole.	However,	at	the	same	time	he	thought	
that	a	mere	differentiation	does	not	guarantee	that	a	civilization	would	function	well;	on	
the	contrary,	it	is	important	that	there	is	also	co-operation	and	interpenetration	between	
differentiated	units.	In	this	respect,	modern	Western	civilization	differs,	for	example,	from	
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traditional	Indian	civilization	that	is	characterised	as	Aan	advanced	archaic	civilization@	
by	Parsons	(1966:	51–53,	69–94).	In	traditional	Indian	civilization,	the	distance	between	
culture	and	society	was	Atoo	long@.	As	India=s	major	religion,	Hinduism	taught	that	in	
order	to	be	able	to	reach	salvation	people	should	retreat	from	the	world	and	concentrate	
on	 the	 practice	 of	 asceticism	 and	 religious	 mysticism;	 actually,	 Buddhism	 went	 even	
further,	 for	 it	 regarded	a	 life	 in	a	monks=	 community	as	an	 ideal	way	of	 living.	Thus,	
both	of	these	religions	were	largely	indifferent	to	mundane	affairs.	In	modern	Western	
civilization,	Parsons	emphasised,	culture	and	society	are	differentiated	from	each	other,	
but	 there	are	also	 several	common	zones	between	 them.	 In	modern	Western	 societies,	
certain	basic	and	abstract	cultural	values	function	as	cornerstones	of	social	systems	and	
institutions,	and	individuals	have	internalised	those	values	as	constituents	of	their	own	
personality.	 In	 this	way,	certain	values	and	principles	are	 transferred	 from	culture	 into	
society	and	personalities	in	modern	Western	civilization.
It	might	not	be	difficult	 to	 see	 that	Parsons=	way	of	 speaking	 about	 socio-cultural	
evolution	 is	 basically	 Darwinist	 or	 evolutionist.	 For	 him,	 different	 civilizations	 and	
historical	periods	represented	different	qualitative	levels	in	socio-cultural	evolution,	whose	
most	advanced	achievement	was	modern	Western	civilization,	in	particular,	the	United	
States	of	America.	Alexander	(1983:	133–134)	points	out	that	in	this	respect	Parsons	is	
not,	however,	an	exceptional	figure,	for	of	the	classics	of	sociology	Marx	and	Durkheim	
were	also	evolutionists	and	from	time	to	time	even	Weber	spoke	about	civilizations	in	
an	evolutionist	way.	To	this	remark	one	can,	however,	add	that	usually	Parsons=	disciples	
and	successors	in	system-theoretical	sociology	have	given	up	the	evolutionist	discourse.	
Even	if	Giddens,	Habermas	and	Luhmann	are	perhaps	Europe-centric	or	Western-centric	
sociologists,	they	have	discarded	the	traditional	evolutionist	thinking.	
According	to	Parsons,	at	the	level	of	societal	system	socio-cultural	evolution	has	led	
to	a	deeper	and	wider	functional	differentiation.	This	type	of	differentiation	was	not	an	
important	phenomenon	in	primitive	civilizations,	although	they	ordered	their	social	life	
and	division	of	 labour	on	the	basis	of	age	and	sex.	Otherwise,	 those	civilizations	were	
dominated	by	 segmented	differentiation	 that	divided	 them	 into	 families	 and	 alliances	
of	families.	Segmented	differentiation	is	a	form	of	horizontal	differentiation,	because	in	
it	 the	differentiated	units	 are	 relatively	 equal.	 Still,	 in	medieval	European	 civilization,	
functional	differentiation	was	not	 a	 central	 structural	 feature,	because	 that	 civilization	
was	based	on	stratified	differentiation.	Speaking	generally,	stratified	differentiation	is	a	
form	of	vertical	differentiation,	for	in	it	the	differentiated	units	differ	from	each	other	
with	regard	to	the	quantity	of	power	and	status.
Parsons	held	that	 in	the	process	of	socio-cultural	modernisation,	society	or	societal	
system	 tends	 to	 differentiate	 internally	 into	 sub-systems	 that	 take	 care	 of	 the	 four	
functional	necessities	(see	Parsons	&	Smelser	1956).	This	is,	he	continued,	precisely	what	
has	happened	in	modern	Western	societies.	Therefore,	modern	Western	societies	can	be	
described	with	the	help	of	the	Table	2	(page	58)	that	brings	up	Parsons=	view	of	functional	
necessities	and	their	equivalents	at	the	level	of	a	societal	system.	
In	 Table	 2,	 the	 functional	 necessity	 of	 Adaptation	 (A)	 is	 taken	 care	 of	 by	 the	
functional	sub-system	of	economics.	The	sub-system	of	economics	does	not	consist	only	
of	enterprises	and	production	plants	or	Aeconomics@	 in	 the	narrow	sense,	because,	 for	
example,	families	might	also	produce	goods	and	services;	in	this	sense,	they	might	be	a	
part	of	the	functional	sub-system	of	economics.	In	modern	society,	science	and	technology	
participate	in	the	production	of	economic	resources	extensively,	apart	from	which	they	
regulate	the	relationship	between	society	and	its	environment.	In	part,	foreign	policy	also	
belongs	to	the	domain	of	the	functional	necessity	of	Adaptation,	for	it	takes	care	of	the	
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relationships	between	a	certain	societal	system	and	other	societal	systems.	This	remark	
shows	that	 in	practice	Parsons	equated	modern	societies	with	nation-states	or	national	
societal	systems.
The	functional	necessity	of	Goal	Attainment	(G)	is	taken	care	of	by	the	functional	
sub-system	of	polity.	In	modern	Western	societies,	state	and	public	administration	are	the	
most	important	constituents	in	this	sub-system,	but	in	the	widest	sense	the	functional	
sub-system	of	polity	comprises	all	of	the	activities	in	which	resources	are	utilised	for	the	
attainment	of	collective	goals.	Thus,	in	this	sense,	the	political	dimension	is	also	included	
in	the	action	of	economic	enterprises	and	production	plants,	although	in	modern	Western	
societies	collective	decision-making	and	the	realization	of	those	decisions	are	centralized	
by	the	states	and	public	administration	(Parsons	1971:	16).	Institutions	such	as	law,	the	
legal	system	and	the	schooling	system,	as	well	as	different	communities	produce	normative	
uniformity	 into	 society	 and	 through	 this	 they	 take	 care	 of	 the	 functional	necessity	 of	
Integration	(I).	Therefore,	they	are	central	constituents	in	the	functional	sub-system	of	
integration.
Socio-cultural	 sub-system	 takes	 care	 of	 the	 functional	 necessity	 of	 Latency	 (L)	 or	
Pattern	Maintenance,	wherefore	 it	has	a	close	 relationship	with	culture. Owing	to	 the	
action	of	this	sub-system,	cultural	representations,	values	and	meanings	do	not	remain	
Table 2. Parsons=	View	of	Functional	Necessities	and	their	Equivalents	at	 the	Level	of	
Societal	System
Functional 
Necessity
Its Equivalent 
at the Level 
of Societal System
Primary Means 
of Action 
in a Functional 
Sub-System
The Symbolically 
Generalised Medium in a 
Functional Sub-System
Adaptation	
to	the	
Environment	(A)
Economy=s	
Functional	
Sub-System
Economic	
Resources
Money
Goal	
Attainment	(G)
Polity=s	
Functional	
Sub-System
Political	
Decisions
Political	Power
Integration	(I) Societal	
Community	
or	Integration=s	
Functional	
Sub-System
Norms Influence
Latency	
or	Pattern	
Maintenance	(L)
Socio-Cultural	
Sub-System
Values Value	Commitments
Sources:	Parsons	1966:	28–29;	1971:	10–11.
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separate	from	society,	for	the	sub-system	at	issue	transfers	them	into	society=s	concrete	
sub-systems	 and	 institutions.	 This	 sub-system	 must	 always	 make	 choices:	 from	 the	
entirety	of	culture	it	picks	up	certain	representations,	values	and	meanings	and	imprints	
them	on	society.	Individuals	internalize	those	cultural	units	in	the	process	of	socialisation,	
and	the	units	in	question	have	been	institutionalised	as	the	operation	principles	of	social	
institutions.	For	Parsons	(1991:	57),	family,	formal	education	and	religious	institutions	
are	 central	 actors	 in	 the	 socio-cultural	 sub-system.	The	 institutions	 in	which	different	
types	of	experts	concentrate	on	the	interpretation	and	explanation	of	cultural	models	also	
belong	to	this	sub-system.	For	example,	higher	education	and	the	institutions	of	science	
represent	institutions	like	these.	The	institutions	of	art	also	belong	to	the	socio-cultural	
sub-system,	but	they	do	not	participate	in	an	unambiguous	way	in	the	production	and	
maintenance	of	social	order.
The	 socio-cultural	 sub-system	 functions	 as	 a	 filter	 between	 culture	 and	 society.	
By	 transferring	certain	abstract	 cultural	values	and	models	 into	 society	 it	guarantees	a	
sufficient	 value	 consensus	 in	 society.	 Each	 concrete	 social	 sub-system	 and	 institution	
emphasises	certain	sides	of	those	values	and	models	and	applies	them	in	its	functioning	
(Parsons	1991:	38–40).	Due	to	this,	collectively	shared	values	and	models	are	in	practice	
possible	in	highly	differentiated	modern	societies.
Symbolically	generalised	media	are	tools	that	people	use	in	social	life	in	order	to	achieve	
their	goals.	Money,	Political	Power,	Influence	and	Value	Commitments	are	tools	such	as	
these.	They	correspond	to	the	four	functional	sub-systems,	but	the	societal	significance	
of	 each	medium	does	not	 limit	 itself	 only	 to	 one	 sub-system.	The	media	 in	 question	
form	a	language	that	makes	possible	communication	between	functional	sub-systems.	By	
means	of	the	medium	of	Money	social	actors	do	not	communicate	only	in	the	functional	
sub-system	of	economics	but	in	the	exchange	and	interaction	between	the	functional	sub-
system	of	economics	and	the	other	functional	sub-systems,	as	well.
Parsons	distinguished	between	functional	and	concrete	social	sub-systems.	The	number	
of	functional	sub-systems	is	four,	and	it	is	chiefly	these	sub-systems	that	he	considered	in	
his	analytical	models	of	social	systems.	For	this	reason,	those	four	functional	sub-systems	
can	be	termed	analytical	sub-systems.	Parsons	believed	that	his	analytical	models	are	able	
to	describe	the	basic	structure	of	socio-cultural	reality	adequately.	This	means	that	modern	
Western	societies	should	be	differentiated	internally	into	four	sub-systems	-	in	the	way	that	
Table	2	presents.	On	the	other	hand,	Parsons	held	that	modern	Western	society	consists	
of	several	concrete	sub-systems	that	are	more	or	less	clearly	differentiated	from	each	other.	
To	concrete	sub-systems	like	these	belong,	among	other	things,	economics	and	politics	in	
the	narrow	sense	as	well	as	the	social	systems	of	law,	science,	art,	education,	mass	media,	
religious	life	and	families.	In	his	investigations,	Parsons	does	not	say	much	about	these	
concrete	social	sub-systems;	he	was	chiefly	interested	in	how	concrete	social	sub-systems	
participate	 in	 taking	 care	 of	 the	 four	 functional	 necessities.	The	 diversity	 of	 concrete	
social	sub-systems	cannot	be	explained	by	means	of	the	Parsonsian	analytical	models.	If	
the	number	of	functional	sub-systems	is	really	four,	why	are	there	several	concrete	and	
differentiated	sub-systems	in	modern	societies?	Parsons=	investigations	do	not	provide	us	
with	an	answer	to	this	question.	Usually	his	successors	have	solved	these	problems	simply	
by	renouncing	the	idea	of	functional	necessity	and	by	concentrating	their	attention	only	
on	concrete	social	sub-systems.
Parsons	held	that	each	functional	sub-system	can	be	considered	from	the	standpoint	
of	the	AGIL-schema.	Each	functional	sub-system	must	itself	solve	how	it	takes	care	of	
the	four	functional	necessities.	An	analysis	like	this	can	also	be	applied	to	concrete	social	
sub-systems.	Next	it	will	be	applied	to	the	concrete	social	system	of	art.
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It	should	be	remembered	that	in	Parsons=	analytical	models	the	sphere	of	art	belongs	
both	to	the	cultural	and	societal	system.	As	a	part	of	cultural	system,	works	of	art	can	be	
analysed	from	three	standpoints,	since	they	mediate	representations	and	beliefs	(cognitive	
dimension)	as	well	as	values	and	value	principles	 (value	dimension)	 to	people;	besides	
this,	it	is	possible	to	analyse	the	tools	or	the	sign	system	by	means	of	which	works	of	art	
express	their	contents	(expressive	dimension).	At	the	level	of	the	AGIL-schema,	that	is,	at	
the	level	of	the	functional	sub-systems	the	institutions	of	art	chiefly	belong	to	the	socio-
cultural	sub-system	which	transfers	certain	cultural	representations,	values	and	meanings	
from	a	cultural	system	into	societal	system.	In	addition,	perhaps	the	institutions	of	art	
also	participate	in	the	maintenance	of	normative	integration	in	society,	wherefore	they	
can,	 in	part,	be	considered	as	a	constituent	of	 the	 integration=s	 functional	 sub-system.	
Finally,	 the	concrete	 social	 sub-system	of	art	 is	 situated	at	 the	 level	of	 societal	 system.	
By	utilising	the	AGIL-schema	we	can	say	that	the	concrete	social	sub-system	of	art	must	
take	care	of	its	relationships	with	the	rest	of	society	and	acquire	material	resources	for	its	
functioning,	which	corresponds	to	the	functional	necessity	of	Adaptation	(A).	In	the	sub-
system	of	art,	social	actors	make	decisions	about	the	use	of	the	resources	of	this	system	
and	about	the	goals	of	the	action	that	takes	place	in	this	system	(G),	certain	arrangements	
and	 Acommon	rules@	produces	normative	uniformity	 into	 this	 sub-system	(I),	 and	 the	
actors	 of	 this	 sub-system	 share	 certain	 abstract	 cultural	 values	 (L).	 In	Parsons=	 (1991:	
38–40)	investigations,	values	are	general	cultural	standards,	and	as	such	they	are	more	
abstract	than,	for	example,	ideologies	are.	Therefore,	even	if	the	actors	of	the	sub-system	
of	art	share	certain	cultural	values,	they	might	have	political-ideological	and	art-political	
disagreements	with	each	other.	In	this	case,	their	mutual	disagreements	do	not	seriously	
shake	the	common	cultural	value	foundation	of	the	sub-system	of	art.
As	far	as	the	concrete	social	sub-system	of	art	itself	takes	care	of	all	of	the	four	functional	
necessities,	it	could	be	understood	as	a	well-formed	sub-system	that	possesses	a	high	degree	
of	system-likeness.	In	this	case,	it	would	be	a	highly	autonomous	sub-system.	However,	
Parsons	 stated	 that	usually	 concrete	 social	 sub-systems	 are	only	 relatively	 autonomous	
formations;	consequently,	they	have	common	and	overlapping	areas,	wherefore	they	are	
more	or	less	interlaced.	For	Parsons,	a	state	of	affairs	such	as	this	was	a	hallmark	of	a	well-
functioning	social	order.
Thus,	we	have	seen	that	Parsons	did	not	have	much	to	say	about	concrete	social	sub-
systems	and	their	mutual	relationships.	Perhaps	this	shortcoming	explains	the	fact	that	in	
the	study	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	and	the	sphere	of	art	he	has	not	been	a	
popular	figure.	Nowadays,	several	researchers	are	expressly	interested	in	the	relationships	
between	different	systems,	for	example,	in	the	relationships	between	the	system	of	art	and	
other	systems.	In	the	study	of	relationships	like	these,	they	usually	have	had	to	borrow	
their	central	ideas	from	outside	Parsons=	system-theoretical	sociology.29
29	In	their	joint	work,	Renate	Heydebrand,	Dieter	Pfau	and	Jörg	Schönert	(1988)	have	applied	the	Par-
sonsian	system	theory	to	the	study	of	the	system	of	literature.	In	a	recent	systemic	study	of	the	sphere	
of	art,	their	investigation	is	a	rather	lonely	phenomenon,	for	usually	the	study	in	question	has	ignored	
Parsons=	thinking.
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3.3 Modern Society as a Web of Autopoietic Sub-Systems and their Mutual 
Relationships in Luhmann=s Late Production
Like	Parsons,	 Luhmann	 emphasised	 that	 an	 increasing	 functional	 differentiation	 does	
not,	as	such,	characterise	the	process	of	socio-cultural	evolution.	Rather	the	process	 in	
question	can	be	understood	as	a	displacement	from	one	form	or	type	of	differentiation	
into	another	form	or	type	of	differentiation.	To	put	it	more	concretely,	primitive	or	archaic	
society	was	primarily	differentiated	in	a	segmented	way	and	civilized	society	in	a	stratified	
way,	whereas	modern	society	is,	in	the	first	instance,	based	on	functional	differentiation.	
In	his	early	period,	Luhmann	was	still	inclined	to	think	that	in	modern	society	functional	
differentiation	represents	vertical	differentiation	-	just	as	centre/periphery	differentiation	
and	 stratified	 differentiation	 do.	 Accordingly,	 modern	 differentiated	 functional	 sub-
systems	would	not	be	equal	but	there	would	be	a	hierarchy	between	them.	In	the	1970s,	
Luhmann	(1974:	142)	wrote	that	it	is	the	economic	sub-system	that	forms	the	dominant	
or	leading	sub-system	in	modern	society.	This	would	perhaps	mean	that,	with	justified	
reasons,	modern	society	could	be	defined	as	a	Acapitalist	society@.	However,	 in	his	 late	
production	Luhmann	(1987:	19;	1997b:	601,	612–613)	adopted	a	view	 that	modern	
Table 3. Luhmann=s	 View	 of	Modern	 Functional	 Sub-Systems	 and	 their	Media	 and	
Medium	Codes
Functional Sub-System Its Medium Its Medium Code
Economics	 Money Payment/Non-Payment
Politics	 Power Owner/Object	of	Power(X)
Law Legality Legal/Illegal
Science Truth True/Untrue
Art Beauty Beautiful/Non-Beautiful
Mass	Media Technology	of	Dissemination Information/Non-Information
Sports Match	or	Competition Win/Lose
Health	Care	 Illness Ill/Healthy
Intimate	
Relationships
Love	or	Intimacy Beloved/Non-Beloved	or	
Intimate/Non-Intimate
Religion Faith Transmundane/Mundane
Sources:	Luhmann	1981:	246;	1984:	51–52;	1986:	620;	1987:	24;	1988;	1991:	508;	1993e;	
1996;	 1997b:	 358-363;	 1997c:	 743–776,	 1102–1104;	 2000b;	 2002.	 See,	 also,	 Becker	&	
Reinhardt-Becker	 2001:	 50–53,	 65,	 67,	 91–92,	 98–99,	 105,	 115,	 127–131.	 (X)	 =	 The	
medium	code	of	politics	can	also	be	formulated	as	follows:	An	authorized	position	in	which	
it	is	possible	to	make	collectively	binding	decisions	/	A	position	in	which	it	is	not	possible	to	
make	collectively	binding	decisions.
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functional	differentiation	is	a	form	of	horizontal	differentiation.	This	view	implies	that	
there	 is	no	primary	or	dominant	 functional	 sub-system	 in	modern	 society;	 those	 sub-
systems	are	simply	equal.30
In	 Luhmann=s	 late	 production,	 communication	 is	 a	 characteristic	 feature	 of	 social	
systems.	The	 specificity	 of	 modern	 functionally	 differentiated	 sub-systems	 lies	 in	 the	
state	of	affairs	that	as	communicative	systems	they	have	their	own	media	and	medium	
codes;	 in	 other	words,	 each	of	 them	has	 its	 own	 specific	medium	and	medium	code.	
Following	 Parsons,	 Luhmann	 termed	 the	media	 used	 by	 the	modern	 functional	 sub-
systems	 Asymbolically	 generalised	 communication	media@.	Thus,	modern	 functionally	
differentiated	sub-systems	do	not	communicate	only	with	the	help	of	natural	languages,	
but	 they	 also	 employ	 their	 own	media	 –	 improving	 in	 this	way	 their	 communicative	
potentialities.	 Table	 3	 presents	 ten	 modern	 functional	 sub-systems	 and	 their	 media	
and	medium	codes.	That	 table	 is	based	on	Luhmann=s	 investigations,	but	 it	 is	not	an	
exhaustive	catalogue	of	functional	sub-systems,	since	certain	sub-systems	–	among	other	
things,	education,	entertainment	and	the	army	–	are	missing	from	it.	At	any	rate,	that	
table	indicates	that	Luhmann	endeavoured	to	apply	the	concepts	of	medium	and	medium	
code	systematically	to	modern	functional	sub-systems.
Table	3	does	not	tell	us	about	the	emergence	of	modern	functionally	differentiated	
sub-systems	and	their	media	and	medium	codes;	in	this	sense,	it	is	Ahistorically	blind@.	
Actually,	Luhmann	thought	that	when	society	was	differentiated	into	modern	functional	
sub-systems,	those	sub-systems	began	to	develop	their	own	media	and	medium	codes.	
Gradually	their	media	and	medium	codes	became	settled,	and	at	the	same	time	functional	
differentiation	became	society=s	main	structural	feature.	It	is	just	this	situation	that	has	
made	 possible	 the	 autopoiesis	 of	 functional	 sub-systems.	 Consequently,	 at	 a	 certain	
historical	moment	of	societal	development,	the	modern	functionally	differentiated	sub-
systems	started	to	work	autopoietically.	Hence,	autopoiesis	is	something	that	has	emerged	
in	social	sub-systems	in	the	course	of	societal	development.	Yet,	it	is	not	possible	to	say	
exactly	 when	 a	 particular	 sub-system	 gained	 its	 autopoiesis;	 to	 this	 question	 one	 can	
only	 give	 approximate	 answers.	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 aristocratic	 estate	 society	 fell	
into	decay	by	 the18th	 century	 and	 it	was	 replaced	by	 functionally	differentiated	 sub-
systems.	When	 considering	 these	 sub-systems	 Luhmann	 gave	 up	 the	 Parsonsian	 idea	
of	 functional	 necessity.	 For	 him,	modern	 functional	 sub-systems	 do	 not	 take	 care	 of	
functional	necessities;	each	of	them	simply	has	its	own	task	or	Afunction@	in	society	and	
in	the	societal	division	of	labour.
As	 far	 as	 social	 systems	 are	 concerned,	 Luhmann	 chiefly	 applied	 the	 concept	 of	
autopoiesis	to	the	entirety	of	society	and	to	the	modern	functional	sub-systems.	He	held	
30	Luhmann=s	thinking	has	been	analyzed	and	estimated	in	several	journals	and	books.	See,	for	examp-
le,	Zeitschrift für Soziologie Volume	21:6(1992),	Theory, Culture and Society Volumes	11:2(1994)	and	
18:1(2001),	 New German Critique	 Volume	 61(1994),	 Cybernetics and Human Knowing Volumes	
12:4(2005),	13:1(2006)	and	14:2-3(2007),	Organization	Volume	13:1(2006)	as	well	as	Hans	Haferkamp	
and	Michael	Schmid	(eds.),	Sinn, Kommunikation und soziale Differenzierung. Beiträge zu Luhmann=s 
Theore sozialer Systeme (Sense,	Communication	and	Social	Differentiation.	Studies	of	Luhmann=s	The-
orie	of	Social	Systems,	1987),	Werner	Krawitz	and	Michael	Welker	 (eds.),	Kritik der Theorie sozialer 
Systeme. Auseinandersetzungen mit Luhmann=s Hauptwerk (Critique	on	 the	Theory	of	Social	Systems.	
Confrontations	with	Luhmann=s	Major	Work,	 1992),	A.	Koschorke	 and	C.	Vismann	 (eds.),	Wider-
stände der Systemtheorie. Kulturtheoretische Analysen zum Werk von Niklas Luhmann (Contradictions	of	
System	Theory.	Culture-Theoretical	Analysises	on	the	Work	of	Niklas	Luhmann,	1999).	A	well-written	
introduction	to	Luhmann=s	thinking	is	Frank	Becker=s	and	Elke	Reinhardt-Becker=s	Systemtheorie. Eine 
Einführung in die Geschichte- und Kulturwissenschaften (2001);	despite	its	title,	it	concentrates	on	presen-
ting	Luhmann=s	system	theory.
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that	 society	 as	 a	whole	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 autopoietic	 system	 that	 differs	 from	nature	
and	functions	according	to	its	own	principles	(Luhmann	1985a:	555;	1986:	620–621).	
Therefore,	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	is	applicable	not	only	to	modern	society	but	also	
to	previous	societies,	that	is,	to	archaic	society	and	to	civilized	society.	In	the	mid-1980s,	
Luhmann	was	 not	 quite	 sure	whether	 all	 of	 the	modern	 functional	 sub-systems	 have	
reached	the	state	of	autopoiesis;	sometimes	he	wrote	as	if	it	is	chiefly	sub-systems	such	
as	 economics,	 law,	 science,	 education,	 art	 and	 religion	 that	 were	 already	 autopoietic,	
whereas	the	rest	of	modern	functional	sub-systems	would	perhaps	not	yet	have	reached	
the	state	of	autopoiesis	(Luhmann	1984:	51–52;	1986:	620–623;	1987:	40).	However,	
from	the	turn	of	the	1990s	on	he	tended	more	clearly	to	see	autopoiesis	as	a	hallmark	of	
all	of	the	modern	functional	sub-systems	(see	Luhmann	1995:	60;	1997a:	7–11;	1997c:	
743–776).	Thereby	 he	 also	 conceptualised	 families	 and	 intimate	 relationships	 as	 self-
referential,	communicative	and	autopoietic	social	systems	whose	justification	lies	in	that	
Apersonal	systems@,	that	is,	actors	regard	them	as	important	from	the	standpoint	of	their	
own	needs	(Luhmann	1987:	145;	1993d:	196–197,	210,	216–217.	See,	also	Luhmann	
1982).	It	should	be	noted	that	in	Table	3	the	hesitation	at	issue	this	does	not	show	itself	
at	all,	but	the	table	in	question	is,	of	course,	a	simplification	of	Luhmann=s	thinking.
Autopoietic	 systems	are	operationally	closed	 formations.	This	characterisation	does	
not	imply	that	they	are	not	connected	with	their	environment.	The	environment	is	for	
them	a	source	of	energy	and	 information,	and	 it	 imposes	 some	general	 limitations	on	
their	 functioning.	However,	 the	 crucial	 thing	 is	 that	 each	 autopoietic	 system	 handles	
this	 energy	 and	 information	 according	 to	 its	 internal	 principles	 of	 operation,	 in	
particular,	according	to	its	medium	and	medium	code;	thus,	precisely	in	this	sense	it	is	
an	operationally	closed	formation.	In	addition,	autopoietic	systems	produce	themselves	
the	elements	of	which	 they	consist,	wherefore	 they	are	 self-referential	 formations	with	
an	ability	to	self-recur	and	self-regenerate	(Luhmann	1984:	51;	1997c:	746–749).	In	the	
case	of	 social	 systems,	 the	most	 constitutive	 elements	 are	 communications.	Therefore,	
modern	functionally	differentiated	social	sub-systems	consist	of	communications	which	
they	themselves	produce	and	which,	in	turn,	maintain	them.	Although,	this	might	sound	
as	if	those	sub-systems	were	isolated	islands	in	society,	Luhmann	underlined	that	they	are	
not	some	kind	of	asocial	formations.	On	the	contrary,	their	autopoiesis	is	a	condition	for	
the	state	of	affairs	that	they	can	be	functional	for	the	society	in	an	effective	way.	From	
the	functional	standpoint,	the	modern	functionally	differentiated	sub-systems	are	by	no	
means	self-sufficient	or	autotelic	formations.	It	 is	 just	their	autopoiesis	that	guarantees	
that	they	can	serve	the	rest	of	society	well.
In	 Luhmann=s	 system	 theory,	 there	 is	 a	 close	 connection	 between	 autopoiesis,	
medium,	medium	code,	basic	value,	basic	value	distinction	and	identity	of	each	modern	
functionally	differentiated	sub-system.	Each	modern	sub-system	such	as	this	is	based	on	a	
certain	value	distinction	that	characterises	this	whole	sub-system.	The	value	distinction	at	
issue	manifests	itself	in	the	medium	code	of	this	sub-system,	and	the	basic	value	manifests	
itself	in	its	medium.	Together	these	two	communicative	tools,	a	special	medium	and	a	
special	medium	code,	guarantee	that	the	sub-system	is	capable	of	operating	autopoietically,	
according	 to	 its	 own	 specific	principles.	Each	medium	code	 is	 divided	 into	 a	positive	
(payment,	owner	of	power,	 legal)	 and	 into	a	negative	 (non-payment,	object	of	power,	
illegal)	value,	each	of	which	is	largely	amoral	(Luhmann	1997c:	751).	This	means	that	
the	basic	values	and	the	basic	value	distinctions	of	the	modern	functionally	differientiated	
sub-systems	have	nothing	to	do	with	moral	values	or	with	the	morally	good	or	bad.	For	
example,	when	the	economic	sub-system	uses	the	code	Payment/Non-Payment,	it	does	
not	evaluate	the	action	from	a	moral	standpoint.	Instead,	it	only	signifies	the	action	from	
a	functional	standpoint;	it	simply	gives	the	action	a	functional	meaning.
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According	to	Luhmann,	to	maintain	a	system	is	to	maintain	and	control	its	boundaries.	In	
this	respect,	it	is	important	that	each	modern	functional	sub-system	uses	a	code	which	has	
only	two	values.	For	this	reason	it	is	relatively	easy	to	decide	what	kind	of	communicative	
action	belongs	to	a	sub-system.	The	communicative	acts	are	either	one	way	or	the	other;	
we	can,	in	a	sensible	way,	either	handle	them	by	means	of	a	system=s	code	or	not	(Luhmann	
1993c:	310–313).	 It	 should	also	be	noticed	 that	 in	Luhmann=s	 theory	 the	 identity	of	
modern	 functionally	differentiated	 sub-systems	 is	based	on	 their	 communicative	 tools	
and	on	their	functions.	The	identity	of	a	sub-system	like	this	is	based	on	that	it	operates	
with	the	help	of	a	specific	medium	and	a	specific	medium	code,	apart	from	which	it	has	
a	specific	function	in	society.	Therefore,	the	differentiation	between	them	can	largely	be	
equated	with	the	state	of	affairs	that	they	use	specific	communicative	tools	for	specific	
purposes	or	functions.
Table 4. A	 Luhmannian	View	 of	 the	 Function,	Medium,	Medium	Code	 and	Other	
Relevant	Codes	of	the	System	of	Art.	Version	I.
 
The Function of the System of Art:                            Production	of	World	Contingency
The Medium of the System of Art:																													Beauty
The Medium Code of the System of Art:	 							Beautiful/Non-Beautiful
Other Aesthetic Codes in the System of Art:	 							Pleasant/Unpleasant
Graceful/Clumsy
Sophisticated/Rustic	(or	Vulgar)
Festive/Banal	(or	Trivial)
Sublime/Low
Tragic/Comic
Grotesque
Lyrical/Dramatic
Melodramatic	(or	Bathetic)
Other Relevant Codes in the System of Art:	 							New/Old
Innovative/Traditional
Original/Conventional
Interesting/Boring
Animated/Non-Animated
Stimulating/Non-Stimulating
Exciting/Non-Exciting
Entertaining/Non-Entertaining
Mimetic/Non-Mimetic
Figurative/Non-Figurative
Fictional/Non-Fictional
Real/Possible
Believable/Non-Believable
True/Untrue	
Sources:	Luhmann	1981:	246–247;	1986:	620;	1990:	29;	1993c:	201–202;	1994:	46–47.
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Table	3	(page	61)	regards	Beauty	as	the	medium	of	the	system	of	art	and	the	distinction	
Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	as	 its	medium	code.	In	addition,	Table	4	(page	64)	mentions	
other	aesthetic	and	non-aesthetic	codes	that	are	relevant	in	the	case	of	the	system	of	art.	
We	can	characterise	those	codes	by	saying	that	receivers	of	art	use	to	define	the	nature	of	
works	of	art	by	means	of	them.	On	the	one	hand,	those	codes	indicate	how	the	receivers	
experience	works	of	art;	and,	on	the	other	hand,	they	also	tell	us	something	about	the	
properties	of	works	of	art	(Luhmann	1984:	53).
Tables	3	and	4	seem	to	 imply	that	Luhmann	had	adopted	the	traditional	aesthetic	
conception	of	art.	To	put	it	briefly,	the	traditional	aesthetic	conception	of	art	was	born	in	
the	18th	century,	and	it	obtained	its	first	formulation	in	Charles	Batteux=s	investigation	
Les beux arts réduits un méme principe (The	Fine	Arts	as	Reduced	to	the	Same	Principle,	
1746).	In	his	investigation,	Batteux	presented	a	clear-cut	system	of	the	genres	of	art;	the	
unity	of	those	genres	is,	to	his	mind,	based	on	the	state	of	affairs	that	all	of	the	genres	of	
art	imitate	Athe	beautiful	nature@,	that	is,	they	describe	the	reality	in	an	idealized	way.	For	
this	reason,	Batteux	continued,	works	of	art	arouse	aesthetic	pleasure	in	receivers.	In	these	
respects,	 aesthetic	 values	 and	 aesthetic	 pleasure	 are	 essential	 factors	within	 the	 sphere	
of	 art.	 Somewhat	 later,	 French	 Enlightenment	 philosophers,	 among	 other	 persons,	 J.	
D=Alembert	and	Denis	Diderot	adopted	a	conception	of	art	like	this,	and	in	the	German-
speaking	Europe	it	was	worked	on	by	persons	such	as	Moses	Mendelssohn,	Johann	Sulzer,	
Immanuel	Kant,	Friedrich	Schiller	and	Johan	Wolfgang	von	Goethe;	from	Great	Britain	
one	can,	in	particular,	mention	the	Earl	of	Shaftesbury,	Francis	Hutcheson	and	Edmund	
Burke.	The	French	Al=art	pour	 l=art@	movement	 in	the	19th	century	and	the	European	
aestheticism	 at	 the	 turn	of	 the	19th	 and	20th	 centuries	 deepened	 and	 radicalized	 the	
aesthetic	conception	of	art	–	in	the	sense	that	they	almost	ignored	the	content	of	art	and	
concentrated	on	its	formal	properties.	Into	this	later	phase	belong,	among	other	persons,	
the	poets	Théophile	Gautier	and	Charles	Baudelaire,	the	novelist	Gustave	Flaubert	and	
impressionist	painters,	as	well	as	the	writer	Oscar	Wilde	and	theorists	and	critics	of	art	
such	as	Clive	Bell,	Roger	Fry	and	Walter	Pater.	In	the	domain	of	the	philosophy	of	art,	
Susanne	Langer	and	Monroe	C.	Beardsley	are	perhaps	the	most	clear-cut	representatives	
of	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art	in	the	20th	century.31
Among	intellectuals	and	upper-class	social	layers,	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art	seems	
to	have	been	the	dominant	conception	of	art	 from	the	 late-18th	century	 to	 the	early-
20th	century.	During	this	long	period,	those	groups	attempted	to	control	the	boundaries	
of	art	strictly.	In	the	first	instance,	they	approved	as	art	only	the	cultural	genres	whose	
main	 function	was	 aesthetic	 or	 aesthetic-spiritual.	Genres	 or	 layers	 such	 as	 literature,	
theatre,	opera,	painting,	sculpture,	architecture,	laying	out	of	gardens,	dance	or	ballet	and	
classical	concert	music	filled	these	demands	most	clearly,	wherefore	they	were	regarded	as	
Agenuine@	or	Apure	genres	of	art@.	In	comparison	with	them	the	status	of	design,	interior	
decoration	and	hand	work	was	lower,	and	they		were	not	always	accepted	as	art.	Similarly,	
media-based	genres	such	as	photographs,	record	music,	radio	plays,	films,	television	plays	
and	television	films	produced		classification		problems	for	the	proponents	of	the	aesthetic	
conception	of	art;	in	fact,	it	was	not	until	the	1950s	and	1960s	that	the	status	of	these	
genres	increased	significantly,	whereafter	they	were	gradually	accepted	as	art.	At	the	same	
time	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art	began	to	lose	its	position	as	the	dominant	conception	
of	art.
Luhmann=s	art-theoretical	writings	and	views	continued	the	tradition	of	the	aesthetic	
conception	of	art	still	in	the	1980s	and	early	1990s.	Although	he	later	changed	his	views	
31	On	the	history	of	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art,	see	Kristeller	1959	and	Tatarkiewicz	1989.
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of	the	medium	and	medium	code	of	the	system	of	art,	we	can	next	consider	his	views	
of	 the	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s,	 because	 until	 that	 date	 the	 aesthetic	 conception	 of	 art	
had	a	profound	influence	on	him.	In	fact,	at	that	time	his	conception	of	art	was	mainly	
philosophical-aesthetic	rather	than	sociological	as	we	can	see	by	looking	at	Table	4.
It	 should	be	noted	 that	 as	 far	 as	 the	 system	of	 art	 is	 concerned	Luhmann	did	not	
himself	present	a	table	like	this.	I	have,	in	part,	derived	it	from	his	investigations,	but	to	
a	certain	amount	I	have	also	completed	his	aesthetic	conception	of	art	by	adding	to	it	
certain	typical	aesthetic	and	non-aesthetic	codes.	The	other	important	thing	in	Table	4	is	
the	fact	that	even	if	Luhmann	regarded	art	as	aesthetic	communication,	he	did	not	define	
the	function	of	art	by	pointing	to	aesthetic	experiences;	usually	aesthetic	conceptions	of	
art	have	understood	the	function	of	art	in	that	way,	that	is,	they	have	regarded	art	as	a	
source	of	aesthetic	experiences.	Consequently,	aesthetic	conceptions	of	art	have	often	seen	
the	function	of	art	in	that	it	makes	profound	aesthetic	experiences	possible.	A	definition	
like	this	would	simply	have	been	in	contradiction	with	Luhmann=s	anti-humanist	 line	
of	 thought.	 Aesthetic	 experiences	 are	 mental	 states	 of	 mind	 possessed	 by	 individuals	
or	 actors,	wherefore	Luhmann	did	not	understand	 the	 function	of	 art	on	 the	basis	of	
them.	In	fact,	his	 investigations	of	the	1980s	largely	ignored	questions	concerning	the	
function	of	art.	To	be	sure,	questions	like	these	arise	in	his	article	ADas	Kunstwerk	und	die	
Selbstreproduktion	der	Kunst@	(The	Work	of	Art	and	the	Self-Production	of	Art,	1986)	
in	which	he	states	that	it	is	the	function	of	art	to	produce	alternative	models	of	the	world:	
works	of	art	help	us	to	understand	that	everything	that	exists	in	our	phenomenal	world	
could	also	 exist	 in	 another	way	–	 in	other	words,	 they	 teach	us	 that	our	phenomenal	
world	can	be	constructed	in	several	different	ways	(Luhmann	1986:	624–625).	In	this	
way,	works	 of	 art	would	make	us	 aware	 of	 the	 contingent	nature	 of	 our	phenomenal	
world.
One	can,	however,	ask	whether	a	function	like	this	really	requires	that	art	uses	Beauty	
as	its	medium	and	the	distinction	Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	as	its	medium	code.	World	
contingency	can	obviously	be	produced	in	different	ways,	and	all	of	those	ways	are	not	
closely	connected	with	Beauty.	These	remarks	indicate	that	in	the	1980s	Luhmann=s	view	
of	art	was	not	sufficiently	consistent	and	well-formulated.
We	can	explicate	the	position	of	aesthetic	experiences	 in	Luhmann=s	conception	of	
art	with	the	help	of	a	three-part	distinction	included	in	Luhmann=s	system	theory.	In	his	
general	view	of	social	system,	he	thinks	(see	Luhmann	1991:	635–637)	that	social	systems	
have	three	kinds	of	relations:	(i)	they	have	a	certain	function	in	society,	that	is,	they	are	
in	relation	to	the	entirety	of	society,	(ii)	each	of	them	produces	certain	concrete	offerings	
to	other	social	systems	and	(iii)	each	of	them	is	also	able	to	stand	in	a	reflexive	relation	to	
itself	and	to	practice	self-consciousness	and	self-description.	Under	the	circumstances,	the	
system	of	art	makes	us	aware	of	the	world	contingency	(the	first	function),	its	products	
are,	 for	 example,	 consumed	 in	 the	 intimate	 sphere	 and	 in	 the	 schooling	 system	 (the	
second	 function)	and	 it	 is	 also	able	 to	 reflect	upon	 itself	 (the	 third	 function).	On	 the	
basis	of	this	three-part	distinction,	one	could	say	that	aesthetic	experiences	belong	to	the	
offerings	that	the	system	of	art	makes	available	for	individuals	and	devotees	of	art.	From	
a	standpoint	like	this,	aesthetic	experiences	are	certain	kinds	of	benefits	that	devotees	of	
art	can	achieve	by	receiving	works	of	art.
Even	if	Luhmann	regarded	the	distinction	Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	as	 the	medium	
code	 of	 the	 system	 of	 art,	 he	 did	 not	 think	 that	 the	 system	 of	 art	 would	 limit	 itself	
only	 to	 the	 use	 of	 this	 basic	 code.	The	 system	 of	 art	 also	 utilises	 other	 aesthetic	 and	
non-aesthetic	 codes;	 for	 example,	 codes	 such	 as	New/Old,	 Innovative/Traditional	 and	
Original/Conventional	are	often	relevant	and	important	in	modern	art	criticism	and	in	
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studies	of	art.	Yet,	for	two	reasons	they	can	not	obtain	the	position	of	the	medium	code	
in	the	system	of	art.	On	the	one	hand,	obviously	those	codes	are	not	used	everywhere	in	
the	system	of	art,	for	certain	genres	of	art	might	see	them	as	indifferent.	On	the	other	
hand,	they	are	used	in	other	modern	social	systems,	as	well,	which	means	that	they	are	by	
no	means	specific	only	to	the	system	of	art	(Luhmann	1993c:	201–202;	1994:	46–47).	
Remarks	like	these	hold	true	also	for	the	code	True/Untrue	and	other	cognitive	codes.	
According	to	Luhmann,	only	the	code	Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	is	used	systematically	in	
the	system	of	art,	whereas	in	other	social	systems	it	seems	to	be	in	use	only	occasionally.	
Therefore,	Luhmann	was	inclined	to	conceive	of	it	as	the	medium	code	of	the	system	of	
art.
If	we	translate	Luhmann=s	view	of	the	system	of	art	into	an	actor-theoretical	language,	
we	can	say	that	in	the	system	of	art	social	actors	practice	communication	on	works	of	art	
by	means	of	different	codes.	If	the	code	Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	really	functions	as	the	
medium	code	in	this	system,	then	this	distinction	should	dominate	the	communicative	
acts	concerning	works	of	art.	In	Luhmann=s	theory,	programmes	are	more	concrete	things	
than	media	and	medium	codes	are.	In	the	case	of	the	system	of	art,	programmes	regulate	
and	define	what	kinds	of	works	of	art	obtain	the	predicate	Abeautiful@	and	what	kinds	
of	works,	in	turn,	must	content	themselves	with	the	predicate	Anon-beautiful@	or	Augly@.	
Thus,	albeit	social	actors	would	agree	on	the	medium	and	medium	code	of	the	system	
of	art,	they	might	have	different	programmes;	that	is,	they	might	disagree	on	what	kinds	
of	works	of	art	could	be	understood	as	beautiful	and	what	kinds	of	works	of	art	as	non-
beautiful	(Luhmann	1981:	246–247,	253).	In	cases	like	these,	they	interpret	and	apply	
the	medium	code	in	question	differently.	Generally	speaking,	 in	functional	social	sub-
systems	programmes	are	collections	of	rules	that	define	what	kinds	of	things	achieve	a	
positive	value	and	what	kinds	of	things	a	negative	value	(Luhmann	1997c:	746,	750–751).	
Programmes	also	change	more	rapidly	 than	media	and	medium	codes	use	 to	do.	This	
can,	for	instance,	be	seen	from	the	fact	that	in	the	modern	system	of	art	the	distinction	
Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	became	central	 in	the	 late	18th	century,	and	still	 in	the	mid-
20th	century	theorists	of	art	were	inclined	to	define	Athe	essence	of	art@	by	means	of	the	
concept	of	beauty	 and	other	 aesthetic	 concepts.	On	 the	other	hand,	during	 that	 long	
period	theorists	and	critics	of	art	produced	several	different	definitions	or	programmes	on	
what	makes	an	object	or	entity	beautiful	and	aesthetically	valuable.
In	this	connection,	it	is	useful	to	make	a	difference	between	the	concepts	of	autonomy	
and	autopoiesis.	According	to	Luhmann	(1995:	97),	the	system	of	art	is	autonomic	in	
the	sense	that	it	decides	itself	what	functions	as	its	medium	and	medium	code	and	what	
kinds	of	communicative	codes	it	uses;	decisions	like	these	are	not	made	outside	the	system	
of	art,	for	example,	in	the	political	or	economic	system.	In	this	case,	Aautonomy@	means	
normative	 independency.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 system	of	 art,	 Aautopoiesis@,	 on	 the	other	
hand,	means	that	this	system	has	its	own	and	specific	communicative	tools,	according	to	
which	it	handles	works	of	art.
In	the	same	way,	the	autopoiesis	of	science	implies	that	science	has	its	own	specific	
medium	 and	 medium	 code.	 Luhmann	 regarded	Truth	 as	 science=s	 medium	 and	 the	
distinction	True/Untrue	as	its	medium	code.	As	an	autopoietic	system,	science	handles	
and	evaluates	observations,	statements	and	theories	by	means	of	the	medium	and	medium	
code	at	issue.	At	the	same	time	the	system	of	science	is	autonomic,	since	it	decides	for	
itself	how	the	predicates	Atrue@	and	Auntrue@	are	distributed	into	observations,	statements	
and	theories.	Autopoiesis	and	normative	autonomy	do	not,	however,	exclude	the	fact	that	
in	other	respects	science	is	dependent	on	its	societal	environment.	For	example,	the	state,	
business	life	and	non-public	associations	regulate	science=s	financing	and	their	influence	
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on	science	can	also	be	seen	in	the	way	in	which	science	chooses	its	research	objects	and	
research	 problems.	 But,	 Luhmann	 (1991:	 300–309)	 added,	 both	 in	 methodical	 and	
theoretical	questions	and	in	the	evaluation	of	the	results,	science	works	in	an	autopoietic	
and	 autonomic	way.	 Likewise,	 the	 system	 of	 art	 is,	 as	 an	 autopoietic	 and	 autonomic	
formation,	dependent	on	its	societal	environment,	even	if	Luhmann	did	not	pay	much	
attention	to	the	relationships	that	the	system	of	art	has	with	its	societal	environment.
Luhmann=s	views	of	 the	 function,	medium	and	medium	code	of	 the	 system	of	art	
have	aroused	a	lively	discussion	among	his	disciples	and	successors	in	Germany	and	in	
the	Netherlands.	 Some	of	 those	 disciples	 and	 successors	 share	Luhmann=s	 basic	 views	
on	these	matters,	while	others	have	been	rather	critical	of	them.	Among	other	persons,	
Siegfried	 J.	 Schimdt	 is	 fairly	 close	 to	 Luhmann	 as	 far	 as	 art-theoretical	 questions	 are	
concerned,	but	otherwise	he	has	disapproved	of	Luhmann=s	anti-humanism,	instead	he	
has	based	his	own	view	of	 the	system	of	art	on	action-theoretical	premises.	According	
to	him,	in	the	modern	system	of	art	social	actors	follow	two	Amacro	conventions@,	that	
is,	AAesthetics	Convention@	and	APolyvalence	Convention@.	Aesthetics	Convention	says	
that	the	reception	of	works	of	art	should,	in	the	first	instance,	take	place	on	the	basis	of	
aesthetic	values	and	interpretation	principles	-	and	not	on	the	basis	of	economic,	political,	
scientific,	moral,	religious	and	practical	values	and	interpretation	principles.	A	formulation	
like	this	clearly	shows	that,	like	Luhmann,	Schmidt	shares	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art.	
Polyvalence	Convention,	in	turn,	says	that	when	receiving	works	of	art	social	actors	can	
freely	interpret	them	and	proportion	them	to	their	own	needs	and	life	situations.	Thus,	
the	latter	convention	announces	that	in	the	domain	of	art	social	actors	can	freely	realise	
their	subjectivity;	an	emphasis	such	as	this	is	missing	in	Luhmann=s	theory	of	the	system	
of	art.	However,	both	Luhmann	and	Schmidt	state	that	art	has	important	cognitive	tasks.	
For	Luhmann,	art	 is	able	to	reveal	 the	contingent	nature	of	our	ordinary	phenomenal	
world,	and	Schmidt	also	emphasises	that	works	of	art	construct	alternative	models	of	the	
world.	Schmidt	adds	that	in	this	respect	art	does	not	differ	crucially	from	science.	Science	
constructs	its	models	of	the	world	according	to	certain	methodic	rules,	whereas	in	art	the	
construction	 of	 alternative	models	 is	 free	 of	methodogical	 rules;	 artistic	 constructions	
are,	therefore,	more	subjective	and	more	creative	than	scientific	models	are.	Yet,	Schmidt	
states,	art	deviates	from	science	in	that	it	does	not	give	us	Aknowledge	of	facts@,	because	
as	a	cognitive	activity	it	chiefly	operates	at	a	more	general	level,	that	is,	at	the	level	of	the	
models	of	the	world.	In	these	respects,	art	has,	in	an	innovative	way,	constantly	produced	
new	 views	 of	 the	world	 as	well	 as	 fresh	 perspectives,	 ideas	 and	 experiences.	 (Schmidt	
1980:	99–106;	1987:	19,	21–22;	1989:	430–431.)
Of	 Luhmann=s	 disciples	 and	 successors,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 Gerhard	 Plumpe	 and	 Niels	
Werber	who	have	been	most	critical	of	Luhmann=s	views	of	the	function,	medium	and	
medium	code	of	the	art	system.	According	to	them,	those	views	are	not	at	all	sociological	
by	nature	but	philosophical-aesthetic;	that	is,	those	views	derive	the	function,	medium	
and	medium	code	of	the	system	of	art	from	philosophical-aesthetic	theories	and	not	from	
societal-cultural	 reality	 itself.	 Plumpe	 and	Werber	 hold	 that	 in	 the	 process	 of	 societal	
differentiation	work	 and	 leisure	 time	have	differentiated	 from	each	other	 gradually.	A	
constellation	like	this	created	broadening	markets	for	the	institutions	of	art	and	cultural	
production,	and,	they	continue,	for	this	reason	it	has	been	the	function	of	art	to	offer	
reasonable	 and	meaningful	 activities	 to	 social	 actors	during	 their	 leisure	 time.	From	a	
functional	 standpoint,	 art	 has,	 therefore,	 been	 entertainment	 in	 modern	 society.	 Art	
has	entertained	actors	by	producing	works	that	actors	find	more	or	less	interesting.	As	
a	 critique	on	Luhmann=s	 and	Schmidt=s	 thinking,	Plumpe	and	Werber	underline	 that	
in	artistic	communications	beautiful	as	well	as	ugly	works	can	be	interesting;	works	of	
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modern	and	contemporary	art	are,	in	fact,	usually	interesting	but	not	beautiful.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 production	 of	world	 contingency	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	works	
of	art,	because	this	thing	can	quite	well	be	understood	without	works	of	art.	Thus,	 in	
Plumpe=s	 and	Werber=s	model	 of	 the	 system	of	 art,	 art	 is	 entertainment,	 the	 category	
of	 Work	 is	 its	 medium	 and	 the	 distinction	 Interesting/Non-Interesting	 its	 medium	
code.	Plumpe	and	Werber	remark	that	there	are	different	strategies	of	entertainment	in	
modern	 and	 contemporary	 society.	 Some	people	 like	 sports	 or	 television	 series,	while	
others	entertain	themselves	by	 listening,	 for	example,	 to	John	Lennon=s	popular	 songs	
or	to	John	Cage=s	avant-garde	music;	and	some	people	read	love	stories,	whereas	others	
enjoy	socially	critical	realistic	novels	or	perhaps	fictions	that	concentrate	on	philosophical	
themes.		Sports	entertains	people	with	the	help	of	matches	and	competitions,	but	art	does	
the	same	thing	by	means	of	interesting	and	stimulating	works.	(Plumpe	1993b:	294,	297,	
300-301;	Plumpe	1995:	48–49,	54–56;	Plumpe	&	Werber	1993:	26,	29,	33–34.)
In	his	last	investigations,	Luhmann	changed	his	views	of	the	system	of	art	–	in	a	way	
that	makes	those	views	internally	more	consistent;	those	changes	manifest	themselves	in	
Table	5.	 In	Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (The	Art	of	Society,	1997a,	originally	published	
1995),	he	states	that	art	produces	world	contingency	both	by	means	of	its	content	and	
form.	For	him,	fictionality	or	imaginativeness	self-evidently	belongs	to	the	constitutive	
features	of	art;	works	of	art	establish	their	own	universes	or	their	own	fictional	worlds	that	
differ	from	the	ordinary	phenomenal	world.	Through	this,	receivers	of	art	can	compare	
the	level	of	an	ordinary	phenomenal	world	with	another	ontological	level,	that	is,	with	
the	fictional	worlds	of	works	of	art.	In	this	way,	receivers	of	art	achieve	an	awareness	of	
the	contingent	nature	of	the	ordinary	phenomenal	world.	Fictional	works	of	art	implicitly	
tell	us	that	this	world	is	not	the	only	possible	world:	worlds	of	other	kinds	are	possible,	as	
well.	(Luhmann	1997a:	229.	See,	also,	Luhmann	1986:	624;	1990:	38–39.)
In	 addition,	 works	 of	 art	 produce	 world	 contingency	 by	 means	 of	 their	 form	 or	
composition.	When	making	his	or	her	unfinished	work	of	art,	the	artist	must	again	and	
again	decide	whether	details	that	he	or	she	intended	to	add	to	the	work	actually	fit	the	
work.	For	this	reason,	neither	the	work	as	a	form	of	wholeness	nor	its	details	are	based	
on	the	principle	of	necessity;	on	the	contrary,	both	the	completed	work	and	its	details	are	
the	result	of	choices	made	by	the	artist.	The	artist=s	freedom	of	choice	is	not,	however,	
unlimited,	because	the	details	should	not	be	totally	arbitrary.	In	a	successful	work,	the	
parts	or	details	are	motivated	in	the	sense	that	they	fit	the	rest	of	the	work.	At	the	same	
time,	a	work	like	this	mediates	to	its	receivers	an	awareness	of	its	own	contingent	nature;	
in	other	words,	when	receiving	the	work	the	receivers	realise	that	at	least	some	of	its	parts	
or	details	could	have	been	chosen	or	made	in	another	way.	(Luhmann	1997a:	315–317,	
497–498.)
In	his	last	works,	Luhmann	still	held	that	the	production	of	world	contingency	can	
be	understood	as	the	function	of	art,	but	after	having	changed	his	other	views	he	then	
thought	 that	 the	 category	 of	 Fittingness	 forms	 the	medium	 of	 the	 system	 of	 art	 and	
the	distinction	Fitting/Non-Fitting	functions	as	 its	medium	code	(see,	nearer,	Table	5,	
page	70).	Consequently,	he	became	estranged	from	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art.	In	a	
Luhmannian	way,	we	could,	therefore,	presume	that	completed	works	of	art	and	their	parts	
or	details	are	not	necessarily	beautiful	or	pleasant	by	nature.	On	the	contrary,	avantgardist	
and	contemporary	works	of	art,	among	other	things,	are	often	ugly	or	unpleasant;	what	
is	 fitting	 in	 those	works	 of	 art	might	 be	 something	 that	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 the	
categories	of	beautiful	and	pleasant.	Views	such	as	these	represent	Luhmann=s	major	art-
theoretical	train	of	thought	in	his	last	investigations.
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Table 5. A	 Luhmannian	View	 of	 the	 Function,	Medium,	Medium	Code	 and	Other	
Relevant	Codes	of	the	System	of	Art.	Version	II.
The Function of the System of Art:																						Production	of	World	Contingency
The Medium of the System of Art:																						Fittingness
The Medium Code of the System of Art:	 Fitting/Non-Fitting
Aesthetic Codes in the System of Art:																			Beautiful/Non-Beautiful
Pleasant/Unpleasant
Graceful/Clumsy
Sophisticated/Rustic	(or	Vulgar)
Festive/Banal	(or	Trivial)
Sublime/Low
Tragic/Comic
Grotesque
Lyrical/Dramatic
Melodramatic	(or	Bathetic)
Other Relevant Codes in the System of Art: New/Old
Innovative/Traditional
Original/Conventional
Interesting/Boring
Animated/Non-Animated
Stimulating/Non-Stimulating
Exciting/Non-Exciting
Entertaining/Non-Entertaining
Mimetic/Non-Mimetic
Figurative/Non-Figurative
Fictional/Non-Fictional
Real/Possible
Believable/Non-Believable
True/Untrue
Sources:	Luhmann	1981:	247;	1986:	624;	1990:	38-39;1993c:	201-202;	1994:	46–47;	1995:	
97–99;	1997a:	229,	302–305,	315–317,	497–498;	1997b:	378,	562.
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Unfortunately,	 in	 his	 last	 investigations	 Luhmann	 did	 not	 always	 understand	 the	
categories	of	fitting	and	beautiful	as	clearly	separate	entities.	Sometimes	he	even	wrote	that	
the	code	Fitting/Non-Fitting	could	perhaps	be	equated	with	the	distinction	Beautiful/
Non-Beautiful	 or	Beautiful/Ugly.	 For	 example,	 in	Die Kunst der Gesellschaft he	writes	
that
[Die	Semantik	von	schön/hässlich]	bringt,	wenn	man	sie	überhaupt	beibehalten	
will,	nichts	anders	zum	Ausdruck	als	ein	zusammenfassendes	Urteil	über	stimmig/
unstimmig	 unter	 der	 Zusatzbedingung	 hoher	 Komplexität,	 also	 selbsterzeugter	
Schwierigkeiten.	(Luhmann	1997a:	317.)
[If	one	wants	to	hold	onto	the	semantics	of	the	beautiful,	then	it	might	best	be	
understood	 as	 a	 summarizing	 judgement	 about	 what	 fits	 /	 does	 not	 fit	 under	
added	conditions	of	high	complexity,	that	is	to	say,	in	the	face	of	self-generated	
difficulties.	(Luhmann	2000a:	195.	Translated	by	Eva	M.	Knodt.)]
Here	Luhmann	obviously	thinks	that	 if	a	work	of	art	seems	to	consist	of	fitting	parts,	
then	it	could,	at	a	very	general	level,	be	received	as	beautiful	(see,	also,	Luhmann	1997b:	
378,	562).	In	my	opinion,	a	statement	like	this	is	simply	inaccurate.	A	work	of	art	can	be	
a	meaningful	and	successful	wholeness	and	its	details	can	fit	it	well	-	and	yet	this	whole	
work	might	be	physically	ugly	or	unpleasant,	just	as,	for	instance,	avantgardist	or	feminist	
art	often	is.	Thus,	even	in	his	last	works,	Luhmann	could	not	always	sufficiently	clearly	
detach	himself	from	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art,	whereby	those	works	are,	to	a	certain	
extent,	also	vulnerable	to	a	critical	analysis.
In	their	art-theoretical	investigations,	Luhmann	as	well	as	his	disciples	and	successors	
have	usually	attempted	to	define	art=s	medium	and	medium	code.	Whilst	doing	this	they	
have	presumed	that	art	would	possess	a	single	or	a	simple	medium	code	that	contains	only	
one	distinction.	A	presupposition	like	this	does	not	sound	plausible,	therefore	one	has	to	
conclude	that	the	Luhmannian	school	has	not	succeeded	to	define	art=s	communicative	
tools	sufficiently	clearly	and	well.	Luhmann	himself,	in	particular,	started	from	the	premise	
that	the	sphere	of	art	is	an	autopoietic	system	whose	medium	and	medium	code	separate	
it	from	other	systems.	Again	this	kind	of	presupposition	seems	to	contradict	the	modern	
sphere	of	art.	The	Luhmannian	school	has	nearly	forgotten	that	in	the	modern	system	
of	art	 social	actors	have	had	an	opportunity	to	become	acquainted	with	art=s	different	
historical	 and	 stylistic	 layers,	 apart	 from	which	 they	might	have	enjoyed	 the	works	of	
living	artists,	that	is,	the	works	of	their	contemporaries.	If	we	still	add	to	this	that	the	
modern	system	of	art	has	consisted	of	several	different	genres,	then	we	can	obviously	with	
justified	reasons	call	Luhmann=s	premises	into	question.	I	believe	that	Schimdt	(1993b:	
259–260)	is	probably	right	when	he	in	the	early	1990s	began	to	think	that	perhaps	all	
of	 the	 functional	 sub-systems	 are	not	based	on	 a	 single	 or	 simple	 code.	According	 to	
him,	 it	might	be	more	plausible	to	think	that,	 in	particular,	 the	Amedium	code	of	the	
system	of	art@	is,	in	fact,	a	combination	of	several	different	single	codes;	and	in	the	same	
vein	Athe	medium	of	the	system@	of	art	could	be	a	peculiar	combination	of	several	single	
mediums.32
32	Luhmann=s	views	of	the	system	of	mass	media	have	also	attracted	critical	attention.	Certain	system-
theorists,	for	example,	Vessela	Misheva	(2005)	and	Rudi	Laermans	(2005)	have	criticized	those	views	in	
an	elegant	and	well-formulated	way,	but	they	do	not	give	up	the	presupposition	that	the	system	of	mass	
media	would	be	based	on	a	single	medium	and	on	a	single	medium	code.	At	least	Laermans	revises	and	
improves	Luhmann=s	model	on	a	basis	like	this.	In	these	respects,	their	criticism	differs	from	Schmidt=s	
critical	remarks	on	Luhmann.
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At	 the	 level	 of	 societal	 system,	 Luhmann	 regarded	 modern	 society	 as	 a	 web	 of	
autopoietic	sub-systems	and	their	mutual	relationships.	Because	each	modern	functional	
sub-system	is,	in	his	model,	an	autopoietic	formation,	there	is	a	unity	in	modern	society.	
However,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 principle	 of	 autopoiesis	 separates	 the	 sub-
systems	 from	 each	 other	 and	makes	 them	 such	 different	 formations.	 In	 this	 respect,	
Luhmann	 constructed	 a	 rather	 paradoxical	 theoretical	 model	 of	 modern	 society.	
His	 model	 also	 largely	 ignores	 the	 relationships	 between	 different	 functional	 sub-
systems.	 To	 be	 sure,	 he	 took	 those	 relationships	 chiefly	 into	 account	 in	 two	 ways.	
Firstly,	as	we	noticed	earlier,	Luhmann	held	that	social	systems	have	three	kinds	of	
relations	to	the	rest	of	society:	(i)	each	of	them	has	a	certain	function	in	society,	(ii)	each	
of	them	produces	certain	concrete	offerings	to	other	social	systems	and	(iii)	each	of	them	
is	able	 to	 stand	 in	a	 reflexive	 relation	to	 itself	and	to	practice	 self-consciousness.	 If,	as	
Luhmann	believed,	the	production	of	world	contingency	is	the	function	of	the	system	of	
art	in	modern	society,	so	one	could	ask,	whether	this	is	really	the	reason	for	the	existence	
of	the	system	of	art	in	modern	society.	Does	a	function	like	this	make	art	a	necessary	and	
legitimate	domain	of	modern	society?	As	an	answer	to	these	questions	I	would	like	to	
say	that	Luhmann	was	incapable	of	dealing	with	the	function	of	art	in	a	satisfactory	way.	
Due	to	this	anti-humanism,	he	did	not	consider	for	what	kinds	of	purposes	individual	
and	collective	actors	use	works	of	art;	he	simply	attempted	to	define	the	function	of	the	
system	of	art	without	pointing	to	social	actors	and	their	ways	of	using	and	consuming	
works	of	art.	Nor	did	he	consider	systematically	what	kinds	of	offerings	the	system	of	art	
makes	available	for	other	functional	sub-systems.
Secondly,	it	was,	especially,	the	concept	of	interpenetration	by	means	of	which	Parsons	
spoke	 about	 the	 relationships	 between	 different	 systems.	He	 thought	 that	 in	modern	
Western	civilization	different	systems	are	not	differentiated	too	far	from	each	other	but	
they	are,	in	many	ways,	interlaced.	Luhmann	also	needed	the	concept	of	interpenetration,	
although	he	often	used	the	concept	of	structual	coupling	as	its	synonymy.	He	stated	that	
there	is	a	relationship	of	interpenetration	or	structural	coupling	between	two	systems	if	
Aeach	of	them	places	its	own	complexity	at	a	disposal	of	the	structure	of	the	other	system@	
(Luhmann	1985a:	289–292;	1997b:	108).	Subsequently,	according	to	Luhmann,	modern	
society	does	not	consist	only	of	autopoietic	functional	sub-systems	but	also	of	structural	
couplings	 between	 those	 sub-systems.	 As	 far	 as	 the	 sub-system	 of	 art	 is	 concerned,	
Luhmann	thought	that	it	only	has	a	few	structural	couplings	with	other	sub-systems.	In	
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft	he	mentions	trade	with	works	of	art	nearly	as	an	only	instance	
of	structural	couplings	between	the	sub-system	of	art	and	other	sub-systems:
Est	gibt	wenige	und	eher	lasche	strukturelle	Kopplungen	zwischen	Kunstsystem	
und	 andere	 Funktionssystemen.	 Es	 gibt	 nach	 wie	 vor	 einen	 auf	 Kunstwerke	
spezialisierten	 Markt	 als	 Kopplung	 von	 Kunstsystem	 und	 Wirtschaftssystem.	
Aber	hier	werden	Kunstwerke	als	Kapitalanlagen	gehandelt	oder	als	extreme	teure	
Individualgüter.	Der	Zugang	zu	diesem	Markt	hängt,	auf	der	Produktionsseite,	
von	durchgesetzter	Reputation	ab,	an	deren	Entwicklung	der	Markt	selbst	beteilig	
ist.	(Luhmann	1997a:	391.)
[There	are	only	a	few,	rather	loose	structural	couplings	between	the	art	system	and	
other	systems.	As	before,	a	specialised	art	market	couples	the	art	system	and	the	
economic	system.	But	in	this	market,	artworks	are	traded	as	capital	investments	
or	as	extremely	expensive	individual	goods.	On	the	production	side,	access	to	this	
market	depends	on	an	established	reputation,	and	the	market	takes	the	active	role	
in	developing	 such	 reputations.	 (Luhmann	2000a:	242–243.	Translated	by	Eva	
M.	Knodt.)]
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To	which	system	does	a	structural	coupling	like	this	belong?	Luhmann	did	not	always	
speak	 about	 structural	 couplings	 in	 a	 consistent	 way.	 Sometimes	 his	 works	 give	 an	
impression	that	structural	couplings	are	not	parts	of	functional	sub-systems	but	they	lie	
outside	 those	 sub-systems	or	between	 them;	however,	more	often	he	 seemed	 to	 think	
that	structural	couplings	simultaneously	belong	at	least	to	two	different	sub-systems	(cf.	
Becker	&	Reinhardt-Becker	2001:	65–67).	The	latter	interpretation	implies	that	Luhmann	
was	 inclined	to	think	that,	 for	 instance,	 trade	with	works	of	art	as	well	as	art	markets	
simultaneously	belong	to	the	sub-system	of	art	and	to	the	sub-system	of	economics.	In	
this	connection,	he	did	not	speak	at	all	about	study	of	art	or	about	art	administration	and	
art	policy;	nor	did	he	mention	radio	and	television	which	became	important	mediation	
institutions	of	radio	plays,	concerts,	films	and	other	works	of	art	by	the	mid-20th	century.	
At	 any	 rate,	 by	 using	 the	Luhmannian	 conceptual	 vocabulary	 one	 can	 say	 that	 study	
of	art	is	a	structural	coupling	between	the	sub-system	of	science	and	the	sub-system	of	
art.	This	means	that	study	of	art	is	also	a	part	of	the	sub-system	of	art;	a	view	like	this	
sounds	reasonable	and	justified,	because	theories	and	investigations	concerning	art	have	
participated	in	the	maintenance	of	the	boundary	between	art	and	non-art,	for	example,	
by	giving	definitions	of	art.	Similarly,	art	administration	and	art	policy	would	obviously	
be	 structural	 couplings	 between	 the	 sub-system	of	 politics	 and	 the	 sub-system	of	 art.	
Radio	and	television,	in	turn,	would	be	structural	couplings	between	the	sub-system	of	
mass	media	and	the	sub-system	of	art.	Albeit	Luhmann	ignores	couplings	 like	these,	I	
want	 to	argue	 for	 the	 standpoint	 that	all	of	 the	above-mentioned	 institutions,	 that	 is,	
trade	with	works	of	art,	art	markets,	study	of	art,	art	administration,	art	policy,	radio	and	
television	must,	in	part,	be	seen	as	constituents	of	the	sub-system	of	art.	It	is	justified	to	
think	that	each	of	them	simultaneously	belongs	to	two	functional	sub-systems.
Luhmann=s	conception	of	social	systems	is	rigid	and	narrow.	It	is	just	on	the	basis	of	
a	conception	such	as	this	that	he	can	understand	the	sub-system	of	art	as	Aa	surprisingly	
isolated@	social	formation:
Im	Vergleich	zu	anderen	Intersystembeziehungen	-	etwa	zwischen	Recht	und	Politik,	
zwischen	 Krankensystem	 und	 Wirtsschaft	 als	 Beschäftigungssystem,	 zwischen	
Wirtschaft	 und	 Politik	 oder	 zwischen	Wissenschaft	 und	Wirtshaft	 –	 fällt	 am	
Kunstsystem	also	eher	die	Abkopplung	auf.	Das	wiederum	könnte	erklären,	weshalb	
die	moderne	Kunst	in	der	Lage	ist,	eine	Symbolisierung	von	Grundproblemen	der	
modernen	Gesellschaft	zu	entwickeln,	die	weder	auf	Imitation	ihrer	Natur	noch	
auf	Kritik	ihrer	Auswirkungen	angewiesen	ist.	(Luhmann	1997a:	391.)
[Compared	 to	other	 intersystemic	 relationships	–	between	 law	and	politics,	 for	
example,	 between	 the	 health	 care	 system	 and	 the	 economy	 as	 an	 employment	
system,	between	the	economy	and	politics	or	between	the	economy	and	science	
–	 the	art	 system	 is	 surprisingly	 isolated.	This	might	explain	why	modern	art	 is	
capable	of	developing	a	symbolization	of	fundamental	social	problems	of	modern	
society	that	relies	neither	on	an	imitation	of	society=s	Anature@	nor	a	critique	of	its	
effects.	(Luhmann	2000a:	243.	Translated	by	Eva	M.	Knodt.)]33
33	I	have	added	the	expression	Abetween	the	economy	and	politics@	into	Eva	M.Knodt=s	translation,	be-
cause	it	-	in	German,	Azwischen	Wirtschaft	und	Politik@-	is	included	in	Luhmann=s	own	original	German	
text,	but	not	in	Knodt=s	translation.
The Modern and Contemporary Sphere of Art and... 7
The	modern	sub-system	of	art	has	not	been	so	isolated	as	Luhmann	presumes.	If	we	take	
into	account	here	the	common	domains	between	the	sub-system	of	art	and	other	sub-
systems,	then	we	can,	with	good	reasons,	say	that	this	sub-system	and	the	rest	of	society	
have	 been	widely	 interlaced.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	Luhmann	 is	 obviously	 right	 in	 that	
modern	art	has	been	capable	of	analyzing	society=s	basic	problems	and	–	I	would	myself	
like	 to	 add	–	of	presenting	 critical	 remarks	on	 society=s	 shortcomings.	 In	 this	 respect,	
modern	art	has	been	more	autonomous	with	regard	to	the	rest	of	society,	for	instance,	
than	the	system	of	science	and	the	schooling	system	have	been.
The	 rigidity	 and	 narrowness	 of	 Luhmann=s	 concept	 of	 system	 can	 be	 interpreted	
in	different	ways.	 In	 their	 study	of	Luhmann=s	 system	 theory,	Frank	Becker	und	Elke	
Reinhardt-Becker	 present	 an	 interesting	 interpretation	 on	 Luhmann=s	 thinking.	
According	to	them,	in	Luhmann=s	theory,	the	systemic	identity	of	communicative	acts	
solely	depends	on	what	kinds	of	medium	and	medium	codes	they	primarily	use	(Becker&	
Reinhardt-Becker	2001:	50–53,	65–67).	This	means	 that	 the	sub-system	of	art	would	
only	consist	of	the	communicative	acts	which	speak	about	works	of	art	primarily	with	
the	medium	code	Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	or	Fitting/Non-Fitting	–	provided	that	one	
of	these	two	codes	actually	functions	as	the	medium	code	of	the	system	of	art.	But	what	
about	the	situation	in	which	critics	of	art	speak	about	works	of	art	primarily	by	means	of	
moral,	political	and	economic	codes?	To	which	system	do	communicative	acts	like	these	
belong?	Becker	and	Reinhardt-Becker	would	obviously	reply	that	they	belong	to	morals,	
politics	or	economics	–	but	not	to	the	sub-system	of	art.	An	interpretation	like	this	would	
not,	however,	correspond	to	Luhmann=s	own	works.	Albeit	in	trade	with	works	of	art,	
Apersons@	or	 actors	handle	works	of	 art	with	 the	help	of	 the	medium	Money	and	 the	
medium	code	Payment/Non-Payment,	a	trading	like	this	is	a	constituent	of	the	sub-system	
of	art	in	Luhmann=s	theory.	Similarly,	in	the	modern	art	life,	different	institutions,	groups	
and	individuals	compete	over	power,	statuses	and	resources	–	utilising	in	competitions	
like	these	the	medium	Power	and	the	medium	code	Owner	of	Power	vs	Object	of	Power;	
despite	this,	those	activities	are	part	of	the	sub-system	of	art.	To	be	sure,	it	is	justified	to	
criticize	Luhmann	in	that	he	largely	passed	over	activities	like	these	and	chiefly	paid	his	
attention	to	activities	which	follow	the	supposed	medium	and	medium	code	of	the	sub-
system	of	art.
3.4 Modern Culture and Society from the Standpoint of Actor-Centric 
Systemic Studies
In	his	system	theory,	Luhmann	(1985a:	629)	states	that	it	is	impossible	to	observe	the	
entirety	 of	 society	 at	 one	 and	 the	 same	 time:	 every	 single	 observation	 is	 unavoidably	
partial	and	it	necessarily	considers	society	from	a	certain	standpoint	or	from	the	horizon	
of	a	certain	sub-system.	Each	single	functional	sub-system	sees	the	rest	of	society,	that	is,	
its	societal	environment	in	its	own	and	peculiar		way,	and	it	is	not	possible	to	unite	those	
pictures	produced	by	 functional	 sub-systems	 into	a	consistent	and	coherent	picture	of	
society	(Luhmann	1987:	34–37).		It	is,	in	part,	for	these	reasons	that	sociology	cannot	avoid	
epistemological	diversity	–	or	the	state	of	affairs	that	there	are	a	huge	number	of	different	
theoretical	representations	or	models	of	modern	society	in	sociology.	Perhaps	a	train	of	
thought	like	this	explains	why	Luhmann	did	not	concentrate	on	constructing	a	general	
system-theoretical	model	of	modern	society.	To	be	sure,	at	a	general	 level	he	theorised	
on	 modern	 social	 systems,	 in	 particular,	 in	 his	 investigations	 Soziale Systeme (Social	
Systems,	1985a,	originally	published	1984),	Beobachtungen der Moderne (Observations	
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of	Modernity,	1992) und	Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Society	of	Society,	1997b	and	
1997c);	 in	 these	works,	 he	 also	worked	 on	 his	 own	 view	 of	modernity.	However,	 he	
otherwise	concentrated	on	writing	theoretical	special	studies	of	modern	functional	sub-
systems.	These	special	studies	deal	with	sub-systems	such	as	economics,	science,	law,	art,	
mass	media,	politics	and	education.34	When	theorising	about	these	sub-systems	Luhmann	
usually	endeavours	to	explicate	what	is	specific	to	each	of	them	and	what	distinguishes	
them	 from	 their	 societal	 environment.	Therefore,	 his	 entire	 production	 does	 not	 pay	
thorough	attention	to	the	relationships	between	the	functional	sub-systems.
Simultaneously,	 Luhmann=s	 production	 does	 not	 always	 take	 into	 account	 the	
differences	 between	 functional	 sub-systems.	 In	 his	 production,	 both	 the	 concept	 of	
functional	differentiation	and	the	concept	of	functional	sub-system,	especially,	are	rather	
monolithic.	 In	 recent	 actor-centric	 system-theoretical	 sociology,	 Jürgen	 Habermas,	
Renate	Mayntz	and	Vessela	Misheva,	among	other	persons,	have	criticised	this	feature	in	
his	investigations.	As	far	as	the	phenomenon	of	functional	differentiation	is	concerned,	
Mayntz	(1988a;	1988b)	distinguishes	three	levels	in	it:	meanings,	roles	and	organisations.	
The	 level	 of	 meanings	 is	 the	 most	 fundamental	 one	 in	 functional	 differentiation.	
However,	insofar	as	social	systems	are	differentiated	from	each	other	only	at	the	level	of	
meanings,	they	do	not	necessarily	achieve	stable	and	clear-cut	boundaries;	in	a	case	like	
this,	their	degree	of	system-likeness	is	usually	low.	Intimate	relationships	or	the	sphere	of	
intimacy	is	a	differentiated	phenomenon	or	system	chiefly	at	the	level	of	meanings,	but	
they	do	not	possess	fixed	roles	and	organisations.	When	there	are	fixed	and	differentiated	
roles	in	a	system,	this	system	is,	then,	more	clearly	differentiated	from	its	environment.	
Finally,	functional	differentiation	has	advanced	furthest,	when	a	system	also	has	its	own	
organisations	and	institutions;	in	this	case,	its	differentiated	position	has	been	strongly	
institutionalised	in	society.
Insofar	as	functional	differentiation	would	take	place	only	at	the	level	of	meanings,	it	
could	hardly	develop	into	a	central	structural	feature	of	society.	It	is,	therefore,	reasonable	
to	presume	that	modern	functional	sub-systems	are	usually	differentiated	formations	also	
at	 the	 levels	 of	 roles	 and	 organisations.	This	 holds,	 among	 other	 things,	 true	 for	 the	
sub-systems	of	economics,	politics,	law,	science,	art,	education,	mass	media,	sports	and	
health	care;	in	this	respect,	functional	differentiation	has	undoubtedly	has	been	a	central	
structural	feature	of	modern	society.	On	the	other	hand,	the	situation	is	different	in	the	
case	of	the	sphere	of	intimacy	–	or	in	the	case	of	people=s	Alife	worlds@.	In	his	critique	on	
Luhmann,	Habermas	(1987b)	has	quite	correctly	pointed	out	that	Luhmann	ignores	that	
people=s	life	worlds	do	not	constitute	a	system	in	the	same	sense	as,	in	particular,	modern	
economics	and	politics	are	systems.	For	this	reason,	Habermas	has	not	at	all	applied	the	
concept	of	system	to	people=s	life	worlds.	It	is,	however,	possible	to	solve	this	problem	in	
another	way,	as	well.	Following	Mayntz,	we	can	launch	here	the	idea	of	system-likeness	
and	 compare	 different	 social	 formations	with	 each	 other	with	 regard	 to	 their	 system-
likeness.	From	this	standpoint	it	might	be	justified	to	say	that	modern	economics	and	
politics	 have	 had	 a	 high	degree	 of	 system-likeness,	whereas	 the	 sphere	 of	 intimacy	 or	
people=s	life	worlds	have	obtained	only	a	low	degree	of	system-likeness.	In	other	words:	
modern	economics	and	politics	are	systems	in	a	strong	sense,	but	the	sphere	of	intimacy	
and	people=s	life	worlds	are	systems	in	a	weak	sense.	
34	See	Luhmann	1988,	1991,	1993e,	1996,	1997a,	2000b	and	2002.	It	should	be	added	that	Luhmann=s	
Einführung in die Theorie der Gesellschaft (Introduction	to	the	Theory	of	Society,	2005),	edited	by	Dirk	
Baecker,	is	a	collection	of	his	writings	and	not	a	single	monograph.
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Where	does	the	modern	system	of	art	lie	on	the	scale	of	system-likeness?	Although	
there	have,	 in	the	modern	system	of	art,	constantly	emerged	new	kinds	of	institutions	
and	organisations	which,	in	particular,	have	taken	care	of	the	production	and	mediation	
of	works	of	art,	there	are	a	great	number	of	informal	and	loose	associations	and	semi-
spontaneous	activities	in	this	system.	In	addition,	the	modern	system	of	art	is	a	voluntary	
formation	in	the	sense	that	actors	can	decide	themselves	whether	they	want	to	participate	
in	 it.	 Representatives	 of	 the	 systemic	 study	 of	 art	 are,	 therefore,	 inclined	 to	 say	 that	
the	modern	 system	of	art	has	not	been	 so	 formal	and	fixed	as	 the	modern	 systems	of	
economics,	politics,	science	and	health	care	have	been	–	or	that	the	modern	system	of	art	
has	possessed	something	like	an	average	degree	of	system-likeness	at	the	most.35
According	to	Mayntz,	the	level	of	meanings	is	the	most	fundamental	one	in	functional	
differentiation.	In	Luhmann=s	system	theory,	the	boundaries	of	social	systems	are	based	
on	 the	 functional	meanings	 of	 communicative	 acts,	 apart	 from	which	 the	media	 and	
medium	codes	of	the	functional	sub-systems	are	close	to	the	level	of	meanings;	they	are,	in	
fact,	classification	tools	which	actors	or	persons	apply	to	communicative	acts	after	having	
first	defined	the	system-identity	or	functional	meaning	of	those	acts.	Although	Luhmann	
does	not	point	 to	roles,	 institutions	and	organisations	 in	 this	connection,	he	 theorizes	
about	functional	sub-systems	as	if	they	were	as	stable,	fixed,	non-personal	and	non-living	
as	organisational	systems	usually	are.	For	this	reason	Misheva	(2000:	20–21,	211–217)	
concludes	 that	Luhmann=s	 theory	of	 autopoietic	 social	 systems	 is,	 in	 fact,	 a	 theory	of	
organisations	or	organisational	systems.	Albeit	she	adds	that	it	is	just	organisations	that	are	
Athe	most	essential	part	of	the	modern	world@	(Misheva	2000:	217),	one	may	easily	state	
that	Luhmann	is	rather	blind	to	other	aspects	and	dimensions	of	modernity.	In	particular,	
if	modern	society	has	been	a	dynamic	and	a	constantly	changing	formation,	its	functional	
sub-systems	ought	to,	with	all	probability,	be	open	and	flexible	formations.	In	contrast	to	
the	dynamics	of	modern	society,	Luhmann=s	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems	seems	to	
require	a	stable	social	order	and	a	fixed	societal	structure	–	an	implication	that	Misheva	
(2000:	 223–224)	 also	 associates	with	Luhmann=s	 theory.	The	 theory	 in	 question	has,	
therefore,	certain	serious	weaknesses	as	a	model	of	modernity.
Thus,	 even	 if	 Luhmann	 speaks	 about	 societal	 evolution	 and	 modernisation	 in	
his	 production,	 his	 investigations	 are	 not	 historical	 enough;	 that	 is,	 because	 of	 their	
abstractness	they	offer	to	us	rather	monolithic	and	one-dimensional	theoretical	models.	
What	is	needed	here	is	a	model	of	modernity	that	is	more	genuinely	historical	by	nature	
and	 that	 pays	more	 attention	 to	 the	 relationships	 between	 functional	 sub-systems.	 A	
model	elaborated	by	Münch	is	close	to	requirements	like	these.
Münch	understands	sociological	system	theory	as	a	branch	of	research	that	elaborates	
analytical	models	for	the	needs	and	purposes	of	empirical	research	work.	Like	Parsons,	
he	distinguishes	between	analytical	and	concrete	systems.	It	is	the	main	task	of	system	
theory	 to	develop	analytical	 concepts	by	means	of	which	empirical	 research	work	can	
outline	and	analyze	societal-cultural	reality;	yet,	 it	would	be	a	mistake	to	equate	those	
concepts	with	the	reality	itself.	In	Münch=s	opinion,	system	theory	should	not	attempt	to	
be	a	mirror	of	reality	but	a	conceptual	frame	of	reference	that	makes	empirical	research	
work	possible.	Although	it	is,	at	an	analytical	or	conceptual	level,	possible	to	distinguish	
clearly	between	economics	and	politics,	or	between	visual	art	and	advertisement,	it	does	
not	follow	from	this	that	the	systems	of	economics	and	politics,	or	the	systems	of	art	and	
advertisement,	would	be	clear-cut	or	sharply	differentiated	from	each	other	in	societal-
35	See,	for	example,	Dickie	1974	and	1984.	
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cultural	reality.	On	the	contrary,	concrete	or	real	systems	are	often	interlaced.	For	this	
reason	the	analytical	models	elaborated	by	system	theorists	cannot	be	straightforwardly	
or	mechanically	 utilised	 in	 empirical	 research	work.	 In	 analytical	models,	 systems	 are	
usually	well-formed;	in	other	words,	they	possess	a	high	degree	of	system-likeness.	On	
the	other	hand,	concrete	or	real	systems	are	not	necessarily	well-formed;	their	degree	of	
system-likeness	might	be	low.	For	reasons	like	these,	empirical	sociological	research	work	
based	on	system	theory	should	always	reflect	upon	to	what	extent	its	objects	of	research	
can	be	regarded	as	systems.
As	a	critique	on	Luhmann,	Münch	states	that	the	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems	
confuses	analytical	models	with	reality	–	or,	as	the	constructionists	would	say,	with	the	
phenomenal	world.	Actually,	in	his	sociological	system	theory,	Luhmann	created	analytical	
models,	even	if	he	himself	believed	that	those	models	are	capable	of	grasping	the	structure	
of	 modern	 society	 correctly.	 As	 far	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 autopoiesis	 itself	 is	 concerned,	
Münch	does	not	discard	it,	but	he	wishes	to	use	it	in	another	way	than	Luhmann	used	
it.	Autopoiesis	was,	for	Luhmann	(1997a:	300–301),	not	a	matter	of	degree;	he	thought	
that	 functional	 sub-systems	 operate	 either	 autopoietically	 or	 not	 –	 and	 there	 is	 not	 a	
third	possibility.	In	contrast	to	this,	Münch	(1994:	304;	1995;	27–29)	suggests	that	the	
concept	of	autopoiesis	can	be	used	to	express	differences	in	degree;	it	is	only	in	this	case	
that	 it	 can	be	 applied	 to	modern	 functional	 sub-systems.	Münch=s	 suggestion	 implies	
that	 the	real	 functional	 sub-systems	have	not	operated	only	according	to	the	principle	
of	autopoiesis;	this	principle	characterises	only	some	features	in	their	operation,	whereas	
the	 other	 features	 connect	 them	with	 other	 functional	 sub-systems.	 It	 should	 also	 be	
mentioned	that	Mayntz	(1988a:	35)	is	willing	to	use	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	in	this	
way,	that	is,	as	a	concept	that	expresses	differences	in	degree.
In	Münch=s	investigations,	theory	of	interpenetration	forms	a	mediating	level	between	
system	theory=s	analytical	concepts	and	societal-cultural	reality.36	Because	this	theory	is	
not	 a	mere	 analytical	 tool,	 it	 contains	 statements	 about	 the	nature	of	 societal-cultural	
reality.	The	 theory	 of	 interpenetration	 is,	 in	 particular,	 needed	 in	 studies	 concerning	
modern	Western	 civilization,	 for,	 to	Münch=s	mind,	 it	 is	 just	 in	 this	 civilization	 that	
differentiated	sub-systems	are	interlaced	in	a	well-functioning	way.	On	the	other	hand,	
Münch	holds	 that	 traditional	 and	Non-Western	 civilizations	have	often	 suffered	 from	
the	 state	 of	 affairs	 that	 in	 those	 civilizations	 differentiated	 sub-systems	have	not	 been	
interlaced	enough;	 that	 is,	 there	has	not	been	a	well-ordered	and	well-functioning	co-
ordination	and	interaction	between	differentiated	sub-systems	in	those	civilizations.	These	
views	 presented	 by	Münch	 recall	 Parsons=	 system-theoretical	 sociology.	 Like	Münch,	
Parsons	also	thought	that	the	concept	of	differentiation	or	functional	differentiation	does	
not	alone	suffice	to	characterise	modern	Western	civilization	accurately.	For	this	reason	
Parsons	gave	the	concept	of	interpenetration	a	central	position	in	his	own	view	of	modern	
Western	civilization.
According	to	Münch,	the	starting	point	in	the	process	of	modernisation	of	Western	
civilization	was	the	situation	in	which	societal	action	and	interaction	began	to	exceed	the	
boundaries	of	a	local	or	regional	unit	(family,	clan,	village,	town).	In	a	situation	like	this,	
people	lived	in	small	communities	in	which	the	degree	of	functional	differentiation	was	
low;	but,	on	 the	other	hand,	 those	communities	were	clearly	differentiated	 from	each	
other	 in	 a	 segmented	way.	Another	 characteristic	 feature	of	 the	 traditional	way	of	 life	
was	the	difference	between	internal	and	external	morals.	Inside	a	local	unit,	relationships	
36	Münch	worked	on	his	theory	in	the	1980s	and	early	1990s.	See	Münch	1984,	1986a,	1986b,	1988a,	
198b	and	1991.
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between	 actors	 or	 individuals	were	 usually	warm	 and	 sympathetic;	 a	 sense	 of	mutual	
solidarity	and	belonging	was	rather	typical	to	those	relationships.	Within	a	community	
like	 this,	 social	 interaction	was	 based	 on	 trust	 and	on	 shared	 customs	 and	 traditions.	
However,	the	members	of	a	local	community	did	not	necessarily	adopt	a	similar	attitude	
to	people	that	were	from	other	local	communities,	that	is,	outside	their	own	community.	
The	prevailing	moral	code	did	not	require	that	foreign	people	had	to	be	treated	in	the	
same	way	as	members	of	a	local	community	treated	their	own	people.
Münch	points	out	that	Max	Weber	was	already	aware	of	the	difference	between	internal	
and	 external	morals	 in	 traditional	 and	Non-Western	 civilizations.	 In	 his	 comparative	
sociological	studies	of	religions,	Weber	(1947)	held	that	in	Asian	civilizations	the	difference	
under	consideration	was	usually	sharper	than	it	was	in	medieval	and	premodern	Europe.	
Because	in	China	and	India	moral	behaviour	was	based	on	ties	of	kinship,	betraying	and	
cheating	were	common	phenomena	outside	those	ties,	for	instance,	in	the	relationships	
between	 different	 communities.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 relationships	 between	 different	
communities	were	 characterised	by	a	general	 suspicion	and	distrust;	 and	 for	 the	 same	
reason	a	rational	interaction	between	different	communities,	that	is,	an	interaction	based	
on	shared	rules	developed	slowly	in	China	and	India.	In	medieval	Europe,	the	difference	
between	 internal	 and	 external	 morals	 was	 softened	 by	 the	moral	 universalism	 of	 the	
Catholic	Church;	according	to	it,	people	are	equal	in	God=s	eyes.	However,	it	was	only	the	
Protestant	sectarian	movements	that	attempted	to	consistently	bring	a	moral	universalism	
such	as	this	into	the	domain	of	mundane	life	and	social	interaction.	In	part,	the	action	of	
those	sectarian	movements	created	a	situation	in	which	rational	functional	action	systems	
could	take	shape;	those	functional	action	systems	were	rational	in	the	sense	that	they	were	
based	on	shared	rules,	wherefore	they	could	exceed	the	boundaries	of	local	communities.	
In	this	sense,	Münch	(1990:	447–463)	understands	functional	differentiation	as	a	process	
that	established	rational	action	systems	between	local	communities.
Münch	 adds	 that	 at	 the	 same	 time	 large-scale	 political	 and	 economic	 changes	
contributed	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 rational	 functional	 action	 systems.	 During	 three	
centuries,	that	is,	from	the	16th	century	to	the	18th	century	there	emerged	in	Europe	a	
group	of	politically	centralized	and	territorially	wide	states	that	unified	and	standardized	
administration	 of	 law	 and	 taxation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 treatment	 of	 people	 within	 their	
territory.	The	power	of	those	states	or	political	authorities	exceeded	the	power	of	local	
authorities,	and,	in	fact,	they	subordinated	local	authorities	through	their	power.	In	the	
first	 instance,	Portugal,	Spain,	France,	England,	Scotland,	 the	Netherlands,	Denmark,	
Sweden,	Russia,	Switzerland,	Austria	and	Prussia	belonged	to	those	states.	In	this	way,	
functional	action	systems	could	now	develop	rationally	within	a	single	territorial	entity	
ruled	by	a	state.	In	particular,	the	development	of	modern	capitalism	benefitted	from	this	
new	situation,	since	modern	capitalism	needs	and	demands	large	market	areas;	but,	on	the	
other	hand,	modern	capitalism	itself	also	accelerated	the	formation	of	territorially	wide	
states,	since	it	created	a	structural	pressure	on	the	formation	of	states	like	these.	From	the	
18th	century	onward,	the	first	modern	European	nation-states	took	shape	on	the	basis	of	
the	above-mentioned	politically	centralized	and	territorially	wide	states.	In	this	process,	
the	estate	privileges	were	gradually	abolished	and	common	people	and	lower	classes	were	
accepted	as	the	members	of	nations.	Münch	concludes	that	through	this,	social	action	
and	interaction	were	more	clearly	regulated	by	the	rules	and	normative	expectations	that	
are	typical	of	the	functionally	differentiated	action	systems.37
37	See	Münch	1984:	22;	1986a,	91,	104–105,	119–120,	131;	1990:	455–458;	1991:	321–324.
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Münch=s	thinking	is	an	instance	of		Amethodological	nationalism@,	that	is,	he	holds	
that	the	concept	of	national	society	or	national	societal	system	is	acceptable	in	theories	
of	modern	society.	Luhmann	was	fairly	critical	of	a	thinking	such	as	this.	He	did	not,	of	
course,	deny	the	existence	of	modern	nations	and	states,	but	he	was	inclined	to	think	that	
the	significance	of	nations	has	been	decreasing	since	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century;	on	
the	other	hand	he	stated	that	modern	states	can	be	understood	as	organizational	systems	
that	produce	peace,	 stability,	prosperity	 and	democracy	 into	 their	 social	 environment.	
Thus,	as	Ole	Thyssen	(2007:	93,	95–96)	remarks,	the	concepts	of	nation	and	state	are	
included	in	Luhmann=s	theory	of	modern	society,	even	if	Luhmann	otherwise	thought	
that	the	theory	in	question	must	be	constructed	on	the	basis	of	the	concepts	of	functional	
sub-system	 and	 world	 society.	 In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 Münch	 underlines	 that	 politically	
centralized	 and	 territorially	 wide	 states	 as	 well	 as	 modern	 nation-states	 and	 modern	
national	societal	systems	created	the	frames	in	which	functional	sub-system	could	develop	
and	be	established.	The	concept	of	a	national	 societal	 system	is,	 therefore,	a	necessary	
tool	in	a	system-theoretical	sociology.	At	the	same	time	national	societal	systems	have,	of	
course,	been	part	of	a	world	society	or	world	system.	This	means	that	both	the	concept	
of	 a	 national	 societal	 system	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 a	world	 society	 or	world	 system	 are	
acceptable	in	system-theoretical	models	of	modernity	or	Western	modernity.	In	a	dual	
way	 like	 this,	 classics	 of	 the	world	 system	 theory,	 in	 particular,	 Fernand	Braudel	 and	
Immanuel	Wallerstein	have	often	used	the	concept	of	system.	Braudel	(1985a;	1985b)	
places	the	first	steps	of	the	modern	world	system	in	the	late	14th	century,	when	a	new	and	
wide	trading	area	emerged	in	the	Mediterranean	region;	and	Wallerstein	(1995;	2000),	
in	turn,	regards	the	late	15th	century	as	its	starting	point,	since	at	that	time	Europeans	
became	increasingly	aware	of	other	continents	and	began	to	exploit	them.	Thus,	from	a	
standpoint	 like	this,	 the	modern	world	system	was	born	long	before	the	emergence	of	
modern	society,	for	usually	sociologists	and	system	theorists	regard	the	18th	century	as	
a	the	birth	date	of	modern	society.	At	any	rate,	the	interesting	thing	in	this	connection	
is	the	fact	that	in	Braudel=s	and	Wallerstein=s	models	the	modern	world	system	contains	
transnational,	national	and	regional	sub-systems.	Münch=s	(1993;	1998;	2001)	own	way	
of	using	the	concept	of	system	is	close	to	Braudel=s	and	Wallerstein=s	thinking.
It	is	interesting	to	note	that	certain	disciples	of	Luhmann	have	modified	his	theory	
in	a	way	that	aims	at	taking	into	account	the	internal	diversity	of	world	society.	Rudolf	
Stichweh	shares	with	Luhmann	the	view	that	modern	society	and	most	of	its	functional	
sub-systems	have	been	global	formations	since	their	birth,	which,	according	to	him,	means	
that	those	global	systems	are	even	about	500–600	years	old.	Thus,	this	seems	to	imply	
that	Stichweh	does	not	place	the	origin	of	modern	society	into	the	18th	century	but	into	
the	15th	and	16th	centuries,	although	one	could	add	into	this	that	at	the	beginning	the	
development	of	modernity	was	slow	and	it	was	not	until	the	18th	century	that	functional	
sub-systems	were	able	to	displace	aristocratic	estate	systems.	Otherwise	Stichweh	thinks	
that	modern	world	society	does	not	lead	to	a	homogenization	of	the	world,	because	there	
are	national,	regional	and	local	structures,	communities	and	cultures	within	this	global	
societal	 system.	Yet,	 like	 Luhmann,	 Stichweh	 underlines	 that	 nowadays	world	 society	
is	the	only	societal	system	in	the	world.	(Stichweh	2007:	133–136,	146–147).	On	the	
other	hand,	Jenö	Bango	(2008)	represents	a	train	of	thought	that	there	are	regional	–	and	
also	national	and	local	–	functional	sub-systems	as	well	as	other	kinds	of	Aregion-systems@	
within	modern	world	society.
Let	 us	 return	 to	Münch=s	 thinking.	According	 to	 him,	 the	 concepts	 of	 functional	
differentiation	and	 interpenetration	are	necessary	 in	models	of	Western	modernity.	 In	
an	 analytical	 or	 ideal	 functional	 differentiation,	 functional	 sub-systems	 develop	 into	
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normatively	 autonomous	 formations.	 In	 a	 case	 like	 this,	 for	 instance,	 economic	 and	
political	 action	 has	 completely	 detached	 itself	 from	 moral,	 communal	 and	 religious	
regulation.	 In	contrast,	when	a	 state	of	 functional	differentiation	 is	based	on	 society=s	
normative	 integration,	 functional	 sub-systems	 limit	 each	 other=s	 autonomy.	 This	 is,	
Münch	continues,	precisely	what	has	happened	in	modern	Western	civilization:
Die	Eigenart	der	modernen	okzidentalen	Sozialordnung	 ist	 im Vergleich zu	den	
ausserokzidentalen	Sozialordnungen	nicht	der	höhere	Grad	der	Rationalisierung	
und	Differenzierung	von	Sphären	im	Sinne	von	Auseinanderentwicklung,	sondern	
der	höhere	Grad	der	Integration	differenzierter	Sphären[...]Aus	Interpenetration	
folgt	normativ integrierte Differenzierung.	(Münch	1988a:	545.	Münch=s	italics.)	
[The	specificity	of	modern	Western	social	order,	in comparison with Non-Western	
social	orders,	does	not	lie	in	the	higher	degree	of	rationalization	and	differentiation	
of	 spheres	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 separate	 development;	 instead,	 it	 lies	 in	 the	 higher	
degree	of	integration	of	differentiated	spheres[...]	From	interpenetration	follows	
normatively integrated Differentiation.	(Münch	1988a:	545.	My	translation.]
In	interpenetration,	two	systems	reciprocally	penetrate	each	other=s	areas.	As	a	result	of	
this,	there	emerge	between	them	common	and	overlapping	areas	that	contain	elements	of	
both	of	them.	Münch	(1984:	14;	1988b:	228)	thinks	that	areas	like	these	are	normative	
by	nature,	that	is,	to	a	certain	extent	those	systems	share	a	common	normative	culture.	
However,	it	is	also	possible	that	two	systems	have	common	organisations	–	just	as	radio	
and	 television	 belong	 to	 the	 system	 of	 mass	 media,	 but,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 are	
important	mediation	institutions	of	works	of	art.
The	age	of	the	Protestant	Reformation	from	the	16th	century	to	the	18th	century	is	a	
classic	example	of	interpenetration.	Already	Weber	thought	that	in	Puritan	and	Calvinistic	
countries,	especially,	a	religious-moral	value	system	was	capable	of	regulating	economic	
activities,	political	attitudes	and	communal	life	widely.	To	be	sure,	art	was	mostly	left	outside	
a	regulation	like	this.	Art	was	usually	seen	as	a	Amagical@	and	Airrational@	phenomenon	
in	Puritan	and	Calvinistic	communities,	and	as	such	it	was	in	contradiction	with	their	
ascetic	and	rationalistic	view	of	Christianity.	In	this	respect,	the	Protestant	Reformation	
differentiated	sharply	between	art	and	religion,	whereas	at	the	same	time	the	Counter-
Reformation	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 used	 art,	 in	 particular,	 painting,	 sculpture	 and	
architecture	as	tools	by	means	of	which	it	propagated	or	disseminated	its	own	theological	
doctrine	to	common	people.	Weber	held	that	the	age	of	the	Protestant	Reformation	was	
an	ideal	phase	in	the	history	of	Western	civilization,	because	it	created	a	religious-moral	
value	system	that	functioned	widely	as	a	common	normative	culture	in	society.	Münch	
(1994:	304;	1995b:	27–29)	adds	that	there	has	been	almost	a	similar	normative	culture	
in	modern	Western	societies.	People	in	those	societies	agree,	for	instance,	widely	on	the	
idea	that	their	state	should	legislatively	guarantee	for	them	certain	rights	of	citizenship.	
Political	rights,	private	ownership,	freedom	of	speech,	freedom	of	assembly,	freedom	of	
association,	personal	or	bodily	integrity,	legal	protection	and	religious	liberty	might	be	
the	most	central	ones	of	those	rights.	The	modern	functional	sub-system	must	function	
in	a	way	that	is	in	accordance	with	these	principles;	the	principles	at	issue	belong	to	the	
normative	culture	shared	by	the	functional	sub-systems.	In	this	respect,	Münch	underlines	
in	a	Parsonsian	way,	there	is	a	normative	integration	in	modern	societies.	Luhmann,	on	
the	other	hand,	thought	that	Parsons	laid	too	much	stress	on	common	values	and	norms	
–	or	that	Parsons	erroneously	held	that	it	is	due	to	collectively	shared	values	and	norms	
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that	modern	society	is	a	well-functioning	whole.	For	Luhmann	(1997c:	603–604),	the	
integration	of	modern	society	is	based	on	the	principle	that	each	functional	sub-system	
has	 to	 adjust	 itself	 to	 the	 functions	of	 the	other	 functional	 sub-systems;	 in	 this	 sense,	
those	sub-systems	limit	each	other=s	freedom.	One	can	also	say	that	Luhmann	believes	
that	a	well-functioning	co-ordination	between	 the	 functional	 sub-systems	explains	 the	
integration	of	modern	society.
Due	to	the	interpenetration,	Münch	argues,	modern	economics	has	not	been	a	mere	
brutal	Manchesterian	 capitalism,	 for	 a	 phase	 like	 this,	 as	 far	 as	 it	 has	 existed	 at	 all	 as	
such,	 forms	only	 a	 relatively	 short	period	 in	 the	history	of	modern	Western	 societies.	
In	 modern	 Western	 countries,	 the	 system	 of	 economics	 has	 not	 usually	 functioned	
apart	from	the	rational	economic	policy	practiced	by	the	state;	in	this	economic	policy,	
economic	activities	have	been	adjusted	to	the	values	and	goals	of	the	rest	of	society.	A	
mere	differentiation	theory	does	not	suffice	either	to	explain	the	societal-cultural	reality	
of	 the	United	 States	 of	America,	 the	 leading	Western	 country.	Unlike	 in	most	 of	 the	
Western	European	countries,	religion	still	has	a	central	position	in	the	American	agenda	
and	societal-cultural	reality;	in	the	American	way	of	life,	religion	is	also	closely	connected	
with	economics,	politics	and	mass	media	–	to	the	extent	that	these	four	spheres	or	systems	
are	extremely	firmly	interlaced.	In	contrast,	Münch	(1986a;	1986b)	points	out,	France	
and	Germany	have	traditionally	been	state-centric	societies	in	which	the	state	has	actively	
regulated,	steered	and	controlled	the	rest	of	society.
The	above-mentioned	examples	indicate	that	in	the	first	instance	Münch	considers	
modern	society	on	the	basis	of	the	so-called	large	or	central	Western	countries;	to	countries	
such	as	these	belong,	above	all,	the	United	States	of	America,	Great	Britain,	France	and	
Germany.	There	 are	 also	 small	 countries	 in	 Europe;	 among	 others	 things,	 the	Czech	
Republic,	Denmark,	Estonia,	Finland,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Norway	and	
Sweden	can	be	regarded	as	such	countries.	Comparative	sociological	studies	support	the	
view	that	in	these	small	countries	the	functional	sub-systems	have	not	been	differentiated	
from	each	other	as	clearly	as	in	large	European	countries.	For	instance,	S.N.	Eisenstadt	
(1987)	points	out	that	there	are plenty of	corporate	features	in	the	societal	life	of	small	
European	countries.	These	countries	usually	have	a	relatively	small	area	and	population,	
and	their	material	resources	are	limited.	For	reasons	like	these,	their	economic,	political	
and	cultural	elite	groups	have	become	accustomed	to	make	co-operation,	and	through	
this	 different	 functional	 sub-systems	 have	 been	 closely	 interlaced	 in	 them.	 (See,	 also,	
Alapuro	1985.)
Likewise,	the	position	of	nationalism	has	been	peculiar	in	small	European	countries.	
In	their	own	studies	of	nationalism,	Eric	Hobsbawm	(1992)	and	Charles	Tilly	(1994)	
claim	 that	 since	 the	 late	 18th	 century	 nationalism	 has	 in	Western	 Europe,	 above	 all,	
been	an	ideology	and	a	way	of	thought	maintained	by	the	state.	In	this	respect,	it	was	
important	 that	 Western	 European	 states	 began	 to	 organise	 popular	 education	 and	
elementary	schools	for	their	population	at	the	turn	of	the	18th	and	19th	centuries.	Ernst	
Gellner	(1983)	and	Michael	Schudson	(1994)	remark	that	it	was	just	popular	education	
and	 elementary	 schools	 that	have	perhaps	been	 the	most	 central	 social	 institutions	or	
systems	in	the	spreading	of	nationalist	ideologies	and	nationalist	ways	of	thought.	As	far	
as	cultural	systems	are	concerned,	it	is	necessary	to	bear	in	mind	that	different	kinds	of	
symbols,	myths	and	narratives	as	well	as	visual	representations	and	musical	compositions	
have	been	useful	 tools	 in	 the	production	or	construction	of	nationalist	 ideologies	 and	
nationalist	sentiments.	Myths,	narratives	and	representations	on	the	origin	of	a	nation	
and	 on	 its	 heroes,	 enemies,	 victories	 and	 defeats	 have	made	 of	 nationalism	 a	 way	 of	
thought	or	a	mental	disposition	that	has	appealed	widely	to	common	people	(see,	nearer,	
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Bennigton	1994;	Hobsbawm	&	Ranger	1993;	Smith	1991).	The	significance	of	culture	
was	 important,	 especially,	 in	 countries	 that	did	not	have	 a	 long	 and	glorious	political	
history	or	 that	did	not	possess	 its	own	state.	For	example,	Estonia,	Finland,	Hungary,	
Norway	 and	 Poland	 were	 countries	 like	 these	 in	 the	 19th	 century	 and	 in	 addition	
Germany	was	divided	into	several	independent	small	states	still	in	the	mid-19th	century.	
For	this	reason,	in	these	countries	nationalism	was,	first	and	foremost,	elaborated	upon	
by	means	of	culture	and	art.	In	Finland,	for	example,	public	institutions	and	authorities,	
political	 leaders,	nationalist	movements	 and	artistic	 groups	 and	 institutions	developed	
the	Finnish	art	life	in	close	co-operation.	No	wonder	then	that	in	the	19th	century	and	
in	the	early	20th	century	Finnish	art	gave	an	expression	to	Finnish-National	mentality,	
on	the	one	hand,	and	it	worked	up	or	even	constructed	the	Finnish-National	identity,	
on	the	other	hand.	Likewise,	Athe	Golden	Era@	of	Finnish	art	places	itself	into	the	period	
at	 hand.	 In	 particular,	 the	 poets	 and	 writers	 Johan	 Ludvig	 Runeberg,	 Elias	 Lönnrot	
(author	of	 the	epos	Kalevala),	Aleksis	Kivi	and	Zacharias	Topelius,	 the	painters	Albert	
Edelfelt,	Aksel	Gallén-Kallela,	Pekka	Halonen,	 Juho	Rissanen	and	Hugo	Simberg,	 the	
sculptor	Wäinö	Aaltonen	and	the	compositor	Jean	Sibelius,	who	have	been	important	
figures	in	the	development	and	construction	of	the	Finnish-National	identity,	lived	and	
worked	at	that	time.	Under	the	circumstances,	in	Finland	art	was	both	as	a	social	and	a	
cultural	system	closely	interlaced	with	other	social	and	cultural	systems	until	the	Second	
World	War.	Albeit	an	interpenetration	like	this	has	gradually	decreased	in	Finland	later,	
nationalist	considerations	and	goals	have,	to	a	certain	extent,	belonged	to	the	public	or	
official	cultural	policy	in	Finland	till	the	present-day.38
In	his	 own	 theory	of	modern	 society,	Luhmann	presumes	 that	modern	 functional	
sub-systems	are	equal.	Similarly,	even	if	Münch	is	critical	of	Luhmann=s	view	of	modern	
society,	his	interpenetration	theory	does	not	usually	describe	situations	in	which	some	of	
the	functional	sub-systems	are	more	powerful	than	the	rest	of	the	functional	sub-systems.	
Misheva	(2005;	2006)	correctly	remarks	that	in	real	societies	the	situation	is	often	different	
from	that;	as	she	herself	says,	the	relationships	between	the	functional	sub-systems	are	not	
necessarily	Asymmetrical@	in	real	societies.	In	this	connection,	she	also	points	to	Habermas=	
theory	of	the	communicative	action;	in	his	theory,	Habermas	(1987a;	1987b)	endeavours	
to	show	how	in	the	course	of	the	process	of	modernisation	the	powerful	sub-systems	of	
economics	and	politics	began	to	penetrate	the	rest	of	the	functional	sub-systems	and	to	
undermine	the	peculiar	value	ground	and	rationality	of	those	other	sub-systems.	In	leftist	
sociology	and	system	theory,	the	sub-system	of	economics	has	usually	been	regarded	as	
the	most	important	functional	sub-system,	but	one	should	not	forget	that	in	state-centric	
societies	the	state	has	obviously	obtained	the	position	of	the	most	important	sub-system.	
Traditionally,	 Finland,	 France	 and	 Germany,	 among	 other	 things,	 were	 societies	 like	
these.	 Likewise,	 authoritarian	 societies,	 for	 example,	 during	 the	 periods	 of	Nazism	 in	
Germany,		Mussolini=s	Italy	and	the	Soviet	Union,	represent	the	extreme	cases	in	which	
one	political	party	controls	 the	 institutions	of	 the	state	and	the	entirety	of	 society	(cf.	
Crook,	Pakulski	&	Waters	1992).	In	authoritarian	societies	 like	these,	the	sub-systems	
of	 art	 and	mass	media	 also	 lost	 a	 great	deal	 of	 their	 autonomy,	 and	 in	many	 respects	
they	became	channels	by	means	of	which	those	in	power	propagated	their	own	ideology.
One	may	 ask	whether	 theories	 of	 the	modern	 system	 of	 art	 sufficiently	 take	 into	
account	the	phenomenon	of	interpenetration.	Luhmann	largely	ignores	this	phenomenon,	
but	what	about	Peter	Bürger=s	and	Pierre	Bourdieu=s	investigations	on	the	modern	system	
38	On	the	situation	in	Finland,	see,	nearer,	Heiskanen,	Mitchell	&	Kangas	2002,	Hroch	1985,	Häyrynen	
2006	and	Sevänen	1998.
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of	art?	Do	these	two	leftist	theorists	give	us	a	plausible	representation	or	model	of	the	
modern	system	of	art?	As	a	tentative	answer	to	this	question	we	may	say	that	both	of	them	
think	that	 the	modern	system	of	art	has	been	closely	 interlaced	with	the	bourgeois	or	
upper-class	way	of	life	and	ideology.	At	least	in	this	respect,	they	think	that	there	has	been	
a	significant	interpenetration	between	the	sub-system	of	art	and	other	sub-systems.
In	his	Theorie der Avantgarde (Theory	of	 the	Avant-Garde,	1974),	Bürger	presents	
a	general	model	of	the	Amodern@	or	Abourgeois	institution	of	art@.	By	the	concept	Athe	
institution	of	art@	he	does	not	point	to	the	concrete	production,	mediation	and	reception	
institutions	 of	 art;	 rather	 he	means	 by	 it	 the	 dominant	 conception	 of	 art	 in	 society.	
Traditionally,	 conceptions	 of	 art	 told	 social	 actors	what	 the	 Aessence@	 of	 art	 is,	where	
the	boundary	between	art	and	non-art	lies	and	what	kinds	of	functions	art	has	(Bürger,	
Peter	1974:	26–35).	Thereby	 the	 institution	of	 art	 is,	 for	Bürger,	mainly	 a	normative	
phenomenon,	for	he	thinks	that	the	dominant	conception	of	art	forms	a	social	norm	that	
regulates	 the	production,	mediation	and	reception	of	works	of	art.	According	 to	him,	
there	has	been	four	main	phases	 in	the	development	of	 the	modern	 institution	of	art:	
(i)	the	period	of	the	Enlightenment	in	the	18th	century,	(ii)	the	period	of	the	autonomy	
aesthetics	 from	 the	 late	 18th	 century	 to	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 (iii)	 the	 avantgarde	
movements	in	the	early	20th	century	and	(iv)	the	contemporary	or	Apost-avantgardist@	
period.	In	particular,	during	periods	(i)	and	(ii)	the	institution	of	art	was	closely	connected	
with	bourgeois	mentality.
In	the	18th	century,	the	art	life	was	dominated	by	the	courts	and	aristocracy.	Bürger	
writes	that	on	the	one	hand	they	saw	art	as	a	source	of	aesthetic	pleasure	and	enjoyment,	
but,	on	the	other	hand,	art	had	for	them	a	ceremonial	function	in	the	sense	that	they	
showed	their	power	by	means	of	it.	The	formed	dimension	manifested	itself,	in	particular,	
in	 rococo	art,	whereas	 the	 latter	 function	was	carried	out	by	magnificent	gardens	and	
palaces.	At	that	time	bourgeois	art	or	Enlightenment	art	was	eclipsed	by	the	art	of	the	
courts	and	aristocracy.	In	contrast	to	the	aesthetic-hedonistic	dimensions	of	the	art	of	the	
ruling	class,	the	Enlightenment	art	served,	first	and	foremost,	pedagogic	purposes,	for	it	
aimed	at	the	moral-political	education	of	its	receivers.	Therefore,	in	Enlightenment	art,	
aesthetic,	pedagogic,	moral	and	political	purposes	were	not	sharply	differentiated	from	
each	other.	This	can,	for	instance,	be	seen	in	that	writers	such	as	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau	
and	Voltaire	 practiced	 philosophical	 reasoning,	moral-political	 education	 and	 societal	
criticism	in	their	literary	works,	and	Jacques	Louis	David=s	paintings,	whose	topics	placed	
themselves	 into	world	 of	 antique	mythology,	 expressed	 republican	 ideals	 in	 a	 resolute	
and	 radical	 way.	However,	 after	 the	 terrorist	 events	 of	 the	 French	Revolution	 (1789)	
and	the	wars	of	Napoleon	Bonaparte	and	along	with	the	rise	of	modern	capitalism	and	
modern	industrial	centres	and	metropolises,	intellectuals	and	the	devotees	of	art	gradually	
adopted	a	new	conception	of	 art.	According	 to	 this	new	conception,	 art	 should	draw	
away	from	immediate	or	concrete	pedagogic,	moral	and	political	purposes	and	cherish	
the	ideal	of	Ageneral	humanity@.	A	relatively	autonomous	art	like	this	served,	in	the	first	
instance,	aesthetic	or	aesthetic-spiritual	purposes,	wherefore	its	forms	and	compositions	
had	to	be	beautiful	and	organic.	Bürger	underlines	the	point	that	during	the	period	of	
autonomy	aesthetics	art	stood	for	qualitative	or	alternative	values	for	intellectuals	and	the	
devotees	of	art:	those	circles	understood	art	and	its	aesthetic	worlds	as	a	hidden	criticism	
of	the	world	of	Acommerce	and	utility@	–	in	other	words,	Bürger	goes	on	by	using	Weber=s	
and	 Habermas=	 conceptual	 vocabulary,	 art	 functioned	 for	 them	 as	 a	 critique	 on	 the	
instrumental	or	 formal	 rationality	prevalent	 in	 the	modern	 systems	of	 economics	 and	
politics.
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In	his	investigation,	Bürger	also	leans	on	Marx=s	critique	on	religion.	According	to	him,	
in	the	19th	century	art	began	to	obtain	similar	functions	as	religion	had	had	in	traditional	
society.	Consequently,	Marx	is	an	important	figure	in	the	study	of	art,	since	it	was	him	
who	has	understood	the	double	nature	of	religion.	Marx	did	not	conceive	of	religion	as	a	
mere	false	consciousness	or	illusion:	religion	was,	for	him,	simultaneously	a	symptom	of	a	
real	societal	misery	and	a	protest	against	that	misery.	However,	because	the	protest	that	is	
included	in	religion	orientates	itself	to	the	pursuit	of	transmundane	life,	religion	does	not	
attempt	to	abolish	the	mundane	misery	but	it	leaves	everything	unchanged.	AIn	advanced	
bourgeois	society@,	Bürger	concludes,	art	has	been	institutionalised	as	an	ideology	in	the	
same	way	 (Bürger,	Peter	1974:	26–30).	 In	 the	19th	 century,	 the	 aesthetic	worlds	 and	
the	human	values	of	 art	 formed	a	utopian	 counter-reality	 to	modern	 society	 that	was	
incapable	of	realising	those	values	in	practice.	Those	values	could	live	only	in	art	and	not	
in	reality;	therefore,	the	experiences	and	visions	offered	by	works	of	art	functioned	as	a	
compensation	for	the	shortcomings	of	modern	society.	Like	religion,	art	functioned	as	a	
certain	kind	of	surrogate	for	a	better	life,	and	through	this	it	actually	helped	individuals	to	
stand	the	imperatives	of	modern	society	and	also	to	adjust	themselves	to	modern	society.	
In	 this	 respect,	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 has	 basically	 had,	 Bürger	 concludes,	 an	 affirmative	
function	in	bourgeois	society.
Later	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 differentiated	 more	 and	 more	 clearly	 from	 non-aesthetic	
functions.	At	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 19th	 and	20th	 centuries,	 aestheticism	 and	 Aart	 for	 art=s	
sake@	movement	were	prominent	phenomena	in	the	European	art	life.	Their	best-known	
representatives	were	perhaps	certain	British	writers,	painters	and	critics:	Charles	Swinburne	
and	Oscar	Wilde	in	literature,	Dante	Gabriel	Rossetti	and	the	other	pre-Raphaelites	in	
painting,	as	well	as	Clive	Bell,	Roger	Fry	and	Walter	Pater	in	criticism	and	theory	of	art.	
Broadly	 speaking,	 impressionistic	 painting,	music	 and	 literature	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
part	of	these	phenomena.	The	proponents	of	these	phenomena	were	often	worshippers	
of	beauty,	and	they	thought	 that	art	 should	not	bother	 itself	with	non-aesthetic	 tasks;	
it	is	just	by	concentrating	on	its	own	aesthetic-spiritual	tasks	and	by	cultivating	its	own	
aesthetic	 forms	 that	 art	makes	 itself	 necessary	 for	 people.	The	 extreme	proponents	 of	
a	 train	 of	 thought	 like	 this	 saw	 art	mainly	 as	 a	 source	 of	 sensuous	 pleasure	 and	 they	
regarded	the	forms	of	art,	instead	of	its	contents,	as	a	cause	for	aesthetic	pleasure	aroused	
by	art.	In	this	phase,	Bürger	states,	art	became,	therefore,	more	formal.	The	avant-garde	
movements	of	the	early	20th	century	revolted	against	a	state	like	this	in	the	art	life.	In	
Bürger=s	interpretation,	movements	such	as	Dadaism,	surrealism,	futurism,	experimental	
art	in	the	Soviet	Union,	Brecht=s	political	theatre	and	Heartfield=s	photo	montages	aimed	
at	returning	art	back	to	the	Alife	practice@;	that	is,	they	wished	to	abolish	the	differentiated	
sphere	of	art	(Bürger,	Peter	1974:	63–75).	In	this	way	Bürger	understands,	for	instance,	
Duchamp=s	ready-made	works	which	do	not	physically	differ	from	the	objects	of	daily	
life.	However,	the	avant-garde	movements	did	not	manage	to	realise	their	goals.	Because	
the	differentiated	state	of	the	sphere	of	art	is	the	result	of	a	general	process	of	functional	
differentiation,	it	cannot	be	abolished	with	mere	artistic	manifests	and	provocations.	The	
avant-garde	movements	could	have	realised	their	goals	only	if	they	had	been	capable	of	
changing	the	basic	structures	of	modern	societal-cultural	reality.	In	spite	of	their	failure,	
those	movements	have	enormously	influenced	the	subsequent	sphere	of	art.	Bürger	points	
out	that	Athe	post-avantgardist@	sphere	of	art	is	still	a	differentiated	formation,	but	in	it	
works	of	art	are	no	longer,	in	the	first	instance,	beautiful	and	organic	wholes	but	rather	
heterogenous	and	fragmentary	things.
Thus,	to	a	certain	extent	Bürger	takes	into	account	the	phenomenon	of	interpenetration.	
His	model	of	the	modern	institution	of	art	 is,	however,	rather	abstract	and	general	by	
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nature.	Although	it	raises	several	interesting	aspects	concerning	the	modern	sphere	of	art,	
as	such,	it	does	not	manage	to	describe	any	concrete	or	national	system	of	art.	As	far	as	
Germany	 is	 concerned,	Bürger=s	model	 ignores	Germany=s	 state-centric	 traditions,	 the	
phenomenon	of	nationalism	and	the	period	of	Nazism.	In	his	own	investigation,	Les regles 
de l=art (The	Rules	of	Art,	1992)	Bourdieu	is	historically	more	concrete	than	Bürger	is,	
for	his	investigation	describes	how	the	French	field	of	art	gained	its	relatively	autonomous	
position.	Still,	 in	 the	mid-19th	 century,	 only	 a	 small	minority	 in	France	demanded	 a	
wide	autonomy	for	the	sphere	of	art.	To	a	minority	like	this	belonged,	in	particular,	the	
poets	Théophile	Gautier	and	Charles	Baudelaire	and	the	novelist	Gustave	Flaubert:	they	
were	 afraid	of	 that	 the	bourgeois,	 that	 is,	 the	new	 ruling	 class	will	 subordinate	 art	 to	
economic	and	political	purposes.	In	this	phase,	the	claim	for	autonomy	was,	therefore,	a	
heroic	phenomenon	in	French	society.	However,	at	the	turn	of	the	19th	and	20th	century,	
the	 claim	 for	 autonomy	was	prevalent	 in	 the	French	field	of	 art;	 in	 this	phase,	 it	was	
no	longer	necessarily	connected	with	the	anti-bourgeois	attitude.	Along	with	the	claim	
for	autonomy,	an	aesthetic	attitude	become	common	in	the	field	of	art.	In	this	respect,	
Bourdieu	 (1992:	 17–71,	 75–164,	 175–181,	 393–458)	 states,	 impressionistic	 painters	
were	an	important	group,	since	they	showed	that	a	work	of	art	does	not	necessarily	need	
to	possess	a	pedagogic,	moral	or	political	function	–	or	that	it	does	not	necessarily	need	
to	include	any	Amessage@.	Instead,	it	can	correctly	be	received	as	an	aesthetic	composition	
or	as	a	structural-formal	whole.
In	the	20th	century,	the	aesthetic	attitude	has	been	prevalent	in	the	French	field	of	
art.	During	the	same	time,	this	attitude	has	also	been	closely	connected	with	an	upper-
class	habitus.	By	adopting	an	aesthetic	attitude,	upper-class	devotee	groups	of	art	have,	in	
Bourdieus=s	distinction	theory,	unconsciously	attempted	to	distinguish	themselves	from	
lower	classes	that	have	been	unable	to	draw	complicated	distinctions	between	different	
attitudes	or	codes.	In	this	sense,	an	aesthetic	attitude	would	have	formed	only	a	part	of	
the	upper-class	habitus	or	 strategy	 that	 the	upper-classes	use	 to	distinguish	 themselves	
from	other	classes.	The	lower	classes	are	not	particularly	interested	in	art,	and	when	they	
do	indeed	happen	to	deal	with	works	of	art	their	attitude	is	a	mixture	of	various	–	moral,	
aesthetic,	cognitive,	practical	–	valuation	principles	or	codes.	Similarly,	when	receiving	art,	
representatives	of	the	lower	classes	are,	above	all,	interested	in	its	contents	and	themes	and	
in	its	relations	to	reality,	whereas	upper-class	devotee	groups	use	to	pay	more	attention	to	
art=s	techniques	and	to	its	formal-structural	side.	In	this	way,	Bourdieu	describes	different	
social	 classes	 in	his	L=amour de l=art (The	Love	of	Art,	1969)	 and	La distinction (The	
Distinction,	1979)	of	which	the	former	is	written	by	him	and	Alain	Darbel.	In	Bourdieu=s	
distinction	theory,	a	clear-cut	differentiation	of	codes	is	a	situation	that	corresponds	to	
the	cultural	interest,	life	style	and	habitus	of	the	higher	social	classes.	In	this	sense,	the	
field	of	 art	or	 its	dominant	 sub-field	would	have	been	 interlaced	with	 the	upper-class	
life	style	and	habitus	in	France	since	the	turn	of	the	19th	and	20th	centuries	(Bourdieu	
1979:	16–67).	To	be	sure,	often	or	usually	Bourdieu	writes	as	 if	his	own	observations	
and	generalisations	do	not	hold	true	only	for	France	but	also	for	other	societies,	and,	in	
fact,	in	L=amour de l=art he	and	Darbel	explore	museum	visitors	in	France	and	in	certain	
other	European	countries	(Greece,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Poland,	Spain).	Yet,	it	seems	
that	despite	this	his	investigations	are	firmly	rooted	in	the	French	soil.	It	is	open	to	what	
extent	they,	in	fact,	hold	true	for	other	societies.	
Both	Bürger	and	Bourdieu	have	stated	that	besides	Ahigh	or	Apure	art@	there	has	been	
a	sub-field	of	mass	culture	or	commercial	art	in	the	modern	field	of	art.	However,	unlike	
high	or	pure	art,	this	sub-field	has	not	been	closely	connected	with	the	upper-class	life	
style	and	ideology.	Because	Bürger	and	Bourdieu	have	attempted	to	de-mystify	and	de-
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naturalize	the	aesthetic	attitude	and	the	upper-class	ideology,	they	have	largely	ignored	the	
sub-field	of	mass	culture	or	commercial	art.	The	sub-field	of	mass	culture	or	commercial	
art	has	rather	transparent	connections	with	the	system	of	economics,	and	it	seems	to	be	
mostly	 politically	 conservative	 by	nature.	 In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 still	 in	 the	decades	 after	
the	Second	World	War,	the	dominant	conception	of	art	in	Western	culture	and	society	
stated	that	high	or	genuine	or	authentic	art	 is	 independent	of	economic,	political	and	
ideological	purposes	–	or	that	it	considers	the	world	from	the	point	of	view	of	general	
humanity,	 wherefore	 it	 is	 neutral	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 particular	 class	 or	 group	 interests.	
Bürger	and	Bourdieu	have	attempted	to	show	that	a	conception	of	art	like	this	does	not	
correspond	to	societal	reality;	the	conception	in	question	conceals	the	state	of	affairs	that	
basically	modern	aesthetic	high	culture	expresses	upper-class	intellectuals=	mentality	and	
their	ambiguous	position	in	modern	society.	Their	position	is	ambiguous	in	the	sense	that	
they	are	close	to	the	ruling	class,	but	at	the	same	time	they	are	critical	of	its	economic	and	
political	courses	of	action.
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4 CONTEMPORARY CULTURE AND 
SOCIETY IN THE LIGHT OF 
POSTMODERN THEORIES AND 
SYSTEMIC SOCIOLOGY
4.1 From the Expansive Welfare State and its Cultural Policy towards a More 
Market-Based Cultural Policy
Theories	 of	 postmodernity	 hold	 that,	 roughly	 speaking,	 from	 the	 1960s	 on	Western	
societies	have	gradually	moved	from	modern	culture	and	society	to	postmodern	culture	
and	society.	These	theories	state	that	a	change	 like	this	began	in	countries	such	as	the	
United	States,	France	and	Great	Britain,	and	later	other	Western	countries	would	have	
undergone	a	similar	structural	change	as	well.	Some	theorists	tend	to	see	postmodernity	
only	as	a	new	phase	 in	the	development	of	modernity,	while	others	do	not	hesitate	to	
think	that	it	is	a	qualitative	new	era	in	the	history	of	civilization.	Often	these	two	groups	
of	theorists	are	also	willing	to	change	the	conceptual	vocabulary	of	sociology;	that	is,	they	
suggest	that	concepts	such	as	Asociety@,	Asystem@	and	Adifferentiation@	do	not	suit	well	for	
the	description	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.
Let	us	first	take	into	consideration	the	concept	of	differentiation.	Several	theorists	of	
postmodernity	have	claimed	that	during	the	last	decades	the	societal-cultural	developmental	
process	has	taken	a	new	course.	If,	they	continue,	modern	civilization	was	characterised	
by	the	structural	principle	of	functional	differentiation,	then	the	contemporary	societal-
cultural	 reality	 has	 turned	 into	 the	 opposite	 direction;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 structural	
principle	 of	 de-differentiation	 is	more	 and	more	 typical	 of	 it.39	According	 to	 them,	 a	
turn	like	this	is	caused	by	profound	changes	in	economics,	information	technology	and	
mass	media.	One	may,	however,	ask	why	theorists	of	postmodernity	used	to	ignore	here	
the	 phenomenon	of	 the	 expansive	 or	 classical	welfare	 state.	 It	 seems	 that	 in	 a	 certain	
sense	 already	 the	 expansive	 or	 classical	 welfare	 state	 represented	 the	 process	 of	 de-
differentiation.
Western	countries	began	to	construct	their	welfare	states	after	the	Second	World	War,	
and,	roughly	speaking,	by	the	1970s	and	1980s	those	welfare	states	had	entered	financial	
crisis,	whereafter	the	countries	in	question	began	to	de-construct	or	unburden	them.	In	
the	United	States	and	Great	Britain,	this	new	or	Aneo-liberalist@	phase	began	in	the	late	
1970s	and	in	the	1980s	President	Ronald	Reagan	and	Prime	Minister	Margaret	Thatcher	
belonged	to	its	most	active	spokesmen.	On	the	othe	rhand,	in	countries	such	as	Finland	
and	Sweden	the	neo-liberalist	turn	took	place	gradually	in	the	1980s.	In	his	investigation,	
The Three Worlds of WellfareWelfare Capitalism (1990)	Gösta	Esping-Andersen	(1990:	3)	
remarks	that	the	most	central	thing	in	different	types	of	welfare	states	was	the	idea	of	social	
rights.	Social	rights	were	seen	as	the	things	that	let	people	improve	their	own	standard	
of	living	regardless	of	pure	market	forces.	Consequently,	those	rights	decreased	citizens=	
status	 as	 commodities	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 produced	 de-commodification	 into	
39	In	this	connection,	Lash	(2002:	207)	has	also	used	the	concept	Aindifferentiation@.	As	far	as	I	can	see,	
it	means,	roughly	speaking	the	same	as	the	concept	Ade-differentiation@	means.	
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society.	Different	models	of	welfare	states	also	included	the	idea	that	as	a	last	resort	it	was	
the	state	or	society	that	had	to	make	sure	that	its	citizens	can	utilise	their	social	rights	and	
live	in	socially	secure	surroundings;	usually	the	state	offered	to	them,	therefore,	a	social	
security	like	this	from	public	tax	funds.	However,	the	level	of	social	security	varied	from	
one	country	to	the	other	country;	in	this	connection,	Esping-Andersen	(1990:	26–29,	
51–52)	distinguishes	between	three	kinds	of	Western	countries.	The	level	of	social	security	
was	lowest	in	Anglo-American	countries	that	realised	the	liberal	model	of	a	welfare	state.	
Australia,	Canada,	Great	Britain,	Ireland,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	States	belonged	
to	these	countries.	In	them,	the	general	consensus	was	that	people	should	get	on	without	
the	help	of	the	state,	so	they	directed	social	benefits	chiefly	to	the	poorest	groups	of	the	
population.	The	conservative	model	of	a	welfare	state	was	prevalent	in	countries	such	as	
France,	Italy	and	West-Germany	which,	on	the	one	hand,	favoured	traditional	families	
and	the	motherhood	in	their	social	policy,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	encourage	
women	to	have	a	paid	 job.	The	social	democratic	model	of	a	welfare	state	was	carried	
out	 in	Scandinavian	countries	–	that	 is,	 in	Denmark,	Norway	and	Sweden	–	and	also	
countries	such	as	Finland	and	the	Netherlands	were	close	to	it.	In	these	countries,	social	
benefits	were	directed	towards	the	whole	population,	and	thus	they	followed	the	principle	
that	social	security	financed	by	the	state	must	concern	every	citizen.
Different	kinds	of	welfare	states	attempted	to	protect	their	citizens	from	the	harmful	
effects	of	pure	market	forces.	At	least	in	the	cases	of	the	conservative	and	social	democratic	
models,	constructors	of	welfare	states	shared	the	idea	that	it	is	the	state,	and	not	the	market	
forces,	that	as	a	last	resort	must	rule	and	lead	the	entirety	of	society.	Therefore,	an	era	of	
expansive	or	classical	welfare	state	expanded	the	tasks	and	duties	of	the	state.	In	many	
countries,	the	state	actively	regulated	labour	markets	and	wage	policy	and	it	controlled,	
financed	and	guided	systems	such	as	health	care,	education,	science,	art	and	mass	media.	
Under	these	circumstances,	it	is	perfectly	justifiable	to	ask	whether	the	expansive	welfare	
state	represented	the	process	of	de-differentiation.	How	could	different	functional	sub-
systems	preserve	their	relative	autonomy	and,	as	Luhmann	believed,	their	Aautopoietic	
way	of	functioning@	during	the	era	in	question?	Was	Luhmann,	in	fact,	rather	blind	with	
respect	to	the	above-described	development?
Although	 the	 era	 of	 the	 expansive	 welfare	 state	 seems	 to	 contradict	 Luhmann=s	
general	 view	 of	 modern	 society,	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 in	 sharp	 contradiction	 with	 his	
view	of	 the	modern	 sub-system	of	 art.	 It	might	 be	 undoubtedly	 true	 that	 during	 the	
era	 of	 the	 expansive	welfare	 state	 several	 functional	 sub-systems	were	 organisationally,	
administratively	and	financially	interlaced	with	the	state;	at	least	in	these	respects	the	era	
in	question	represented	the	process	of	de-differentiation.	As	far	as	the	normative	level	is	
concerned,	we	may	 justifiably	presume	 that	 the	decades	of	 the	 expansive	welfare	 state	
reduced	 the	 normative	 autonomy	 and	 independence	 of	 functional	 sub-systems,	 since	
during	that	period	Western	states	actively	endeavoured	to	regulate	the	whole	of	society	
–	for	example,	by	giving	rules	and	instructions	that	functional	sub-systems	had	to	follow.	
However,	the	important	thing	here	is	the	fact	that	the	sub-system	of	art	seems	to	have	
been	a	special	case	during	the	era	of	the	expansive	welfare	state.	Namely,	often	the	state	
strove	to	respect	its	wide	autonomy;	at	least	a	generalisation	like	this	holds	true	for	the	
sub-system	of	art	in	Western	European	countries.	Western	European	states	started	with	
the	principle	that	the	sphere	of	art	has	a	special	function	in	culture	and	society.	Oliver	
Bennett	 writes	 that	 in	 British	 public	 cultural	 policy	 that	 special	 social	 function	 was	
associated	with	art=s	civilising	mission:
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I	now	come	 to	what	has	been	 the	most	 important	 and	 influential	 idea	behind	
British	cultural	policies.	I	call	this	Athe	civilising	mission@.	It	has	its	roots	in	the	
response	 of	 artists	 to	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 industrialism	 during	 the	 nineteenth	
century.	The	arts	came	to	embody	essentially	human	values	which	the	development	
of	industrialised	society	was	seen	to	be	destroying.	The	arts	and	culture	thus	had	
civilising	powers	[...]	If	art	and	culture	were	to	have	a	civilising	mission,	then	the	
question	had	to	be	asked	of	whether	or	not	the	market	was	a	suitable	vehicle	for	it.	
The	answer	was	emphatically	Ano@.	Indeed,	the	popular	culture	which	thrived	on	
the	market	was	seen	to	be	inferior.	It	was	therefore	necessary	to	use	the	resources	
of	government	to	provide	alternatives	which	could	further	the	civilising	mission.	
It	was	argued	that	without	subsidy	only	the	immediately	popular	would	survive	on	
the	market.	(Bennett	1995:	22–23.)
Because	of	 its	 special	 social	 function,	 art	had	 to	be	 a	 relatively	 autonomous	 sphere	 in	
society,	and	it	was	the	duty	of	the	state	to	protect	the	autonomy	of	the	sphere	of	art	against	
pure	market	forces	and	instrumental	thinking.	This	is	the	core	of	the	autonomy	doctrine	
that,	according	to	Bennett,	emerged	in	Great	Britain	in	the	19th	century,	although	the	
British	state	took	the	role	of	the	active	initiator	in	cultural	policy	just	after	the	Second	
World	War.	Let	us	recall	that	Peter	Bürger	termed	the	doctrine	in	question	Aautonomy	
aesthetics@;	 according	 to	 him,	 it	was	 still	 the	 dominant	 conception	 of	 art	 in	Western	
society	in	the	early	20th	century.	This	doctrine	stated	that	only	as	an	autonomous	sphere	
is	 art	 able	 to	 carry	out	 important	 and	 long-term	 social	 functions;	 that	 is,	 it	 is	 just	by	
concentrating	 on	 its	 own	 aesthetic	 and	 aesthetic-spiritual	 tasks	 that	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	
would	be	highly	functional	for	the	rest	of	society.	As	a	Finnish	public	document,	Valtion	
taidekomitean mietintö (The	Finnish	State=s	Committee	Report	on	the	Arts,	1965),	puts	
it:	
Art	 achieves	 social	 functions	 just	 by	 being	 art:	 the	 better	 it	 is,	 the	most	 lively	
influence	it	has	on	people	and	the	biggest	significance	it	has	as	a	factor	that	arouses	
creative	 powers	 in	 all	 kinds	 of	 human	 work.	 (Valtion	 taidekomitean	 mietintö	
1965:	50.	My	translation.)
The	committee	report	in	question	believed	that	the	arts	are	capable	of	offering	meaningful	
activities	to	people	during	their	leisure	time,	and	through	this	the	arts	lessen	the	alienation	
and	dissatisfaction	that	the	modern	industrial	wage	work	and	the	urban	way	of	life	often	
arouse	in	people.	Bennett	(1995:	23)	points	out	that	in	Great	Britain	cultural	politicians	
also	believed	that	because	art	has	a	cultivating	influence	on	its	devotees,	it	restrains	the	
emergence	of	political	radicalism	and	participates	in	the	maintenance	of	a	peaceful	social	
order.	Generally	speaking,	the	British	and	the	Finnish	states	thought	that	it	is	the	task	of	
the	arts	to	take	care	of	the	harmful	mental	side	effects	that	the	process	of	societal-cultural	
modernisation	produces.
On	 the	basis	 like	 this,	Western	European	 states	 established	networks	of	museums,	
galleries,	theatres,	opera	houses,	concert	stages,	libraries	and	art	centres.	The	underlying	
idea	in	a	policy	like	this	was	the	principle	that	works	of	art	or	cultural	services	ought	to	
be	available	 to	every	citizen	–	 irrespective	of	 their	 social	 class,	 sex,	dwelling	place	and	
age.	Cultural	politicians	 themselves	 thought	 that	 the	networks	 in	question	carried	out	
principles	 of	 Athe	 democratization	 of	 culture@;	 in	 other	 words,	 those	 networks	 made	
products	of	art	available	to	the	whole	population,	and	in	this	respect	the	public	cultural	
policy	 of	 the	 period	 of	 the	 expansive	welfare	 state	was	 based	 on	 egalitarian	 ideals.	 In	
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addition,	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 radio	 and	 television	 stations	 owned	 by	 the	 states	
developed	 into	 important	mediation	 channels	 of	 art;	 those	 stations	 also	 considerably	
increased	people=s	opportunities	to	take	an	active	interest	in	the	arts.	To	be	sure,	during	
those	decades,	public	mediation	institutions	of	art	as	well	as	public	radio	and	television	
channels	followed	a	rather	elitist	conception	of	art,	for	they	gave	priority	to	the	products	
of	high	art	or	high	culture	over	popular	culture	or	mass	culture.	In	this	respect,	the	public	
cultural	policy	of	the	period	at	issue	was	paternalistic	by	nature,	that	is,	it	protected	high	
art	against	the	Apervasive@	influence	of	popular	culture	or	mass	culture.	However,	in	the	
1970s	this	public	cultural	policy	adopted	a	new	dimension	called	Acultural	democracy@,	
by	cultural	politicians	themselves.	According	to	this	new	dimension,	the	states	and	local	
authorities	should	also	support	people=s	own	and	creative	cultural	activities,	even	if	those	
activities	would	not	 reach	 the	 level	 and	quality	of	professional	 art.	Thereby	 the	 states	
and	the	local	authorities	began	to	support,	for	instance,	groups	and	associations	of	the	
devotees	of	art	as	well	as	art	education	directed	at	ordinary	people	and	children.40
Besides	egalitarian	and	paternalistic	ideals,	the	public	cultural	policy	of	the	expansive	
welfare	state	in	Western	European	countries	included	clear-cut	nationalistic	dimensions.	
The	constructors	and	realisers	of	the	public	cultural	policy	did	not	only	wish	to	protect	
high	art	or	high	culture	against	popular	culture	or	mass	culture.	They	also	strove	to	protect	
their	own	country=s	national	art	and	its	traditions	against	the	flows	of	transnational	or	
supranational	mass	culture	that	originated	mainly	from	the	United	States.	In	particular,	
a	dimension	such	as	this	was	strong	in	France	in	which	a	separate	Ministry	of	Cultural	
Affairs	was	established	in	1959	during	the	era	of	President	Charles	de	Gaulle.	Until	the	
late	 1960s,	 the	ministry	 in	 question	 was	 led	 by	 the	 formerly	Marxist	 novelist	 André	
Malraux	 who	 sought	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 strictly	 paternalistic	 and	 high-cultural	 course	 of	
action	(McGuigan	2004:	67).	Speaking	more	generally,	from	the	early	1960s	on,	Western	
European	 states	began	 to	financially	 support	 their	own	national	film	productions	 and	
protect	those	productions	against	American	film	producers	and	film	mediators;	in	part,	a	
policy	like	this	made	a	flourishing	of	the	European	film	possible	(Beale	2002:	79).	At	the	
same	time	that	policy	raised	the	status	of	film	and	made	of	it	a	recognised	genre	of	art.
As	far	as	the	United	States	themselves	are	concerned,	even	in	the	1920s	and1930s,	
the	status	of	art	was	not	high	in	American	society.	On	the	contrary,	Andreas	Huyssen	
(1992:	167)	points	out	that	during	that	time	the	arts	were	not	usually	taken	seriously	
in	America.	Rather	they	were	regarded	as	mere	luxurious	things,	wherefore	only	a	small	
minority	was	interested	in	them.	In	addition,	public	authorities	did	not	take	an	active	
role	in	maintaining	the	art	world;	the	art	world	was,	therefore,	mainly	based	on	markets	
and	 private	 sponsorship	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 In	 these	 respects,	 the	 art	 world	 was	 a	
differentiated	and	even	isolated	formation	in	American	society,	but,	unlike	in	Western	
Europe,	its	differentiated	status	did	not	have	a	wide	legitimacy.	After	the	Second	World	
War	 the	 situation	 changed	 rapidly,	 because	 now	 American	 art,	 in	 particular,	 abstract	
expressionism	in	painting	as	well	as	certain	novelists	and	film	makers	attracted	a	lot	of	
international	attention;	consequently,	names	such	as	Willem	de	Kooning,	Jackson	Pollock	
and	Mark	Rothko	in	painting,	William	Faulkner,	Ernst	Hemingway	and	John	Steinbeck	
in	literature	and	Howard	Hawks,	Alfred	Hitchcock,	John	Huston	and	Orson	Welles	in	
film	gained	unquestionable	international	reputations	in	other	continents.	Simultaneously,	
40	On	the	public	cultural	policy	during	the	era	of	the	expansive	welfare	state	in	Western	Europe,	see	Ben-
nett	1995,	Burns	&	van	der	Will	2003,	The Development of Cultural Policy in Europe (1981),	Häyrynen	
2001,	Looseley	2003,	McGuigan	2004	and	Toepler	&	Zimmer	2002.
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New	York	 developed	 into	 the	most	 important	 centre	 of	 art	 in	 the	world.	 Still	 in	 the	
1920s	and	1930s,	American	artists	used	to	study	and	work	 in	European	metropolises,	
especially	in	Paris,	but	after	the	Second	World	War	the	cultural	exchange	between	Europe	
and	the	United	States	turned	into	the	opposite	direction,	since	now	European	artists	and	
scientists	began	to	study	and	work	in	the	United	States	on	a	large	scale	(see	Therborn	
1995:	361–362).
Serge	Guilbaut	(1984)	has	shown	that	the	above-described	development	did	not	take	
place	quite	spontaneously.	In	the	years	of	the	Cold	War,	the	CIA	financed	the	activities	
of	the	Museum	of	Modern	Art	when	this	museum	from	New	York	organised	exhibitions	
of	American	paintings	in	different	countries;	usually	abstract	expressionism	had	a	pride	
of	place	 in	those	exhibitions.	Through	exhibitions	 like	 these,	 the	CIA	strove	to	 tell	 to	
the	world	 that	 the	United	States	 is	 a	 country	 in	which	 a	 genuine	 economic,	 political	
and	artistic	freedom	as	well	as	a	wide	ideological	pluralism	has	come	true.	This	indicates	
that	the	art	world	gained	more	legitimacy	in	the	United	States	after	the	Second	World	
War.	According	to	Diana	Crane	(1987:	2–5,	137),	it	was	just	in	those	decades	that	the	
American	art	world	began	to	grow,	but	its	growth	was	especially	rapid	in	the	1960s	and	
1970s;	 in	 1980,	 for	 example,	 one	million	people	 in	 the	United	 States	were	 artists	 by	
profession,	and	even	67%	of	the	American	active	museums	were	founded	after	the	year	
1940.	In	the	early	1960s,	the	states	of	the	USA	also	began	to	establish	funds	and	councils	
in	support	of	the	arts,	and	in	the	mid-1960s	the	Federal	government	in	Washington	took	
a	more	active	role	in	the	art	world,	by	establishing	the	National	Endowment	for	the	Arts	
(1965)	that	has	co-ordinated	and	organised	the	public	support	of	the	arts	in	the	United	
States	(Martorella	1986:	32–34,	41).	Yet,	public	authorities	and	institutions	were	not	able	
to	regulate	the	art	world	profoundly	and	widely,	since	the	American	art	world	has	largely	
been	based	on	markets	and	private	activities.	
In	this	respect,	Western	European	and	American	art	worlds	clearly	differed	from	each	
other	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	In	Western	European	countries,	the	public	cultural	policy	
was	based	on	the	principle	of	differentiation;	in	other	words,	in	those	countries,	cultural	
politicians	attempted	to	maintain	rather	clear	boundaries	between	high	and	low	culture,	
on	the	one	hand,	and	between	art	and	non-art,	on	the	other	hand.	A	cultural	policy	like	
this	was	also	capable	of	effectively	regulating	the	art	 life,	whereas	 in	the	United	States	
the	art	 life	took	a	different	course.	At	the	turn	of	the	1950s	and	1960s,	Andy	Warhol	
and	the	other	pioneers	of	pop	art	made	their	debut	in	the	American	art	world;	in	their	
works,	they	attempted	to	abolish	the	clear-cut	boundaries	that	distinguished	works	of	art	
from	objects	of	daily	life	and	from	products	of	commercial	mass	culture	and	industry.	
According	to	Joni	Maya	Cherbo	(1997:	91–95),	the	rapid	breakthrough	and	success	of	
pop	art	was	possible,	because	influential	art	dealers	and	art	collectors	favoured	it,	despite	
the	fact	that	certain	respected	museums	and	art	critics	adopted	a	rather	negative	attitude	
to	it.	Thus,	pop	art	was	avant-garde	in	the	sense	that	it	acted	against	the	differentiated	
position	of	the	sphere	of	art.	Likewise,	the	avant-garde	musician	John	Cage	questioned	
the	 established	boundaries	 between	music	 and	noise	 –	 or	 between	music	 and	 relative	
silence	-,	and	in	the	domain	of	dance	modern	dance	groups	expanded	the	scope	of	the	art	
of	dance.	All	of	these	artists	criticised	traditional	boundaries	between	art	and	non-art.	Of	
them,	it	was	the	movement	of	pop	art	that	had	a	lot	in	common	with	the	rock	music	of	
the	1960s	and	the	early	1970s.	Rock	musicians	such	as	Bob	Dylan,	Frank	Zappa,	Janis	
Joplin,	Jim	Hendrix,	Joan	Baez,	Jefferson	Airplane,	The	Mothers	of	Invention	and	Velvet	
Underground	had	conscious	 artistic	goals:	 they,	 for	 instance,	made	 important	musical	
experiments	and	innovations	and	renewed	the	lyrics	of	rock	music.	In	this	sense,	they,	like	
the	representatives	of	pop	art,	aimed	at	refuting	the	traditional	boundary	between	art	and	
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popular	culture	or	between	high	art	and	low	art.	If	we	still	add	that	in	the	1970s	feminist	
themes	 and	 feminist	 critique	 on	 the	 art	 world	 and	 society	 also	 became	 a	 significant	
phenomenon	in	the	American	art	world,	then	we	may,	following	Andreas	Huyssen	(1992:	
188,	194–195),	conclude	that	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	the	art	world	was	rapidly	changing	
into	a	postmodern	formation.
In	the	1980s	or	by	the	beginning	of	the	1990s	at	the	latest,	the	era	of	the	expansive	
welfare	state	and	its	cultural	policy	ended	in	the	Western	world.	In	sociological	studies,	
the	decades	from	the	1980s	onwards	has	often	been	called	an	era	of	de-regulation	or	an	
era	of	neo-liberalist	policy.	Expressions	like	these	attempted	to	explain	that	the	regulation	
mechanisms	which	were	built	during	 the	 era	of	 the	 expansive	welfare	 state	have	been	
lightened	or	suppressed	during	the	last	two	or	three	decades	and,	conversely,	at	the	same	
time	Western	societies	have	been	opened	up	to	market	forces	on	a	new	scale.	Since	the	
1980s,	Western	societies	have	been	ruled	by	a	neo-liberalist	policy	that	attempts	to	treat	
the	whole	of	society	and	the	rest	of	the	world	as	markets.	Thus,	if	most	of	the	Western	
European	people	formerly	lived	in	a	state-centric	society,	nowadays	they	live	in	a	market-
based	society.
To	a	growing	extent,	the	sub-system	of	art	has	also	been	an	object	of	neo-liberalist	
policy.	As	a	result	of	this	policy,	the	public	financing	of	the	arts	has	decreased	in	Western	
countries	since	the	1980s	and	1990s.	In	this	way,	several	art	centres,	museums,	theatres,	
dance	groups,	orchestras,	film	productions	and	art	schools	have	been	privatised	in	those	
countries.	However,	the	clearest	exception	in	this	respect	might	be	France	in	which	the	
state	has	not	given	up	its	own	institutions	of	art,	even	if	the	rest	of	French	society	nowadays	
largely	functions	according	to	neo-liberalist	principle41.	In	the	case	of	culture,	authorities	
and	politicians	as	well	as	ordinary	citizens	in	France	still	think	that	it	is	the	duty	of	the	
state	and	public	authorities	to	protect	the	sphere	of	art	against	pure	and	brutal	market	
forces	 (McGuigan	 2004:	 65–70;	Topler	&	 	Zimmer	 2002:	 34–36).	 Likewise,	 despite	
privatisation	tendencies,	in	Nordic	countries	such	as	Finland	and	Sweden	the	art	world	is	
still	largely	dependent	on	the	financial	support	of	the	state.42	In	this	respect,	the	situation	
is	 clearly	 different	 in	 Anglo-American	 countries,	 particularly	 in	 the	United	 States.	 In	
describing	the	situation	in	the	United	States,	Rosanne	Martorella	(1986:	32–34,	41)	writes	
that	in	the	mid-1980s	the	financial	support	that	the	business	world	gave	to	the	art	world	
was	over	three	times	bigger	than	the	art	budget	of	the	Federal	government,	and	it	was	
nearly	two	times	bigger	than	the	common	art	budgets	of	the	Federal	government	and	the	
states	of	the	USA.	Nowadays	Anglo-American	countries	such	as	Australia,	Great-Britain	
and	New	Zealand	underline	the	importance	of	the	markets	and	private	sponsorship,	as	
well,	but	obviously	the	state	has	a	more	active	role	in	them	in	the	art	life	than	the	Federal	
government	and	the	states	have	in	the	USA	(see	Caust	2003).	At	any	rate,	in	the	Western	
world,	the	state=s	role	as	an	owner	of	the	institutions	of	art	is	decreasing.	Furthermore,	
also	the	institutions	of	art	that	are	owned	by	the	state	or	public	sector	(provinces,	cities,	
towns,	villages)	must	nowadays	more	and	more	function	like	commercial	enterprises.
41	In	his	last	years,	Bourdieu	(1930-2002),	among	other	persons,	directed	sharp	criticism	at	neo-libe-
ralist	policy.	See,	 for	example,	his Contre-feux. Propos servir á la résistance contre l=invasion neolibérale	
(1998)	which	has	been	published	in	English	by	the	name	Counterfire. Against the Tyranny of the Market 
(2002).
42	See	Cantell	1994,	Cultural Policy in Finland (1995),	Heiskanen,	Mitchell	&	Kangas	2002,	Häyrynen	
2006,	Sevänen	1998	and	Toepler	&	Zimmer	2002.
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In	 his	 investigation,	Rethinking Cultural Policy  (2004),	 Jim	McGuigan	 presents	 a	
summary	of	present-day	cultural	policy	in	Western	countries.	According	to	him,	formerly	
cultural	politicians	thought	that	artistic	or	cultural	values	cannot	be	reduced	to	economic	
values:	it	was	thought	that	it	is	impossible	to	explain	the	meaning,	value	and	function	of	
the	sphere	of	art	exhaustively	with	economic,	political	or	pedagogic	terms,	because	works	
of	 art	 function	at	 the	 aesthetic-spiritual	 level	 (McGuigan	2004:	1–2).	We	can	equally	
formulate	this	thought	by	means	of	Habermasian	language;	thus,	the	demand	that	art	
must	 serve	economic	or	commercial	purposes	might	destroy	 the	 specificity	of	modern	
art.	For	Habermas	(1982a;	1982b;	1987a:	135–141,	225–366),	the	specificity	of	modern	
art	 lies	 in	 that	 it	 is	a	peculiar	 form	of	communicative	 rationality;	 that	 is,	 it	 represents	
aesthetic-expressive	rationality.	In	this	sense,	Habermas	continues,	modern	works	of	art	
deepen	our	knowledge	of	our	inner	self,	and	they	help	us	to	reflect	upon	the	world	and	
upon	ourselves	 and	 to	 express	 ourselves	 better.	Due	 to	modern	works	 of	 art,	modern	
subjects	are,	therefore,	capable	of	living	more	self-consciously	and	reflectively.	
According	to	McGuigan,	cultural	policy	has	been	reformulated	in	a	way	that	 it	no	
longer	 points	 to	 art=s	 specific	 rationality.	 However,	 often	 these	 formulations	 chiefly	
concern	the	language	and	rhetoric	of	cultural	policy,	for	McGuigan	(2004:	59,	65–66)	
carries	on	that	in	practice	all	of	the	states	belonging	to	the	European	Union	still	realise,	
to	a	smaller	extent,	the	principles	that	were	established	during	the	era	of	the	expansive	
welfare	state.	In	this	sense,	the	former	principles	of	cultural	policy	have	not	disappeared	
altogether,	but	 they	have	been	eclipsed	by	principles	which	are	more	market-based	by	
nature.	The	existence	of	the	former	principles	can,	for	example,	be	seen	in	that	the	states	
within	 the	European	Union	finance	 the	art	genres	and	art	projects	 that	would	not	be	
able	 to	survive	 in	a	pure	market	competition.	Likewise,	 the	states	 in	question	support	
their	national	cultural	production,	albeit	nowadays	a	support	such	as	this	 is	no	longer	
directed	only	to	national	high	art	but	also	and	to	a	growing	extent	to	national	popular	and	
commercial	culture.	Moreover,	Diana	Crane	remarks	that,	in	fact,	most	of	the	Western	
states	 still	protect	 their	national	high	and	popular	arts	 from	the	flows	of	 international	
or	 transnational	mass	 culture.	 For	 example,	 in	 France	 the	 public	 radio	 stations	must	
dedicate	at	least	50%	of	their	music	programs	to	French	popular	music,	and	comparable	
restrictions	concerning	the	public	supply	of	music	can	also	be	found	in	Australia,	Canada,	
Denmark,	Finland,	the	Netherlands	and	Sweden	(Crane	2002:	14–15).	Likewise,	many	
Western	states	demand	that	at	least	a	certain	part	of	public	television	broadcasts	must	be	
domestic	by	origin;	in	practice,	in	some	Western	countries	about	50%	of	the	television	
programs	are	American	by	origin,	whereas	in	other	Western	countries	less	than	one	third	
of	the	programs	are	from	America	(Crane	2002:	5–6).	At	any	rate,	albeit	Western	states	
have	not	altogether	abandoned	their	old	cultural	policy,	 studies	of	cultural	policy	give	
strong	support	to	the	generalisation	that	nowadays	the	sphere	of	art	has	become	a	more	
commercialised	 phenomenon	 in	Western	 societies.	 Crane	 (1987:	 141–142)	 does	 not	
hesitate	to	say	that	in	the	United	States	the	art	world	has,	in	many	respects,	become	a	part	
of	entertainment	culture,	and	obviously	her	conclusion	is	applicable	also	to	several	other	
Western	countries.43
43	On	the	changes	in	cultural	policy	see,	also,	Bennett	1995,	Burns	&	van	der	Will	2003,	Cantell	1994,	
Caust	2003,	Häyrynen	2006,	Martorella	2002,	Rodgers	1989	and	Toepler	&	Zimmer	2002.
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4.2 Postmodernity as a Process of De-Differentiation
Thus,	in	the	last	decades,	the	public	cultural	policy	has	not	treated	the	sphere	of	art	as	a	
highly	differentiated	social	and	cultural	system	and	nor	has	it	always	actively	defended	its	
relative	autonomy	against	other	systems.	Large	scale	changes	in	societal-cultural	reality	
are,	in	general,	in	accordance	with	these	changes	in	cultural	policy.	In	this	connection,	it	
is	not	possible	to	get	through	all	of	the	theories	of	postmodern	or	contemporary	societal-
cultural	reality.	Instead,	it	is	useful	to	concentrate	on	those	theories	which	pay	attention	
to	the	sphere	of	art	and	its	position	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	Therefore,	
of	the	theorists	of	postmodernity	this	thesis	considers,	first,	Scott	Lash=s	and	John	Urry=s	
thinking.	Since	the	 late	1980s,	Lash	and	Urry	have	published	several	 investigations	of	
contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	In	this	connection,	the	most	relevant	ones	of	those	
investigations	are	their	joint	works	The End of Organised Capitalism (1987)	and	Economies 
of Signs and Space (1994)	and	Lash=s	Sociology of Postmodernism (1992,	originally	published	
1990)	and	Critique of Information (2002).
In	their	The End of Organised Capitalism,	Lash	and	Urry	(1987:	13–15)	empirically	
consider	the	development	of	capitalism	in	France,	Germany,	Great	Britain,	Sweden	and	the	
United	States,	and	on	the	basis	of	this	consideration	they	make	large	scale	generalisations	
concerning	capitalism	and	Western	societies.	The	investigation	in	question	structures	the	
development	of	capitalism	into	a	liberal,	organised	and	disorganised	phase.	With	respect	
to	 the	 liberal	phase	Lash	and	Urry	have	not	a	 lot	 to	 say,	but	private	entrepreneurship	
and	 a	 liberal-individualist	 ideology	were	 typical	 of	 it,	 and	 in	 that	 phase	 the	 state	 did	
not	actively	seek	to	regulate	the	system	of	economics.	At	the	turn	of	the	19th	and	20th	
centuries,	the	liberal	phase	was	replaced	by	the	organised	phase.	This	new	phase	restricted	
the	autonomy	of	the	functional	sub-systems,	for	during	it	the	state	and	civil	society,	on	
the	one	hand,	and	the	state	and	the	economics,	on	the	other	hand,	came	closer	to	each	
other.	 In	 addition,	 the	 organised	 phase	 included	 powerful	 corporate	 features.	During	
it,	the	state,	political	parties,	trade	union	movements	and	the	employers	were	in	a	close	
co-operation	with	 each	other.	Lash	 and	Urry	 (1987:	232–236)	 remark	 that	 in	 several	
Western	countries	corporate	policy	was	basically	a	national	project	in	which	central	social	
classes	and	collective	organisations	made,	with	the	aid	of	the	state,	a	compromise.	As	a	
result	of	this	compromise,	the	working	class	obtained	a	high	standard	of	living	and	social	
security,	and	 for	 the	employers	 it	meant	a	 state	of	affairs	 in	which	class	conflicts	were	
pacified	 and	 abolished	 from	 the	 domain	 of	 production;	 the	 state,	 in	 turn,	 developed	
most	various	forms	of	regulation	by	means	of	which	it	steered	the	rest	of	society.	From	a	
standpoint	like	this,	the	era	of	the	expansive	welfare	state	can	be	conceived	of	as	an	end	
period	and	as	a	culmination	of	the	organised	phase.	
The	shift	to	the	disorganised	phase	has	passed	gradually	and	in	a	non-uniform	way.	
Lash	and	Urry	(1987:	7)	write	that	in	the	Unites	States	and	Great	Britain	Athe	crucial@	
signs	 or	 symptoms	 of	 this	 third	 phase	were	 already	 evident	 in	 the	 1960s,	whereas	 in	
France	comparable	signs	or	symptoms	emerged	at	the	turn	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	and	
Germany	and	Sweden	reached	a	similar	state	at	the	turn	of	the	1970s	and	1980s.	In	the	
disorganised	phase,	traditional	industrial	capitalism	and	the	social,	political	and	cultural	
structures	 produced	by	 it	 have	 fallen	 into	 a	 process	 of	 dissolution.	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	
process,	traditional	industrial	production	is	losing	its	central	position	in	society	and	the	
absolute	and	the	relative	seize	of	the	traditional	working	class	is	decreasing,	but,	on	the	
other	hand,	the	societal	significance	of	education	and	knowledge	is	on	the	increase	and	
the	service	sector	is	changing	into	a	central	phenomenon	in	society.	Furthermore,	in	the	
disorganised	phase,	industrial,	finance	and	marketing	enterprises	grow	and	their	marketing	
areas	become	international	or	global.	Owing	to	changes	like	these,	traditional	collective	
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identities,	in	particular,	class	identities,	political	identities	and	national	identities	tend	to	
become	problematic	in	the	phase	of	disorganised	capitalism	(Lash	&	Urry	1987:	7–8).	
Already	in	the	above-mentioned	investigation,	Lash	and	Urry	(1987:	7–8,	13–14)	state	
that	at	the	cultural	level	the	phenomenon	called	postmodernism	could	be	understood	as	
the	 cultural	 equivalent	 of	 the	 disorganised	 capitalism.	Although	 a	 conception	 such	 as	
this	seems	to	draw	a	mechanical	connection	between	culture	and	economics,	Lash	and	
Urry	(1987:	285)	specify	that	there	is	not	Aa	reductionistic	relation@	between	postmodern	
culture	 and	 the	 disorganised	 capitalist	 economics.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 investigation	 under	
consideration	they	conceive	of	postmodernity	as	a	cultural	phenomenon,	and	not	as	a	
societal	phenomenon.	Largely	in	the	same	way	Lash	deals	with	postmodernity	in	his	work	
Sociology of Postmodernism,	for	at	the	beginning	of	it	he	states	that	postmodernity	must	be	
understood	as	a	strictly	cultural	phenomenon	(Lash	1992:	3–4).	Despite	this,	in	the	same	
investigation	he	also	remarks	that	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	the	difference	
between	the	social	and	the	cultural	is	tendentiously	disappearing	(Lash	1992:	11,	39–40,	
43–45,	252).	However,	because	passages	like	these	do	not	dominate	that	investigation,	
we	can	perhaps	justifiably	say	that	in	it	Lash	regards	postmodernity	chiefly	as	a	cultural	
phenomenon.	 It	 is	 just	 in	 this	 sense	 that	he	compares	modernity	with	postmodernity.	
According	to	him,	the	structural	principle	of	differentiation	was	typical	of	modern	culture.	
In	other	words,	modern	culture	was	based	on	dichotomies	such	as	science	versus	art,	art	
versus	advertisement,	art	versus	entertainment,	art	versus	popular	culture	or	mass	culture,	
and	art	versus	daily	 life;	 the	first	one	and	 the	 last	one	of	 these	dichotomies	obviously	
represent	horizontal	differentiation,	while	the	rest	of	those	dichotomies	represent	vertical	
differentiation	or	cultural	value	hierarchies.	In	modernity,	different	cultural	spheres	were,	
therefore,	highly	differentiated	from	each	other.	Lash	(1992:	3–4,	8–11)	suggests	that	in	
modernity	each	cultural	sphere	itself	elaborated	upon	the	valuation	principles	which	were	
used	within	it.	Consequently,	those	spheres	became	self-legislating	or	autonomous	at	the	
normative	level:	they	reached	the	state	that	was	called	normative	AEigengesetzlichkeit@	by	
Weber.	This	means,	Lash	(1992:	9)	continues,	that	Avalue	within	a	sphere	is	dependent	on	
how	well	a	cultural	object	in	the	sphere	measures	up	to	the	norms	proper	to	that	sphere	
itself@.
It	is	difficult	to	avoid	the	impression	that	Lash	gives	us	an	overly	autonomous	picture	
of	modern	culture.	His	picture	entirely	passes	over	the	interpenetrating	zones	between	
different	cultural	spheres	or	systems.	As	we	have	earlier	noted,	as	a	cultural	system	modern	
art	 has	 not	 been	 independent	 of	moral	 standpoints;	 on	 the	 contrary,	modern	 art	 has	
possessed	a	civilising	function,	and	it	has	maintained	qualitative	values	or	communicative	
rationality	in	a	society	that	is	increasingly	based	on	instrumental	thinking.	On	the	other	
hand,	 as	 a	 cultural	 phenomenon	modern	 art	 has	 also	 been	 interlaced	 with	 national-
patriotic	value	and	meaning	systems,	and	in	many	cases	it	has	even	actively	constituted	
national-patriotic	symbols	and	myths.	At	the	end	of	the	third	chapter	of	this	thesis	we	
saw	that	Peter	Bürger	and	Bourdieu	have	laid	stress	on	the	view	that	in	an	equal	manner	
the	modern	sphere	of	art	has	been	interlaced	with	the	societal	level.	According	to	them,	
basically,	modern	aesthetic	high	culture	has	expressed	upper-class	intellectuals=	mentality	
or	habitus	and	their	ambiguous	position	in	modern	society.
In	 comparison	with	modern	 culture,	 postmodernity	means,	 for	 Lash	 (1992:	 ix–x,	
3–4,	 11),	 cultural	 de-differentiation.	 In	 postmodernity,	 for	 example,	 the	 contrast	
between	 art	 and	daily	 life	 has	 been	 refuted.	For	 the	most	 part,	 this	 phenomenon	has	
been	the	result	of	changes	in	society=s	media	structure.	Already	since	the	1960s,	but,	in	
particular,	since	the	1980s	radio,	television	and	other	mass	media	have	developed	into	
central	mediation	institutions	of	art.	Hence,	nowadays	the	reception	of	works	of	art	or	
cultural	products	often	takes	place	in	everyday	life	worlds	or	in	the	context	of	everyday	
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activities	–	housework,	ways	to	work	–	without	a	real	concentration	on	those	products.	
Therefore,	Lash	(1992:	153–157)	underlines,	Walter	Benjamin	(1892-1940)	–	and	not	
Baudrillard,	as	some	cultural	theorists	perhaps	might	have	presumed	-	should	be	regarded	
as	 the	paradigmatic	 theorist	of	postmodern	culture.	 It	was	 expressly	Benjamin	 (1980)	
who,	as	a	cultural	theorist,	first	foresaw	that	the	traditional	distance	between	the	works	of	
art	and	their	receivers	on	the	one	hand,	and	between	the	works	of	art	and	objects	of	daily	
life	on	the	other	hand	tends	to	disappear	along	the	development	of	modern	technology	
and	modern	popular	art	genres.44
On	the	vertical	dimension,	postmodernity	means	a	state	of	affairs	in	which	traditional	
dichotomies	such	as	art	versus	popular	culture,	high	culture	versus	low	culture,	art	versus	
entertainment,	and	serious	culture	versus	light	culture	are	increasingly	becoming	lower	
(Lash	 1992:	 11).	Unfortunately,	 Lash	 hardly	 presents	 any	 concrete	 examples	 of	 these	
processes.	At	 any	 rate,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 realise	 that	 in	 the	mid-1990s	Timo	Cantell	
also	spoke	about	those	processes	in	his	own	investigations	on	present-day	cultural	policy.	
According	to	him,	nowadays	the	Arts	Council	in	Great	Britain,	for	example,	comprehends	
the	concept	of	art	in	a	very	broad	way;	besides	traditional	genres	such	as	literature,	theatre,	
opera,	painting,	sculpture,	architecture	and	classical	music,	it	regards	design,	fashion	and	
the	production	of	films,	radio	programs,	television	programs	and	tape	recordings	as	art	
(Cantell	1994:	23–24).	This	indicates	that	the	Arts	Council	has	attempted	to	bring	the	
sphere	of	art	and	economic	life	closer	to	each	other.	On	the	other	hand,	representatives	of	
popular	culture	have	themselves	striven	to	bridge	the	gap	between	high	art	and	popular	
culture.	For	example,	in	Great	Britain	the	rise	of	the	public	status	of	rock	music	is	partly	
explained	by	rock	musicians	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	–	such	as	Pink	Floyd,	Sex	Pistols	and	
The	Who,	who	were	fosters	of	art	schools,	and	besides	commercial	goals	they	had	conscious	
artistic	goals.	During	the	last	decades	BBC	(British	Broadcasting	Corporation)	has	also	
become	internationally	well-known	for	its	good	quality	television	series	and	documentary	
programs,	 and	 in	 this	 respect	 it	 has	 brought	 television	 culture	 closer	 to	 high	 culture.	
Finally,	it	should	be	noticed	that	during	the	last	decades	a	new	generation	has	entered	into	
the	circles	of	intellectuals	and	art	critics;	this	generation	has	grown	up	in	the	atmosphere	
of	popular	culture,	so	it	does	not	automatically,	unlike	several	older	intellectuals	and	art	
critics,	experience	popular	genres	as	a	cultural	decline.	Together	institutions,	actors	and	
factors	like	these	have	been	institutionalising	popular	genres	as	art.
As	far	as	works	of	art	are	themselves	concerned,	Lash	thinks	that	postmodernist	works	
of	art	and	cultural	products	are	more	concrete	and	immediate	by	nature	than	modernist	
works	of	art	were.	According	to	him,	modernist	art	favoured	an	abstract	form	of	language,	
and	in	the	sub-field	of	visual	arts	it	included	strong	non-figurative	and	non-representative	
elements.	 In	contrast	 to	 this,	 typical	postmodernist	works	of	art	 signify	 in	a	more	de-
differentiated	 way;	 that	 is,	 they	 signify	 by	 means	 of	 representative	 pictures,	 concrete	
figures	and	iconic	signs	(Lash	1992:	194–195).	In	cases	like	these,	the	distance	between	
the	sign	and	its	referent	is	small,	for	the	sign	physically	or	externally	resembles	its	own	
referent;	in	semiotics,	these	kind	of	signs	are,	therefore,	understood	as	highly	motivated.	
Because	of	this	motivation,	that	is,	because	of	the	physical	or	external	similarity	between	
the	sign	and	its	referent,	actors	can	usually	immediately	grasp	where	the	sign	refers	to.	In	
44	Benjamin=s	view	of	popular	art	has	also	been	estimated	in	the	collection	of	articles Mapping	Benjamin. 
The Work of Art in the Digital Age (2003),	edited	by	Hans	Ulrich	Gumbrecht	and	Michael	Marrinan.	
Among	other	persons,	Dirk	Baecker,	Antoine	Hennion,	Bruno	Latour,	Siegfried	J.	Schmidt	and	Niels	
Werber	belong	to	its	writers.
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addition,	Lash	(1992:	99–100;	1994:	138–140)	writes	that,	as	compared	with	modernist	
works	of	 art,	 postmodernist	works	of	 art	 give	more	 space	 to	desire,	 libidinous	 energy	
and	corporality.	In	this	connection,	he	points	to	Peter	Brook=s	theatrical	and	dramatic	
performances	which	have	been	heavily	 influenced	by	Antonin	Artaud=s	Atheatre	of	 the	
cruelty@,	but	in	the	same	way	present-day	dance	art	and	body	art	as	well	as	feminist,	gay	
and	 lesbian	 art	have	dealt	with	 the	 themes	of	 corporality	 and	 sexuality.	On	 the	other	
hand,	when	speaking	about	postmodernist	works	of	art	Lash	almost	entirely	ignores	that	
nowadays	 art	 genres	 such	 as	 novels,	 theatre,	 film	 and	 visual	 genres	 often	 refer	 to	 and	
comment	upon	themselves,	previous	works	of	art	and	art-theoretical	problems	–	just	as	
John	Fowles=	famous	novel	The French Lieutnant=s Woman (1969)	tells	a	love	story	from	
the	19th	century=s	Great	Britain,	on	the	one	hand,	and	reflects	upon	the	narration	of	the	
story	in	question	and	the	conventions	of	the	19th	century=s	realistic	novel,	on	the	other	
hand.	In	contemporary	art	theory,	works	like	these	are	usually	called	Ameta-art@,	because	
they	deal	with	art-theoretical	questions	or	because	they	are	art	about	art.	On	the	whole,	
nowadays	art	is	more	reflective	or	more	conscious	of	itself;	in	particular,	this	holds	true	
for	genres	such	as	the	novel,	theatre,	film,	performance	and	visual	genres,	wherefore	they	
include	 a	 lot	 of	 features	 of	meta-art.	Due	 to	 this,	 the	 traditional	 dichotomy	between	
criticism	and	art,	or	between	critical	and	artistic	discourse,	has	clearly	become	lower	in	
contemporary	culture.	In	this	respect,	meta-art	undoubtedly	represents	the	phenomenon	
of	de-differentiation.
Thus,	 Lash=s	 and	 Urry=s	 The End of Organised Capitalism	 (1987)	 presents	 that	
traditional	industrial	capitalism	and	the	social,	political	and	cultural	structures	produced	
by	it	have	fallen	into	a	process	of	dissolution.	According	to	the	investigation	in	question	
and	 according	 to	 Lash=s	Sociology of the Postmodernism (1990),	 postmodernity	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 the	 cultural	 equivalent	 of	 disorganised	 capitalism.	 Lash=s	 and	 Urry=s	
Economies of Signs and Space (1994)	uses	 the	 concept	 of	 postmodernity	 in	 a	 different	
way;	there	they	apply	it	to	the	entirety	of	present-day	societal-cultural	reality.	Now	they	
state	 that	 the	whole	of	 life	 in	 contemporary	 society	 is	 increasingly	 Aculturally	 loaded@	
and,	speaking	more	generally,	modern	or	industrial	society	is	changing	into	a	Acultural	
society@,	which	means	the	perfection	of	the	process	of	modernisation.	A	characterisation	
like	this	indicates	that	Lash	and	Urry	regard	postmodernity	as	a	new	phase	of	modernity,	
and	not	as	a	radically	new	societal-cultural	formation.	Cultural	society	is,	for	Lash	and	
Urry,	postmodern	society.	In	that	society,	cultural	dimension	has	obtained	a	pride	of	place	
in	the	economics	and	production	and	at	the	same	time	aestheticity	has	developled	into	a	
socially	important	phenomenon;	nowadays	aestheticity	is	not	concerned	only	with	art	but	
also	with	economic	production,	everyday	life	worlds,	social	interaction	and	the	identity	
formation	of	 subjects	 (Lash	&	Urry	1994:	54,	132,	143).	Both	of	 these	processes	 are	
closely	connected	with	the	dissolution	of	traditional	economic	and	social	structures	and	
with	the	substitution	of	those	structures	by	communication	and	information	structures.
Of	those	two	processes,	let	us	first	consider	the	role	of	cultural	dimension	in	economics	
and	production.	Lash	and	Urry	(1994:	4,	15)	remark	that	nowadays	economic	enterprises	
do	not	produce	only	physical	things	and	physical	commodities	but	also,	and	to	a	growing	
extent,	signs.	These	kind	of	signs	can	be	divided	into	two	classes:	(i)	firstly,	they	refer	to	
the	signs	which	have,	in	the	first	instance,	a	cognitive	content	and	which	are,	therefore,	
post-industrial	goods	or	information	goods	by	nature;	(ii)	and	secondly,	they	point	to	the	
signs	whose	content	has,	in	the	first	instance,	an	aesthetic	characteristic.	
As	 for	 class	 (i),	 Lash	 and	Urry	 emphasise	 that	 today	 the	 production,	 transfer	 and	
exploitation	 of	 information	 as	well	 as	 its	 availability	 has	 formed	 into	 a	 central	 factor	
in	the	economic	life.	In	present-day	telecommunication	and	digital	communication,	it	
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is	possible	 to	 transfer	 information	easily	 from	one	place	 to	 the	other	place.	Moreover,	
contact	and	communication	between	different	parts	of	the	globe	is	rapid	with	the	help	of	
computer	networks,	satellites	and	cables.	Hence,	organised	capitalism	has	been	replaced	
by	disorganised	capitalism	or	by	a	special	economics	of	signs	and	spaces;	this	new	phase	of	
capitalism	consists	of	de-centered	information	flows	which	exist	in	a	global	space.
Class	(ii)	comprises	the	signs	or	products	which	offer	aesthetic	pleasure,	stimulating	
experiences	and	entertaining	moments	to	consumers.	Among	other	things,	light	music,	
rock	music,	films,	television	serials	and	videos	are	products	such	as	these.	Besides	them,	
class	(ii)	contains	the	phenomenon	that	has	been	called	Athe	aestheticization	of	goods@	or	
even	Athe	aestheticization	of	everyday	life@	in	recent	cultural	and	sociological	studies.	By	
Athe	aestheticization	of	goods@	Lash	and	Urry	mean	that	in	present-day	Western	life	styles	
the	sign	value	or	image	value	of	goods	(clothes,	shoes,	furnitures,	household	appliances,	
cars,	apartments,	houses,	services)	has	been	emphasised,	and	to	consumers	this	value	is	
often	a	more	important	thing	than	the	concrete	use	value	of	goods	is	for	them.	In	the	
same	way,	the	design	of	goods	is	nowadays	a	central	factor	in	the	production	of	goods.	At	
a	more	general	level,	one	can	say	that	nowadays	the	production	and	marketing	of	goods	
requires	intensive	research	work,	product	development	and	design,	whereas	purely	manual	
work	has	lost	a	great	deal	of	its	significance	in	the	present-day	economic	production	and	
in	the	value	formation	of	goods.
Due	 to	 the	 above-mentioned	 two	 processes,	 the	 economic	 and	 the	 cultural	 have	
become	 closer	 to	 each	 other	 in	 postmodernity;	 that	 is,	 they	 are	 no	 longer	 sharply	
differentiated	from	each	other.	In	all,	economic	activities	have	become	more	information-
intensive	in	the	sense	that	more	and	more	they	consist	of	the	production,	interpretation	
and	application	of	 information,	knowledge	and	conceptual	symbols.	At	the	same	time	
economic	production	and	economic	 life	have	become	aestheticized,	which	means	 that	
they	are	increasingly	accentuated	by	the	sign	and	image	value	of	goods.	For	reasons	like	
these,	sociology	ought	to	change	its	established	view	of	societal-cultural	reality:
The	term	Areflexive	accumulation@	looks	like	a	contradiction	in	terms.	Reflexivity	
is	 cultural,	 accumulation	 is	 economic.	However,	we	 use	 the	 term	 to	 enable	 us	
to	capture	how	economic	and	symbolic	processes	are	more	than	ever	 interlaced	
and	inter-articulated;	that	is,	that	the	economy	is	increasingly	culturally	inflected	
and	that	culture	is	more	and	more	economically	inflected.	Thus,	the	boundaries	
between	the	two	become	more	and	more	blurred	and	the	economy	and	culture	
no	longer	function	in	regard	to	one	another	as	system	and	environment.	(Lash	&	
Urry	1994:	64.)
The	message	of	this	passage	seems	to	be	unambiguous;	according	to	it,	the	sub-system	
of	economics	and	culture	would	have	merged	or	 they	will	merge	 in	postmodernity.	 If	
this	 is	what	Lash	 and	Urry	basically	 try	 to	 say	 in	 their	 investigation,	 then	one	has	 to	
say	that	obviously	they	exaggerate	the	process	of	de-differentiation	between	economics	
and	culture.	In	system-theoretical	sociology,	culture	has	been	understood	as	a	complex	
phenomenon.	At	the	horizontal	level,	it	consists	of	world	views,	representations,	values,	
norms,	 languages,	 sign	 systems,	 habits,	 rituals	 and	 traditions;	 at	 the	 vertical	 level,	
phenomena	 such	 as	 religion,	 philosophy,	 science,	 art	 and	 moral	 have	 been	 its	 most	
appreciated	manifestations,	 but	 equally	 well	 people=s	 lifestyles	 and	 their	 everyday	 life	
worlds	have	been	seen	as	instances	of	culture.	From	this	standpoint,	it	would,	of	course,	
be	erroneous	to	claim	that	the	sub-systems	of	economics	and	the	entire	complexity	of	
culture	have	merged	or	that	they	will	merge;	at	the	most,	it	would	be	right	to	say	that	the	
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sub-system	of	economics	has	become	increasingly	cultural	by	nature.	Although	it	remains	
unclear	what	Lash	and	Urry	basically	mean	by	the	above-cited	passage,	their	investigation	
does	not	adhere	to	a	supposition	that	economics	and	culture	would	form	a	single	system	
in	postmodernity.	Rather	 they	simply	attempt	 to	avoid	 the	concept	of	 system	in	 their	
descriptions	of	contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality,	because	 since	 the	 late1980s	 they	
have	been	inclined	to	think	that	this	reality	is	no	longer	clearly	systemic	by	nature.	On	
the	contrary,	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	is,	according	to	them,	in	the	process	
of	dissolution	or	disorganizing	(Lash	&	Urry	1994:	10).
In	their	investigation,	Lash	and	Urry	also	deal	with	the	process	of	de-differentiation	
between	the	cultural	and	the	social,	or	between	the	aesthetic	and	the	social.	At	a	general	
level	 they	think	that	 in	postmodernity	previous	social	 structures	are	being	replaced	by	
information	and	communication	structures,	which,	in	part,	brings	the	cultural	dimension	
in	a	new	way	into	the	heart	of	social	life.	In	working	life	and	the	labour	market,	for	example,	
actors	nowadays	constantly	interpret	different	signs	and	messages,	wherefore	they	often	
have	to	reflect	upon	their	own	ways	of	thinking	and	their	own	courses	of	action.	In	actors=	
way	of	life,	a	phenomenon	like	this	represents	cognitive	reflexivity,	that	is,	a	mental	state	
in	which	actors	 analyse	 their	own	 thoughts,	beliefs,	 values,	 attitudes	 and	dispositions.	
Likewise,	 the	 process	 of	 de-differentiation	 between	 art	 and	 everyday	 life	 worlds,	 the	
centrality	of	mass	media	and	cultural	industry	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality,	as	
well	as	the	aestheticization	of	goods	and	services	have	created	a	situation	in	which	actors	
live	amidst	different	signs,	in	particular,	amidst	visual	signs.	In	a	situation	like	this,	they	
interpret	those	signs	daily,	which	increases	their	capability	for	aesthetic	reflexivity,	that	
is,	their	capability	for	self-knowledge	and	self-expression.45	In	these	respects,	present-day	
ways	of	lives	are	culturally	loaded	and	aestheticized	social	phenomena.	However,	in	this	
connection	Lash	and	Urry	(1994:	132)	underline	that	they	do	not	claim	that	the	cultural	
and	the	social	will	merge	or	that	the	entirety	of	society	will	become	aestheticized;	rather	
they	describe	central	tendencies	in	present-day	societal-cultural	reality.	Despite	this,	the	
interesting	thing	here	is	again	the	fact	that	they	hardly	at	all	use	the	concept	of	system	
in	their	descriptions	of	present-day	societal-cultural	reality.	Instead,	they	obviously	think	
that	clear-cut	boundaries	between	systems	are	disappearing	from	that	reality.
In	their	investigations	concerning	postmodernity,	Lash	and	Urry	are	willing	to	apply	
the	concept	of	Areflexive	modernity@	to	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	After	all,	
they	 believe,	 postmodernity	 has	 released	 actors	 from	 established	 or	 rigid	 societal	 and	
cultural	structures,	and	it	is	partly	for	this	reason	that	living	in	this	new	phase	of	modernity	
requires	growing	capabilities	for	reflexivity	from	actors	or	individuals.	By	emphasising	the	
new	position	of	actors	or	individuals	in	postmodernity	Lash	and	Urry	use,	therefore,	the	
concept	of	reflexive	modernity	in	a	slightly	different	way	than	Ulrich	Beck	has	used	it.	As	
it	is	well-known,	the	concept	of	reflexive	modernity	has,	in	particular,	been	elaborated	by	
Beck	who,	in	the	first	instance,	considers	the	growth	of	reflexivity	from	the	standpoint	of	
society	and	its	institutions.46	At	the	same	time,	all	of	these	three	sociologists	share	a	critical	
and	suspicious	view	of	system-theoretical	sociology.	As	far	as	Beck	is	concerned,	he	has	
45	See	Lash	&	Urry	1994:	51-54.	Lash	has	also	considered	aesthetic	reflexivity	in	his	article	AReflexivity	
and	its	Doubles:	Structure,	Aesthetics,	Community@	(1994).	Usually	the	concept	of	reflexivity	means	a	
situation	in	which	a	subject	analyzes	himself	or	herself,	that	is,	a	situation	in	which	a	subject	is	conscious	
of	himself	or	herself.	In	Lash=s	and	Urry=s	investigations,	the	concepts	of	cognitive	and	aesthetic	reflexi-
vity	include	a	dimension	like	this,	but	those	investigations	do	not	clearly	explicate	what	is	the	difference	
between	cognitive	and	aesthetic	reflexivity.
46	See	Beck	1986	and	1994.	See,	also,	Beck,	Giddens	&	Lash	1994.	
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often	directed	his	own	criticism	of	system-theoretical	sociology	against	the	Luhmannian	
school;	according	to	him,	Luhmann=s	concept	of	social	system	is	rather	rigid	and	inflexible,	
therefore	it	only	has	a	limited	use	value	in	descriptions	of	contemporary	or	present-day	
societal-cultural	reality	(see,	nearer,	Beck	1994;	Beck,	Bonss	&	Lau	2004).	However,	a	
criticism	like	this	implies	that	system-theoretical	sociology	could	also	be	a	useful	tool	in	
descriptions	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	-	provided	that	it	will	renew	its	basic	
concepts.	Unfortunately,	Beck	has	not	himself	attempted	to	renew	those	concepts.
In	 fact,	 Lash	 and	Urry	 seem	 to	 have	 adopted	 a	 rather	 similar	 attitude	 to	 system-
theoretical	 sociology.	 Basically,	 they	 are	 not	willing	 to	 give	 up	 the	 concept	 of	 system	
altogether;	 instead	 they	 admit	 that	 this	 concept	might	 possess	 a	 limited	 use	 value	 in	
the	descriptions	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	In	his	Critique of Information 
(2002),	Lash	points	out	that	his	and	Urry=s	The End of Organised Capitalism	(1987)	speaks	
about	Athe	dis-integration	of	 institutions	and	organisations,	of	 structures	and	systems@	
(Lash	2002:	207.	Italics	by	Lash).	Obviously	he	means	that	the	process	of	disintegration	
and	dissolution	of	traditional	industrial-capitalist	society	has	produced	the	dissolution	of	
modern	functional	sub-systems,	even	if	the	concept	of	social	system	is	hardly	raised	in	the	
above-mentioned	book	by	Lash	and	Urry.	To	the	question	of	what	kind	of	societal-cultural	
reality	has	come	after	traditional	industrial-capitalist	society	Lash	answers	as	follows:
[–	–	]	Manufacturing	capitalism	arises	towards	the	end	of	a	centuries-long	(indeed	
millenia-spanning)	 process	 of	 differentiation:	 of	 structural	 differentiation	 and	
functional	integration.	It	is	the	junction	at	which	this	differentiation	of	structures,	
systems,	organisations	and	 institutions	reaches	 its	high	point,	 its	 summit.	With	
the	end	of	organised	capitalism,	this	process	of	differentiation	goes	into	reverse.	It	
becomes	a	process	of	indifferentiation,	leading	to	a	generalised	indifference	of	the	
many	kinds	of	increasingly	digitaliszed	flows.	It	describes	a	process	of	the	highest	
difference	to	one	of	generalised	indifference.	But	at	a	certain	point	the	indifference	
of	flows	starts	solidifying	in	their	own	new	territories,	or	should	I	say	in	their	own	
new	 Ade-territories@.	These	 new	 (de-)territories	 are	 not	 structures,	 institutions,	
organisations	 and	 organic-systems.	They	 are	 instead	 such	 entities	 as	 platforms,	
brands,	 non-places,	 junkspace	 and	 cybernetic,	 open	 systems.	 (Lash	 2002:	 207.	
Italics	by	Lash.)
In	this	passage,	Lash	contrasts	Aorganic-systems@	with	Aopen	systems@.	He	does	not	specify	
what	he	actually	means	by	these	concepts,	but	obviously	the	concept	of	Aorganic-system@	
refers	to	the	kind	of	system	in	which	the	parts	are	entirely	subordinated	to	the	whole;	in	
systems	like	these,	the	parts	do	not	possess	any	independence	in	relation	to	the	whole.	In	
contrast,	open	systems	would	perhaps	be	loose	formations	in	which	the	parts	are	relatively	
independent	of	each	other	and	of	the	whole;	in	systems	like	these,	the	whole	does	not	
entirely	define	the	character	and	function	of	the	parts.	If	this	is	what	Lash	has	in	mind	in	
this	connection,	then	he	also	could	think	that	there	are	loose	system-like	formations	in	
contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.
Likewise,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	Lash	does	not	entirely	disapprove	Luhmann=s	
theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems.	In	fact,	he	even	thinks	that	in	his	theory	of	autopoietic	
social	systems	Luhmann	has	grasped	the	essence	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	
quite	accurately.	Yet,	it	is	not	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	itself	that	is,	for	Lash,	of	crucial	
importance	in	Luhmann=s	theory,	and	nor	does	Lash	utilise	Luhmann=s	concept	of	social	
system	in	his	own	investigations.	On	the	contary,	Lash	does	not	regard	the	Luhmannian	
concepts	of	autopoiesis	and	social	system	as	sociologically	illuminating	and	useful	tools.	
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Instead,	Lash	believes	 that	 it	 is	 just	by	basing	his	 theory	of	 society	on	 the	 concept	of	
communication	 that	 Luhmann	 succeeds	 in	 reaching	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 contemporary	
societal-cultural	reality:
The	real	 is	a	space	of	communication.	And	this	 is	what	makes	Niklas	Luhmann	
the	paradigmatic	sociologist,	and	along	with	Deleuze	the	paradigmatic	thinker	of	
the	information	age.	What	Luhmann	has	understood	is	that	the	social	bond	itself	
is	no	longer	about	exchange	in	the	symbolic	but	has	taken	on	the	proportions	of	
communication.	The	 social	bond	 is	here	compressed	and	stretched	at	 the	 same	
time.	And	the	communication	is	the	fabric	of	the	real.	Information	politics	take	
place	in	conjunction	with	the	communication.	The	argument	of	this	book	is	that	
in	the	information	age	the	centrality	of	the	means	of	production	are	displaced	by	
the	means	of	communication:	the	centrality	of	production	relations	by	relations	
of	 communication.	 Communication	 is	 here	 understood	 in	 its	 very	 broadest	
sense.	The	 logic	of	flows	 is	 the	 logic	of	communications.	With	the	domination	
of	 production	 there	 is	 a	 politics	 of	 struggles	 around	 accumulation	 (of	 capital).	
With	the	dominance	of	communication	there	is	a	politics	of	struggle	around	not	
accumulation	but	circulation.	Manufacture	capitalism	privileges	production	and	
accumulation,	 the	 network	 society	 privileges	 communication	 and	 circulation.	
(Lash	2002:	111–112.	Italics	by	Lash.)
According	to	Lash,	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	is	largely	based	on	communication	
and	circulation,	whereas	old	industrial-capitalist	society	gave	priority	to	the	production	of	
goods	and	the	accumulation	of	capital.	It	is	just	this	thing	that	Luhmann	has	understood	
perfectly	well	 in	his	 late	production	 (Lash	2007:	65–66).	Yet,	 from	Lash=s	 standpoint	
Luhmann	made	an	error	in	that	he	generalised	too	much	on	the	basis	of	his	observations	
concerning	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality.	 Luhmann	 used	 the	 concept	 of	
communication	as	a	cornerstone	of	his	entire	theory	of	modern	and	contemporary	society,	
but	–	in	Lash=s	opinion	–	actually	the	phenomenon	of	communication	has	not	become	
crucially	important	until	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.
Here	Lash	is,	 in	fact,	close	to	Stichweh=s	thinking.	Namely,	when	reflecting	on	the	
relationship	between	action	theory	and	communication	theory,	Stichweh		writes	that	action	
theory	is	Aan	intellectual	phenomenon	germane	to	industrial	society@	and	communication	
theory,	 in	 turn,	 Acan	be	 classified	 as	 a	kind	of	 sociology	 adequate	 to	 information	 and	
knowledge	societies@	(Stichweh	2000:	11).	This	means	that	the	contemporary	phase	of	
modern	society	and	its	functional	sub-systems	must	be,	in	the	first	instance,	understood	
by	means	of	the	concept	of	communication.	Yet,	Stichweh	(2000:	12)	admits	that	action	
theory	has	a	limited	value	in	analysises	concerning	contemporary	society	and	its	functional	
sub-systems,	besides	which	it	is	a	useful	tool	when	one	considers	previous	societies.	Thus,	
largely	in	this	way	Lash	seems	to	think	in	the	above-cited	passage.
Despite	the	appreciation	that	Lash	gives	to	Luhmann=s	late	production,	on	the	whole	
he	and	Urry	call	the	use	value	of	the	concept	of	system	into	question	in	their	production.	
To	 be	 sure,	 Lash	 admits	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 an	 open	 system	 has	 a	 limited	 use	 value	
in	 sociological	descriptions	of	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality,	but	 this	does	not	
change	his	understating	overall	view	of	system	theory.	In	this	respect,	Lash	and	Urry	think	
nearly	in	the	same	way	as	Bauman	and	Beck	and	several	other	sociologists	think.	But	has	
the	use	value	of	 the	concept	of	 system	really	 sank	as	dramatically	as	 these	 sociologists	
presume?	Could	this	concept	actually	possess	a	wider	application	extension	in	sociology	
than	they	are	ready	to	admit?
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At	the	beginning	of	this	thesis,	I	distinguished	between	social	and	cultural	systems	and	
divided	social	systems	into	interactional,	organisational,	functional	and	societal	systems.	
Now,	we	can	say	that	there	are	interactional	and	organisational	systems	in	contemporary	
societal-cultural	 reality;	 for	 example,	 families,	 friendship	 circles	 and	 different	 small	
communities	 represent	 the	 former	 ones,	 whereas	 enterprises,	 factories,	 administrative	
institutions	and	states	are	instances	of	the	latter	ones.	Probably	Lash,	Urry,	Bauman	and	
Beck	 do	 not	 deny	 the	 existence	 of	 systems	 like	 these.	Hence,	 problematic	 entities	 in	
this	connection	are	functional	and	societal	systems.	The	concept	of	a	functional	system	
concerns	the	heart	of	the	theory	of	modern	society	in	the	sense	that	several	sociologists	
have	thought	that	functional	differentiation	is	the	most	central	or	at	least	an	important	
structural	feature	of	modernity.	For	this	reason,	theories	of	modern	society	usually	pay	
attention	to	 functional	 sub-systems	and	 largely	 ignore	 interactional	and	organisational	
systems.	And	 for	 the	 same	 reason,	 those	 theorists	 tend	 to	 think	 that	 it	 is	 just	 due	 to	
functional	sub-systems	that	the	structure	of	modern	societal-cultural	reality	is	systemic	by	
nature;	and	conversely,	if	functional	sub-systems	are	in	the	process	of	de-differentiation,	
then	societal-cultural	reality	is	basically	losing	its	systemic	nature	and	it	is	changing	into	
Aflows@	or	Asocial	 life@.	 I	would	myself,	however,	 claim	 that	 fortunately	we	have	other	
alternatives	for	the	description	of	this	situation.
In	this	connection,	it	is	useful,	for	example,	to	analytically	distinguish	between	simple	
and	 complex	 systems	 and	 elaborate	 the	 idea	 of	 system-likeness.	 For	 example,	 in	 his	
investigation	General Systems Theory. Ideas and Application (2001)	Lars	Skyttner	works	on	
Table 6. Simple	and	Complex	Systems	According	to	Lars	Skyttner.
Simple Systems Complex Systems
Number	of	Elements Few Rich	with	Elements
Interaction	Between	the	
Elements
Highly	Organised Loosely	Organised
Characteristic	of	Rules Clear,	Explicit	and	Strict Partly	Explicit,	
Partly	Implicit
Characteristic	of	
Sub-Systems
Strongly	Dependent	
on	the	Whole
Differentiated	Sub-Systems	
With	Their	Own	Goals
Relation	to	
Environment
A	Relative	Low
Degree	of	Openness
A	Relative	High	Degree	of	
Openness
Source:	Skyttner	2001:	49–50,	98.
0
the	distinction	between	simple	and	complex	systems.	According	to	him,	simple	systems	
contain	few	elements,	the	interaction	between	these	elements	is	highly	organised,	clear	
and	explicit	rules	regulate	people=s	action	in	these	systems	which	possess	a	relative	low	
degree	of	openness	with	regard	to	their	environment.	It	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	
a	certain	kind	of	openness	is	always	characteristic	of	social	systems,	wherefore	one	must	
say	 that	 simple	 social	 systems	are	more	 closed	 than	 social	 systems	usually	 are.	Besides	
this,	possible	 sub-systems	 in	a	 simple	 system	are	weakly	differentiated	 from	the	whole	
and	they	do	not	possess	their	own	goals.	In	contrast,	complex	systems	contain	a	lot	of	
elements,	the	interaction	between	these	elements	is	loosely	organised	and	the	rules	that	
regulate	people=s	action	in	these	systems	are	partly	explicit	and	partly	implicit,	unwritten	
and	 informal.	 Complex	 systems	 also	 contain	 sub-systems	 which	 might,	 to	 a	 certain	
extent,	be	differentiated	from	the	whole,	which	means	that	they	might	develop	their	own	
goals.	With	regard	to	their	environment	complex	systems	possess	a	relative	high	degree	
of	openness.	In	addition,	complex	living	systems	possess	a	tendency	towards	entropy	or	
dissolution;	this	tendency	they	strive	to	restrict	and	restrain,	for	example,	by	regulating	
their	own	operations	and,	as	far	as	it	is	possible,	by	controlling	their	boundaries.
It	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	the	distinction	between	simple	and	complex	systems	
is	analytical.	It	offers	to	researchers	a	tool	by	means	of	which	they	can	appraise	to	what	
extent	real	social	formations	and	real	social	phenomena	can	be	defined	either	as	simple	
or	as	complex	systems;	besides	this,	it	is,	of	course,	possible	that	some	social	phenomena	
can	 not	 at	 all	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 systems.	 In	 the	 same	way,	 researchers	 can	 use	 the	
concept	of	system-likeness.	In	the	third	chapter	of	this	thesis	we	saw	that	Renate	Mayntz	
(1988a;	1988b)	has	elaborated	this	concept	at	a	general	 level	–	without	proportioning	
it	to	the	discussion	on	postmodernity	and	globalisation	(see,	nearer,	chapter	3.4.).	Her	
ideas	 have	 been	 extremely	 valuable	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 argumentation	 chain	
of	this	thesis,	but	in	this	particular	connection	I	would	like	to	lean	more	on	the	ideas	
developed	by	Richard	Münch	(1991;	1995)	as	well	as	by	Stephen	Crook,	Jan	Pakulski	
and	Malcolm	Waters	(1992).	These	four	theorists	speak	about	system-likeness	chiefly	in	
relation	to	the	processes	of	de-differentiation.	They	do	not,	however,	define	the	concept	
of	system-likeness	broadly	and	explicitly;	for	this	reason,	in	this	connection,	I	have	myself	
worked	on	this	concept	by	completing	their	ideas	with	Skyttner=s	views	of	general	systems	
theory.	According	 to	Münch,	Crook,	Pakulski	 and	Waters,	 real	 social	 formations	 and	
phenomena	can	be	more	or	less	system-like.	A	social	formation	possesses	a	high	degree	
of	system-likeness,	as	far	as	it	has	its	own	specific	function	in	society,	it	possesses	a	well-
organised	 internal	 structure,	 there	 is	 a	well-functioning	 co-ordination	 and	 division	 of	
labour	between	the	elements	of	this	formation	and	this	formation	is	clearly	differentiated	
from	its	environment.	 In	addition,	a	 social	 formation	equipped	with	a	high	degree	of	
system-likeness	defines	itself	the	tasks	of	its	own	elements,	and	it	is	able	to	self-regulate;	
that	is,	it	regulates	and	controls	the	operations	which	take	place	within	it.	On	the	other	
hand,	 if	a	 formation	possesses	a	 low	degree	of	 system-likeness,	 then	 its	boundaries	are	
vague,	it	has	a	loose	internal	structure	and	organisation,	the	co-ordination	and	division	
of	labour	between	its	elements	is	informal	and	only	partial,	and	this	formation	can	only	
weakly	regulate	its	own	operations	and	the	action	that	takes	place	within	it.	In	addition,	a	
formation	like	this	is	not	functionally	sharply	differentiated	from	its	environment.
On	the	basis	of	the	above-presented	conceptual	definitions	it	is	tempting	to	equate	
simple	 systems	with	 the	high	degree	of	 system-likeness	and,	correspondingly,	complex	
systems	with	the	low	degree	of	system-likeness.	Although	an	equation	such	as	this	might	
be	rather	accurate	in	a	broad	outline,	it	is	by	no	means	acceptable	in	all	cases.	As	far	as	
simple	systems	are	concerned,	we	may	here	use	contemporary	public	cultural	policy	as	an	
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example.	Contemporary	public	cultural	policy	fills	several	criteria	of	simple	systems,	for	
it	is	usually	a	highly	organised	and	strictly	limited	action	which	follows	rather	clear	and	
explicit	rules.	On	the	other	hand,	a	social	formation	with	a	high	degree	of	system-likeness	
is	clearly	differentiated	from	its	environment,	wherefore	it	might	possess	a	high	degree	
of	autonomy,	as	well.	However,	this	feature	does	not	hold	true	for	public	cultural	policy	
that	must	be	seen	as	a	part	of	the	political-administrative	system	or	as	a	sub-system	of	it;	
because	of	a	dependence	like	this,	public	cultural	policy	does	not	fill	all	of	the	criteria	of	
the	high	degree	of	system-likeness.	In	addition,	certain	societies	or	societal	systems	can	be	
regarded	as	complex	systems	with	a	relatively	high	degree	of	system-likeness.	As	far	as	I	
can	see,	this	is,	in	particular,	true	of	totalitarian	societies	such	as	Benito	Mussolini=s	Italy,	
Adolf	Hitler=s	Germany	and	Josef	Stalin=s	Soviet	Union	which	were	extremely	organised	
and	extremely	centralised	societies.	Similarly,	traditional	Western	nation-states	or	national	
societal	systems	were	complex	systems	which	filled	several	criteria	of	the	high	degree	of	
system-likeness,	 even	 if	 they	were	not	 equally	 organised	 and	 centralised	 as	 the	 above-
mentioned	totalitarian	societies	were.	And	if	Lash	and	Urry	are	right,	we	are	justified	in	
saying	that	during	the	period	that	lasted	from	the	turn	of	the	19th	and	20th	centuries	to	
the	1960s	and	1970s	Western	countries	developed	into	rather	highly	organised	societal	
systems	in	which	the	state	actively	regulated	and	led	the	entirety	of	society.
It	 is	obviously	possible	 to	describe	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	by	means	
of	the	above-mentioned	concepts.	As,	for	example,	Crook,	Pakulski	and	Waters	(1992),	
Lash	 and	Urry	 (1994)	 and	Münch	 (1991;	 2001a;	 2001b)	 have	 remarked,	 two	 large-
scale	 processes	 are	 nowadays	 going	 on	 in	Western	 societies.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 clear-
cut	boundaries	between	different	functional	sub-systems	and	between	different	cultural	
sub-systems	 are	 becoming	 lower	 and	perhaps	 even	disappearing.	Crook,	 Pakulski	 and	
Waters	 (1992:	 75)	 as	well	 as	Münch	 (1991:	 23)	 apply	 system-theoretical	 concepts	 to	
the	description	of	this	process	when	saying	that	traditional	functional	and	cultural	sub-
systems	have	become	 less	 system-like	and	 less	differentiated	and	autonomous.	On	 the	
other	hand,	nowadays	the	activities	 in	economic,	political	and	cultural	systems	and	in	
mass	media	constantly	exceed	the	limits	of	national	societal	systems.	According	to	Münch	
(1991:	135),	together,	these	two	processes	mean	a	situation	in	which	social	systems	are	
increasingly	merging	in	single	societies	and	single	societies	are	increasingly	merging	on	
the	scale	of	the	world.	Münch=s	views	seem	to	 imply	that	the	partial	disintegration	or	
dissolution	of	national	societal	systems	is	necessary,	for	it	makes	possible	the	emergence	and	
development	of	regional	and	transnational	or	global	social	formations;	these	formations,	
in	turn,	are	more	or	less	system-like	by	nature.	Consequently,	Münch	(see,	nearer,	1993;	
1995;	1998)	points	out	that	today	citizens	of	Western	European	countries	live	somewhere	
between	a	Anation-state,	regional	autonomy	and	world	society@.
In	his	descriptions	of	the	ongoing	societal	processes,	Münch	does	not	relinquish	the	
concept	of	society.	On	the	contrary,	 in	the	1990s	he	used	to	define	the	contemporary	
societal-cultural	 reality	 as	 Aa	 communication	 society@	 that	 develops	 in	 an	 intensive	
and	dynamic	way	(see	Münch	1991;	1995).	In	contrast	to	this,	Bauman,	among	other	
persons,	has	suggested	that	sociology	should	abandon	the	concept	of	society	in	studies	
concerning	present-day	societal-cultural	reality.	According	to	Bauman	(1987;	1992),	the	
concept	of	 society	 refers	 to	 something	which	 is	fixed	and	 stable	–	and	which	does	no	
longer	exist.	Therefore,	he	continues,	the	concept	of	sociality	should	replace	the	concept	
of	society,	for	it	is	better	capable	of	expressing	the	dynamic	and	unpredictable	nature	of	
present-day	societal-cultural	reality.	In	this	thesis,	I	have	also,	in	several	connections,	used	
the	concept	of	societal-cultural	reality	instead	of	the	concepts	of	society	and	culture.	A	
procedure	like	this	does	not,	however,	mean	that	I	would	like	to	abolish	the	concept	of	
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society	from	sociology.	I	have	used	the	concept	of	societal-cultural	reality	simply	in	order	
to	show	that	I	am	aware	of	the	present-day	theoretical	discussion	concerning	the	concept	
of	society.	At	the	same	time	I	believe	that,	with	certain	reservations,	we	can	still	speak,	for	
example,	about	AAmerican@,	ABritish@	,	AFinnish@	or	AGerman@	society.	When	speaking	in	
this	way	we	just	ought	to	bear	in	mind	that	albeit	those	societies	have	their	own	territorial	
boundaries,	 they	are	economically,	politically	and	culturally	 interlaced	with	the	rest	of	
the	world.
In	the	Luhmannian	tradition,	the	above-mentioned	processes	have	been	seen	rather	
differently.	 Karl-Otto	Hondrich	 (1992:	 352),	 for	 example,	 writes	 that	 the	 process	 of	
globalisation	 carries	 on	 the	 process	 of	 functional	 differentiation.	 For	 him,	 the	 former	
process	 means	 that	 nowadays	 the	 power	 of	 economic,	 political	 and	 cultural	 systems	
exceeds	 the	power	of	national	 societal	 systems,	 and	 it	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 the	process	
of	 functional	differentiation	 is	going	on	on	a	global	 scale.	 In	the	same	vein	Luhmann	
thought	 that	 the	 contemporary	 process	 of	 globalisation	 carries	 on	 the	 process	 of	
functional	 differentiation,	 although	he	 at	 the	 same	 time	 remarked	 that	 basically	 both	
of	 these	processes	have	been	going	on	 since	 the	birth	of	modernity.	For	 those	 reasons	
mentioned	in	the	third	chapter	of	this	thesis,	I	am	not	ready	to	accept	these	thoughts,	as	
such.	Therefore,	I	would	like	to	repeat	that	largely	Luhmann	denies	that	national	societal	
systems	and	national	 functional	sub-systems	have	existed	during	the	era	of	modernity.	
This	view,	in	part,	makes	it	understandable	as	to	why	he	does	not	recognise	the	ongoing	
processes	of	de-differentiation	within	contemporary	national	societies	and	between	single	
national	societies.
The	concepts	of	simple	and	complex	system	and	system-likeness	might	also	help	us	
to	 describe	 the	 position	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 in	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality.	
Several	investigations	concerning	the	sphere	of	art	speak	convincingly	for	the	view	that	
this	sphere	has	become	a	more	complex	system	or	formation	and	at	 the	same	time	its	
system-likeness	is	on	the	decrease.	Subsequent	empirical	studies	of	the	sphere	of	art	have	
to	explicate,	to	what	extent	the	process	of	globalisation	has	become	true	in	the	sphere	of	
art;	so	far	this	process	has	not	been	explored	enough.	On	the	other	hand,	the	process	of	
globalisation	of	the	system	of	mass	media	has	interested	researchers	much	more.	In	part,	
researchers	like	these	have	also	dealt	with	the	system	of	art,	since	those	two	systems	are	
nowadays	 increasingly	overlapping.	However,	despite	 this,	at	present,	 it	 is	 too	early	 to	
make	empirical	generalisations	concerning	the	globalisation	of	the	system	of	art.47
4.3 Views of the End of Art
Lash=s	and	Urry=s	models	of	postmodernity	imply	that	the	sphere	of	art	has	lost	a	great	
deal	 of	 its	 differentiated	 and	 relatively	 autonomous	 position	 in	 present-day	 societal-
cultural	 reality.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 do	 not	 claim	 that	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 would	 have	
altogether	ceased	to	exist	or	that	it	would	have	completely	fused	with	the	rest	of	societal-
cultural	reality.	In	the	study	of	postmodernity,	it	is	Baudrillard=s	and	Vattimo=s	writings	
that	most	 clearly	 represent	 a	 claim	 like	 this,	 and	Featherstone=s	writings	on	consumer	
culture	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	are	close	to	it.	Besides	these	three	theorists	
of	postmodernity	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality,	certain	representatives	of	the	
philosophy	of	art	have	spoken	about	the	end	of	art.	Without	doubt,	the	most	well-known	
47	On	the	process	of	globalisation	in	the	sphere	of	art	see,	for	example,	Crane,	Kawashima	&	Kawasaki	
2002	and	Quemin	2006.
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of	those	representatives	is	Arthur	C.	Danto,	but	in	this	connection	one	cannot	ignore	art	
philosophers	and	art	theorists	such	as	Donald	Kuspit,	Eduard	Beaucamp,	Jean	Clair	and	
Yves	Michaud	either,	since	their	views	of	the	contemporary	sphere	of	art	are	interesting	
from	the	systemic	standpoint.	
Baudrillard=s	 (1983;	 1997)	 and	 Vattimo=s	 (1988;	 1989)	 writings	 often	 repeat	 the	
thought	 that	 contemporary	 Western	 societies	 are	 losing	 their	 own	 internal	 systemic	
structure	or	order.	According	to	those	writings,	nowadays	Western	people	live	in	a	society	
that	 is	 characterised	by	 the	omnipresence	of	communication	and	media,	as	well	 as	by	
the	massive	aestheticization	of	everyday	life.	Owing	to	phenomena	and	processes	such	
as	 these,	 the	 entirety	 of	 societal-cultural	 reality	would	have	 changed	 into	 a	 texture	 of	
signs,	images	and	pleasurable	aesthetic	objects	-	in	short,	into	a	certain	kind	of	artificially	
simulated	 hyper-reality.	 Baudrillard	 points	 out	 that	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 these	 changes	 are	
caused	by	the	rapid	commercialisation	of	society,	the	present-day	consumerist	way	of	life	
and	the	development	of	 information	technology	and	society=s	media	structure.	At	any	
rate,	Baudrillard	(1983:	147–152)	continues,	due	to	its	highly	artificial	and	aestheticized	
nature,	the	societal-cultural	reality	is	nowadays	more	and	more	an	art-like	construction,	
since	a	work	of	art	is	a	paradigmatic	instance	of	aesthetic	human	artifacts.	In	this	sense,	a	
peculiar	sphere	of	art	would	have	ceased	to	exist	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	
Similarly,	Vattimo	 (1988:	 51)	 states	 that	 there	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 differentiated	 sphere	 of	
art	 in	 societal-cultural	 reality:	 the	dynamic	expansion	of	mass	media	 and	 the	growing	
aestheticization	of	everyday	life	have	suppressed	the	relatively	autonomous	sphere	of	art.	
Thus,	Vattimo	seems	to	think	that	the	sphere	of	art	would	have	fused	with	mass	media	
and	design.
The	above-presented	views	by	Baudrillard	and	Vattimo	must	be	chiefly	understood	
as	conscious	exaggerations,	albeit	they	often	write	as	if	the	sphere	of	art	would	already	
have	fused	with	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	One	can	also	infer	from	their	writings	
that,	 according	 to	 them,	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 has	 not	 yet	 lost	 its	 differentiated	 position	
altogether.	 In	 general,	 Baudrillard	 adopted	 a	 highly	 rhetorical	 and	 suggestive	 way	 of	
writing	whereby	he	usually	 expressed	his	major	 ideas	 in	 a	 rigid	 and	dramatized	 form.	
Under	the	circumstances,	he	did	not	only	speak	about	the	end	of	art	but	also	about	the	
end	of	the	social	and	about	the	end	of	the	real;	notwithstanding,	other	passages	in	his	
writings	indicate	that	the	sphere	of	art,	the	social	and	the	real	still	continue	to	exist,	at	
least	in	some	sense.	Similarly,	Vattimo=s	writings	speak	about	the	end	of	art,	but	at	the	
same	time	they,	explicitly	or	implicitly,	admit	that	at	present	the	sphere	of	art	is	still,	to	
some	extent,	a	differentiated	formation.	For	example,	at	the	beginning	of	his	work	La 
fine della modernitá (The	End	of	Modernity,	1985)	he	points	out	that	in	the	era	of	the	
end	of	art	single	works	of	art	call	their	own	status	as	art	and	the	established	institutional	
frames	of	art	into	question;	in	particular,	body	art,	street	theatre	and	earth	art	should	be	
interpreted	as	a	questioning	like	this	(Vattimo	1988:	xxvii).	Thereby,	Vattimo	presumes	
that	at	last	the	social	institution	of	art	or	the	social	system	of	art	is	still	a	part	of	societal-
cultural	reality,	albeit	he	predicts	that	the	sphere	of	art	will	fuse	with	the	rest	of	societal-
cultural	reality.
The	social	system	of	art	and	its	constituents	–	in	particular,	art	administration,	art	
policy,	 museums,	 galleries,	 publishing	 houses,	 theatres,	 concert	 halls,	 art	 critics	 and	
theorists	of	art	–	classify	artifacts	and	cultural	products	either	as	art	or	as	non-art.	From	the	
standpoint	of	Baudrillard=s	and	Vattimo=s	writings,	a	classification	like	this	must	more	and	
more	often	look	arbitrary,	since	those	two	theorists	think	that	in	several	cases	the	products	
of	art,	mass	media,	advertisement	and	design	do	not	any	longer	differ	from	each	other	and	
from	the	objects	of	every-day	life	sufficiently	clearly;	nor	do	works	of	art,	therefore,	form	a	
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clearly	differentiated	class	of	artifacts	or	cultural	products.	To	Baudrillard=s	and	Vattimo=s	
mind,	this	state	of	affairs	is	derived	from	the	constellation	that	the	entire	societal-cultural	
reality	 is	 increasingly	 changing	 into	 an	 art-like	 and	 aestheticized	 construction.	 In	 the	
same	way,	Featherstone	(1991:	270–271;	1993:	27)	has	spoken	about	the	fusion	of	the	
sphere	of	art,	mass	media,	advertisement,	industrial	design	and	people=s	life	worlds.	In	
this	thesis,	I	do	not	aim	at	completely	denying	the	existence	of	the	processes	in	question,	
but	I	argue	for	the	claim	that	Baudrillard,	Featherstone	and	Vattimo	have	forgotten	the	
other	side	of	the	coin.	Namely,	nowadays	a	relatively	great	number	of	the	genres	and	layers	
of	art	have	actually	become	estranged	from	the	traditional	art-likeness	and	the	aesthetic	
conception	of	art.	To	put	it	simply:	if	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality	has	become	closer	
to	traditional	art-likeness,	 then	a	relatively	great	deal	of	contemporary	professional	art	
has	differentiated	itself	from	traditional	art-likeness.	It	is	just	in	this	sense	that	Christa	
Bürger	 (1986:	99,	104)	 speaks	 about	 the	 aestheticization	of	 everyday	 life	 and	 the	de-
aestheticization	of	art.48	She	does	not	mention	individual	genres	and	layers	of	art	in	this	
connection,	but	it	might	be	easy	to	see	that	nowadays	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art	is	
often	maintained	by	traditional	institutions	such	as	opera	houses,	symphony	orchestras	
and	museums,	as	well	as	by	popular	genres	like	light	music,	folk	music,	television	serials,	
design	and	fashion.	In	contrast,	the	anti-aesthetic	conception	of	art	manifests	 itself,	 in	
particular,	in	modern	dance,	performances,	body	art,	installations	and	assemplages.	At	a	
more	general	level	the	anti-aesthetic	layers	of	contemporary	art	seem	to	indicate		that	the	
sphere	of	art	is	still,	to	a	certain	extent,	a	differentiated	cultural	formation.
Although	Baudrillard=s,	Featherstone=s	and	Vattimo=s	views	of	the	end	of	art	contain	
strong	 simplifications,	 their	 writings	 concerning	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 raise	 interesting	
possibilities.	They	are	certainly	right	in	that	the	sphere	of	art	is	not	an	eternal	thing	but	
a	historical	phenomenon,	and	as	such	it	might	disappear	in	the	future.	Also,	in	his	late	
production,	Baudrillard	pointed	out	that	as	a	special	sort	of	cultural	activity	art	is	nowadays	
disappearing.	According	to	him,	this	ongoing	process	can	be	juxtaposed	with	the	cultural	
change	that	took	place	between	the	Middle	Ages	and	the	Renaissance.	The	painters	and	
sculptors	of	the	Renaissance	conceived	of	themselves	first	as	manufacturers	of	religious	
objects	and	after	that	they	found	themselves	as	researchers	of	nature	and	human	anatomy,	
but	 from	the	18th	century	onward,	at	 the	 latest,	 their	 action	has	been	conceptualised	
as	art.	As	far	as	contemporary	art	is	concerned,	it	is	not	art	in	the	same	sense	than	the	
concept	of	art	has	been	used	since	the	18th	century.	Baudrillard	(1997:	7,	16–17)	writes	
that	 Acontemporary	 art@	 largely	 consists	 of	 reflections	on	 the	 idea	 and	 concept	of	 art,	
besides	which	it	constantly	feels	an	urge	to	critically	comment	on	the	boundaries	of	art.	
Thus,	in	this	connection	Baudrillard	does	not	relate	art	to	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	
life	and	to	the	omnipresence	of	mass	media	and	communication;	instead,	he	speaks	now	
about	the	phenomenon	of	meta-art.	As	it	is	well-known:	in	meta-art,	the	object	of	art	is	art	
itself.	Because	meta-artistic	features	are	rather	common	in	contemporary	art,	Baudrillard	
holds	that	art	is	nowadays	transforming	into	a	special	theoretical	discourse	–	and	at	the	
same	time	into	a	thing	that	might	be	called	something	else	than	art	in	the	future.
Baudrillard=s	 writings	 concretely	 show	 that	 cultural	 products	 can	 be	 classified	 in	
different	ways.	What	is	nowadays	called	the	art	of	the	Renaissance	was	originally	labelled	
as	religious	objects	and,	through	this,	as	a	part	of	the	system	of	Catholic	Christianity;	and	
48	Already	in	1976,	Dieter	Wellershoff	published	a	book	Die Auflösung des Kunstbegriffs (The	Dissolution	
of	the	Conception	of	Art)	in	which	he	contrasts	the	de-aestheticization	of	art	with	the	aestheticization	of	
mass	culture	or	popular	culture.	In	this	book,	he	is	inclined	to	ignore	the	fact	that	certain	institutions,	
genres	and	layers	of	art	still	maintain	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art.
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somewhat	later	the	paintings	and	statues	of	the	Renaissance	were	conceived	of	as	studies	
of	nature	and	human	anatomy,	which	meant	that	the	manufacturers	of	those	objects	were	
regarded	as	certain	kinds	of	scientists.	As	far	as	cultural	products	are	classified	as	works	
of	art,	a	classification	like	this	always	takes	place	on	the	basis	of	some	sort	of	conception	
of	art.	Traditionally,	different	conceptions	of	art	aimed	at	defining	what	the	essence	and	
function	of	art	is	and	how	works	of	art	differ	from	other	cultural	products.	Usually	it	was	
held	that	cultural	products	must	possess	a	humanly	significant	content	and	certain	formal	
and	stylistic	properties	before	they	can	be	accepted	as	works	of	art.	In	addition,	it	was	
held	that	works	of	art	must	contain	certain	external	signs	or	signals	by	means	of	which	
devotees	of	art	can	recognise	them	as	works	of	art.	Criteria	like	these	could	not,	of	course,	
create	an	exact	and	unambiguous	boundary	between	art	and	non-art,	but	in	practice	they	
helped	devotees	of	art	to	distinguish	works	of	art	from	other	cultural	products.	On	the	
other	hand,	if	works	of	art	were	externally	or	physically	entirely	similar	to	other	cultural	
products	or	if	works	of	art	lacked	art=s	conventional	formal	and	stylistic	characteristics	
and	art=s	conventional	external	signs	and	signals,	devotees	of	art	would	become	uncertain	
about	what	kinds	of	cultural	products	actually	belong	to	the	domain	of	art.	Nowadays,	
the	situation	in	cultural	life	is	often	like	this.	Because	works	of	art	have	entirely	or	partly	
lost	their	distinctive	characteristics,	devotees	of	art	can	often	wonder	why	certain	artifacts	
have,	on	the	whole,	been	placed	on	display	as	works	of	art.	In	the	sub-system	of	art,	for	
example,	galleries,	art	museums	and	theatres	function	as	outer	signs	or	signals	which	tell	
social	actors	that	places	like	these	have	been	meant	for	the	presentation	of	certain	kinds	
of	works	of	art.	The	contemporary	sub-system	of	art	undoubtedly	contains	galleries,	art	
museums	 and	 theatres,	 but	 often	 these	 places	 present	 art	 as	 something	 that	 hardly	 at	
all	differs	externally	 from	other	human	artifacts	and	activities.	Therefore,	 the	receivers	
of	those	artifacts	and	activities	might	easily	wonder	what	really	makes	the	artifacts	and	
activities	in	question	into	works	of	art.	Or	alternatively,	one	could	also	say	that	in	cases	
such	as	these	social	actors	do	not	necessarily	possess	such	a	conception	of	art	whereby	they	
would	be	capable	of	identifying	those	artifacts	and	activities	as	works	of	art.
Conceptions	of	art	also	play	an	important	role	in	Danto=s	views	of	the	art	world	and	
the	end	of	art.	For	Danto,	the	idea	of	the	end	of	art	does	not,	in	the	first	instance,	refer	
to	the	process	of	de-differentiation	between	different	spheres	or	systems,	albeit	he	often	
remarks	that	nowadays	works	of	art	do	not	necessarily	differ	externally	or	physically	from	
other	objects	and	cultural	products.	He	speaks	about	the	end	of	art,	among	other	things,	
in	the	sense	that	contemporary	works	of	art	can	no	longer	be	grasped	as	art	by	means	
of	a	single	conception	of	art.	In	the	contemporary	art	world,	every	single	conception	of	
art	would	exclude	from	the	art	world	works	which	do	not	fill	this	conception=s	criteria	
of	art,	but	at	the	same	time	those	works	are	defined	as	art	by	other	conceptions	of	art.	
Therefore,	 the	 contemporary	 art	world	 can	be	understood	 as	 a	 largely	 Aunstructured@	
social	formation	that	does	not	possess	any	unifying	principle	(Danto	1995:	xiii,	4,	12,	
48–51,	114).	On	the	other	hand,	due	to	its	different	conceptions	of	art	and	due	to	its	
internal	diversity,	the	contemporary	art	world	functions	Aas	a	model	of	pluralistic	society,	
in	which	all	disfiguring	barriers	and	boundaries	have	been	thrown	down@	(Danto	2000:	
431).	Although	Danto	seems	to	outline	a	rather	idealised	model	of	the	contemporary	art	
world,	his	generalisations	can	relatively	easily	be	translated	into	the	language	of	system	
theory.	System-theoretically	his	generalisations	quite	obviously	mean	that	the	art	world	
has	become	a	more	complex	system	and	at	the	same	time	its	internal	system-likeness	is	
on	the	decrease.
What	kind	of	role	do	conceptions	of	art	possess	in	the	art	world?	According	to	Danto,	
they	are	of	crucial	importance,	since	they	participate	in	the	constitution	of	the	boundaries	
of	the	art	world.	Poems,	novels,	plays,	compositions,	paintings,	pictures,	statues,	buildings,	
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installations	and	performances	obtain	the	status	of	art	only	in	a	theoretical	discourse.	A	
certain	kind	of	 theoretical	discourse	produces	 the	definition	of	art	and	the	distinction	
between	art	and	non-art;	most	clearly	a	discourse	like	this	manifests	itself	in	the	academic	
study	of	art	and	art	criticism,	as	well	as	in	the	everyday	decision-making	of	art	museums,	
galleries	 and	other	 institutions	 of	 art.	To	but	 it	 simply:	 the	 above-mentioned	 cultural	
products	belong	to	the	sphere	of	art,	because	individual	and	collective	social	actors	have	
learned	 to	 apply	 a	 special	 Aart	 talk@	 just	 to	 them;	 that	 is,	 they	 speak	 and	write	 about	
those	products	as	works	of	art.	Danto	(1992:	40–52)	defines	the	concept	of	art	world	
through	this.	He	understands	the	art	world	or	the	institution	of	art	as	an	@institutionalised	
theoretical	 discourse@	 that	 includes	 a	 view	 of	 art=s	 basic	 nature	 and	 function	 and	 its	
boundaries.		Thus,	an	institutionalised	theoretical	discourse	like	this	contains	some	sort	
of	conception	of	art.	Speaking	more	generally,	Danto	presumes	that	the	art	world	is	not	
able	to	function	properly	without	a	conception	of	art.
Danto	 (1995:	47–48,	65,	125)	divides	 the	history	of	Western	 art	 into	 three	main	
phases	each	of	which	has	understood	art=s	nature,	function	and	boundaries	in	its	own	way.	
By	Aart@	he	means,	in	this	connection,	mainly	the	visual	art	genres.	Drawing	on	the	ideas	
of	the	Italian	Renaissance	figure	Giorgio	Vasari	(1511–1574),	he	terms	the	first	phase	a	
AVasari-episode@.	In	fact,	this	episode	lasted	from	the	14th	century	to	the	19th	century,	
and	during	it	art	was	largely	understood	as	an	imitation	of	reality;	moreover,	it	was	thought	
that	in	its	progressive	development	art	would	be	able	to	give	us	more	and	more	precise	
representations	of	reality.	When	photograph	and	film	were	invented	in	the	19th	century,	
the	first	phase	was	replaced	by	the	second	phase	or	by	a	AGreenberg-episode@.	The	second	
episode	is	the	phase	of	modernism,	and	during	it	artists	concentrated	on	art=s	means	of	
expression	and	on	its	formal	side.	The	American	art	critic	and	the	proponent	of	modernist	
art	Clement	Greenberg	(1909–1994),	who	had	an	influential	role	in	the	American	art	life	
from	the	late-1930s	to	the	1960s,	was	one	of	the	major	theorists	of	art	during	that	phase.	
However,	Danto	give	us	a	too	homogenous	picture	of	the	phase	 in	question.	Roughly	
speaking,	it	might	be	true	that	from	the	mid-19th	century	to	the	1950s	the	dominant	
conception	 of	 art	 saw	works	 of	 art,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 as	 highly	 autonomous	 formal	
compositions.	However,	there	were	also	other	conceptions	of	art	during	that	period.	On	
the	basis	of	Bourdieu=s	(1992)	and	Peter	Bürger=s	(1974)	investigations,	we	know	that	
in	 the	 late	19th	century	proponents	of	 realistic	 and	naturalistic	 art	 laid	 stress	on	art=s	
content	and	on	its	social	functions,	and	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	avant-garde	movements	
rebelled	against	the	highly	differentiated	and	autonomous	system	of	art.	Thus,	these	two	
conceptions	of	art	competed	with	the	dominant	conception	of	art.	At	any	rate,	Danto	
writes	that	the	third	phase	began	in	the	1960s,	and,	in	part,	this	ongoing	phase	resembles	
the	Middle	Ages.	Before	the	Renaissance,	there	were	plays,	poems,	epic,	paintings,	statues	
and	songs	in	European	culture,	but	they	were	not	conceptualised	as	(fine)	art;	the	concept	
of	 (fine)	 art	 took	 shape	 somewhat	 later,	 in	 fact,	 in	 the	 period	 between	 the	 16th	 and	
18th	centuries	(see,	nearer,	Kristeller	1959).	The	ongoing	phase	differs	from	the	Middle	
Ages	in	that	it	possesses	the	concept	of	art,	but	no	single	conception	of	art,	or	no	single	
narrative	 concerning	 art,	 is	 any	 longer	 able	 to	 encompass	 all	 of	 the	 activities	 that	 are	
involved	in	the	Amaking@	of	art.	Nor	is	it	possible	to	outline	progressive	developmental	
lines	in	contemporary	art:
What	has	come	to	an	end,	rather,	is	a	certain	narrative,	under	the	terms	of	which	
making	art	was	understood	to	be	carrying	forward	the	history	of	discovery	and	
making	 new	 breakthroughs	 [...]	We	 face	 the	 future	 without	 a	 narrative	 of	 the	
present.	We	live	in	an	afterwash	of	a	narrative	which	has	come	to	its	end.	(Danto	
1992:	10.)
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In	 these	 respects,	 Danto	 continues,	 the	 art	 world	 has	 nowadays	 come	 into	 a	 Apost-
narrative@	or	Apost-historical@	phase.	
Although	the	time	of	Amaster	narratives@	seems	to	be	over	in	the	domain	of	art,	Danto	
has	 constantly	 remarked	 that	 at	 least	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 visual	 art	 genres	 is	 nowadays	
fundamentally	 changing.	 For	 him,	 the	 visual	 art	 genres	 have	not	 ceased	 to	 exist;	 that	
is,	 they	have	not	died	out.	Rather,	 they	are	changing	 into	a	meta-art	or	 into	a	 special	
philosophy	whose	object	is	the	art	itself	(Danto	1992:	217;	1997:	342).	In	other	words,	
in	the	ongoing	phase	the	visual	art	genres	are	fusing	with	the	philosophy	of	art,	and	it	
is	just	in	this	sense	that,	according	to	Danto,	the	process	of	de-differentiation	concerns	
the	visual	art	genres.	Consequently,	when	theorising	about	the	contemporary	visual	art	
genres	Danto	largely	ignores	the	fact	that	nowadays	the	omnipresence	of	communication	
and	media	and	the	massive	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	have	brought	certain	visual	
art	genres	closer	to	the	world	of	media	culture,	advertisements	and	commodities.	Danto	
has	not	been	ready	to	take	phenomena	like	these	into	account	in	his	own	conception	of	
contemporary	art.	For	this	reason,	his	investigations	do	not	provide	us	with	a	systematic	
overall	picture	of	the	contemporary	art	world.
In	 his	 art-theoretical	 investigations,	Danto	 often	 deals	with	 cases	which	 are,	 from	
the	standpoint	of	the	philosophy	of	art,	especially	interesting.	This	is	why	Andy	Warhol	
(1928–1987)	has	obtained	a	peculiar	place	in	his	production.	According	to	Danto,	it	is,	
above	all,	Warhol	whose	works	of	the	early	1960s,	for	example,	his	famous	Brillo Box (1963)	
made	traditional	conceptions	and	definitions	of	art	obsolete,	and	at	the	same	time	Warhol	
transformed	objects	of	everyday	life	into	art	radically	rejecting	in	this	way	the	traditional	
distinction	between	high	and	low	culture.49		The	other	philosophically	especially	interesting	
artist,	for	Danto,	is	Marcel	Duchamp	(1887–1968)	who	first	brought	an	art-philosophical	
reflection	into	the	centre	of	art.	Danto	(2000:	xi)	remarks	that	from	the	standpoint	of	
the	 contemporary	 art	world	Duchamp=s	works	 are	 of	 paradigmatic	 importance,	 since	
nowadays	 the	entirety	of	 the	art	world	 follows	his	experiments.50	Likewise,	Danto	has	
leant	on	Hegel=s	philosophy	of	art	when	elaborating	his	own	conception	of	contemporary	
art.	 In	 this	 connection,	Hegel	 is	 an	 important	philosopher	 also	 for	 the	 reason	 that	 in	
his	 lectures	 on	 aesthetics	 he	 points	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 art=s	 end.	 In	Hegel=s	 overall	
philosophy,	art	forms	a	special	phase	in	the	development	of	the	Absolute	Spirit	or	Truth.	
Religion	expresses	the	Absolute	Spirit	with	the	help	of	mental	images	and	experiences	and	
philosophy	does	the	same	thing	by	means	of	abstract	concepts,	whereas	in	works	of	art	
concrete	figures,	pictures	and	forms	manifest	the	Absolute	Spirit	(Hegel	1976a:	13–33,	
127–142;	Hegel	1976b:	11–16).	A	concrete	manifestation	like	this	has	come	true	best	
in	classical	art,	in	particular,	in	the	sculpture	of	ancient	Greece;	only	in	it,	the	Absolute	
Spirit	has	obtained	an	unforced	and	successful	artistic	equivalent.	To	Hegel=s	mind,	in	its	
subsequent	development	art	became	estranged	from	this	ideal	situation.	In	the	Middle	
Ages	and	during	Hegel=s	own	life	time,	there	emerged	something	Adisproportional@	and	
Asubjective@	in	the	arts,	which	was,	for	Hegel,	an	indication	of	the	situation	that	art	had	
carried	out	its	own	task	in	the	development	of	the	Absolute	Spirit.	From	that	era	on,	the	
development	of	the	Absolute	Spirit	has	leant	more	on	religion	and	philosophy,	which	are,	
in	comparison	with	art,	Ahigher	forms@	of	knowing	and	consciousness.	About	the	end	of	
art	Hegel	spoke	in	the	sense	that	he	placed	art=s	bloom	into	the	past.	After	the	classical	
period,	 art	 has	 still	 existed	 as	 a	 concept	 and	 as	 single	works,	 but	 those	works	 do	not	
possess	a	similar	historical	significance	as	the	works	of	the	classical	period	do.	Therefore,	
49	See	Danto	1981:	vii–viii;	1992:	3-4;	1995:	13,	35;	1997:	6;	1999:	4–5,	125–127;	2003:	ix–x.
50	See,	also,	Danto	1981:	11;	1995:	84–85;	1997:	6;	2003:	x,	9–10.	
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religion	and	philosophy	take,	in	part,	care	of	the	historical	task	that	formerly	belonged	
to	the	art,	but,	on	the	other	hand,	in	this	process	art	also	comes	closer	to	philosophy	and	
actually	Hegel	predicted	that	it	might	transform	into	a	special	kind	of	philosophy.
Danto	and	Hegel	do	not	speak	about	the	death	of	art;	instead,	by	elaborating	the	idea	
of	the	end	of	art	they	underline	that	art=s	historical	significance	is	changing	in	an	important	
way.	In	his	own	investigations,	Danto	also	pays	attention	to	different	conceptions	of	art.	
On	the	basis	of	those	investigations	it	is,	therefore,	possible	to	comment	on	Luhmann=s	
view	 of	 art	 briefly.	 In	 his	 system-theoretical	 sociology,	 Luhmann	 presumed	 that	 each	
modern	autopoietic	 functional	 sub-systems	functions	with	the	aid	of	a	 single	medium	
and	a	single	medium	code.	As	far	as	the	sub-system	of	art	is	concerned,	he	first	held	that	
in	this	sub-system	the	category	of	Beauty	is	in	the	position	of	medium	and	the	distinction	
Beautiful/Non-Beautiful	is,	correspondingly,	in	the	position	of	medium	code.	However,	
later	he	began	to	think	that	those	positions	belong	the	category	of	Fittingness	and	to	the	
distinction	Fitting/Non-Fitting.	Obviously,	 the	medium	and	 the	medium	code	of	 the	
sub-system	of	art	raise	or	express	the	conception	of	art	on	which	the	functioning	of	the	
sub-system	of	art	is	based.	From	a	standpoint	like	this,	we	can	conclude	that	Luhmann	
was	usually	inclined	to	think	that	there	is	only	one	conception	of	art	in	this	sub-system	
at	a	time;	that	is,	he	excluded	the	possibility	that	several	conceptions	of	art	could	coexist	
in	 this	 sub-system.	We	 can	 also	 formulate	 this	 conclusion	 otherwise	 by	 saying	 that	
Luhmann	did	not	take	into	account	that	a	certain	kind	of	art-theoretical	pluralism	has	
been	characteristic	of	Western	systems	of	art.	A	pluralism	such	as	this	already	occurred	
in	the	system	of	art	in	the	19th	century	and	in	the	early	20th	century,	but	an	especially	
important	feature	it	is	in	the	contemporary	system	of	art.
Albeit	Danto	has	worked	on	the	idea	of	the	end	of	art,	he	is	not	a	cultural	pessimist.	
His	art-philosophical	 investigations	imply	that	human	beings	will	always	write	poems,	
tell	 stories,	 sing	 songs,	play	music,	paint	pictures,	present	dramatic	performances	 and	
perhaps	also	reflect	upon	activities	 like	these,	but	 in	different	cultures	and	in	different	
historical	eras	these	things	are	not	necessarily	classified	in	the	same	way.	Nor	does	Danto	
claim	that	nowadays	the	art	world	is	disappearing	or	dissolving;	instead,	he	claims	that	
contemporary	art	forms	a	cultural	phenomenon	that	concentrates	on	art-philosophical	
reflection.	 And	 as	 an	 art-philosophical	 reflection,	 contemporary	 art	 differs	 both	 from	
traditional	 art	 and	 philosophy=s	 conventional	 discourse;	 it	 is	 just	 for	 this	 reason	 that	
contemporary	art	is	a	special	and	a	new	kind	of	cultural	phenomenon	–	or,	we	might	say,	
cultural	system.	Thus,	it	is	possible	to	translate	Danto=s	views	into	the	language	of	system	
theory.	 In	Münch=s	 terms	 one	 can	perhaps	 say	 that	 in	 part	 this	 new	kind	 of	 cultural	
system	is	situated	in	the	interpenetration	zones	between	art	and	philosophy,	and	as	such	
it	is	not	reducible	to	traditional	art-likeness	nor	to	philosophy=s	normal	discourse.
A	more	pessimistic	tone	is	included	in	Donald	Kuspit=s	art-philosophical	investigations	
in	 which	 he	 utilises	 general	 systems	 theory	 when	 formulating	 his	 own	 view	 of	 the	
contemporary	 art	world	 and	 contemporary	 art.	 In	Kuspit=s	 (2004:	2,	 14,	43,	51,	83)	
opinion,	nowadays	 the	art	 life	or	 the	 system	of	art	 is	 in	a	 state	of	 entropy	or	 internal	
dissolution	which	 is	 caused	by	 the	 commercialisation	of	 its	 operation	principles.	This	
remark	 resembles	Danto=s	 view	 of	 the	 Aunstructured@	 nature	 of	 the	 contemporary	 art	
world,	although	systems	theorists	might	add	that	a	tendency	to	entropy	is	usually	more	
or	 less	 characteristic	 of	 all	 of	 the	 complex	 systems.	At	 any	 rate,	Kuspit	writes	 that	 as	
a	 result	of	 the	commercialisation,	art	 is	nowadays	 largely	changing	 into	a	 special	kind	
of	entertainment	and	the	institutions	of	art,	correspondingly,	tend	to	function	as	some	
sorts	of	 entertainment	 centres	which	offer	 stimulating	 experiences	 and	different	kinds	
of	services	to	their	customers.	A	rather	similar	generalization	has	been	made	by	Diana	
Crane	 (1988:	141–142)	–	but	without	 the	pessimistic	 tone	 that	 is	 typical	 of	Kuspit=s	
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writings.	 According	 to	 Kuspit,	 in	 the	 contemporary	 art	 life	 economically	 successful	
artists	such	as	Warhol	and	Jeff	Koons	(born	in	1955),	who	glamorise	the	banality	of	the	
everyday	life	and	commercial	publicity,	manifest	most	clearly	the	operation	principles	of	
the	commercialised	art	world.	To	be	sure,	Kuspit	(1995:	65,	70,	84,	92,	101–102;	2004:	
80,	83,	152–153)	adds,	there	have	in	the	contemporary	art	world	also	existed	figures	such	
as	the	German	artist	Joseph	Beuys	(1921–1986),	who	continued	the	spirit	of	the	avant-
garde	movements,	but	unfortunately	he	does	not	represent	the	art	world=s	mainstreams.	
In	all,	the	state	of	art	was	entirely	different	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	when	
art	had	a	 rather	 similar	 function	as	 religion	had	 in	 traditional	and	premodern	society.	
Traditionally,	with	 the	aid	of	a	 religious-metaphysical	world	view	people	were	capable	
of	finding	profound	meanings	for	their	life	and	activities,	and	even	for	events	of	reality.	
Although	religion	lost	a	great	deal	of	this	function	due	to	the	secularisation	of	Western	
culture,	people	were	not	cast	adrift	in	the	modern	world.	According	to	Kuspit,	in	modern	
culture	art	has	aimed	at	satisfying	people=s	existential	needs	and	by	means	of	it	they	have	
often	been	able	to	give	meaning	to	their	life	and	experiences.	Nowadays,	art	is,	however,	
rapidly	losing	this	existential	function.	In	the	present-day	commercialised	art	world,	art	
is	changing	into	a	Apost-art@	that	is	banal,	superficial	and	spiritually	empty.	For	Kuspit,	
post-art	means	the	end	of	genuine	or	authentic	art.
Kuspit=s	cultural	pessimism	might	arise	from	the	fact	that	in	the	first	instance	he	theorises	
about	the	contemporary	art	world	on	the	basis	of	the	American	art	life.	As	we	have	already	
noticed	in	several	different	connections,	in	the	United	States	the	art	life	is	largely	based	on	
markets	and	private	sponsorship,	whereas	in	Western	Europe	the	state	still	has	a	relatively	
active	role	in	maintaining	art	life;	due	to	a	role	like	this,	the	states	of	Western	Europe	are,	
in	principle,	capable	of	protecting	the	art	life	against	pure	market	forces.	To	be	sure,	to	a	
considerable	extent	the	process	of	commercialisation	is	nowadays	also	taking	place	in	the	
countries	of	Western	Europe,	but	in	the	United	States	this	process	is	more	expansive	and	
more	fundamental	than	it	is	in	Western	Europe.	Perhaps	a	constellation	like	this	explains	
why	Kuspit	mourns	the	shrinking	position	and	the	diminishing	status	of	the	serious	art	
or	high	art	in	the	contemporary	art	world.	However,	rather	similar	pessimistic	statements	
have	been	presented	in	Western	Europe,	as	well.	For	example,	in	the	early	1990s	Eduard	
Beaucamp,	a	German	art	critic	writing	in	the	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper,	
aroused	a	public	discussion	on	contemporary	art.	 In	his	opinion,	 contemporary	art	 is	
spiritually	exhausted	and	it	has	stopped	developing;	one	important	reason	for	this	state	
of	affairs	is	the	commercialisation	of	the	art	life,	which	has	forced	artists	and	leaders	of	
the	art	institutions	to	strive	for	popularity	and	economic	profit.	In	Germany,	some	critics	
defended	contemporary	art	against	Beaucamp,	but	other	critics	were,	like	him,	worried	
about	 the	 firm	position	 of	 the	 economic	 values	 in	 the	 art	 life.51	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 late	
1990s	Jean	Clair,	the	director	of	the	Picasso	Museum	in	Paris,	questioned	the	value	of	
contemporary	art	and	its	experiments	in	his	book	Resposibilité de	l=artiste. Les avant-gardes 
entre terreur et raison (Responsibility	of	the	Artist.	The	Avant-Gardes	Between	Terror	and	
Reason,	1997)	which	attracted	a	 lot	of	 attention	and	discussion	 in	 the	French	media.	
Shortly	after	 its	publication,	Philippe	Dagen,	 a	 journalist	 and	professor	of	 art	history,	
brought	out	his	own	book	La Haine de l=art (The	Hatred	for	the	Art,	1997)	in	which	he	
expressed	his	approval	for	contemporary	art	and	at	the	same	time	he	defined	Clair=s	way	
of	thinking	as	an	instance	of	hostility	towards	art.	On	the	other	hand,	in	his	investigation	
Crise de l=art contemporain (Crisis	 of	 the	Contemporary	Art,	 1998),	Yves	Michaud,	 a	
well-known	philosopher	and	theorist	on	art,	followed	Clair	in	that	he	also	declared	that	
51	On	this	discussion,	see	Bürger,	Peter	2001:	135–137.	
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contemporary	art	is	in	a	state	of	crisis,	wherefore	it	is	incapable	of	satisfying	its	devotees=	
deeper	spiritual	needs.
Thus,	theorists	who	have	launched	the	idea	of	the	end	of	art	use	the	word	Aend@	in	
different	ways	in	their	writings	and	investigations.	Some	of	them	speak	about	the	end	of	
art	in	the	sense	that,	as	a	result	of	the	process	of	de-differentiation,	the	sphere	of	art	would	
fuse	with	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	In	particular,	Baudrillard,	Featherstone	and	
Vattimo	have	represented	a	view	like	this.	In	the	first	instance,	they	have	theorised	about	
the	cultural	system	of	art,	that	is,	about	works	of	art	which	have,	according	to	them,	lost	
nearly	all	of	 their	distinctive	marks.	Simultaneously,	 they	do	not	necessarily	deny	that	
there	still	is	an	action	system	of	art	or	a	functional	sub-system	of	art	in	society,	but	they	
tend	to	think	that	the	established	institutions	of	art	can	no	longer	effectively	control	the	
boundary	between	works	 of	 art	 and	other	 cultural	 objects.	On	 the	 other	hand,	 other	
theorists	speak	about	the	end	of	art	in	the	sense	that	the	content	of	the	concept	of	art	
would	have	changed	fundamentally.	For	instance,	Danto	and	Kuspit	belong	to	theorists	
such	as	these.	In	their	opinion,	what	is	now	called	art	differs	sharply	from	the	traditional	
conception	of	art,	which	means	that	nowadays	the	traditional	way	of	conceiving	art	has	
come	to	its	end.	Therefore,	contemporary	works	of	art	are	not	art	in	the	same	sense	as	
traditional	works	of	art	were.	Secondarily,	Danto	and	Kuspit	also	refer	to	the	process	of	
de-differentiation	when	theorising	on	the	contemporary	art	world.	Danto	holds	that	art	
is	nowadays	changing	into	a	peculiar	philosophy	of	art,	whereas	Kuspit	emphasises	that	in	
contemporary	culture	and	society	art	largely	functions	as	an	entertainment.
4.4 The Contemporary Sphere of Art from the Standpoint of System-
Theoretical Sociology
Previous	chapters	have	shown	that	according	to	theorists	of	postmodernity	and	globalisation	
two	 large	 scale	processes	are	nowadays	going	on	 in	 the	Western	world	and,	also	more	
generally,	in	the	whole	world.	On	the	one	hand,	within	single	societies	functional	sub-
systems	 are,	 to	 a	 growing	 extent,	merging;	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 process,	 those	 sub-
systems	have	 lost	a	considerable	deal	of	 their	 relatively	autonomous	and	differentiated	
position.	A	train	of	thought	like	this	emerges	in	Lash=s	and	Urry=s	production	as	well	as	
in	Bauman=s	and	Beck=s	investigations,	although	Beck	speaks,	in	this	connection,	about	
reflexive	modernity	instead	of	postmodernity.	The	most	radical	theorists	of	postmodernity,	
in	particular	Baudrillard	and	Vattimo,	hold	 that	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	
has	entirely	 lost	 its	 systemic	order	or	systemic	nature.	On	the	other	hand,	 theorists	of	
postmodernity	or	reflexive	modernity	have	also	presented	generalisations	on	the	ongoing	
process	 of	 globalisation.	 Lash,	Urry,	Bauman	 and	Beck	 have	 all	 stated	 that	 nowadays	
economic,	political	and	cultural	activities	more	and	more	often	exceed	the	boundaries	of	
national	societies	and	they	are	increasingly	taking	place	on	the	scale	of	world	society.
As	far	as	the	system	of	art	is	concerned,	theorists	on	postmodernity	usually	hold	that	
in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	this	system	has	lost	a	great	deal	of	its	previous	
autonomous	 and	differentiated	 position.	A	 view	 like	 this	 is,	 for	 example,	 included	 in	
Lash=s	 and	Urry=s	 investigations,	 whereas	 Baudrillard,	 Featherstone	 and	Vattimo	 have	
stated	that	nowadays	the	sphere	of	art	has	merged	with	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	
It	should	be	noted	that	in	fact	views	like	these	are	not	necessarily	bound	to	theories	of	
postmodernity.	The	discussion	on	postmodernity	was	at	its	most	active	from	the	1970s	
to	the	early	1990s,	whereafter	it	was	partly	replaced	by	the	discussion	on	globalisation;	
this	 change	 in	academic	 intellectual	 conversation	was	not,	however,	 sharp,	 since	 some	
theorists	have	conceived	of	postmodern	society	as	a	truly	global	world	society.	In	recent	
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years	certain	theorists	and	researchers	who	did	not	participate	in	the	elaborating	of	the	
idea	of	postmodernity	have	also	spoken	about	the	state	of	affairs	that	in	contemporary	
societal-cultural	 reality	 the	 boundary	 between	 art	 and	 non-art	 is	 tendentiously	
disappearing.	According	to	Yves	Michaud	(2003),	a	disappearance	like	this	is	due	to	the	
process	of	Aartification@	of	societal-cultural	reality,	and,	in	the	same	vein,	Jeremy	Rifkin	
(2000)	and	Stefan	Weber	(1999b;	1999c)	have	stated	that	present-day	generations	are	
obviously	witnessing	a	process	in	which	the	sphere	of	art	is	fusing	with	the	rest	of	societal-
cultural	reality,	in	particular,	with	the	spheres	of	capitalist	economics	and	commercialised	
media.52
This	thesis	represent	the	stand	that	the	process	of	de-differentiation,	the	artification	
of	societal	environment	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	are	actually	characteristic	
of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality,	at	least	in	the	Western	world.	At	the	same	time,	
I	think,	however,	that	the	most	radical	theories	of	postmodernity	and	de-differentiation	
exaggerate	the	meaning	of	those	processes,	which	implies	that	nowadays	the	sphere	of	art	
has	not,	in	fact,	fused	completely	with	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	Nor	do	I	share	
the	view,	presented	in	particular	by	Baudrillard	and	Vattimo,	that	the	concept	of	social	
system	has	become	obsolete	in	studies	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	On	the	
other	hand,	I	agree	with	Bauman,	Beck	and	Lash	regarding	the	view	that	contemporary	
societal-cultural	 reality	 –	 or,	 should	 we	 say,	 observations	 concerning	 it	 –	 cannot	 be	
accurately	grasped	by	means	of	traditional	or	rigid	system-theoretical	concepts;	instead	
of	those	concepts,	nowadays	system-theoretical	sociology	needs	more	open	and	dynamic	
concepts.	This	thesis	attempts	to	elaborate	concepts	like	these	by	distinguishing	between	
simple	 and	 complex	 systems	 and	 by	 developing	 the	 idea	 of	 system-likeness.	 When	
distinguishing	between	simple	and	complex	systems	the	thesis	mainly	leans	on	Skyttner=s	
view	 of	 general	 systems	 theory	 that	 the	 thesis	 sociologically	 interprets	 and	 elaborates	
upon.	The	 idea	 of	 system-likeness,	 in	 turn,	 is	 here	 based	 on	Mayntz=s	 and	Münch=s	
investigations	and	on	Crook=s,	Pakulski=s	 and	Water=s	 views	of	 contemporary	Western	
culture	and	society;	in	part,	the	thesis	sociologically	develops	the	idea	in	question	with	the	
help	of	Skyttner=s	distinctions.	In	all,	these	ideas	and	distinctions	could	be	understood	as	
explicit	or	implicit	corrections	to	Luhmann=s	concept	of	system.
When	 the	 idea	 of	 system-likeness	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 study	of	 contemporary	 culture	
and	society,	this	application	results	in	a	model	in	which	an	increasing	interpenetration	
between	functional	sub-systems	is	characteristic	of	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	
In	 the	 process	 in	 question,	 functional	 sub-systems	 have	 changed	 into	 less	 system-like	
formations	–	in	a	way	that	is	concretely	described	in	Münch=s	several	topical	investigations	
and	in	Crook=s,	Pakulski=s	and	Water=s	joint	study	of	the	postmodernisation	of	Aadvanced	
societies@.	 In	 the	 same	 way,	 the	 process	 of	 interpenetration	 concerns	 single	 national	
societies	or	single	national	societal	systems.	In	this	process,	those	societies	have	become	
more	and	more	open	with	regard	to	each	other	–	with	the	result	that	nowadays	they	form	
economically,	politically	and	culturally	a	highly	interlaced	whole.	As	Münch53	points	out,	
together,	these	two	processes	mean	that	a	partial	internal	dissolution	or	disganisation	of	
single	societies	has	been	a	necessary	condition	for	the	concept	that	there	have	emerged	
global	social	formations	which	are	more	or	less	system-like	by	nature.
Let	 us	 still	 see	 how	 Luhmann	 replied	 to	 these	 views.	 Particularly	 in	 his	 last	
investigations,	Luhmann	emphasised	 that	his	own	view	of	 functional	 sub-systems	and	
system-differentiation	is	based	on	the	concept	of	communication,	and	not	on	the	concept	
52	See,	also,	Levanto,	Naukkarinen	&	Vihma	2005.	
53	See,	nearer,	Münch	1993,	1998,	2001a	and	2001b.	
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of	action.	To	his	mind,	usually	theories	of	de-differentiation	are	based	on	the	concept	of	
action	rather	than	on	the	concepts	of	medium	and	medium	code.	However,	if	we	chose	
as	our	starting	point	the	concept	of	action,	we	would	be	incapable	of	understanding	what	
is	actually	going	on	in	society:
Wer	 Handlungen	 beobachtet,	 wird	 typisch	 mehrfache	 Systemzugehörigkeiten	
feststellen	 können,	 allein	 schon	 deshalb,	 weil	 der	 Handeldne	 selbst	 körperlich	
und	mental	als	Zurechnungspunkt fungiert	und	außerdem	eine	Handlung	sich,	
nach	 Motiven	 und	 Wirkungen,	 an	 mehreren	 Funktionssystemen	 beteiligen	
kann.	Wer	von	Handlungen	ausgeht,	wird	daher	Mühe	haben,	die	Theorie	der	
Systemdifferenzierung	überhaupt	zu	verstehen.	(Luhmann 997c: 608.)
[When	observing	actions	one	can	 typically	notice	 that	 they	belong	 to	multiple	
systems,	 if	 only	 for	 the	 reason	 that,	 physically	 and	mentally,	 the	 actor	 himself	
functions	 as	 a	meeting	 point;	 in	 addition,	 an	 action	 can	 participate	 in	 several	
functional	systems	for	its	motives	and	effects.	If	one	starts	from	the	action,	there	
will,	in	general,	be	some	difficulty	in	one=s	understanding	the	theory	of	system-
differentiation.	(Translated	by	E.S.)]
Because	 human	 action	 is	 usually	 a	 poly-functional	 phenomenon,	 people	 often	 utilise	
several	 different	 codes	 simultaneously	 in	 their	 activities.	 This	 is	 why,	 in	 Luhmann=s	
opinion,	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 understand	 the	 idea	 of	 system-differentiation	 by	means	 of	
the	concept	of	action.	Instead,	he	stated,	when	we	connect	this	idea	to	the	concepts	of	
medium	and	medium	code,	it	becomes	possible	to	realise	that	our	society	still	consists	of	
differentiated	media	and	their	corresponding	systems.	In	Luhmann=s	system-theoretical	
sociology,	the	differentiation	of	functional	sub-systems	is	thereby,	in	the	last	resort,	based	
on	 the	 differentiation	 of	media	 and	medium	 codes.	He	 could,	 therefore,	 present	 and	
underline	the	view	that	functional	differentiation	is	still	our	society=s	dominant	structural	
feature	(see,	for	example,	Luhmann	1997c:	612).
Luhmann	 is	 doubtless	 right	 in	 that	 theorists	 of	 de-differentiation	 have	 often	 used	
the	concept	of	action	as	their	starting	point.	In	particular,	when	those	theorists	say	that	
the	 operation	 principles	 of	 the	 system	 of	 economics	 are	 nowadays	 widely	 applied	 in	
society,	they	seem	to	point	to	the	values,	rules	and	conventions	which	people	and	social	
institutions	follow	in	their	activities.	In	this	sense,	for	example,	cultural	politicians	and	
the	institutions	of	art	and	mass	media	have	adopted	economic	principles	in	their	action.	
Yet,	the	most	radical	theories	of	de-differentiation	are	not	based	solely	on	the	concept	of	
action.	Baudrillard=s,	Featherstone=s	and	Vattimo=s	views	of	postmodernity	are,	at	least	in	
part,	based	on	the	thought	that	nowadays	traditional	differences	between	cultural	systems	
or	different	artifacts	have	disappeared	due	to	the	processes	of	the	artification	of	society	and	
the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life.	This	means	that,	in	part,	they	have	considered	the	
process	of	de-differentiation	at	the	level	of	cultural	systems,	and	not	at	the	level	of	social	
action.	Luhmann	does	not	himself	ignore	that	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	
works	of	art	do	not	always	differ	externally	from	other	cultural	artifacts	(see	Luhmann	
1997a:	482–483).	He	just	claims	that	similarities	like	these	do	not	refute	the	structural	
phenomenon	of	system-differentiation,	because	the	differentiation	of	media	and	medium	
codes	guarantees	the	prevalence	of	that	phenomenon	in	contemporary	society.
Nor	 could	 Luhmann	 accept	 the	 approach	 whereby	 most	 of	 the	 theorists	 of	
postmodernity	 and	 globalisation	have	 considered	 the	 process	 of	 globalisation.	Usually	
those	theorists	have	understood	the	process	of	globalisation	basically	in	the	same	way	as	
Paul	Bairoch	defines	it:	
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Globalisation	refers	to	a	situation	where	industrial	and	commercial	companies	as	
well	as	financial	institutions	increasingly	operate	transnationally,	in	other	words,	
beyond	national	borders.	(Bairoch	2000:	197.)
Here	Bairoch	takes	into	account	only	the	sphere	of	economics,	but	in	the	same	vein	one	
could	speak	about	globalisation	in	the	domains	of	politics,	social	co-operation,	ecological	
action	 and	 co-operation,	 military	 action	 and	 co-operation,	 science,	 communication,	
cultural	 production	 and	 distribution,	 sports,	 tourism	 and	 people=s	 mentality	 and	
consciousness.	What	ways	of	 speaking	 like	 these	have	 in	common	 is	 the	 thought	 that	
in	 the	 process	 of	 globalisation	 certain	 phenomena	 exceed	 local	 and	 national	 borders	
and	start	to	influence	and	operate	on	a	wider	geographical	scale	–	as	a	last	resort,	on	a	
transcontinental	 scale.	These	ways	of	 speaking	are	not	 in	 accordance	with	Luhmann=s	
system-theoretical	view	of	globalisation.	As	we	have	already	noticed,	when	pointing	to	
the	process	of	globalisation	Luhmann,	on	the	one	hand,	emphasised	that	there	can	be	
no	 regional	 and	national	 societies	 under	 the	 conditions	 of	modernity,	 because,	 in	 his	
opinion,	since	its	birth	modernity	has	been	a	global	phenomenon;	for	this	reason	most	
of	the	modern	functional	sub-systems	have	functioned	in	the	world	society	for	centuries	
(see	Luhmann	1997b:	166–167).	On	the	other	hand,	Luhmann	(1995:	117)	was	ready	to	
admit	that	the	contemporary	process	of	globalisation	carries	on	and	deepens	the	process	
of	functional	differentiation,	wherefore,	nowadays,	functional	sub-systems	are	more	and	
more	clearly	parts	of	the	world	society.
For	 reasons	 such	 as	 these,	 Luhmann	 did	 not	 like	 the	 concepts	 of	 national	 society	
and	national	 societal	 system.	This	dislike	can	be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 in	
his	late	production	he	hardly	wrote	any	special	study	on	single	or	national	societies	and	
nor	did	he	want	 to	 speak	about	national	 functional	 sub-systems.	Such	being	 the	case,	
he	did	not	publish	any	 investigations	on	the	German	sub-system	of	 science	or	on	the	
German	sub-system	of	art.	Instead,	he	just	conducted	investigations	on	Athe	science	of	
society@	and	on	Athe	art	of	society@,	and	in	both	of	them	he	almost	completely	ignores	
national	dimensions	of	 the	modern	 sub-systems	of	 science	and	art.	 In	 this	 respect,	he	
differs	 rather	 sharply	 from	Münch	whose	 investigation	Die	Kultur der Moderne (The	
Culture	of	Modernity,	1986a	and	1986b)	deals	with	modern	culture	 in	Great	Britain,	
the	United	States,	France	and	Germany.	In	contrast	to	Luhmann,	Münch	thinks	that	the	
concept	of	national	societal	system	is	a	theoretically	legitimate	tool	in	studies	of	modern	
culture	and	society,	and	he	also	utilises	this	concept	when	describing	the	contemporary	
process	of	globalisation.	This	thesis	shares	Münch=s	procedure	in	broad	outline,	for	I	hold	
that	the	concepts	which	refer	to	national	societal	formations	are	necessary	for	the	study	
of	modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	When	utilising	concepts	like	these,	
sociologists	should,	however,	be	aware	of	the	fact	that	since	the	beginning	of	modernity	
national	societal	systems	and	national	functional	sub-systems	have	been	relatively	open	
formations	with	regard	to	other	national	societies	and	to	other	national	functional	sub-
systems.	The	contemporary	process	of	globalisation	has	just	accelerated	their	opening	up	
to	the	rest	of	the	world.
As	 a	 whole,	 Luhmann	 believed	 that	 contemporary	 theoretical	 discussions	 on	
postmodernity	 and	 globalisation	 are	 partly	 based	 on	 erroneous	 views	 of	 modernity.	
Theorists	of	postmodernity	and	globalisation	have	often	declared	that	there	has	emerged	
a	 radical	 break	 in	 societal	 development.	 Actually,	 Luhmann	 (1992:	 42;	 1994:	 101;	
1997c:	1143)	points	out,	nothing	like	this	has	happened;	regardless	of	what	theorists	of	
postmodernity	have	claimed,	we	live	still	in	a	functionally	differentiated	society,	and	as	
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for	the	process	of	globalisation,	it	cannot	be	regarded	as	a	radically	new	phenomenon	in	
societal	development.	In	addition,	theories	of	postmodernity	are	basically	incompatible	
with	Luhmann=s	view	of	the	use	value	of	system	theory.	Namely,	in	his	Soziale Systeme. 
Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie (Social	Systems.	Outline	of	a	General	Theory,	originally	
published	1984),	he	presents	his	sociological	system	theory	as	an	Auniversal	theory@	that	
attempts	to	cover	all	of	the	societal	and	social	phenomena	(see	Luhmann	1985a:	9,	19).	
Thus,	he	contrasted	universal	theories	with	partial	theories;	the	 latter	ones	are	capable	
of	covering	only	a	certain	part	of	 the	societal	and	social	phenomena.	This	means	 that	
Luhmann	was	inclined	to	think	that	the	entirety	of	the	societal	world	or	all	of	the	societal	
and	social	phenomena	can	be	conceptualised	by	means	of	system-theoretical	sociology.
Theorists	 of	 postmodernity,	 de-differentiation	 and	 globalisation	 are	 hardly	 ready	
to	accept	a	statement	like	this,	for	most	of	them	have	thought	that	nowadays	societal-
cultural	reality	has	lost	a	great	deal	of	its	systemic	nature.	Likewise,	I	believe	that	Luhmann	
overestimated	 the	 use	 value	 of	 system	 theory	 in	 sociology.	 As	 Hans	 Joas	 (1997)	 has	
convincingly	attempted	to	show,	there	usually	are,	besides	system-like	formations,	also	
contingent	phenomena	as	well	as	creative	and	spontaneous	activities	in	societal-cultural	
reality;	phenomena	and	activities	 like	 these	do	not	 follow	an	established	 Amedium@	or	
Amedium	 code@,	 although	 gradually	 they	 might	 gain	 an	 institutionalised	 position	 in	
society	and	become,	therefore,	more	system-like	by	nature.	For	example,	graffiti	and	many	
innovations	in	rock-music	were	originally	born	as	some	sorts	of	rebellious	phenomena,	
and	it	was	only	later	that	they	were	gradually	integrated	into	the	system	of	art.	To	be	sure,	
a	great	deal	of	graffiti	are	still	excluded	from	both	the	system	of	art	and	other	functional	
sub-systems.
Let	us	then	finally	outline	a	general	model	of	the	contemporary	system	of	art.	This	
model	 is	 critical	 of	 the	most	 radical	 theories	 of	 postmodernity,	 de-differentiation	 and	
globalisation	 and	 nor	 does	 it	 accept	 the	 Luhmannian	 system-theoretical	 approach,	 as	
such,	although	it	does	utilise	both	of	these	influential	trains	of	thought.	First,	the	model	
in	question	concentrates	on	art=s	boundaries	and	on	its	relations	to	the	rest	of	societal-
cultural	reality,	it	then	pays	attention	to	the	internal	structure	of	the	system	of	art.
In	their	own	critique	on	theories	of	postmodernity,	Siegfried	J.	Schmidt	and	Brigitte	
Spiess	(1991:	142,	160–162)	wrote	in	the	early	1990s	that	from	the	standpoint	of	system	
theory	it	is	an	exaggeration	to	claim	that	different	spheres	or	functional	systems	would	
have	merged	nowadays.	Albeit	there	is	today,	they	go	on,	an	increasing	interaction	between	
advertisement,	mass	media	and	art,	these	spheres	are	not	one	and	the	same	thing.	On	the	
other	hand,	some	years	later	Schmidt	(1995b:	38)	added	that	despite	this	nobody	knows	
any	 longer	exactly	what	art	 is	 and	where	 the	boundary	between	art	and	non-art	goes.	
Traditional	distinctions	between	different	spheres	have	simply	become	so	low	that	social	
actors	are	often	unaware	of	the	criteria	by	means	of	which	they	could	recognise	works	of	
art	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	These	remarks	are	undoubtedly	accurate,	but	
at	the	same	time	it	should	be	noticed	that	in	all	probability	works	of	art	have	never	really	
possessed	 entirely	 clear	 and	 unambiguous	 distinctive	marks	 –	 although	 there	 perhaps	
existed	in	society	a	relatively	wide	agreement	on	the	criteria	of	art	in	the	19th	and	early	
20th	centuries.	Hence,	it	is	likely	that	traditional	aesthetic	theories	have	been	trying,	in	
vain,	to	define	exactly	the	distinctive	features	of	works	of	art.	And	hence	it	is	no	wonder	
that	aesthetes	have	now	usually	abandoned	attempts	of	this	kind.	They	have	noticed	that	
in	the	present	art	world	almost	everything	can	function	as	a	work	of	art.	For	this	reason	it	
is	no	longer	fruitful	to	ask:	AWhat	distinctive	features	do	works	of	art	have	in	common?@	
It	is	more	reasonable	to	investigate	when	and	how	an	object	functions	as	art;	that	is,	it	
is	more	productive	to	interrogate	the	ways	in	which	works	of	art	acquire	their	status	or	
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how	certain	artefacts	become	accepted	as	art.	Quite	obviously	there	are,	in	contemporary	
societal-cultural	reality,	still	certain	institutions	that	stick	to	the	distinction	between	art	
and	non-art	and	attempt	to	distinguish	important	art	from	non-important	art	and	non-
art.	I	will	soon	also	argue	for	the	stand	that	there	really	are	institutions	such	as	these	in	
contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.
In	part,	the	artification	of	societal-cultural	reality	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	
life	have	contributed	to	the	state	of	affairs	that	the	boundary	between	art	and	non-art	as	
well	as	the	criteria	of	art	have	become	increasingly	ambiguous.	The	artification	of	societal-
cultural	 reality	 and	 the	 aestheticization	 of	 everyday	 life	 seem	 to	 be	 closely	 connected	
with	 the	 disappearing	 of	 manufucture	 capitalism	 or	 traditional	 industrial-capitalist	
society	whose	cities	and	industrial	centres	used	to	constitute	ugly	and	unpleasant	social	
spaces.	Because	contemporary	capitalism	is	largely	based	on	the	production,	mediation	
and	processing	of	information,	it	has	not	had	equally	dramatic	and	negative	influences	
on	societal-cultural	reality.	To	be	sure,	serious	ecological	crisis	and	military	conflicts	are	
also	 possible	 in	 contemporary	 globalised	 and	digitalised	 capitalism,	 but	 on	 the	whole	
a	capitalism	like	this	has	 laid	more	stress	on	cultural	matters	and	after	having	become	
general	the	consumer	way	of	life	has	formed	a	productive	ground	for	the	two	processes	
under	 consideration.	 Certain	 sociologists,	 for	 example,	 Featherstone	 (1991:	 27,	 123;	
1993:	268–271)	and	Lash	(1992:	158)	have	stated	that	the	artification	of	societal-cultural	
reality	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	continue	the	programmes	of	the	avant-
garde	movements,	since	all	of	these	phenomena	would	have	bridged	the	gap	between	art	
and	non-art.	However,	as	Wolfgang	Welsch	remarks,	it	is	erroneous	to	equate	these	two	
processes	with	the	goals	of	the	avant-garde	movements:
This	 everyday	 aestheticization	 is	 not,	 as	 some	 theoreticians	 believe,	 about	 an	
accomplishment	-	albeit	an	unsatisfying	way	one	–	of	the	avant-garde	programmes	
to	extend	and	break	down	the	limits	of	art.	On	the	contrary:	when	Beuys	or	Cage	
pleaded	for	an	extension	of	the	concept	of	art	and	a	breaking	down	of	its	boundaries	
they	were	thinking	that	something	which	wasn=t	art	should	be	understood	as	art	
–	 and	 the	 conception	 of	 art	 would	 thereby	 be	 altered	 or	 extended.	 In	 today=s	
aestheticization,	however,	it	is	quite	the	reverse:	traditional	artistic	attributes	are	
being	carried	over	into	reality,	daily	life	is	being	pumped	full	of	artistic	character.	
This	corresponds	not	to	the	programmes	of	the	avant-garde,	but	at	best	to	older	
aestheticization	 programmes	 la	 Schiller,	 the	 System-Programme	 of	 German	
idealism,	Werkbund,	and	so	on.	Admittedly,	in	the	current	aestheticization	these	
too	seem	only	to	being	accomplished	as	a	programme	to	further	the	kitsch.	(Welsch	
1997:	3.)
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 avant-garde	 movements,	 the	 current	 aestheticization	 largely	 serves	
economic	 purposes.	 In	 contemporary	 commercialised	 society,	 homo aestheticus is	
becoming	 a	 new	 role-model;	 a	 person	 like	 this	 is,	 according	 to	 Welsch	 (1997:	 5),	
Asensitive,	hedonistic,	educated	and,	above	all,	of	discerning	taste@	–	and	he	or	she	knows	
Athat	 you	cant=	 argue	 about	 taste@.	Thus,	we	may	 say	 that	 a	person	 like	 this	 is	highly	
functional	from	the	standpoint	of	the	systems	of	economics	and	business.	Besides	design	
and	the	aestheticization	of	goods,	the	current	aestheticization	includes	mass	culture	or	
mass	media	whose	products	–	 light	music,	 rock	music,	films,	 television	serials,	videos,	
music	videos,	advertisements	–	people	can	more	and	more	consume	in	their	leisure	time.	
In	all,	the	aesthetic	has,	therefore,	become	a	central	constituent	in	Western	ways	of	life.	
Echoing	Habermas=	 theory	 of	 the	 communicative	 action,	 Christa	 Bürger	 (1986:	 99)	
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writes	that	nowadays	Athe	aesthetic	crosses	the	boundaries	of	the	institution	of	art	and	
penetrates	 into	 all	 aspects	 of	 social	 existence@	 and	 even,	we	may	 add,	 colonises	 those	
aspects.	When	pointing	to	this	same	phenomenon	Münch	(1991:	139–141,	145–148),	
on	the	other	hand,	speaks	about	the	growing	interpenetration	between	the	aesthetic	and	
societal-cultural	 reality,	but	 to	his	 remark	one	has	 to	add	that	an	 interpenetration	 like	
this	has	not	been	symmetrical;	on	the	contrary,	it	has	largely	taken	place	according	to	the	
conditions	of	economics	and	business.
Thus,	the	artification	of	societal-cultural	reality	and	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	
life	 have	 brought	 contemporary	 culture	 and	 society	 closer	 to	 traditional	 art-likeness,	
that	is,	to	a	period	in	which	art	still,	first	and	foremost,	served	aesthetic	purposes	and	it	
was	usually	regarded	as	a	source	of	aesthetic	pleasure.	Likewise,	nowadays	the	operation	
principles	of	the	institutions	of	art	have	made	the	boundary	between	the	sphere	of	art	
and	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality	lower.	In	the	current	neo-liberalist	situation,	public	
support	for	the	arts	has	been	decreasing	in	Western	countries.	At	a	more	concrete	level,	the	
neo-liberalist	course	of	action	has	manifested	itself	in	two	ways:	on	the	one	hand,	public	
cultural	institutions	have	been	privatised,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	other	public	cultural	
institutions	 and,	more	generally,	other	 cultural	 institutions	must	nowadays,	more	 and	
more,	function	like	commercial	enterprises.	For	this	reason	Bourdieu	(1998)	doubted	in	
the	late	1990s	whether	it	is	still	justified	to	classify	the	sphere	of	cultural	production	into	
fields	 of	 restricted	 production	 and	 large-scale	 production.	 Formerly,	 Bourdieu	 (1992)	
had	thought	 that	 the	 latter	–	 that	 is,	 the	 sphere	of	 Acommercialised	art@	 and	Apopular	
culture@	–	serves	mainly	economic	purposes,	whereas	the	former	or	the	sphere	of	Apure@	or	
Agenuine@	art	is	largely	autonomous	with	regard	to	economic,	political	and	other	external	
purposes.	As	a	result	of	his	doubts	and	reasoning,	he	stated	that	 the	field	of	restricted	
production	has	not	entirely	lost	its	relative	autonomy,	but	its	independence	is	seriously	
threatened	by	market	forces	and	the	neo-liberalist	social	policy.
Together	the	artification	of	society,	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	and	the	new	
operation	principles	of	the	institutions	of	art	represent	the	process	of	de-differentiation	
in	societal-cultural	reality.	Besides	them,	there	are	in	reality	tendencies	which	point	in	the	
opposite	direction,	that	 is,	 to	the	process	of	differentiation.	Those	opposite	tendencies	
maintain	the	difference	between	the	sphere	of	art	and	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	
Of	them	one	can	first	mention	the	de-aestheticization	of	art.	In	her	own	estimation	of	
postmodernity,	Christa	Bürger	(1986)	regards	the	de-aestheticization	of	art	almost	as	an	
equally	important	tendency	as	the	aestheticization	of	everyday	life	and	the	omnipresence	
of	 commercial	 mass	 culture;	 obviously	 she	 thinks	 that	 the	 de-aestheticization	 of	 art	
concerns,	in	the	first	instance,	the	so-called	serious	art,	although	certain	popular	genres,	
for	example,	American	horror	and	action	films	often	contain	brutal	violence	and	other	
aesthetically	and	morally	unpleasant	scenes.	
Christa	Bürger	does	not	present	a	 list	of	 contemporary	de-aestheticized	art	genres,	
whereas	Habermas	has	been	more	concrete	in	this	respect.	According	to	Habermas	(1973:	
118–120;	1982b:	102),	art	genres	such	as	conceptual	art,	earth	art,	happenings,	science	
fiction	and	multi	art	are	instances	of	de-aestheticized	art;	of	those	genres	multi-art	consists,	
in	fact,	of	works	which	mix	different	genres	up.	Likewise,	modern	or	contemporary	dance,	
installations	and	assemplages	are	usually	incompatible	with	the	aesthetic	conception	of	
art,	and	the	most	radical	representatives	of	feminist	art	have	aimed	at	shocking	devotees	
of	 art,	 instead	of	pleasing	 them.	One	 important	 layer	 in	 contemporary	art	 consists	of	
works	which	 explore	 human	 relationships	 and	 reveal	 everyday	 life=s	 self-evident	 social	
conventions	and	rules	and	collectively	shared	beliefs.	For	example,	Roy	Vaara,	a	Finnish	
performance	artist	has	presented	several	performances	in	public	spaces	such	as	streets	and	
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market	places.	One	of	his	performances	took	place	in	the	Red	Square	in	Peking;	in	that	
performance	Vaara	wore	a	black	suit	and	he	stood	exactly	in	a	visible	place	at	the	same	
time	shaking	hands	with	people	who	were	walking	in	the	Red	Square	-	with	the	result	that	
suspicious	Chinese	police	men	paid	attention	to	him	and	started	to	ask	him	questions.	In	
this	way,	Vaara=s	performance	brought	to	the	fore	the	network	of	control	and	power	that	
dominates	people	in	China.	In	his	Ésthetique Relationelle (Relational	Aesthetics,	2001),	
Nicolas	Bourriaud,	 a	well-known	French	 art	 critic	 and	philosopher	of	 art,	 applies	 the	
concept	of	relational	aesthetics	to	works	like	these,	but	actually	the	word	Aaesthetic@	does	
not	suit	well	a	description	of	these	works	-	simply	because	their	primary	purposes	are	not	
at	all	aesthetic	by	nature	or	because	they	are	not	necessarily	aesthetically	pleasant	objects	
or	events.
This	remark	indicates	that	it	is	possible	to	speak	about	de-aestheticized	art	at	least	in	
two	different	senses.	First,	we	may	say	that	art	can	be	de-aestheticized	in	the	sense	that	
it	does	not	please	our	senses;	in	other	words,	works	of	art	like	these	are	physically	ugly,	
repulsive	and	unpleasant.	Secondly,	works	of	art	can	also	be	de-aestheticized	in	the	sense	
that	they	do	not	primarily	aim	at	arousing	sense	impressions	in	their	receivers;	instead	of	
impressions	like	those,	they	aim	at	mediating	ideas	and	thoughts	to	their	receivers.	For	
example,	contemporary	serious	theatre	plays,	dance	performances,	visual	works	of	art	and	
the	most	radical	feminist	works	of	art	are	often	de-aestheticized	in	the	first-mentioned	
sense,	whereas	Duchamp=s	ready	made	works,	Marina	Abramovic=s	performances,	Joseph	
Beuys=	Aactions@,	Roy	Vaara=s	performances,	and	conceptual	works	of	art	represent	de-
aestheticized	art	in	the	latter	sense	(cf.	Sederholm	2000:	17).	In	all,	de-aestheticization	
is	a	relative	strong	tendency	in	contemporary	serious	art,	but	as	such	it	is	not	an	entirely	
new	phenomenon.	In	the	Middle	Ages,	pictures,	statues	and	churches	were	not	built	for	
aesthetic	 purposes;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 they	 embodied	 religious	meanings	 and	 the	world	
view	of	the	Church.	In	fact,	it	was	not	until	during	the	Renaissance	that	the	category	of	
beauty	became	important	in	art,	in	particular,	in	visual	art	genres.	From	this	standpoint,	
contemporary	art	represents	a	phase	in	which	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art	is	losing	its	
long-term	dominant	position	in	culture.	
Because	 de-aestheticization	 is	 an	 important	 phenomenon	 in	 contemporary	 serious	
art,	it	is	not	justified	to	presume	–	as	certain	representatives	of	critical	theory	have	done	
–	 that	 the	 aestheticization	 of	 everyday	 life	 would	 automatically	 destroy	 art=s	 critical	
potentialities.54	 Rather	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 is	 often	 just	 by	 becoming	 estranged	 from	 the	
aesthetic	conception	of	art	that	contemporary	works	of	art	are	clearly	capable	of	presenting	
a	critical	attitude	towards	market	forces	and	their	instrumental	demands.	We	can	clear	up	
this	general	remark	with	the	help	of	the	following	example.
On	the	one	hand,	performances	and	installations	as	well	as	works	of	earth	art,	body	
art	 and	 community	 art	 are	 critical	 of	 commercialization	 and	 capitalist	markets	 in	 the	
sense	that	they	do	not	aim	at	arousing	pleasant	aesthetic	experiences	in	receivers;	that	is,	
they	do	not	want	to	be	aesthetic	entertainment.	On	the	other	hand,	they	are	critical	also	
in	the	sense	that	it	is	often	impossible	to	treat	them	as	commodities;	that	is,	they	cannot	
be	bought	by	galleries,	art	dealers,	collectors	and	museums.	Thus,	their	material	way	of	
being	resists	commercial	treatment.	Partly	in	the	same	vein	works	of	environmental	art
use	to	resist	commercialization,	although	most	of	them	probably	belong	to	the	domain	of	
the	aesthetic	conception	of	art.
54	See,	nearer,	Bürger,	Christa	1986:	99–100,	102–103.	
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Examples	such	as	these	imply	that	at	the	level	of	cultural	systems	works	of	art	have	not	
entirely	melted	with	other	kinds	of	artifacts	or	cultural	systems,	even	if	their	external	or	
physical	hallmarks	have	become	increasingly	unclear	and	ambiguous.	Consequently,	the	
structural	principle	of	differentiation	has	not	lost	all	of	its	validity	in	contemporary	culture.	
Likewise,	certain	institutions	in	societal-cultural	reality	are	interested	in	the	distinction	
art/non-art,	and	 in	 their	daily	activities	 they	maintain	 it.	To	 institutions	 such	as	 these	
belong,	among	other	things,	public	cultural	policy,	art	administration,	art	museums,	art	
galleries,	 art	 criticism,	 study	 of	 art,	 schools	 of	 applied	 arts,	 associations	 of	 artists	 and	
societies	and	foundations	for	the	arts	(cf.	Schmidt	1995b:	40).	It	is	the	task	of	empirical	
sociological	study	to	clear	up	what	kinds	of	differences	there	are	between	single	countries	
or	societies	in	this	respect.	Quite	obviously	public	cultural	policy	and	art	administration	
are	more	important	factors	in	Western	European	countries	than	they	are	in	the	United	
States;	in	Western	Europe,	in	particular,	in	countries	like	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	the	
Netherlands,	Norway	 and	Sweden,	 cultural	 politicians	 and	 art	 administration	 are	 still	
central	actors	in	the	art	life,	whereas	in	the	United	States	their	meaning	and	role	is	rather	
limited.	This	means	that	in	Western	European	countries	the	state	and	the	public	sector	
are,	in	principle,	more	able	to	protect	the	art	life	against	pure	market	forces.	And,	in	fact,	
the	states	within	the	European	Union	also	protect	the	art	life,	for	example,	by	financing	
the	art	genres	and	art	projects	that	would	fade	in	a	pure	market	competition.	However,	
at	the	same	time	those	states	have	attempted	to	bring	the	sphere	of	art	closer	to	industrial	
design,	cultural	industries,	mass	media	and	marketing.	Albeit	they	stick	to	the	distinction	
art/non-art,	they	have,	to	a	considerable	extent,	lowered	traditional	distinctions	such	as	
art	versus	commerce,	art	versus	entertainment	and	art	versus	cultural	industry.
Hopefully,	the	above-presented	remarks	have	shown	that	–	as	Christa	Bürger	(1986:	
106)	puts	it	–	the	institution	of	art	or	the	system	of	art	is	still	a	relatively	Avital@	social	
formation	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 contains	 certain	 tendencies	 to	 entropy.	However,	 at	
the	 same	 time	one	must	 admit	 that	 theorists	of	postmodernity	or	 reflexive	modernity	
are	right	in	that	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	cannot	be	accurately	grasped	by	
means	of	a	rigid	concept	of	system.	To	my	mind,	Luhmann=s	system	theory	represents	a	
rigid	thinking	such	as	this.	In	his	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems,	he	mainly	attempts	
to	 consider	 the	 things	 that	 separate	 different	 functional	 sub-systems	 from	 each	 other.	
According	 to	 him,	 an	 autopoietic	 system	 has	 its	 own	medium	 and	medium	 code	 on	
which	its	 function	is	based;	these	two	things,	that	 is,	a	specific	medium	and	a	specific	
medium	code	would	separate	it	from	other	functional	sub-systems.	Such	being	the	case,	
as	Luhmannians	we	could	say	that,	for	instance,	the	system	of	science	is	autopoietic	if	
its	 own	methodological	 criteria	 determine	 the	production	 and	 estimation	of	 scientific	
knowledge.	 Similarly,	 the	 system	of	 art	would	be	 autopoietic	 if	 it	 possessed	 a	 specific	
medium	and	a	specific	medium	code	by	means	of	which	the	communication	concerning	
works	of	art	takes	place.	However,	in	this	thesis	I	have	stated	that	the	systems	of	science	
and	art	are	not	autopoietic	in	this	strict	sense;	in	other	words,	they	do	not	use	only	their	
own	internal	criteria	but	also	criteria	that	they	have	in	common	with	other	functional	sub-
systems.	Following	Mayntz	(1988a;	1988b)	and	Münch	(1994)	I,	therefore,	propose	that	
the	concept	of	autopoietic	social	system	is	acceptable	if	we	express	differences	in	degree	
with	 the	help	of	 it.	According	 to	 this	 train	of	 thought,	 functional	 sub-systems	can	be	
more	or	less	autopoietic	and,	as	far	as	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	is	concerned,	
nowadays	their	degree	of	autopoiesis	is	decreasing.	On	the	other	hand,	Luhmann	did	not	
accept	a	conceptual	procedure	like	this,	since,	for	him,	social	systems	were	simply	either	
autopoietic	or	non-autopoietic	formations.
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Similarly,	the	concept	of	autonomy	can	be	used	for	the	expression	of	differences	in	degree.	
It	 is	possible	 to	 speak	about	 the	autonomy	of	 social	and	cultural	 systems	 from	several	
different	standpoints.	Firstly,	a	system	is	normatively	autonomic	 if	 it	 imposes	on	itself	
the	rules	on	which	its	function	is	based	on;	in	a	case	like	this,	other	systems	and	external	
actors	do	not	have	a	possibility	to	make	decisions	about	the	rules	of	that	system.	Secondly,	
a	 system	 is	 structural-causally	 autonomic	 if	 the	 events,	 processes	 and	 structures	 of	 its	
environment	do	not	have	 an	 influence	on	 it.	And	 thirdly,	 a	 system	can	be	 said	 to	be	
functionally	autonomic	if	it	has	a	specific	function	in	societal-cultural	reality,	that	is,	if	a	
certain	function	has	been	delegated	to	it.	Traditionally,	system-theoretical	and	systemic	
sociologists	 have	 thought	 that	 social	 systems	 are	 open	 formations,	wherefore	 they	 are	
Table 7. A	List	of	Contemporary	Genres	of	Art
Traditional System of the Arts. This System Emerged in the mid–18th Century
Literature,	especially,	Poetry														Painting	 	 													Dance	or	Ballet
Eloquence																																									Sculpture																											Classical	Music	
Theatre	 	 	 														Architecture	 	
Opera	 	 	 	 Laying	out	of	Gardens
During the Period 1850–1960 New Genres of Cultural Products Were Accepted 
as Art
Decorative	Art																																		Design	 	 	 													Circus
Interior	Decoration																											Poster	Art	 													Pantomime
Art	of	Hand	Work																												Part	of	Photographs												Radio	Plays
Industrial	Art																																				Part	of	Films
Since the 1960s, the Concept of Art Has Become More and More Expansive
Modern	Dance	 	Comics	 	 													Light	Music
Happening	 	 														Television	Plays	 													Computer	Music
Performance																																						Television	Films	 													Digital	Pictures
Body	Art	 	 														Television	Serials	 													Digital	Animation
Conceptual	Art	 	 														Video	Art	 													Art	of	Sound	
Installations	 	 														Media	Art	 													Art	of	Light	
Assemplages																																						Fashion	 	 													Bio	Art
Environmental	Art																												Graffiti																															Multi-Art
Earth	Art	 	 	 Jazz	Music	 													Multi-Media	Art
Community	Art	 	 														Rock	Music
Animation	Art																																		Folk	Music
Children=s	Art																																			Rap	Music
Sources: Kristeller 959, Sederholm 000, Tatarkiewicz 980, Zolberg & Cherbo 997.
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always,	at	least	in	part,	dependent	on	their	environments.	This	means	that	social	systems	
can	be	autonomic	only	in	a	relative	sense;	thereby	the	concept	of	relative	autonomy	had	
a	 firm	 place	 in	 traditional	 system-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociology.	 By	 utilising	 this	
concept	one	can	say	that	in	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	the	relative	autonomy	
of	societal	systems	and	functional	sub-systems	has	been	on	the	decrease.
Perhaps	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	could,	in	an	equal	manner,	be	described	
with	the	aid	of	a	distinction	between	autopoietic	and	poietic	systems.	A	distinction	like	
this	has	been	made,	among	other	persons,	by	Misheva,	whose	investigation	Shame and 
Guilt. Sociology as a Poietic System (2000)	 contains	 an	 appraisal	 of	Luhmann=s	 system	
theory	and	it	elaborates	the	concept	of	poietic	system.	Misheva	does	not	discard	entirely	
the	concept	of	autopoietic	social	system,	but	she	holds	that	it	has	a	limited	use	value	in	
sociology.	To	her	mind,	the	Luhmannian	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems,	as	such,	
is	chiefly	applicable	to	organisational	or	non-living	systems,	whereas	living	systems	need	
a	different	theory.	It	is	just	in	this	connection	that	she	introduces	the	concept	of	poietic	
system.	Poietic	 systems	are	producing	 systems,	but	 they	are	not	 self-producing,	which	
means	 that	 they	have	been	 constructed	by	 external	 actors	 and	 factors.	Poietic	 systems	
are	 open	 formations	 that	do	not	 themselves	define	 their	 own	boundaries,	 since	 Atheir	
boundaries	 become	 defined	 by	 the	 external	 boundaries	 of	 the	 autopoietic	 systems@	
(Misheva	2000:	233).	Along	 these	dimensions	poietic	 systems	differ	 from	autopoietic	
systems	which	are	operatively	closed	and	self-producing	systems.	In	addition,	Misheva	
thinks	 that	originally	 autopoietic	 systems	have	developed	 from	poietic	 systems.	But	 is	
it	possible	that	societal	evolution	could	also	take	place	in	reverse	order;	in	other	words,	
could	an	autopoietic	system	change	into	a	poietic	system?	And	if	this	is	possible,	are	we	
today	witnessing	a	process	in	which	national	societal	systems	and	functional	sub-systems	
are	increasingly	losing	their	autopoietic	features	and	becoming	closer	to	the	concept	of	
poietic	system?	Although	it	would	be	rather	tempting	to	answer	the	latter	question	in	the	
affirmative,	at	present	it	might	not	be	reasonable	to	give	hasty	answers	to	questions	like	
these,	since,	so	far,	the	concept	of	poietic	system	is	not	yet	a	well-known	tool	in	system-
theoretical	sociology.	In	this	respect,	we	will	perhaps	be	wiser	after	the	concept	of	poietic	
system	has	undergone	a	critical	estimation	in	system-theoretical	sociology.
In	 this	 sub-chapter,	 we	 have	mainly	 considered	 art=s	 external	 boundaries.	 Now	 it	
is	 time	to	 look	at	 the	 internal	 structure	or	 internal	order	of	 the	 sphere	of	art.	Table	7	
aims	at	presenting	a	list	of	what	kinds	of	cultural	artifacts	are	nowadays	regarded	as	art.	
Although	the	table	is,	in	part,	based	on	empirical	studies,	it	should	be	noticed	that	with	
all	probability	the	concept	of	art	is	not	understood	exactly	in	the	same	way	in	different	
countries	or	in	different	national	and	regional	art	worlds.	For	example,	comics	have	been	
a	recognised	genre	of	art	in	France	for	centuries,	whereas	in	some	other	countries,	among	
others	in	Finland	it	–	or	perhaps,	a	certain	part	of	it	–	has	only	recently	obtained	the	status	
of	art.	Unfortunately,	in	this	connection	we	have	to	pass	over	differences	like	these.	For	
this	reason,	Table	7	provides	us	only	with	a	rude	overall	view	of	the	contemporary	genres	
of	art.
At	any	rate,	the	table	under	consideration	shows	us	that	since	the	1960s	the	sphere	
of	art	has	opened	up	to	new	 layers	of	cultural	production,	wherefore	 the	extension	of	
the	system	of	art	has	expanded	enormously.	Originally	the	extension	of	the	system	of	art	
was	rather	narrow.	When	the	modern	system	of	art	emerged	in	the	mid-18th	century,	
it	consisted	of	ten	genres.	Of	those	ten	genres	eloquence	disappeared	already	in	the	19th	
century,	whereas	literature,	theatre,	opera,	painting,	sculpture,	architecture,	laying	out	of	
gardens,	ballet	and	classical	concert	music	were	regarded	as	self-evident	genres	of	art.	The	
dominant	conception	of	art	held	that	genuine	art	deviates	essentially	from	the	world	of	
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industry,	business,	politics	and	practical	life;	this	meant	that	the	position	of	decorative	
art,	interior	decoration,	hand	work,	industrial	art,	design,	poster	art,	photograph,	circus,	
pantomime,	radio	plays	and	film	was	obscure	for	a	long	time,	for	they	seemed	to	be	too	
close	to	those	everyday	and	banal	activities.	However,	by	the	decades	after	the	Second	
World	War	their	status	approached	the	status	of	the	so-called	pure	or	self-evident	genres	
of	art,	whereafter	they	have	been	accepted	as	art	without	serious	reservations.
Table	7	shows	that	during	the	last	five	decades	the	expansion	of	the	system	of	art	has	
been	connected	with	the	rapid	development	of	information	and	media	technology,	for	
a	great	number	of	 the	new	art	genres	are	media-based	by	nature;	 in	particular,	genres	
such	as	television	plays,	television	films,	television	serials,	video	art,	media	art,	computer	
music,	digital	pictures	digital	animation	and	multi-media	art	belong	to	this	connection.	
On	the	other	hand,	 several	new	genres	of	art	are	 far	 from	the	aesthetic	conception	of	
art	 or	 from	 the	 traditional	 idea	 of	 art-likeness,	 which	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 contemporary	
system	of	art	is	based	on	pluralistic	thinking,	that	is,	on	several	different	conceptions	of	
art.	For	example,	modern	dance,	performances,	body	art,	conceptual	art,	 installations,	
assemplages,	earth	art,	community	art	and	bio	art	represent	a	new	kind	of	conception	of	
art-likeness.	In	particular,	community	art	can	not	be	grasped	by	means	of	the	traditional	
concepts	of	expression	and	representation,	since	in	it	the	artist	does	not	strive	to	express	
himself	or	herself	and	nor	does	he	or	she	represent	or	 imitate	reality;	on	the	contrary,	
community	art	is	made	in	co-operation	with	social	actors	or	a	community,	wherefore	a	
common	action	or	interaction	like	this	is	often	an	important	thing	in	it.	Joseph	Beuys,	
who	used	to	speak	about	Asocietal	sculpture@	instead	of	Acommunity	art@,	has	often	been	
regarded	as	a	precursor	of	community	art.	For	instance,	in	1982	he	participated	in	an	art	
exhibition	by	carrying	out	a	work	7000 oaks	in	which	oak	trees	were	planted	in	the	city	
of	Kassel	 in	Germany.	Similarly,	 in	1994	Minna	Heikinheimo,	a	young	Finnish	artist,	
arranged	 in	Helsinki	an	art	exhibition	Gratuitous Breakfast in	which	she	offered	a	 free	
meal	to	people	for	a	summer;	in	this	way	she	wanted	to	explore	her	own	relation	to	art	
and	social	life.	These	examples	show	that	in	many	respects	community	art	carries	on	the	
spirit	of	the	avant-garde	movements;	like	them,	it	aims	at	lowering	the	gap	between	the	
sphere	of	art	and	people=s	life	worlds.	This	is	why	it	has	also	been	called	Aparticipation	
art@	or	Asocial	art@.
In	addition,	there	is	a	great	number	of	hybrid	or	mixed	phenomena	in	the	contemporary	
system	of	art.	For	example,	nowadays	video	is	a	relatively	common	auxiliary	medium	in	
installations,	and	the	so-called	proper	video	installations	utilise	both	the	idea	of	installation	
and	the	genre	of	video	art.	Certain	artists	or	institutions	of	art	have	also	combined	single	
genres	 of	 art	 in	 a	more	 radical	way.	Vera	L.	Zolberg	 and	 Joni	Maya	Cherbo	 (1997b:	
2–3)	mention	 theatre	Zingaro,	 a	 classical	 French	 dressage	 troupe,	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 a	
combination	 such	 as	 this;	 in	 its	 performances,	 Zingaro	 Aunites	 horsemanship,	 circus	
acrobatics,	ethnic	music,	and	dance	into	an	uncommon	theatricality@.	A	rather	similar	
artistic	group	is	Cirque	du	Soleil	which	was	 founded	in	Canada	 in	1984;	 it	combines	
elements	of	traditional	circus,	theatre,	pantomime,	music,	song	and	dance	in	its	shows	or	
works.	Phenomena	like	these	indicate	that,	to	a	considerable	extent,	an	internal	process	
of	de-differentiation	between	single	genres	of	art	is	going	on	in	the	contemporary	system	
of	art.
Thus,	 the	contemporary	 sphere	or	 system	of	 art	 seems	 to	display	a	high	degree	of	
variety	and	diversity.	Unfortunately,	Luhmann	largely	passed	over	a	variety	and	diversity	
like	this.	As	Boris	Groys	(1996:	12)	and	Niels	Werber	(1996:	23)	point	out,	Luhmann=s	
conception	of	art	is	rather	purist	or	high-cultural,	that	is,	he	did	not	regard	phenomena	
such	as	design,	pulp	fiction	and	other	popular	cultural	genres	as	art.	At	a	more	general	
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level	one	can	say	that	he	ignored	that	an	increasing	interpenetration	between	the	system	
of	art	and	other	social	and	cultural	systems	is	typical	of	the	contemporary	societal-cultural	
reality.
It	should	be	noticed	that	Table	7	does	not	cover	the	entirety	of	the	internal	structure	
or	 internal	order	of	 the	contemporary	art	world.	 In	 fact,	 it	only	attempts	 to	 reveal	 (i)	
the	genre-based	 structure	of	 the	 contemporary	 art	world.	Besides	 this,	 there	 are	other	
interesting	structures	in	the	contemporary	art	world.	One	can,	for	example,	speak	about	
art	world=s	functional,	normative	and	institutional	or	organizational	structure	as	well	as	
about	its	power	and	status	structure.		The	concept	(ii)	Aart	world=s	functional	structure@	
points	to	the	internal	division	of	labour	in	the	art	life,	and	the	structure	in	question	consists	
of	the	types	of	action	that	appear	in	the	art	life.	First	and	foremost,	activities	such	as	the	
production,	mediation	and	reception	of	art	as	well	as	art	administration	and	art	policy	
are	 central	 functional	 constituents	 in	 the	 contemporary	 art	 life.	The	 concept	 (iii)	 Aart	
world=s	normative	structure@	points	to	the	norms,	conventions	and	operations	principles	
which	regulate	people=s	activities	in	the	art	life.	The	most	central	units	in	(iv)	the	art	life=s	
institutional	or	organizational	structure	are	the	organizations,	institutions,	associations,	
foundations	 and	 funds	which	 carry	out	 an	organized	 and	goal-oriented	 action	 in	 this	
sub-system	of	society.	When	one	considers	(v)	the	art	life=s	power	and	status	structure,	
the	most	important	questions	are,	what	actors	and	institutions	or	organizations	control	
the	art	life=s	economic	resources,	what	kind	of	group	makes	the	art-political	decisions	and	
how	much	social-cultural	status	different	actors,	 institutions	and	genres	possess.	Thus,	
the	art	world=s	internal	order	or	structure	is	a	rather	complex	phenomenon	with	several	
different	dimensions.
Representatives	of	the	systemic	study	of	art	do	not	always	speak	about	the	same	thing	
when	they	consider	the	art	world=s	internal	structure.	Roughly	speaking,	one	can	say	that	
researches	such	as	Baudrillard,	Featherstone,	Vattimo,	Lash	and	Urry	have	paid	a	lot	of	
attention	to	the	art	world=s	genre-based	structure.	The	genres	of	art	form	a	cultural	system	
that	these	five	theorists	have	compared	with	cultural	systems	such	as	advertisement	and	
mass	media,		besides	which	they	have	explored	what	kind	of	common	properties	works	
of	art	have	with	objects	of	everyday	life	and	industrial	production.	In	contrast	to	their	
approach,	Luhmann	as	well	as	Christa	and	Peter	Bürger	have,	in	the	first	instance,	spoken	
about	the	art	world=s	normative	structure.	On	the	other	hand,	Schmidt=s		view	of	the	art	
world	is	anchored	on	its	functional	structure	and	Bourdieu	and	his	disciples	have	studied	
the	art	world=s	power	and	status	structure.	Researchers	of	cultural	policy,	in	particular,	
have	been	interested	in	the	art	world=s	institutional	or	organizational	structure.
Let	us	 then	consider	 the	contemporary	art	world	 from	the	 standpoint	of	works	of	
art.	The	articles	of	this	thesis	propose	that	the	internal	state	of	the	system	of	art	could,	
in	part,	be	conceptualised	with	the	help	of	Luhmann=s	system	theory,	in	particular,	by	
means	of	the	concept	of	autopoiesis.	Actually,	Luhmann	used	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	
in	several	different	meanings.	In	his	theory,	a	system	is,	on	the	one	hand,	an	autopoietic	
formation	if	it	handles	the	information	and	the	energy	that	it	takes	from	its	environment	
according	to	its	own	internal	principles	of	operation	or	according	to	its	own	medium	and	
medium	code.	On	the	other	hand,	Luhmann	connected	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	to	the	
idea	of	self-production:	an	autopoietic	system	itself	produces	the	elements	that	it	consists	
of,	 it	 produces	new	 communications	on	 the	basis	 of	 its	 previous	 communications.	 In	
the	first	sense,	the	autopoiesis	of	the	system	of	art	is	decreasing,	since	in	the	process	of	
de-differentiation	 this	 system	has	adopted	more	media	and	medium	codes	 from	other	
systems	and	at	the	same	time	other	systems	have	also	borrowed	communicative	means	
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from	the	system	of	art.	In	the	second	sense,	the	autopoiesis	of	the	system	of	art	is,	however,	
increasing,	since	–	as,	among	other	persons,	Peter	Bürger	(1988:	202–204)	has	pointed	
out	–	 intertextuality,	 self-understanding	and	meta-artistry	are	 typical	of	 contemporary	
cultural	 products.	 AIntertextuality@	means	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 relationship	 between	 two	
cultural	products;	in	this	relationship,	one	product	refers	to	the	other	product;	if	it	also	says	
something	about	that	product	or	comments	on	it,	it	is	an	instance	of	meta-art.	In	general,	
meta-artistic	works	comment	on	themselves	or	other	works	or	the	rules	and	conventions	
of	art.	In	meta-art,	works	of	art	indicate	explicitly	or	implicitly	that	they	are	art,	and	in	
this	sense	they	represent	art=s	self-understanding	or	its	reflective	consciousness.
Intertextuality	is	perhaps	most	clearly	visible	in	the	Hollywood	film	system	in	which	
almost	every	new	fictional	film	seems,	both	openly	and	covertly,	to	refer	to	several	earlier	
films	and	to	parody	or	modify	them.	Similarly,	a	number	of	contemporary	novelists	have	
felt	 an	 urge	 to	 define	 their	 stand	 on	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 novel	 –	 as	Michel	Tournier	
refers	 to	 and	 comments	 on	Daniel	 Defoe=s	 famous	 novel	Robinson Crusoe (1719)	 in	
his	 own	novel	Vendredi	 (Friday,	 1967).	Numerous	works	within	 visual	 art	 genres	 can	
be	 understood	 as	meta-art,	 as	well.	Classical	 examples	 of	works	 like	 these	 are	Marcel	
Duchamp=s	ready-made	works	which	questioned	the	traditional	boundary	between	art	
and	non-art.	Later,	questioning	such	as	this	continued,	for	example,	in	Andy	Warhol=s,	
John	Cage=s,	Karlheinz	Stockhausen=s,	 Joseph	Beuys=s	and	Marina	Abramovic=s	works.	
Intertextuality,	 artistic	 self-understanding	 and	meta-artistry	 represent	 the	 principle	 of	
autopoiesis	in	the	sense	that	in	them	new	works	of	art	are	made	on	the	basis	of	previous	
works	of	art	or	by	questioning	previous	artistic	conventions.
All	this	indicates	that	nowadays	the	sphere	of	art	forms	a	dynamic	social	and	cultural	
system	in	the	Western	world.	Unlike	what	most	radical	theorists	of	postmodernity	and	de-
differentiation	have	suggested,	this	system	has	not	died	or	fused	with	the	rest	of	societal-
cultural	reality.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	a	vital	and	complex	system	whose	boundaries	have	
become	more	and	more	open.	Due	 to	 this,	 it	 is	 closely	connected	with	other	cultural	
and	 social	 systems,	 in	 particular,	 with	 the	 economics,	 mass	 media,	 design	 and	 –	 in	
Western	Europe	–	with	the	state	and	public	section.	Although	it	and	most	of	the	other	
functional	sub-systems	are	nowadays,	to	a	considerable	extent,	transformed	by	the	system	
of	economics,	the	neo-liberalist	policy	and	by	the	operation	principles	of	the	markets	and	
business,	it	has	not	changed	into	a	sub-system	of	economics.	To	be	sure,	certain	sections	
of	it	operate	like	commercial	enterprises,	but	on	the	other	hand	it	also	contains	sections	
that	stand	in	opposition	to	the	economics	and	the	operation	principles	of	the	markets	and	
business.	At	the	same	time	the	internal	structure	of	the	system	of	art	has	become	more	
complex,	more	flexible	and	more	obscure,	wherefore	that	system	has	somewhat	lost	its	
internal	stability	and	order.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
The	thesis	at	hand	aims	at	explicating	what	kind	of	position	the	sphere	of	art	holds	in	
modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality,	according	to	system-theoretical	and	
systemic	sociology.	The	concept	Athe	sphere	of	art@	is	used	in	this	thesis	in	a	twofold	sense,	
which	means	that	works	of	art	or	the	cultural	system	of	art	as	well	as	the	institutions	of	
art	or	the	social	system	of	art	are	in	an	equal	manner	parts	of	the	sphere	of	art.	Certain	
representatives	of	 system-theoretical	and	systemic	 studies	of	art,	among	other	persons,	
Habermas	and	Schmidt	have	used	the	concept	of	system	just	in	this	twofold	way,	whereas	
in	Luhmann=s	investigations	Athe	functional	or	the	social	sub-system	of	art@	contains	both	
works	of	art	and	the	institutions	of	art.		Luhmann=s	concept	of	system	is	a	onefold	entity;	
it	does	not	recognise	the	existence	of	cultural	systems,	since	Luhmann	thought	that	the	
so-called	culture	is	included	in	social	systems.
System-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociology	 is	 understood	 here	 in	 a	 loose	 sense.	
Originators	of	system-theoretical	sociology	such	as	Parsons,	Shils	and	Smelser	belong	self-
evidently	to	this	branch	of	sociology,	and	in	the	same	vein	Parsons=	European	disciples	
and	successors,	in	particular,	Luhmann,	Münch	and	Touraine	are	part	of	it.	In	addition,	
system-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociology	 includes	 sociologists	who,	on	 the	one	hand,	
have	been	critical	of	Parsons=	thinking	and	research	work,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	have	
utilised	 and	 elaborated	 the	 concept	 of	 system	or	 its	 kindred	 concepts.	To	 sociologists	
like	these	belong	Habermas,	Bourdieu	and	Giddens	who	represent	the	spirit	of	the	left-
wing	Acritical	theory@	in	system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology.	Furthermore,	Parsons=	
American	successors	Alexander	and	Colomy	are	close	to	this	branch	as	well,	even	if	they	
have	not	been	especially	interested	in	the	elaboration	of	the	concept	of	system.	Of	the	
present-day	or	younger	representatives	of	system-theoretical	sociology,	it	is	Mayntz	and	
Misheva	who	are	important	figures	from	the	standpoint	of	the	problematics	of	this	thesis,	
since	 they	 have	 elaborated	 upon	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 system	 by	 critically	 analysing	
Luhmann=s	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems.
Most	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 sociologists	 have	 constructed	 theoretical	 models	 of	
modern	society,	and	some	of	them	have	also	participated	in	the	discussion	on	postmodernity.	
Usually	the	above-mentioned	sociologists	have	not	published	investigations	on	art,	even	if	
three	of	them,	that	is,	Bourdieu,	Habermas	and	Luhmann	have	been	active	in	the	domain	
of	the	study	of	art.	These	three	sociologists	have	also	had	a	great	number	of	disciples	and	
successors	who	have	utilised	and	developed	their	ideas	in	the	study	of	art;	of	disciples	and	
successors	such	as	these,	one	can,	in	particular,	mention	Schmidt	as	well	as	Christa	and	
Peter	Bürger.	In	addition,	certain	researchers	within	the	system-theoretical	and	systemic	
study	 of	 art	 have	 had	 only	 a	 loose	 connection	with	 the	 above-mentioned	 sociologists	
and	 their	 theories.	To	 researchers	 such	 as	 these	 belong,	 among	 other	 persons,	 Crane	
and	Zolberg,	who	have	published	several	empirical	investigations	on	the	contemporary	
American	art	world;	theoretically	those	investigations	are	chiefly	based	on	Becker=s	and	
Danto=s	conceptions	of	the	art	world	and	on	Dickie=s	concept	of	the	institution	of	art.
In	 principle,	 the	 research	 material	 of	 this	 thesis	 consists	 of	 the	 investigations	 on	
modern	and	contemporary	society	and	on	modern	and	contemporary	sphere	of	art	that	
the	 above-mentioned	 researchers	 have	 published.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 clears	
up	how	those	researchers	understand	modern	societal-cultural	reality	and	what	kind	of	
position	they	give	to	the	sphere	of	art	in	their	own	models	of	modern	societal-cultural	
reality.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 also	 clears	 up	 how	 they,	 in	 turn,	 understand	
contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	as	well	as	the	contemporary	sphere	of	art	and	its	
position	in	that	reality.	The	researchers	in	question	share	the	view	that	both	in	modern	
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and	contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 the	 sphere	of	 art	 forms	a	differentiated	and	
a	 relatively	 autonomous	 social	 and	cultural	 formation.	 In	contrast	 to	 this,	 theorists	of	
postmodernity	or	reflexive	modernity	have	claimed	that	nowadays	societal-cultural	reality	
has	largely	lost	its	systemic	nature,	and	the	most	radical	of	them	have	even	declared	that	
actually	 the	 sphere	 of	 art	 has	merged	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 societal-cultural	 reality.	Of	
theorists	such	as	these,	this	thesis	has,	in	particular,	taken	into	account	Lash=s	and	Urry=s	
investigations,	as	well	as	Baudrillard=s,	Featherstone=s	and	Vattimo=s	views.	In	the	same	vein	
this	thesis	pays	attention	to	the	criticism	that	Beck	and	Bauman	have	presented	against	
the	traditional	and	the	Luhmannian	concept	of	social	system.	Although	the	most	radical	
theories	 of	 postmodernity	 and	 de-defferentiation	 have	 clearly	 exaggerated	 the	 process	
of	 de-differentiation,	 theories	 of	 postmodernity	 and	 de-differentiation	 have	 formed	 a	
challenge	to	system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology	and	to	their	ways	of	conceiving	
societal-cultural	 reality.	 If	 those	 theories	 are,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 right,	 system-theoretical	
sociology	 should	 elaborate	more	flexible	 and	dynamic	 concepts	 for	 the	 description	of	
contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	This	thesis	at	hand	represents	the	stand	that	this	
is	exactly	the	case:	system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology	must	take	into	account	the	
theories	 at	 issue	 and,	 after	 having	 analysed	 them	 critically,	 renew	 its	 own	 conceptual	
vocabulary.
A	 special	 position	 in	 the	 research	material	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 occupied	 by	 Luhmann	
and,	to	a	minor	extent,	his	critics;	into	those	critics	one	can,	in	particular,	add	Bourdieu	
and	Habermas	as	well	as	Mayntz,	Misheva	and	Münch.	Luhmann=s	special	position	is	
derived	 from	the	 fact	 that	 since	 the	 turn	of	 the	1970s	and	1980s	he	concentrated	on	
elaborating	his	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems.	During	the	last	decades,	this	theory	
has	proved	to	be	very	influential	 in	sociology	and	in	the	study	of	art,	wherefore	it	has	
recently	also	become	an	object	of	an	international	critical	discussion	and	estimation	both	
in	the	community	of	system-theorists	and	in	the	social	sciences	and	humanities.	In	part,	
this	thesis	participates	in	this	critical	discussion	and	estimation.
Methodologically,	 this	 thesis	 is	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 rational	 reconstruction.	The	
thesis	 goes	 analytically	 and	 critically	 through	 different	 models	 and	 investigations	 of	
modern	 and	 contemporary	 societal	 cultural-reality,	 in	 particular,	 of	 the	 modern	 and	
contemporary	sphere	of	art	and	its	position	in	that	reality.	When	analysing	those	models	
and	 investigations	 the	 thesis	 considers	how	 they	understand	 the	general	 structure	 and	
the	operation	principles	of	modern	society;	and	as	far	as	the	system	of	art	is	concerned,	
this	thesis	clears	up	what	kind	of	relation	this	system	has,	according	to	the	models	and	
investigations	in	question,	to	the	rest	of	societal-cultural	reality.	Furthermore,	this	thesis	
explicates	what	kinds	of	methodological	instructions	and	implications	those	models	and	
investigations	include	and	what	kinds	of	philosophical	commitments	and	presuppositions	
underlies	them.	By	means	of	a	procedure	like	this,	this	thesis	endeavours	to	define	their	
merits	and	shortcomings	and	at	the	same	time	it	strives,	from	the	standpoint	of	the	sphere	
of	art,	to	outline	a	more	adequate	model	of	modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	
reality.
System-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociologists	 do	 not	 provide	 us	 with	 an	 entirely	
homogenous	 picture	 of	 modern	 culture	 and	 society.	 To	 be	 sure,	 usually	 they	 think	
that	modern	culture	and	society	have	been	characterised	by	the	structural	principle	of	
functional	differentiation	that	has	divided	modern	societal-cultural	reality	into	functionally	
differentiated	and	relatively	autonomous	spheres	or	systems.	In	addition,	system-theorists	
such	as	Parsons,	Luhmann,	Habermas	and	Münch	have	regarded	societal	and	cultural	
rationalisation	as	an	important	feature	of	the	process	of	modernisation,	although	they	have	
not	understood	it	precisely	in	the	same	way.	Furthermore,	in	Luhmann=s	and	Habermas=	
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models	secularisation	belongs	to	the	hallmarks	of	the	process	of	modernisation,	whereas	
Parsons	and	Münch	tend	to	think	that	religion	has	still	an	active	meaning	 in	modern	
Western	culture	and	society,	in	particular,	in	the	United	States.
As	for	the	system	of	art,	Parsons	was	incapable	of	describing	its	position	in	modern	
societal-cultural	reality	in	a	satisfactory	way.	This	shortcoming	derived	from	his	idea	of	
functional	necessities.	 In	his	 analytical	models,	Parsons	 thought	 that	 in	 the	process	of	
societal-cultural	modernisation	society	tends	to	differentiate	internally	into	sub-systems	
that	take	care	of	the	four	functional	necessities.	He	thereby	termed	these	four	sub-systems	
economy=s	functional	sub-system,	polity=s	functional	sub-system,	integration=s	functional	
sub-system	 and	 a	 socio-cultural	 sub-system.	However,	 Parsons=	models	 do	not	 answer	
to	 the	question	as	 to	why	 the	number	of	 these	 analytical	or	 functional	 sub-systems	 is	
precisely	 four,	even	 if	 there	are	 in	modern	society	a	much	greater	number	of	concrete	
or	empirical	systems.	For	this	reason,	in	Parsons=	AGIL-model	the	sphere	of	art	has	no	
special	function.	On	the	contrary,	on	the	one	hand	the	institutions	of	art	belong	to	the	
socio-cultural	sub-system	(L)	that	transfers	certain	abstract	cultural	values	and	meanings	
into	society	and	guarantees,	in	this	way,	a	sufficient	value	conscensus	in	society.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	institutions	of	art	also	belong	to	the	integration=s	functional	sub-system	
(I)	that	takes	care	of	the	maintenance	of	society=s	normative	integration.	In	addition,	in	
Parsons=	models	works	of	art	belongs	to	the	cultural	system,	and	as	such	they	contain	a	
cognitive	 dimension,	 a	 value	 dimension	 and	 an	 expressive	 dimension.	Thus,	 Parsons=	
models	provide	us	with	 interesting	 ideas	concerning	 the	 sphere	of	art	but	 they	 largely	
ignore	the	special	properties	of	this	sphere.	Perhaps	this	is	why	his	models	have	not	been	
widely	used	in	the	systemic	study	of	art.
In	 Luhmann=s	models,	modern	 society	 consists	 of	 functionally	 differentiated	 sub-
systems	which	have	reached	a	state	of	autopoiesis.	Autopoetic	systems	are	operationally	
closed	formations.	The	environment	is,	for	them,	a	source	of	energy	and	information,	and	
it	imposes	some	general	 limitations	on	their	function.	However,	an	autopoietic	system	
handles	this	energy	and	information	according	to	its	own	internal	principles	of	operation,	
in	particular,	according	to	its	medium	and	medium	code.	In	addition,	autopoietic	systems	
are	 self-referential	 formations	with	an	ability	 to	 self-recur	and	self-regenerate;	 in	other	
words,	 they	 themselves	produce	 the	 elements	 of	which	 they	 consist	 of.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
social	systems,	these	elements	are	communications.	Consequently,	modern	functionally	
differentiated	sub-systems	consist	of	communications	which	they	themselves	produce	and	
which,	in	turn,	maintain	them.	Each	autopoietic	system	has	in	society	a	specific	function	
that	 is	 closely	 connected	 with	 its	 medium	 and	 medium	 code.	 In	 his	 art-theoretical	
investigations,	Luhmann	thought	that	it	is	the	function	of	art	to	show	us	the	contingent	
nature	of	our	phenomenal	world.	Till	the	early	1990s	he	held	that	in	the	sub-system	of	
art	 the	 category	of	Beauty	 functions	 as	 a	medium	and	 the	distinction	Beautiful/Non-
Beautiful	as	a	medium	code,	but	it	might	be	easy	to	realise	that	these	communicative	tools	
are	not	necessarily	connected	to	the	production	of	world	contingency.	In	his	last	works,	
Luhmann,	 therefore,	 changed	 his	 art-theoretical	 views;	 now	 he	was	 inclined	 to	 think	
that	in	the	sub-system	of	art	the	category	of	Fittingness	functions	as	a	medium	and	the	
distinction	Fitting/Non-Fitting	as	a	medium	code.	In	fact,	a	change	such	as	this	seems	to	
be	more	in	accordance	with	the	idea	of	world	contingency.
In	his	late	production,	Luhmann	was	mainly	interested	in	what	separates	functional	
sub-systems	 from	 each	other.	 Partly	 for	 this	 reason	he	 spoke	 about	 the	 sub-system	of	
art	 as	 if	 it	would	be	 an	 isolated	 island	 in	 society,	 even	 if	 he	was	 otherwise	 convinced	
of	the	view	that	art	is	a	functional	thing	from	the	standpoint	of	society	and	other	sub-
systems.	However,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 he	 thought	 that	 the	 system	 of	 art	 is	 structurally	
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loosely	connected	to	the	rest	of	society.	In	my	thesis,	I	regard	a	view	like	this	as	erroneous.	
At	a	general	 level,	 I	 agree	with	Parsons	and	Münch	 in	 that	 the	 structural	principle	of	
functional	differentiation	does	not	 alone	characterise	modern	 society,	 since	 there	have	
also	 been	 common	 or	 overlapping	 areas	 between	 modern	 functionally	 differentiated	
sub-systems;	those	common	or	overlapping	ideas	are	called	Ainterpenetrating	zones@	by	
Münch.	This	thesis	argues	for	the	stand	that,	contrary	to	what	Luhmann	thought,	the	
modern	sub-system	of	art	has	possessed	several	interpenetrating	zones	with	other	social	
and	cultural	sub-systems,	for	example,	with	the	political-administrative	system	as	well	as	
with	the	systems	of	science,	mass	media	and	nationalism.
This	does	not	mean	that	this	thesis	entirely	rejects	the	concept	of	autopoiesis.	Instead,	
following	Mayntz	and	Münch,	it	proposes	that	the	concept	of	autopoiesis	should	be	used	
for	 the	expression	of	differences	 in	degree,	 even	 if	Luhmann	did	not	himself	 accept	 a	
procedure	like	this.	According	to	the	proposition	at	issue,	social	systems	can	be	more	or	
less	autopoietic	formations.	A	social	system	possesses	a	high	degree	of	autopoiesis,	if	its	
operation	principles	clearly	deviate	from	the	operation	principles	of	other	systems;	but,	
if	its	operation	principles	are	rather	similar	to	the	operation	principles	of	other	systems,	
its	degree	of	autopoiesis	is	low.	In	the	same	way,	sociology	could	utilise	the	concept	of	
system-likeness.	This	concept	implies	that	social	formations	can	be	more	or	less	system-
like	wholes	-	as	Mayntz	and	Münch	as	well	as	Crook,	Pakulski	and	Waters	state	in	their	
investigations.	By	means	of	the	concept	of	system-likeness	it	is	possible	to	explicate	the	
criticism	 that	Habermas	 has	 directed	 against	 Luhmann=s	 thinking	 and	 the	 traditional	
system	theory.	As	it	is	well-known,	Habermas	has	stated	that	people=s	life	worlds	and	their	
intimate	spheres	can	not	be	systems	in	the	same	sense	as	the	economic	and	political	life	
are	systems.	This	remark	is	obviously	quite	accurate,	but,	contrary	to	what	Habermas	has	
thought,	one	can	apply	the	concept	of	system-likeness	to	people=s	life	worlds	and	their	
intimate	spheres.	Consequently,	one	may	conclude	that,	as	compared	with	the	systems	
of	economics	and	politics,	people=s	life	worlds	and	their	intimate	spheres	possess	a	low	
degree	of	system-likeness.
Luhmann	 held	 that	 modern	 functionally	 differentiated	 sub-systems	 stand	 in	 a	
symmetrical	relation	to	each	other;	that	is,	those	systems	would	be	equal,	and	there	would	
be	no	dominant	or	primary	system	amongst	them.	In	contrast,	Marxists	sociologists	have	
traditionally	regarded	economics	as	the	dominant	system	or	level	in	society,	and	in	the	
1970s	 and	 1980s	 certain	 theorists	 of	 society	 stated	 that	 after	 the	 Second	World	War	
Western	societies	had,	in	fact,	been	dominated	by	the	political-administrative	system,	in	
particular,	by	the	state.	Habermas=	and	Misheva=s	criticism	of	Luhmann	is	connected	to	a	
train	of	thought	like	this.	Namely,	both	of	them	have	presented	the	view	that	functional	
sub-systems	 have	 not	 been	 equal	 in	modern	 society;	 actually,	 the	 economics	 and	 the	
political-administrative	 system	 have	 obtained	 a	 special	 position	 in	modern	 society	 in	
which	 they	 have,	 to	 a	 growing	 extent,	 penetrated	 other	 sub-systems	 and	 undermined	
the	relative	autonomy	of	those	sub-systems.	It	should	be	noted	that	Münch	also	speaks	
about	 interpenetration	 without	 clearly	 taking	 into	 account	 questions	 of	 power	 and	
domination.
As	for	theories	of	postmodernity	and	globalisation,	usually	system-theorists	have	been	
critical	of	them.	Bourdieu,	Habermas	and	Münch	have	not	denied	the	existence	of	the	
process	of	de-differentiation,	but	they	have	claimed	that	the	so-called	postmodernity	is	not	
a	qualitatively	new	phase	in	societal	evolution	but	a	part	of	the	developmental	dynamics	
of	modern	society.	In	comparison	to	this,	Luhmann	has	been	more	critical	of	theories	of	
postmodernity	and	globalisation.	According	to	him,	those	theories	ignore	that	since	its	
birth	modern	society	has	been	a	global	societal	system	or	a	world	society.	For	this	reason,	
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he	continued,	there	have	not	been	national	societies	or	national	societal	systems	under	the	
conditions	of	modernity.	In	the	same	vein,	most	of	the	modern	functional	sub-systems	
would	 have	 been	 a	 part	 of	 the	world	 society.	 Luhmann	 admitted	 that	 the	 states	 and	
the	juridic	systems	have	had	national	or	physical	boundaries,	but,	he	underlined,	other	
modern	functional	sub-systems	have	been	global	since	the	18th	century.	The	thesis	regards	
these	thoughts	presented	by	Luhmann	as	too	rigid.	In	contast	to	Luhmann=s	thinking,	
this	thesis	utilises	the	concepts	of	national	societal	systems	and	national	functional	sub-
systems.	However,	at	the	same	time	the	thesis	emphasises	that	modern	national	societal	
systems	and	modern	national	 functional	 sub-systems	can	not	be	understood	as	 closed	
formations.	From	the	18th	century	on	they	have,	in	many	respects,	been	interlaced	with	
their	societal	environment,	and	in	the	contemporary	phase	of	the	process	of	globalisation	
an	interpenetration	like	this	has	simply	deepened	and	widened	enormously.
Theories	of	postmodernity	and	de-differentiation	have	held	that	since	the	1960s	the	
aestheticization	of	the	everyday	life,	the	artification	of	society	and	the	omnipresence	of	
commercialism,	 mass	 media	 and	 information	 technology	 have	 gradually	 produced	 a	
situation	in	which	the	sphere	of	art	no	longer	clearly	differs	from	the	rest	of	the	societal-
cultural	 reality.	This	 means	 that	 the	modern	 differentiated	 sphere	 of	 art	 would	 have	
ceased	 to	 exist	 and	 the	 societal-cultural	 reality	 itself	would	 have	 changed	 into	 a	 non-
systemic	formation	–	or	even	into	an	unstructured	social	Aflow@.	The	thesis	at	hand	argues	
for	the	view	that	the	most	radical	theories	of	postmodernity	and	de-differentiation	have	
exaggerated	the	process	of	de-differentiation.	Those	theories	have	ignored	the	fact	that	
actually	there	are	opposite	tendencies	in	the	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.	First	
of	all,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	whole	sphere	of	art	no	longer	sticks	to	the	aesthetic	
conception	of	art.	It	is	true	that	the	conception	at	issue	is	still	alive	in	popular	layers	of	
art	and	in	certain	layers	of	serious	art.	However,	partly	as	a	reaction	to	the	processes	of	
the	aesthetizicaton	and	artification,	serious	genres	and	layers	of	art	have,	to	a	considerable	
extent,	become	estranged	from	the	aesthetic	conception	of	art	and	from	traditional	art-
likeness.	 Moreover,	 institutions	 like	 art	 administratrion,	 art	 policy,	 art	 museums,	 art	
galleries,	art	criticism,	study	of	art	and	societies	and	foundations	for	the	arts	still	have	an	
interest	in	the	distinction	between	art	and	non-art;	although	their	conception	of	art	has	
become	more	and	more	open	and	flexible,	in	their	activities	they,	at	any	rate,	maintain	
the	distinction	in	question.	This	thesis	admits	that	since	the	1960s	the	system	of	art	has	
enlargened	in	a	dynamic	way	and	at	the	same	time	there	has	emerged	new	interpenetrating	
zones	between	the	system	of	art	and	other	social	and	cultural	systems.	As	a	result	of	a	
development	like	this,	the	sphere	of	art	has	changed	into	a	truly	complex	system	that	has	
lost	somewhat	its	internal	system-likeness	or	its	internal	systemic	structure.
All	this	means	that	the	thesis	represents	synthetised	thinking.	When	elaborating	its	
own	view	of	the	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality	and	the	contemporary	sphere	of	art	
it	takes	system-theoretical	and	systemic	sociology	as	its	point	of	departure.	In	particular,	
it	 adopts	 ideas,	 concepts	 and	 views	 from	 actor-centric	 theorists	 such	 as	 Habermas,	
Bourdieu,	Mayntz,	Misheva	and	Münch.	In	the	study	of	art	and	cultural	policy,	Christa	
and	Peter	Bürger=s,	Crane=s,	Danto=s,	McGuigan=s,	Schmidt=s	and	Zolberg=s	investigations	
proved	to	be	useful	from	the	standpoint	of	this	thesis.	And	even	if	this	thesis	is	rather	
critical	of	Luhmann=s	theory	of	autopoietic	social	systems,	it	utilises	certain	concepts	and	
ideas	 formulated	by	him;	 in	particular,	 this	holds	true	for	the	concepts	of	autopoiesis,	
medium	and	medium	code.	Similarly,	the	thesis	does	not	entirely	abandon	the	theories	
of	postmodernity,	reflexive	modernity	and	globalisation.	Instead,	this	thesis	finds	these	
theories	interesting	and	it	takes	into	account	the	criticism	that	they	have	raised	against	
system-theoretical	 and	 systemic	 sociology;	 in	 part,	 this	 thesis	 regards	 this	 criticism	 as	
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sensible	and	acceptable.	The	most	important	and	fruitful	conceptual	tools	in	this	thesis	
turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	 idea	 of	 system-likeness	 and	 the	 distinction	 between	 simple	 and	
complex	 systems.	 The	 latter	 distinction	 originates	 from	 general	 systems	 theory,	 for	
example,	from	Skyttner=s	investigations,	and	the	former	tool	has	been	elaborated	upon	by	
Mayntz	and	Münch,	as	well	as	by	Crook,	Pakulski	and	Waters.
In	part	overtly	and	in	part	covertly,	this	thesis	argues	for	the	stand	that	modern	and,	
in	 particular,	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality	 cannot	 be	 grasped	 accurately	with	
the	help	of	established	system-theoretical	concepts.	In	system-theoretical	sociology,	it	is	
chiefly	Parsons=	and	Luhmann=s	theories	that	contain	certain	weaknesses	in	this	respect,	
although	 present-day	 system-theoretical	 sociology	 should,	 of	 course,	 also	 utilise	 those	
highly	 innovative	 and	 influential	 theories	when	elaborating	 a	well-founded	 theoretical	
model	 of	 contemporary	 societal-cultural	 reality.	Unlike	 Baudrillard	 and	Vattimo	 have	
claimed,	it	is	quite	possible	to	analyse	that	reality	by	the	concept	of	system	and	its	kindred	
concepts.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 thesis	 partly	 Asaves@	 system-theoretical	 sociology	 from	 the	
criticism	that	theorists	of	de-differentiation	have	presented	against	it.	However,	in	spite	
of	 this	 I	 tend	 to	 think	 that	 it	might	 not	 be	 reasonable	 to	 connect	 system-theoretical	
sociology	 to	 the	premise	 that	 societal-cultural	 reality	 is	 always	necessarily	divided	 into	
systems.	Traditionally,	 general	 systems	 theory	 adopted	 a	 view	 like	 this	 of	 reality,	 and	
through	this	 it	engaged	 itself	 to	certain	ontological	presuppositions	concerning	reality.	
Perhaps	it	is	wiser	to	underline	the	methodological	use	value	of	system	theory;	perhaps	
it	is	just	better	to	clear	up	to	what	extent	societal-cultural	reality	can	be	conceptualised	
by	means	of	concepts	such	as	Asystem-differentiation@,	Asystem=s	boundaries@,	Asystem=s	
internal	 order	 or	 structure@,	 Asystem=s	 function@,	 Ainterpenetration@,	 Ainterpenetrating	
zones	between	systems@,	Acolonisation@,	Ade-differentiation@,	Asystem-likeness@,	Adifferent	
degrees	of	system-likeness@,	Asimple	systems@,	Acomplex	systems@,	Anormative	autonomy@,	
Afunctional	 autonomy@,	 Aautopoiesis@,	 Asystem=s	 medium@,	 system=s	 medium	 code@,	
Acode@	and	Asystem-specific	rationality@.	Even	if	the	actual	research	practice	might	show	
that	 societal-cultural	 reality	 also	 contains	 phenomena	 that	 cannot	 be	 conceptualised	
sufficiently	 well	 by	 system-theoretical	 tools,	 system	 theory	 is	 a	 relevant	 and	 fruitful	
approach	in	the	study	of	modern	and	contemporary	societal-cultural	reality.
Most	of	 the	above-mentioned	concepts	 are	 explicitly	defined	 in	 the	articles	of	 this	
thesis.	The	concepts	Asystem-likeness@,	Asimple	 system@	 and	Acomplex	 system@	deviate,	
however,	 a	 little	 from	 this	 general	 rule	of	 explicitness.	The	 concept	of	 system-likeness	
is	defined	indirectly	in	the	articles,	that	is,	with	the	help	of	the	concept	of	autopoiesis.	
The	articles	 suggest	 that	 the	 concept	of	 autopoiesis	 should	be	used	 for	 the	 expression	
of	differences	in	degree.	Accordingly,	social	systems	can	be	more	or	less	autopoietic:	an	
entirely	autopoietic	social	system	is	usually	in	the	operative	sense	a	well-formed	whole,	
which	means	that	it	usually	possesses	a	high	degree	of	system-likeness.	Thus,	the	articles	
imply	that	autopoiesis	means	a	high	degree	of	system-likeness.	Conversely,	a	social	whole	
with	a	low	degree	of	autopoiesis	is	not	usually	an	especially	well-formed	formation	but	it	
possesses	a	low	degree	of	system-likeness.	An	example	of	this	phenomenon	is	medieval	art.	
Medieval	art	did	not	possess	its	own	medium	and	medium	code	and	neither	did	it	form	
its	own	system;	on	the	contrary,	it	was	rather	a	part	of	the	religious-metaphysical	cultural	
systems,	and	its	products	were	dealt	with	the	codes	of	that	system.	I	elaborated	the	idea	of	
system-likeness	in	my	investigation	Taide instituutiona ja järjestelmänä. Modernin taide-
elämän historiallis-sosiologiset mallit (Art	 as	 an	 Institution	 and	System.	The	Historical-
Sociological	Models	of	Modern	Art	Life,	1998,	pp.	65–68	and	79).	My	thoughts	about	
the	different	degrees	of	the	autopoiesis	and	system-likeness	presented	in	the	articles	must	
be	understood	against	this	background.
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As	for	the	concepts	Asimple	systems@	and	Acomplex	systems@,	the	articles	point	out	that	
the	system	of	art	has	expanded	and	become	more	complex	-	partly	for	the	reasons	that	
since	the	1960s	a	huge	number	of	new	genres	of	cultural	products	have	been	approved	
as	art	and	at	the	same	time	there	have	emerged	more	and	more	interpenetrating	zones	
between	the	system	of	art	and	other	systems.	Due	to	the	fact	that	these	thoughts	can	not	
be	understood	properly	without	 the	 aid	of	 a	 general	 systems	 theory,	 the	 introductory	
chapters	of	this	thesis	have	presented	that	theory	in	a	general	outline.
The	articles	in	this	thesis	deal	chiefly	with	the	contemporary	process	of	de-differentiation	
with	regard	to	theories	of	postmodernity	and	globalisation.	In	those	connections,	these	
articles	 hardly	 at	 all	 utilise	 the	 concepts	 of	 Aneo-liberalist@	 cultural	 policy	 and	 Aneo-
liberalist@	social	policy,	even	if	they	point	to	the	fact	that	the	contemporary	societal-cultural	
reality	is	increasingly	dominated	by	market-based		principles	of	operation.	Thus,	in	this	
sense	the	concept	of		Aneo-liberalism@	would	have	deepened	the	analysises	presented	by	
these	articles.	On	the	other	hand,	the	articles	in	this	thesis	do	not	either	analyse	different	
theories	of	neo-liberalism,	since	an	analysis	such	as	this	undoubtedly	deserves	a	study	of	
its	own.	For	reasons	such	as	these	the	introductory	chapters	of	this	thesis	have,	at	a	general	
level,	paid	attention	to	the	principles	of	neo-liberalist	policy.
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